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ABSTRACT 
Theoretically, land policy is presented as a necessary intervention by governments in 
order to iron out the inefficiencies inherent in land markets. The result would be a smooth 
working urban land market, yielding an equitable and efficient land use structure. In practice 
though, land policy is part and parcel, and, indeed, a paradigm of the wiser issues of 
governance. Historically, land policy has been used to serve colonial interests; to achieve 
segregation between social groups in society; to justify and concretise exploitation and social 
inequalities; and to allocate wealth, power, and privilege. Laws can be passed, or 
inappropriate laws upheld by those who control land policy to help them benefit from this 
policy rather than meet the perceived ends of society. 
This study surveys the impacts of various tools of land policy on the land use structure 
of Dar es Salaam, over a period spanning a century from the 1 890s. At no time has land 
policy been found to have aimed at smoothening the workings of the urban land market. 
Throughout, land policy has been found to have been geared to serving colonial interests, and 
the interests of government officials and politicians. The result has been an inefficient and 
inequitable land use structure for Dar es Salaam characterized by social segregation, land 
grabbing and hoarding, urban sprawl, poor land servicing, prevalent squatt!ng, unequal access 
to planned and serviced land, violation of land use regulations, disregard of public interests 
in land use (e.g. diminution of public open spaces and hazard lands). 
Government intervention inland markets through land policy is seen as necessary, but 
past policies are seen as having been inappropriate since they are shown to have been geared 
towards perpetuating inequality and privilege. A new approach to land policy has been 
therefore called for. Recommendatios put forward for this new land policy include: 
The retuning of land policy so that in principle and practice land policy addresses and 
caters for the interests of the majority of the urban population by, for example, 
working with, and supporting the actions of the majority of urbanites, and thus 
stopping conceiving land use schemes in terms of benefitting those who are socially 
powerful to the complete disregard of of those who are socially weak; and here, 
policies like land poling and adjustment can prove to be very useful; 
xl" 
Transparency and social accountability in the delivery of land policy; 
The reviewing of major tools of land policy such as the Land Ordinance, the Town and 
Country Planning Ordinance, the Land Acquisition Act, and the various land use and 
building regulations so that they protect and enhance the interests of the majority; 
The generation of more revenue from the current planned land schemes so as to enable 
the authorities to adopt a more dynamic land policy as a way of reaching more people, 
removing inequity, and enhancing positive externalities as well as minimising harmful 
ones; 
Effective devolvement of land delivery powers to local and neighbourhood authorities 
and maximisation of public participation; 
Removing unnecesary bureaucracy in land delivery; and 
generally, smoothening the working of the urban land market in both the informal and 
formal sectors. 
The basic principle guiding land policy must be the interests of the majority of the urban 
population. This way, both efficiency and equity in the delivery of land policy can be realistic 
goals. 
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THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1 Introduction 
Urban areas are not points in space. Instead they cover several hundreds, sometimes 
thousands, of square kilometres of land, on which various economic, cultural and recreational 
activities of local, national and international dimensions are carried out. Most urban areas 
reveal some kind of activity concentration patterns either in zones, sectors, clusters, or 
ribbons. How do those patterns come about? Is urban land use haphazard, or is there some 
rational explanation for it? How does the "sorting and sifting" of various land uses in an urban 
area occur? Land economists have generally sought to answer these questions concerning 
location, by studying land market forces. Bertaud, for example, points Out that a well 
functioning land market is essential in shaping the city açi in the allocation of land among 
various urban activities in an efficient manner 1 . Decisions on location by various economic 
actors have serious economic implications for the budgets and utility functions of firms and 
households (e.g. in terms of rents, transport costs, satisfaction, economies of scale, etc.), and 
have important consequences for society as a whole (e.g. in terms of social costs and 
benefits, externalities, use of scarce resources, provision of service infrastructure, etc.). The 
way in which land is used, i.e. the location and the relative concentration of households and 
firms, will largely determine the efficiency of the networks upon which all urban activities 
rely 2 . 
Land economists however, realise that the land market is imperfect and justify 
government intervention in this market to remove or minimise the imperfections inherent in 
A. Bertaud. 'The Impact of Land use Regulations on Land Supply, Consumption and Price", Regional Development 
Dialogue, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1992, pp  35-40. 
2 	ibid, p. 35. 
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land markets 3 . Therefore, the urban land use mosaic is considered to be the result of the 
operation of market forces on urban land as moderated by government intervention through 
regulation. Any urban land policy is the blueprint for such regulations and has important 
spatial implications for urban activities over time. 
Under conditions obtaining in African cities, the effectiveness of such policy over the land 
allocation mechanism may be limited. Colonial legacies, characterised by policies conceived 
in the interests of colonial states that served to marginalise the interests of the colonised 
majority, have distorted the operation of market forces over land use. As a consequence, the 
existing land use mosaic of many African cities may not be a result of organic growth, as 
influenced by decisions of thousands of individuals and firms operating in the urban space. 
Also such a land use mosaic may not be consistent with the principles of rational land use 
ordering. This may lead to structural inefficiency, and operational ineffectiveness of urban 
activities. It is thus deemed important to understand all th\'arious forces that determine land 
use location decisions over the urban space. 
One way of doing this is to study the evolution of the land use structure of any urban area 
by isolating the effects of government policy, and seeking to account for those land uses that 
may develop outside or contrary to the aims of such land policy. Thereafter, the economic, 
and even social forces that have shaped these land uses could be sought. 
1.2 Factors Influencing Urban Land Use Structure 
1.2.1 Introduction 
For the purposes of this study, three main forces influencing land use in urban areas are 
isolated. These are: historic/ethnic interactions over time, government land policy, and, 
economic forces. Each of these does not work in isolation of all others at any time. They all 
work simultaneously, influencing each other. Some factors may have greater impacts on 
urban land uses than others during certain periods. Historical epochs of social interaction 
determine national economic settings, which in turn determine the kinds of dominant 
C.M.E. Whitehead, 'The rationale for Government Intervention," in H.B. Dunkerley (Ed.), Urban LandPo/icy, Issues and 
Opportunites, Oxford University Press, Washington, 1983,   pp. 108-131. 
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economic systems and the kinds of land and other policies adopted for running national and 
urban communities. The policies themselves provide the constraints in which economic forces 
operate. However, such policies are also a results of economic and social systems. 
Collectively, these may in the long run affect historical processes. 
Rapid urbanisation itself is a historical process. This has determined the treatment of land 
as an economic commodity. Unfavourable results of the operation of the land markets have 
led to government land regulation policies designed to ameliorate the adverse effects of 
market forces. Such government policies have traditionally included public health measures, 
town planning, housing policies, provision of infrastructure, etc. 
1 .2.2 The Economic Theory of Land Use 
Economic theories of land use are concerned with explaining the patterns of urban land 
uses. The complexity of such urban land uses has always been simplified by means of models. 
Land use models assume an economy in which the allocation of resources is basically decided 
by costs, prices and profits. It is assumed that individuals and firms have preferences for 
settling in particular urban locations and that these preferences are reflected in the amount 
of money they are prepared to pay for the use of land at these locations. It is also assumed 
that the owners of land and buildings will let or sell these to the highest bidder in order to 
maximise profits. Thus, a pattern of land use, and of land and building prices, is established, 
by which land and buildings are used for those purposes giving the highest returns4 . A 
classical approach to understanding land use location is the rent bid functions model. 
The Rent Bid Functions Model 
Early theoretical formulations ofcation and rent theories dealt with agricultural land. 
The beginning of the classical rent theory is usually associated with the writings of a group 
of European economsts at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars when there was widespread 
political concern over land use allocation for crop production. Thomas R. Malthus, David 
Ricardo, Robert Torrens and James West, published important pamphlets on land rent 
G. Hallet, Urban Land Economics.' Principles and Policy, Macmillan Press, London, 1979. 
3 
between 1815  and 1 824. Two writers of this Napoleonic period: David Ricardo, and J.H. 
von Thunen, made significant contributions to the present economic rent and land use theory. 
Ricardo began by defining Economic Rent as being that part of rent which is paid for the 
use of land as such, and which has nothing to do with costs, but is determined solely by 
scarcity. Economic rent is therefore a residual payment, after paying the costs of production. 
The difference between (normal) costs (including normal profit), and receipts, represents the 
amount the farmer can afford to pay as economic rent. If the landowner is anxious to obtain 
the maximum rent, this will be the rent that will be charged. 
Having explained the residual basis of the pricing of particular pieces of land, Ricardo went 
on to introduce the concept of a range of fertility. As land that is put to farming becames less 
and less fertile, its economic rent falls to a point where it would be zero. This point 
represents the "extensive" margin beyond which cultivation will not take place in the long run, 
although changes in the prices of agricultural produce in relation to costs will shift the 
extensive margin and alter the total value of economic rent. Naturally, land will be allocated 
to the most competitive bidder, the bid being the value of the economic rent, which in turn 
is related to the productivity of the land 6 . 
It has been argued that the Ricardian model as such, as distinct from the basic concept 
of economic rent, has only a limited applicability to urban land. This is because, in urban 
areas, the location of activities is determined by other factors than fertility7 . The distance 
of any site from the hub of urban activity, determines its economic utility to the owner. 
Urban models based on the infl.Thnce of transport costs on the economic returns of owning 
land, are essentially an application of the agricultural model, put forward in the 1 9th century 
by J. H. von Thunen, to urban situations. 
R. Barlowe, Land Resources Economics: The Economics of Real Estate, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1986. 
6 	D. Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, (Ed. Piero Strafa), London, 1956. 
Hallet, Urban Land Economics, p.47. 
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In contrast to the Ricardian emphasis on differences in land quality as a basis of land rents, 
von Thunen, working independently in 1826, stressed that land rent arises because of 
differences in location 8 . He observed that when crops produced for a central city market are 
grown on lands of like fertility on a featureless isolated plain with ubiquitous and uniform, 
equally costly, transportation schedules, the lands located nearest the city enjoy a definite 
advantage over those located at greater distances. Producers on distantly located land would 
have to pay for transport to bring their products to the market. In view of the fact that 
transportation costs would differ with the type of produce (due to differences in bulk and 
perishability), commercial production of some crops would be limited to certain locations only. 
The central market would, therefore, be surrounded by a series of concentric land uses each 
being the most competitive at its location; and reflecting the use's need to be as near the 
market as possible. The low level of transportation technology during von Thunen's time 
suggested a land use structure as shown in Figure 1 .1. When transportation facilities are 
improved, like when the ideal plain is traversed by a navigable river, the land use pattern 
becomes elongated along transportation routes. If another market centre is introduced in the 
plain, then it too generates its own production zones. The resulting land use mosaic would 
be a result of competitiveness among the users, each occupying a location at which costs are 
minimised and returns maximised. The boundaries of each use will be at the interaction of 
these land uses' rent bid functions, the steeper ones occupying those locations nearest to the 
market. 
Von Thunen's model can be applied to urban land use. Let it be assumed that there are 
only two land uses in a town, residential and commercial, and that both uses prefer to be near 
the centre of town because that is where transportation costs are least. Around the town, 
land would be in agricultural use. In view of their need to locate near customers in the city 
centre, it can be assumed that commercial uses can outbid residential uses near the centre, 
but that the land rent which commercial uses are prepared to pay will fall sharply with 
distance from the centre. The rent offered by residential users will also fall with distance from 
the centre, although less sharply so, whereas agricultural rent is constant. The rent bid 
gradients for the various uses, representing the rent the users are willing to pay at various 
8 	M. Chisoim, Rural Settlement and Land Use, Hutchinson, London, 1962.   
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locations will be as shown in Figure 1 .2(a), bringing about a concentric circles land use pattern 
as shown in Figure 1 .2(b). If there are the equivalents of von Thunen's "navigable river", 
which reduce transportation costs or time in certain directions, (for example, railway lines or 
roads), the concentric circle pattern will become star shaped as shown in Figure 1 .2(c). 
Figure 1.1 von Thunen's System of Land Use 
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Source: M. Chisolm, Rural Settlement and Land Use, Hutchinson, London, 1962,   p. 27. 
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Source: G. Hallet, Urban Land Economics: Principles and Poilcy, Macmillan Press, London, 
1979,   p. 48. 
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Von Thunen's model therefore, attempted to obtain a theoretical explanation of land use 
patterns. Although modified by von Thunen himself and by other workers in the field, his 
fundamental distance-cost relationship in land use location has continued to form the basis 
of land use location studies to date. "Classical" models of urban spatial structure, like the 
Burgess's concentric zone model, Hoyt's sectoral model and Harris and Ullmann's Multi-nuclei 
model can be seen within the context of the von Thunen model 9 . Subsequent statements 
and formulations by economist like Hurd, Haig and Ratcliffe, as well as Alonso's trade off 
model (below) have all been based on the rent bid function concept. Each kind of land use has 
a given rent-bit curve. When the various rent-bid curves are superimposed on each other, they 
result into a certain interlocking or concentric land use pattern focused on, and related to, the 
city centre 10 . 
Since the early 1 960s, economists have attempted to formulate a general equilibrium of 
city form based on the concept of the rent-bid functions. Assumptions have been that 
employment is concentrated at a single point, and people decide where to live and locate their 
activities solely on the basis of transport costs and land price& 1 . Alonso, in his famous 
"trade off model" introduced the effects of consumer preferences regarding space, combined 
with differences in income 12 . If people are prepared to pay for more space and lower 
density, an observation considered valid as people's incomes rise, then those who can afford 
to do so (i.e. those in high income brackets), will move to lower priced land at the periphery, 
and consume more of it. Those with lower incomes will be unable to afford the commuting 
costs, and so, would be forced to remain in the expensive central area consuming small 
quantities of land. 
lie 
L.S. Bourne, "Urban Structure and Urb, n Land Use Decisions", Annals, American Association of Geographers, Vol. 
66, 1976, pp.  531-547. 
V 
10 A.S. Mather, Land Use, Longmans, London, 1986.   
L.S.Bourne, "Housing Supply and Housing Market Behaviour in Residential Development", in, D.T. Hebert and R.J 
Johnston, Social Areas in Cities, London, Wiley, 1979, pp.  111-158. 
12 W. Alonso, Location and Land Use, Havard University Press, Cambridge, Muss., 1964. 
Criticisms of Rent-bid Models 
Like all models the rent-bid concept simplifies reality. It is however, internally consistent. 
Restrictive assumptions, like centralised employment, can be relaxed, and different types of 
households, can be introduced, to enhance the explanation power of the model. However, 
the concept has been found wanting because it ignores the influence of established physical 
structures and social patterns 13 . Moreover, rent bid function models have been criticised for 
emphasizing space and accessibility at the expense of a more complex situation; for failing 
to predict whether households in any income bracket will continue to occupy their respective 
areas; and for failing to highlight the many imperfections in the land market as well as the 
institutional factors and the power structures they represent, all of which exercise significant 
influences on urban land use patterns 14 . It has also been pointed out that when applied to 
African cities, these models have failed to explain the observed situation where the majority 
of the poor live at the periphery 15 . Besides, it has been pointed out that economic theory 
relies on the dual concept of efficiency and equity, concepts which are not adequately defined 
without recourse to non-economic dimensions and resources redistribution among the 
population 16 . In view of these observations, some commentators have been agnostic, 
arguing that it was all very complicated and that each city was different and one could not, 
therefore, generalise 17 . However, since cities have as many similarities as they have 
differences, it has been argued that the rent-bid model should be seen as a partial model, 
which does indicate the direction in which the city is likely to move. It should be used as a 
kit of tools to be applied when appropriate, and can at least indicate some general patterns 
11 Hallett, Urban Land Economics, p.  117. 
14 See for example: A.W. Evans, Urban fpppnomics, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985; H. carter, The Study of Urban 
Geography, Edward Arnold, London, 1976; L.J. King, and R.G. Golledge, Cities, Space, and Behaviour: The Elements 
of Urban Geography, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1978. 
is 	A. Mabogunje, "Urban Planning and the Post Colonial State", African Studies Review, Vol. 33, No 2, 1990, pp. 121- 
203. 
16 C. Rakodi, "A Comment" on Bertaud, "The Impact of Land Use Regulations", p.41. 
17 R. Turvey, The Economics of Real Property, London, 1957 
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and causal relationships that contribute to an understanding of the urban mosaic 18 . 
The Theory of Urban Land Use in African Cities 
For historical reasons the theory of urban land use location was developed and refined 
mostly in the West. However, most African cities were either created, or greatly modified, 
during the colonial and post-colonial eras. Consequently, most of these cities were 
incorporated in the wider capitalist world economy, where capitalist norms of commoditizing 
land became generalized. Economic theory of urban land use is therefore limited by the fact 
that most African cities were created specifically to serve colonial interests of domination and 
exploitation. The kinds of land market operations implied by economic theory were highly 
restricted by the impress of colonial governments' dictates. Besides, capitalism did not aim 
at completely proletarianising the colonised peoples of Africa so, that what has been termed 
"the economy of affection" 19 , characterised by informal employment, subsistence economy, 
and customary land tenure holdings, still operate. Thus, there is still a lot of attachment to 
land which is completely non-market. 
If rent-bid models must be seen as partial representations of reality when applied to the 
cities of the Western world, they must be seen as being even more so when applied to African 
cities. It is for this reason that a recent workshop on the nature of trends in land prices in the 
cities of developing countries concluded that a broad theoretical and methodological approach 
to the analysis of land markets was needed; incorporating analyses of land market operations 
in terms of prices and land supply; analyses of land development processes in terms of actors 
and institutions; and analyses oLhe  role of government; and of cultural factors in shaping 
property relations 20 . Therefore, a more sophiscated approach to urban land markets is 
needed, spanning the political and social theory, as well as the traditional neo-classical 
18 
Hallet, Urban LanthEconomics, p. 118; Mather, Land Use, pp.  1 25-1 30. 
19 
G. Hyden, No Shortcut to Progress: African Development in perspective, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of 
California Press, 1983.   
20 Fitzwilliam Memorandum, "Land value changes and the impact of Urban Policy upon Land valorisation processes in 
Developing Countries" (Conclusions of an International Research Workshop, Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, 14-19 July 
1991), International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 15, No.4, 1991, pp. 623-628. 
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economic analysis. It must be capable of understanding the segmented nature of land delivery 
systems and property relations 21 . And in African cities, the role of the colonial and post 
colonial land policy is as important in shaping land use structures, as are non-market social 
relations. 
1 .2.3 Approaches Towards Understanding Urban Land Uses in African Cities 
In studying land uses in African cities, one approach has been to apply Western delivered 
models to local scenes. For example, attempts have been made to identify concentric zones 
in Nairobi and in Dar es Salaam22 . Ngau 23 has tried to apply Social Area Analysis to 
Nairobi, while Mabogunje attempted to apply Proudfoot's retail structure to Ibadan 24 . These 
attempts have perhaps yielded predictable results since they were aimed at identifying 
whether traces of such western derived models could be identified. de Blij, for example, 
identifies all the three popular land structure models (concentric, sectoral, and, multinuclei) 
in Dar es Salaam, depending on the observer's orientation. This deductive approach does not 
offer a theoretical underpinning which can be utilised to understand the land use structure of 
these urban areas. 
Other studies of land uses have tended to emphasize colonial and post colonial policy, 
identifying the colonial or "modern" city from the "traditional", "native", or, "spontaneous", 
city. Kingoriah 25 concludes that it is the colonial government's land policy, not market 
forces, which has led and guided Nairobi's development. Kiamba and Emig and Islam argue 
that the structure and development of Nairobi is a reflection of the class and social power 
21 	Rakodi, "A Comment", p.  42. 
22 	D. Halliman, and W.T.W. Morgan, "The City of Nairobi", in, W.T.W. Morgan, (Ed), Nairobi, City and Region, Oxford 
University Press, Nairobi, 1969, pp.105-1 12; H.Y. de Blij, Dares Salaam: A study in Urban Geography, Northwestern 
Press, Evanston, 1 63. 
23 	R.M. Ngau, The internal structure of residential areas in Nairobi, MA Thesis, University of Nairobi, 1979. 
24 	A.L. Mabonguje, "Evolution of Retail Structures of Lagos", Economic Geography, Vol. 40, 1964, pp. 304-323; M.J. 
Proudfoot, "City Retail Structure", Geography, Vol. 13, 1937. 
25 	G.K. Kingoriah, Policy Impacts on the Urban Land Use Patterns in Nairobi, Kenya, 1899-1979, Ph.D. Thesis, Indiana 
University, 1980. 
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structure in the service of capitalism both at the local and the international scenes 26 . With 
respect to Lusaka, both Collins and Rakodi emphasize the effects of white colonial policies, 
and in Nigeria, Home concludes that Town planning was limited to the needs of the colonial 
power, and that "native" towns were kept physically separate from colonial urban 
development 27 . Kanyeihamba 28 extends his analysis to the post-colonial era by pointing 
out that much of the post-independence planning law is in fact borrowed from the former 
colonising powers, while King 29 highlights the impact of "exported' planning (e.g. through 
education, expatriates, aid, etc.) on ex-colonial cities. The perpetuation of colonial concepts 
in urban Tanzania, particularly residential segregation, is decried by Banyikwa and by both 
Alexander and Armstrong who, moreover, criticise the use of European ideology in urban 
masterplanning 30 . 
All of the works cited above have one factor in common: the generalisation into limited 
abstractions of a very complicated situation ( e.g. in terms of coloniser against colonised; 
government policy against the market; international capital against local interests; ruling 
classes, against the ruled; whites against blacks, etc.). The basis of this dichotomy would 
appear to be the reliance on the underdevelopment theory. 
26 
C.M. Kiamba, The Role of the State in the Control of Urban Development: Urban Land Policy for Nairobi, Phd Thesis, 
University of Cambridge, 1 986; S. Emig and Z. Islam, Notes on the Urban Planning of Nairobi, Diploma Thesis, 1980. 
27 	
J. Collins,"Lusaka: Urban Planningi a British Colony, 1931-1 964", in G.E. Cherry,(ed), Shaping an Urban World, 
Mansell, London, 1980, pp. 227-241; C. Rakodi, "Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and its 
Legacy", Third World Planning Review, vol.8, No.3, 1986, pp. 153-217; R.K. Home, "Town Planning Segregation 
and Indirect Rule in Colonial Nigeria", Third World Planning Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1983, pp.  1 65-1 75. 
28 
G.W. Kanyeihamba, "The Impact of the Received Laws on Planning and Development in Anglophonic Africa", 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol.4, 1980, pp. 239-266. 
29 
A.D. King, "Exporting Planning: the Colonial and Neocolonial Experience", in, Cherry, Shaping an Urban World, pp. 
203-226. 
30 	
W.F. Banyikwa, "Recent changes in urban residential land use Policies in Tanzania and their spatial repercussions", 
Journal of the Geographical Association of Tanzania, No. 16, 1978, pp. 38-66; B. Alexander, "European Planning 
Ideology in Tanzania", Habitat International, Vol. 7, Nos. 1/2, 1983, pp. 17-36; A.M. Armstrong, "Masterplans for 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania", Habitat International, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1988, pp. 75-96. 
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In a critique of the underdevelopment theory, Phillips 31 has pointed Out that it has tended 
to see capital as being rational and omnipotent, and the colonial and post colonial state as 
intervening on behalf of international capital, whereby the colonial state is presented as a 
simple agent of capital,-and capital as having a logic which dictates determinant forms of 
either development, or underdevelopment, and in the case of urban areas, access to, and the 
use and development of land. Thus at a time whene Marxism had largely retreated from a 
crude identity of the state and capital in its analysis of advanced countries 32, discussion of 
colonialism using the undervelopment theory accepted the version of the state as a 
mouthpiece of capital. The intricacies of modern state theory bypasssed the analysts of 
colonialism who argued that the colonial state was imposed externally at the instigation of 
European capitalists, and was relieved of the burden of universal franchise. On such tenuous 
grounds, it appears, critics of colonialism, have presumed a state which could serve 
unconditionally the interests of capital. Yet, as Lonsdale and Berman have argued in their 
analysis of Kenya, "the state cannot be the obedient servant of capital", a claim which is true 
of the colonial state, as of its progenitor in Europe 33 . 
In Africa, the colonial state was faced with many constraints. Unlike in Britain, where 
compulsion to labour was constructed over centuries until needs were defined though 
commodities, with wages as the only access, violence was required to carry through any 
transformation in Africa. There was no generalised natural necessity to force labour to work. 
Needs were still expressed in terms of use values, and dependence on money limited. Free 
access to land meant subsisitence was assured. Wage labour could only be imposed through 
direct coercion. Yet, as Phillips 34 observes, the state which inherited this task was 
incomplete and undeveloped: a political power which was in many ways a mere fascimile of 
the state. Colonial rule could only be sustained through a complex of shifting of alliances with 
local rulers and select social groupsnd colonial officials were acutely aware of the limitation 
31 A. Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa, James Currey, London, 1989.   
32 
J. Holloway and S. Picciotto, (Eds), State and Capital: A Marxist Debate, Edward Arnold, London, 1978.   
33 
J. Lonsdale and B. Berman, "Coping with the contradictions: the development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895-
1914", Journal of African History, Vol. 20, 1979, pp. 487-505. 
34 Phillips, The Enigma of Coliniallsm. 
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of their control both at the local scene, and at the "home" scene. Colonialism was therefore 
necessarily makeshift35 , an adventure into the idealised but unknown. Its history was one 
of adjustment to conditions it could not dictate, and the abruptness of decolonisastion gave 
open expression to a lack of control which had existed all along. Colonial policies were 
formed against this background. The anti capitalism which apparently characterised so much 
of colonial thinking ( e.g. policies upholding customary land tenure; the upholding of 
subsistence agriculture; the support of casual circular labour, when capital was advocating 
complete proletarialisation; racial segregation; cheap land policy for colonial officials, etc.,) 
arose out of the constraints of local conditions. It was determined neither by the demands 
for capital accumulation, nor by the peculiarities of colonial recruitment. Rather, it was forged 
out of experience of colonial administration and emerged as an uneasy resolution to the often 
conflicting requirements of colonial rule. In particular, the political and economic weakness 
of the colonial state, limited its capacity for undertaking direct coercion, leading to its sour 
relationships with private capital, particularly with relations to the proletarianisation of labour. 
The state was forced into an alliance with local chiefs as the only reliable guarantors of 
labour. This in turn dictated the terms on which colonialism operated. Free access to land 
precluded the formation of a landless proletariat, and was ensured by relations to communal 
land tenure over which chiefs were installed as agents of political order. The coercive powers 
of these chiefs, provided the colonial state with the means to recruit labour, but to sustain 
these powers, the right to alienate land ( to private capital) had to be curtailed. This 
importance of local constraints accounts for much of the discontinuity in colonial policies, 
from favouring private land ownership and wage labour before 1914, to promoting the 
peasant road to development based on communal land ownership and very limited capital 
during the interwar period. Yet ' iuring this second phase, adhoc adjustment and compromise 
to changes which threatened political order had to be made, as favouring peasant production 
deprived both capital and the statepf control over colonial production, and efforts to force 
peasants to act as their masters desired, were generally unsuccessful. In the end, by the time 
the second World 'ar came, the defeat of colonialism was apparent. Decolonisation was as 
much a recognition of the failure of colonialism as it was a response to the powers of 
35 	ibid,p.11. 
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nationalism 36 . The Independence movements that took over Africa did not inherit a stable 
polity, but one which was already coming apart at the seams. The resultant chaos on the one 
part, and continuity on the other, was only to be expected, since these movements took up 
colonialism's unfinished role and gave capitalism a chance to try again 37 . 
Whatever policies were ultimately attempted during colonial administration, there were 
usually major disagreements, tensions and conflicts during their formulation, between officials, 
and between officials and capital in the colonies, between various levels of government, and 
between the colonial governments and the colonial office. In colonial practice, it was 
impossible to find a consistent expression of the supposed objectives of colonial rule 38 . 
Most of the nationalist histriographists, and other analysts of the colonial and post colonial 
scene, as well as the entire underdevelopment school, have, as a general observation, not 
highlighted the powers and interests of the local caucuses, and their limiting, and, sometimes 
debilitating effects, on colonial and post colonial policy in its ordained role of serving 
capitalism. This is the case whether discussing general development, or urban policy. On the 
other hand, the antidependency school sees the indigenous capitalist class as using state 
power to enhance its interests over the national economy. 39 Thus, both the dependency 
and the antidependency schools see the state as an instrument of factional interests: either, 
of international capital, or, of the rising indigenous capital. Jessop, however, argues that the 
state is not a neutral instrument serving the interests of capital (international or local), but that 
it offers institutional and organisational resistance to manipulation. Such an approach can at 
least offer some insights into the understanding of both the partial, incoherent, and provisional 
nature of state activity, and the complex forms of institutional and organisational set ups 
16 	ibid., p.  13 
37 	ibid., p. 163. 
38 	ibid., p 13. 
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involved in policy formulation and mediation. 4° Kiamba concludes that the relationship 
between the state and the dominant and dominated classes is very complex. The state should 
be seen in relational terms as an unstable equilibrium of compromises between classes and 
other social forces, rather than according to the instrumentalist perspective, as being passive, 
neutral and totally manipulable by one group, or, as a subject having absolute autonomy and 
functioning in its own right outside society. 41 
In view of the above arguments this study aimes at highlighting the various interest 
groups in the development of Dar es Salaam rather than concentrate on the role of colonialism 
and capitalism alone. Indeed, colonial and post colonial officials used, and still use, land 
policy to serve as much their own interests, as the interests of capital. 
In going through the existing literature on Dar es Salaam, one finds that some tools of land 
policy are hinted upon. Urban planning and land law and tenure during the German, British 
and post colonial periods at a general level, are discussed e.g. by de Boer, Gillman, Sutton, 
Mascarenhas, Armstrong and Fimbo 42 . There has, however, not been any deep study of the 
impact of the various factors of land policy that may have influenced the overall evolution of 
the city's land use structure, and it is the purpose of this study to fill in this gap in knowledge. 
1 .2.4 Land Policy and Land Use Structure 
Conceots of Land Policy 
In presenting models for undtanding land use location, economic theory recognises that 
the land market is imperfect as a result of various non-optimising factors. Government 
intervention in land markets through land policy has the function to correct the forces that 
40 B. Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods, Martin Roberts, Oxford, 1982.   
41 	
Kiamba, The Role of the State in Urban Development, p.  9. 
42 W. de Boer, Urban Renewal and Rehabilitation in Kariakoo, Ardhi Institute, Dar es Salaam, Mimeo, 1 984; C.C.Gillman, 
"Dar es Salaam 1860-1 940: A Story of Growth and Change", Tanganyika Notes and Records 20, 1945,   pp. 1-23; 
J.E.G. Sutton, Oar es Salaam City Port and Region, 71, 1970; A.C. Mascarenhas, Urban Development in Dar es 
Salaam, M.A. Thesis, University of Los Angeles, 1966; Armstrong, "Masterplans for Dares Salaam", G.M. Fimbo, Law 
and Urban Planning: A Study of State intervention in Urban Planning in Tanzania, Phd Thesis, University of Oar es 
Salaam, 1988. 
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cause imperfections and irrationality inherent in urban land markets to bring about efficiency 
and equity. 
Darin-Drabkin would like to see as a basic goal of public land policy, the definition of the 
role of public authorities in providing the land needed at the right time, location and price 43 . 
Lichfield points Out that the term "land policy" has a variety of meanings. For some, it is used 
indistinguishably from "land use policy"; for others, it is associated with land reform; and yet 
for others, it is the policy of government in relation to the land which it owns. It is at its 
widest sense where, under urban land policy, the minimal scope includes government 
intervention in regulating urban land resources under the headings: la?id tenure, public land 
management, land title registration, land laws and courts, property taxation, property 
valuation, public goods, public utilities, public transport highways and government property 
management. The scope goes beyond minimal when government is more actively engaged 
in owning, using and developing land resources, and, seven additional components can be 
added: urban government structure, urban government finance, urban (local) and central 
government relations, central government fiscal and monetary policies, housing policies, 
regional development policies and urban planning control 44 . 
Such a wide ranging treatment, some of which covers policies which go beyond the focus 
of land, and which embrace all government policies having anything to do with land, calls for 
a working definition. In this study, land policy is to be considered with respect to the planning 
and development of human settlements, or any of its more restricted forerunners i.e. town 
planning, land use planning, etc. 45 , though it is realised that land policy (e.g. land reform) 
need not be related to land use planning 46, and also that other general socio-economic 
43 H. Oarin-Drabkin, Land Policy and Urban Growth, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1977. 
44 	
N. Lichfield, "Towards a Comprehension of Land Policy", in, O.H. Koeningsberger and S. Groak, A Review of Land 
Policies, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1980, pp. 379-395. 
45 	
ibid. 
46 D.R.Denman, The Place of Property, Geographical Publications, Berkhampstead, 1 978; E.H. Jacoby, Man and Land: 
The Essential Revolution, Alfred A. Knop, New York, 1971. 
17 
development policies have some effects on land uses. Land policy will therefore be taken to 
mean those promulgations or undertakings by public authorities, aimed at affecting the pattern 
of land holding within a society, and aimed at directing the development and use of land in 
a certain predetermined way by, or for, certain uses or segments of society. 
Land policy is an instrument of state power, and as hinted to above, this power can be 
manipulated to serve a variety of interests. Institutional implementation of land policy is 
within the realms of both central and local governments. It has been observed however, that 
in most African countries, local authorities are very weak. They are denied a lot of economic, 
and managerial freedom of action by central government, and this is a reflection of the wider 
problem of power consolidation in society. Central government control of local aothorities is 
more stringent in key urban areas like the largest or capital cities (of which Dar es Salaam is 
an example), particularly with relation to land policy. In this study, the difference in the 
impact of central and local government on land policy is not highlighted, as indeed it is 
minimal, save for the struggle to control the land delivery process, discussed in Chapter Eight. 
The Rationale for Land Policy 
Economists regard urban land policy as the intervention by public authorities into the 
working of the private land market which, according to Lichfield 47 , built cities and regions, 
and operated urban and regional economies, before planning became effective this century. 
Land, being locational specific, and highly heterogenous, is considered to have more imperfect 
markets than the markets in other commodidites. This provides a moral prima fade case for 
government intervention48 . Nt all agree that intervention is necessary49 . Some people 
are skeptical about the government's ability to achieve, results which are better than those 
of the market through regulation ofJand use 50 . But perhaps a stronger body of scholarship 
47 	N. Lichfield, 'Planning and the Land Market", in D.R. Denman, (Ed.), Contemporary Problems of Land Ownership. 
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 1964. 
48 K.W. Kapp, The Social Costs of Private Enterprise, Havard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1950.   
49 See for example, S.N.S. Cheung, The Myth of Social Cost, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1978. 
5° F. Hayek, The Political Order of a Free People, Routledge Kegan Paul, London, 1979. 
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is that which believes in the strength of the market and argues for its extentiomi in certain 
areas 51 . 
Whitehead 52 identifies eight categories of reasons justifying government intervention 
in land markets. These are: to produce goods and services with "public good" characteristics; 
to prevent or regulate the production of harmful externalities; to correct the imperfections in 
the land market resulting from poor information; to counter the unequal and usually 
monopolistic market power among agents related to land; to counter inter-temporal 
distortions in the land market resulting from private investors' lower valuation of future costs 
or benefits; to counter the individuals' aversion to risk in large scale projects or untried 
technology; to produce merit goods for which there is joint consumption by the whole 
society; and, to effect income redistribution. The following is a brief explanation of her 
reasons supporting government intervention in land use market allocation mechanisms: 
(iProvision of Public Goods and Services 
Certain goods and services related to land markets have "public good" characteristics 
They are non-rival and non excludable (i.e. one person's consumption does not diminish the 
supply for another, and, once produced, it is difficult to prevent the consumption of such 
goods or services by any person). Such goods do not render themselves easily to production 
by the market, although the desirability to produce them is there since conceived benefits are 
higher than costs. While pure "public goods" are few, - a classical example being national 
defence-, many that are partially so include local administration, street lighting, uncongested 
roads, open space, police services, utility services, sewers and drains, etc. Such goods can 
only be provided by the govern'??ent because they cannot be feasibly controlled by individuals. 
Therefore, governments need to intervene and provide them on behalf of the whole society. 
The unregulated development of unplanned areas in Third World Cities, at extremely high 
densities without any land for roads and public uses is an example of market failure in this 
51 	E.J. Mishan, The Cost of Economic Growth, Stplcss Press, London, 1967; D.E. Dowall, "The Boiiclits of Minimal 
Land Development Regulations", Habitat International, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1992, pp.  1 b-26. 
52 	
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respect. 
Externalities and Spillover Effects 
Many land uses hav.e externalities or spillover effects and these could be harmful or 
beneficial. Externalities can be defined as side effects of an activity which are not 
accounted for in the budget or utility functions of their producers or generators, or their 
beneficiaries or sufferers 54 . Thus, a factory which discharges large quantities of fumes to 
the atmosphere, is reducing its own cost of production, and presumably the price of its 
product to its customers, at the expense of the health and welfare of others. In this situation, 
the costs of pollution are not borne by those responsible for causing it. A house owner who 
improves the environment of his property may enhance the value of neighbouring property as 
well but is not compensated by these other property owners. Welfare is therefore not properly 
evaluated when spillover costs or benefits are not taken into account. While the market can 
partially respond to this phenomenon, coordination is difficult and relevant information is not 
readily available. Solutions would depend on private contracts which may be difficult to 
enforce 55 . In some cases, while the benefits or costs of an externality are realised by the 
affected community, no one takes ameliorative action, as all stand to gain from underspending 
should somebody else pay for the bringing about or the removal of the externality. This is the 
so called "freerider" problem 56 . Thus, public authorities have to intervene, to "internalise" 
these externalities and regulate the activities of the market to abate pollution, congestion, 
overcrowding, noise, smell, etc.; to prevent the growth of unsuitable urban forms in the 
interest of sanitation, eto; or to bring about desirable infrastructure and services or suitable 
urban forms. Tools of intervention to deal with externalities include zoning regulations to 
separate incompatible uses (e4 industry from residences), anti-pollution laws, etc. 
Poor Information 
Many times, information with regard to land transactions is imperfect and expensive to 
54 	J. Rothenberg, Econori,ic Evaluation of Urban Renewal, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1967.   
55 	W.S. Baurnol, and W.F. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Clitts, N.J., 1 979.   
56 Rothonberg, Economic Evaluation of Urban Renewal. 
assemble through the market, particularly in view of the fact that land is location specific 57 . 
Thus decisions likely to have long term effects, which may affect society at large, can be 
made based on poor information. Governments are likely to have the correct information 
concerning land transactions, or to be able to collect it cheaply, or to modify it by releasing 
their intentions on planning, or on forecasts. Policies to improve information, and to reduce 
transaction costs, are usually applied nationally, e.g. the improvement of the legal framework 
related to land markets, the clarification of tenure and ownership rights, the development of 
new markets, etc. Many of these supersede the market mechanism. 
Poor information e.g. the clouded land titles in many African cities, has been found to be 
a major cause of inefficiency in land uses. Transactions in land my not take place because 
for example the landowners cannot be identified with certainty, leading to the underutilisation 
of land, or to lengthy disputes. Poor information also encourages corruption and speculation, 
and can lead to high land prices. 
Monopolistic Market Power 
There is usually an unequal division of market power among economic agents related to 
land, and this can lead to their significant control over the land delivery process, or of the 
output of land in the market. For example, land ownership can be concentrated into a few 
hands, while the development, construction and finance markets are often oligopolistic, and 
the supply of many urban services cannot be increased quick enough to meet increased 
demand. This could be a result of historical factors, and, in the absence of government 
intervention, such a situation may perpetrate itself, though it may be desirable for society as 
a whole, that access to land is opened up to many people. At the same time, monopolistic 
market power over land could lead to its underutilisation, to high land prices, and to 
inequitable windfall gains to those'in control of land. Thus the need for government 
intervention. 
IV 
Inter-temporal Distortions in the Land Market 
There are inter-temporal distortions in the land market resulting from private investors' 
57 	H. Demsetz, "Information and Efficiency: Another view point", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1969. 
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lower valuation of future costs or benefits 58 . There can therefore be underinvestment where 
benefits are mainly expected in the future, or overconsumption, at present, of non-renewable 
resources. Governments then have to intervene, e.g. by subsidising or controlling the rate of 
investment, or by increasing the cost of non-renewable resources, or by taking over the 
processes directly. 
Examples could include the occupation of hazard land to meet immediate need, which 
could cost society dearly in the future, e.g. through environmental degradation. The 
dimunation of earth cover, to meet current land and energy needs is another example. 
NO Private Individuals' Aversion to Risk 
Private individuals may be more risk averse than the community as a whole, and this may 
lead to the underinvestment in large scale projects and untried technology, like sewers and 
sewage treatment plants, and new cheap building materials. This again calls for government 
intervention 59 
(vii) Merit Goods 
It is also argued that the community benefits from the individuals' consumption of merit 
goods60 . An example often cited is that society as a whole may suffer if sections of it lived 
in substandard housing, and would gain if all enjoyed a certain minimum housing standard. 
The poor may not want to pay for such high standards, but society as a whole may derive 
satisfaction from everyone living at, or above a certain level i.e., there is joint consumption 
of these minimum standards by individuals and society. Such merit goods call for government 
intervention e.g. by providing subsidised public housing, public transport, and low income land 
development schemes, as well as job creation schemes in low income areas. 
58 P.S. Dasgupta, "Fairness Between Generations and the Social Discount Rate", Resources and Policy, Vol. 4, No. 3, 
1978. 
59 	
K.J. Arrow, and R.C. Lind, "Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Expenditure Devices", American Economic 
Review, Vol 60, No. 3, 1970, pp. 364-368. 
60 Musgrave and Musgrave, Pub/ic Finance. 
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(viii) Income Redistribution 
Finally, intervention is usually justified to effect income redistribution, horizontally between 
people of the same level and vertically between the rich and the poor. Most of the examples 
cited above have some Income redistributional effects. Other examples include low income 
area redevelopment schemes, direct low cost housing strategies, etc. 
Intervention is therefore accepted even by those who advocate freedom from government 
interference 61 . The array of intervention possibilities ranges from adjusting and working with 
the market, to overthrowing the capitalist system altogether 62 . In this study it is the former 
possibility that is discussed. 
Tools of Land Policy 
Within the narrow definition of urban land policy given above, the tools used by 
governments include: Policy related to land tenure, registration and transfer63 ; land taxation, 
especially to recover infrastructure costs and betterment value 64 ; urban land use regulations 
which include zoning, regulations on land subdivisions, building regulations, issuance of 
approval of land development schemes by public agencies, and urban planning 65 ; and, direct 
intervention by public authorities, which in turn includes infrastructure provision, land 
acquisition, direct land development, provision of financing facilities, cooperating with the 
private sector in land development, surgical action (e.g. squatter area upgrading), and national 
and local investment decisions with local land use effects 66 . 
61 E.g. Hayek, The Political Order of a Free People. 
62 D. Harvey, Social Justice and the City, Edward Arnold, London, 1973. 
63 H.B. Dunkerley, "introduction and Overview", in, H.B. Dunkerley (Ed), Urban Land Policy, pp. 3-39; W.A. Doebele, 
"concepts of Urban Land Tenure", in, Dunkerley, Urban Land Policy, pp. 63-107. 
64 	D.C. Shoup, "Intervention through Property Taxation and Public Ownership", in, Dunkerley, Urban Land Policy, pp. 
132-152. 
65 	J.M. Courtney, "Intervention through Land Use Regulations", in, Dunkerley, Urban LandPolicy, pp. 153-170. 
66 	M.D. Rivkin, "Intervention through direct participation", in, Dunkerley, Urban Land Policy, pp. 171-198. 
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Ci) Land Tenure, Registration and Transfer 
Land tenure denotes a framework whereby land seekers can get access to land, and 
denotes as well the terms and conditions governing the enjoyment of rights in this land. While 
forms of tenure can be broadly divided into a dichotomy of public versus private land, 
Doebele 67 argues that the situation is more complex. He identifies seven proprietary 
categories of tenure, that is: non-formal de facto; private freehold; private leasehold; public 
freehold; public leasehold; communal ownership (tribal); and communal ownership 
(neighbourhood). The inter-relation between these forms of tenure is complex especially in 
the urban areas of Third World countries where various forms of tenure are conflated in a 
dynamic system of rapid change. Virtually nowhere is there a single unified system of land 
tenure. 68 
Forms of tenure (which are usually products of land policy) have profound effects on 
physical urban patterns and affect the flexibility of adapting to pressures of rapid growth. 
Governments, for example, may deny certain sections of their populations, access to some 
kinds of tenure rights. On the other hand, security of tenure is of crucial importance in 
property investment and land management, and, systems of tenure affect the ease of land 
registration and land transfer. 
Land registration has been defined as the overall process of recording details about land 
parcels for the purpose of land ownership and tenure 69 . An efficient land registration system 
(a) leads of certainty about ownership, (b) enhances security of tenure, (c) reduces land 
disputes, (d) reduces the costof, and delays in, property conveyancing, (e) helps in the 
monitoring and control of land markets, (f) provides security for credit, (g) improves the 
operation and efficiency of the land markets, (h) facilitiates land reform, (i) helps the 
management of state lands, (j) suorts local taxation, (k) improves physical planning, (I) 
67 
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records land resource information, and, (m) can support environmental management 7° 
In many developing countries, colonial land tenure systems treated land as an estate to 
be owned in freehold or leasehold, thus many traditional rights in land were ignored, or were 
lumped together in an amorphous concept termed "customary tenure". Throughout the 
colonial period, relatively little was done to ensure the protection or even the identification of 
customary interests. In many developing countries, those introducing registration of title have 
tended to ignore the subleties of customary tenure, giving rise to informal dealings in land 
taking place outside the register71 
In East Africa, as a broad generalisation, colonial governments nationalised all land, 
distinguishing between what they defined as unowned land, which therefore became crown 
land, and unowned land, where limited rights of societies occupying it were recognised. For 
Africans in general, it was held that land was owned under customary tenure. The transfer 
of land from Africans to non Africans was highly restricted. In most cases, land registration 
was limited to non-native owned land. Major tools of land policy under this category in 
Tanzania were: the 1895 German Decree; The Land Ordinance of 1923, and, the Land 
Registry Ordinace of 1954. 
(ii) Land Taxation 
Land ownership is not only a major form of wealth, it is also a kind of wealth that can 
benefit from the surplus value created by society as a whole (e.g. through general urban 
growth), or by site specific public undertakings (e.g. the planning of, or, the provision of 
infrastructure to, an area). It is argued that governments are duty bound to tax this surplus 
value in the name of equity. Revenue yielded by such taxation can enable public authorities 
to provide serviced land, which could be earmarked to low income households. Some 
countries have specific land taxes,.g. to stimulate land development (for example taxes 
against vacant land), or to curb speculation. Shoup 72 proposes that land taxes can be 
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classified depending on the taxation base: i.e total property value, site value, and betterment. 
Theoretically, site value is a better form of taxation since it excludes the landholder's input. 
Empirical evidence, however, has tended to support taxation based on property value 73 . 
Betterment taxes can be' site specific i.e. related to a public investment project, or can be 
determined when there is a transfer. Alternatively, a gain can be enjoyed when there is 
change of use. Various studies suggest that betterment taxes related to a public investment 
project achieve better results than mere general land taxes, and can therefore be effective in 
promoting land uses 74 . 
A collorary of betterment is worsenment, whereby the activities of the public authorities 
can lead to the suffering of individuals. Taxation can be imposed to abate the nuisance or to 
compensate the sufferers. Where existing infrastructure is likely to be made less efficient by 
new development, the institution of development impact exactions has been suggested 75 . 
Land Taxation tools in Tanzania include the Land Ordinance which provides for the 
charging of land rent and premia; and the Urban Authorities (Rating) Act of 1983.   The latter 
provides for the charging by local authorities, of a general rate based on improved site value, 
and of a special rate, based on the cost of the improvements carried out in area by expending 
public funds. Capital gains tax is also payable when a property is sold. 
(iii) Urban Land Use Regulation 
Urban Land Use Regulations provide a framework within which activities affecting land 
must take place. Courtney 76 
itemises the most common of these as: Zoning; control of subdivisions; building regulations; 
issuance of approval of a development scheme by public agencies; and urban planning. 
73 O.F. Grimes, Urban Land and Public Policy: Social Appropriation of Betterment, World Bank Staff Paper No. 179, 
Washington DC, '974. 
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Zoning is the demarcation of a city by ordinances and the establishment of regulations to 
govern the use of land in the specified zones. It attempts to organise and systematize the 
growth of urban areas, by setting up categories, classes or districts of land, prescribing uses 
to which buildings and land may be put and applying uniform restrictions on the shape and 
placement of buildings. It includes general rules concerning location, bulk, height, and 
therefore plot ratios, shape, use and coverage of structures within each zone. The main 
objectives of zoning are to improve efficiency; promote agglomeration economies and 
minimise spillover effects; specify health and safety requirements; and, to achieve 
distributional effects e.g. by protecting the rights of existing owners or by releasing land for 
low income households. 
Subdivision regulations govern the development of raw land for residential, or other purposes, 
and describe standards for plot sizes and layout, street improvements, and procedures for 
dedicating private land to public purposes. Subdivision of land before development determines 
the pattern of a neighbourhood. 
Building regulations, one of the oldest and most common method of controlling land 
development, were originally meant for fire protection, structural safety and sanitation. Today 
building regulations cover a wider range of aims including aesthetic considerations, and the 
prevention of the deterioration of the housing stock. Regulations limit/define the way new 
structures are to be built and with what materials. 
ApDroval by a Public agency is the main way in which controls over development rights, 
subdivisions and building regulations are enforced. Building permits are required in order to 
ensure compliance with local bylaws and city plans. Public agencies have powers to refuse 
to grant permits, to demolish structures not complying to requirements and to fine 
non-conforming users. 
Urban Planning is the process of making decisions about the physical environment and 
evaluating how changes in this environment affect people and the economy in relation to 
some specified objective. A city plan is put into operation using regulatory instruments 
described above, and the most commonly used planning processes are: Comprehensive 
general planning, master planning, strategic planning and structure planning. Comprehensive 
general planning and master planning assume a static and slow growing urban situation, quite 
manageable in terms of investment decisions, and the long range planning of major 
infrastructure projects. In developing countries, rapid urban growth, major backlogs of 
infrastructure investment, and heavy competition for the limited financial resources make 
masterplanning unsuitable. 
Strategic or structural planning highlights the critical issues, identifies priority investment 
for infrastructure, and therefore identifies areas in which growth and change should take 
place, guides key investment decisions, and involves local decision making and participation. 
In particular a structure plan indicates action areas and the nature of their treatment. These 
are priority areas for intensive action and for which action plans can be prepared. Despite its 
problems, tructural planning and action planning are seen as being more appropriate to 
developing countries than masterplanning. Courtney 77 laments the fact that in many parts 
of the developing world, urban planning is of an essentially static nature, lacking both 
investment priorities, and effective land use control policies. Only limited attention is paid to 
ensuring feasible means of implementation; to anticipating the reaction of market forces; and 
to assessing the cost of various government agencies and the economic effects on different 
income groups. 
Major tools used in this respect in urban Tanzania have included the various Bauordnungs 
(Chapter Three) of the German Colonial era; the Township Ordinance of 1920 and the 
Township Rules made under itthe Town Development (Control) Ordinance of 1 936; the 
Municipalities Ordinance of 1 946; and the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1956.   
(iv) Direct Intervention by Public A&horities 
Rivkin 78 points out that besides regulatory measures, public authorities do influence land 
use patterns by direct intervention through at least seven strategies. These are: 
infrastructure provision; land acquisition; direct land development; financing; cooperating 
77 ibid 
78 	Rivkin, "Intervention through Public Participation'. 
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with the private sector in development; and, surgical action. The seventh form of intervention 
emanates from unintended results of national or local investment decisions, which have an 
impact on the urban spatial pattern. 
By infrastructure rrovision, the public sector provides roads, sewers and water lines and 
treatment facilities, electricity and other basic facilities, plus support infrastructure e.g. 
schools, hospitals and health centres, recreational areas, police posts, markets, etc. 
Historically, the provision of infrastructure in African cities has been provided on a racial basis. 
In urban Tanzania, the provision of infrastructure was, until the 1 950s, rather limited, but 
generally paid for by the government, although efforts were usually méde to recover some 
service costs through land rent and premia. Infrastructure provision in urban areas has 
generally been effected by the central government. 
Through land acciuisition, land can be expropriated for provision of public facilities, 
infrastructure, or other specific development purposes. This is sometimes achieved through 
"excess condemnation" where the public agency expands its ownership to surrounding lands 
to control the land uses there. There is also a system of "land banking" where a lot of land 
is acquired in advance of need in order to reduce costs. Sometimes, in order to facilitate land 
acquisition in the future the government freezes land values to current levels. 
In Tanzania, land acquisition has generally been based on paying the land occupier, the 
value of he unexhausted improvements on the land carried out by the occupier, a colonial 
practice aimed at minimising th,e cost of land acquisition. The practice is still upheld under 
the LandAcqu/sit/on Act of 1967. 
The rublic aQency may itself Lè the develorer, e.g. where it constructs housing or 
industrial property. Comprehensive land developing agencies include: new town authorities; 
national housing authorities; the government itself; various parastatals; etc. In urban 
Tanzania, the government has traditionally built for its senior officers, and lowcost African and 
Asian quarters were constructed during the late 1 940s and the 1 950s by the colonial 
government. After Independence, the role of direct construction of lowcost housing was 
taken up by the National Housing Corporation, created in 1962.   
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On the other hand public agencies may influence land use and development by providinci 
finance for develorment e.g. in the form of credit mechanisms. Examples that are often cited 
are the site and services programmes. The record of land development finance in urban 
Tanzania is poor. An African Urban Housing Loan Scheme was set up in the 1 950s. This 
was followed by the Roof Loan Scheme, and a Revolving Fund for Senior Civil Servants, both 
in the 1 960s. The Permanent Housing Finance Company was established in the late 1 960s 
to finance high cost housing, while the National Housing Corporation played a financing role 
in its slum clearance and rebuilding and tenant purchase schemes of the 1 960s (Chapter Six). 
With the adoption of Sites and services schemes in the 1 970s, infrastructure was provided 
on the basis of future cost recovery from the beneficiaries. Finally a Tanzania Housing Bank 
was established in 1973,   with a mandate to finance mainly lowcost housing. 
In a mixed public and private development the key instruments are: the control of 
infrastructure provision, powers to determine the nature of new buildings, and powers of 
condemnation. Another interesting way is through "land adjustment" where properties in an 
unplanned area are condemned and land replotted according to a plan which, besides land for 
private use (residential, commercial or other uses), includes land for public uses e.g. schools 
or open space. Infrastructure is then installed and property redistributed to original owners 
in proportion to their original holdings. A proportion of the plots are auctioned to "cost 
recover" the public outlay 79 . 
Land pooling and readjustment was attempted in East Africa during the colonial days: 
in Mombasa, in the 1 930s, and in Dar es Salaam (Upanga) in the 1 950s. Freehold holders of 
large pieces of land in Dar es Salaam were encouraged to subdivide their land under the 
guidance of planning authorities. That way, high income estates like Regent, Ursino and Ada 
Estates in Dar es Salaam were created. Powers allowing for public/private cooperation inland 
uses are provided under the Town and Country Ordinance of 1956.   
79 C. Farvacque, and P. McAuslan, Reforming Land Policies and Institutions in Developing Countries, World 
Bank/UNCHSIUNDP Urban Management Programme, 1991, p. 81-2; R.W. Archer, The possible use of Urban Land 
Pooling/Readjustment for the planned development of Bangkok", Third World Planning Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1987,   
pp. 235-253; I. Masser, "Land Readjustment", Third World Planning Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1987, 205-210. 
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Through surgical action, the public agency bulldozes a settlement, relocates the occupiers 
and replans and redevelops the area. Altenatively a slum/squatter area may be upgraded or 
rehabilitated with minimum property destruction. Squatter or unplanned settlements have 
grown rapidly after indeØendence throughout Africa. During the 1 960s they were regarded 
as eyesores and there were regular threats of their demolition. In practice, and as a result of 
political expediency, only a few squatter settlemets have ever been demolished in Urban 
Africa. Instead, governments turned a blind eye to the development of squatting although 
limited upgrading was undertaken in some settlements, in line with externally financed sites 
and service schemes of the 1 970s. 
Finally, Courtney8° points to government actions on land, which have unintended, and 
many times, unforeseen influences on spatial development, and the use of land. For example, 
construction of a national highway or bridge can lead to fundamental effects on land uses and 
land values. With respect to Dar es Salaam, it can be pointed out that the construction of a 
bridge over the Msimbazi River along Morogoro Road in 1953 as part of he Tanga-Dar es 
Salaam Road, helped the opening up of the Magomeni area. Radial roads out of Dar es 
Salaam: Kilwa Road, Pugu Road, Morogoro Road, and Bagamoyo Road,have all influenced the 
siting of Industrial areas in the City, as did the construction of the Port Access Road in 1980,   
to divert heavy port and upcountry traffic from the city centre. 
Results of Urban Land Policy 
(i) Land Tenure, Registration and Trinsfer 
Many studies conclude that urban land tenure systems in developing countries do not 
produce the most efficient patterns of land uses. They tend to reproduce the existing 
inequalities in wealth and opportunity, and are mechanically ill suited to the needs of rapid 
urbanisation in a situation of limited wherewhithal, because of cumbersome methods of 
80 	Courtney, "Intervention through Land Use Regulations. 
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access to land and land registration; clouded titles especially with regard to customary tenure; 
high transfer taxes; lack of adequate and workable powers of expropriation for legitimate 
public needs; and, outmoded institutions. In particular, Governments are loath to innovate and 
to help the land market work efficiently. Problems are technical, institutional and political. 
For example, modern land registration is highly hinged on a cadastre system. Although in 
many countries cadastres exist, few operate efficiently. Maps are out of date, expensive to 
maintain, difficult to come by, inefficient or largely ineffective in practice and are irrelevant 
to modern conditions and requirements. In most countries, there is little awareness of the real 
cost of surveys and the precision that is sufficient for the task in hand. There is much 
ignorance of the true needs of the users. The significance of individuI cases, for example, 
of a boundary dispute, is often exaggerated out of all proportions and is used as justification 
for meticulous surveys. Checking, for instance, may take months, or years. Management 
skills are in short supply, and there is uncertainty about the level of responsibility of, or the 
quality of work undertaken by, civil servants, hence the'reluctance to take risks, and the 
tendency, instead, to be slow, checking and counterchecking the work 81 . 
Farvacque and McAuslan 82 point out that many public laws relating to land are too 
complicated, are in a language that most people do not understand, and are usually not readily 
available. Adjudicative powers work very inefficiently where they work at all. Court 
procedures are lengthy and costly, and are regarded as being pro-administration, an attitude 
inherited from the colonial period. Legal aid is expensive and as a result, lawyers tend to 
serve the interests of landlords, landowners or government officials against the poor. 
The case of Peru, by no means untypical, is illustrative. Getting government land taken 
43 months and comprises 207 bureaucratic steps involving 48 different government 
offices83 . In Ghana, the tedious process of getting stool land involves 20 major steps and 
81 	UNCHS, Guidelines, p. 11. 
82 Farvacque and McAuslan, Reforming Land Policies, pp.  17-19. 
83 H. de Soto, The Other Path, Harper and Row, New York, 1989. 
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can take several years84 . In Cameroon, land registration takes between 2 to 7 years, and 
only 6% of the plots in the country is registered 85 . 
The situation in most tJrban areas of the Third World is that the official land delivery 
programmes benefit only a minority86 . In all cases, both the informal and the formal land 
tenure systems work inefficiently and there is little effort to unclog these inefficiencies. The 
majority of the household get their land outside the formal sector, and most do not benefit 
from tools of land policy like having certificates of title to land, or having the land registered 
Land Taxation 
In most Third World cities, government land is grossly undertaxed. DowalI 87 notes that 
Karachi is experiencing an acute shortage of land because residential plots are underpriced, 
thus limiting the financial capacity to fund infrastructure development. Kiamba 88 points to 
the low price of government land in Nairobi, even after certain subsidies had been removed. 
In many countries, taxes are poorly collected because of poor records on, and information 
about, existing properties and land lots; and also because of the lack of political will. Most 
governments, particularly central ones, are generally unwilling to introduce, and to enforce, 
effective land taxation measures. 
Land Use Regulations 
According to Lowder 89 , few major cities in the Third World can claim that the scale of 
noncompliace with laws and pJanning ordinances is anything but ubiquitous and 
94 
S. Asiama, "Land Management in Kumasi" ,aper prepared for the World Bank, 1990.   
8$ Farvacque and McAuslan, Reforming Land Policies, p.  74. 
86 	Mabogunje,"Urban Planning..". p. 163. 
97 D.E. Dowall, The Land Market Assessment: a new tool in Urban Management, UNDPIWorId Bank/UNCHS Urban 
Management Programme, 1991, p.  4. 
88 	Kiamba, The Role of the State in the Control of Urban Development, p.  124. 
89 S. Lowder, Inside Third World Cities, Routledge, London and New York, 1986, pp.  17. 
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commonplace. Other observers of the urban planning scene in developing countries point to 
the dismal performance, in implementing land use regulations almost everywhere. Reasons 
for this situation are many and include: the unsuitability of most regulations to the local 
conditions; their rigidity-and non-adaptability to changes; and the lack of administrative, 
financial and institutional capacity to implement them. Other reasons are: lack of dependable, 
and up to date information on existing land uses, development density, land ownership, soil 
characteristics, and location and capacity of existing utilities and services; rapid urban growth 
which makes planning very difficult; the importance of land as an economic and cultural good, 
making it the principal choice of individual investment, where investors include very powerful 
segments of society, presenting the process of land use changes and planning, with a difficult 
situation; and the static nature of land use regulations which puts the public sector in position 
of reaction and constraint, rather than initiation and promotion. As a result, in many cases, 
instead of being positive, regulations generate negative effects, e.g. delays in decision making, 
high administrative costs, high investment costs (in terms of time and money), and create a 
climate for corruption 90 . 
(iv) Public Intervention 
Infrastructure Provision 
Almost everywhere, rapid growth of metropolitan centres has been accompanied by major 
breakdown of infrastructure, notably road, water, electric and sanitation networks and supply 
systems 91 , not only from overburdening, but also from poor, or lack of maintenance. 
Besides, in many cities, new planned areas are allocated with highly restricted, or, no, 
infrastructure. Areas outside the formal sector have hardly been recipient of any standard 
municipal infrastructure except under improvement projects like squatter area upgrading 
schemes. But this situation has noturprisingly, prevented authorities in Third World cities 
from continuing to uphold unrealistically high standards for the required infrastructure. In 
Nairobi (Kenya), authorities resisted moves by external project sponsors to revise 
90 UNCHS, The Reformulation of Building Acts, Regulations and Codes in African Countries, Nairobi, 1985. 
" 	
Mabogunje, "Urban Planning..", p. 145; R.E. Stren and R.R. White, (Eds), African Cities in Crisis: Managing Rapid 
Urban Growth, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1989.   
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infrastructure standards downwards in a low income sites and services project to the extent 
of delaying the implementation of the project (with the resultant costs escalation) for 
years92 . In most cities, though, only a minority of households enjoy direct access to 
municipal facilities, and many areas are poorly, or not at all, serviced. 93 The situation in Dar 
es Salaam is that of a poor endowment with infrastructure, and matters have gotten worse 
since the mid-i 970s (Chapters Eight and Nine). 
Land Acquisition 
Everywhere in Third World cities, land expropriation is deeply unpopular. Most laws 
pertinent to eminent domain were inherited from the former colonial powers 94 . The 
procedure adopted is not only long and time consuming, but also it never ensures adequate 
and timely compensation. In Ghana, for example the procedures of compulsory acquisition 
and the paying of compensation span over more than 20 years in some cases 95 . There is 
consequently great resentment over, and political organisation against, the exercise of 
compulsory purchase powers. Since the liberal use of the bulldozer is out of question in many 
countries, many a development projects get stalled or delayed because of the inability of 
governments to acquire land. In particular, the basing of compensation on the value of 
"unexhausted developments", which ignores use value, land value, the cost of replacing the 
developments to be acquired and social disruption related to land acquisition, has made it 
difficult for governments to acquire land. In Dar es Salaam, land acquisition by government 
is highly resented and the government admits that lack of compensation is amajor hindrance 
to the provision of planned plots. 
Direct Development 
In most developing countries, there have been set up, since Independence, National 
Housing Corporations or or other putic corporations with a function of constructing what is 
92 UNCHS, Case Study of Sites and Services Schemes in Kenya: Lessons from Dan dora and Thika, Nairobi, 1987.   
93 Stren and White, African cities in Crisis. 
94 M. Kitay, LondAcquisition in Developing Countries: Policies and Procedures of the Public Sector, Oelgeschlager, Gunn 
and Hairn, Boston, MA, 1985. 
95 Farvacque and McAuslan, Reforming Urban Land Policies, p.  74. 
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usually termed low cost housing 96 . Not only has the output of such institutions been 
miniscule vis a vis the total urban housing supply, but also the products have ended up being 
consumed by the elite. Stren 97 observes that this "static" direct development approach of 
the 1 960s, gave way to "aided self-help" between the mid-i 970s and the mid-i 980s, and 
to "enabling", currently. Each of these approaches represents the downgrading of the state's 
role in direct participation in the developing of the final product. State direct development 
schemes have tended to be inefficiently produced to too high a standard. They have, 
therefore been too expensive for the majority. Yet, despite its benefitting the better off in 
society, public housing has tended to be highly subsidised. The public sector was, during the 
1 950s and 1 960s a major land developer in Dar es Salaam. This role has been relegated to 
insignificance since the 1 970s. 
Finance 
Many countries have Housing Banks, Building societies, or other formal mortgage 
institutions. Almost everywhere these finance a minority of properties put up. They have 
tended to be limited by the level of funds at their disposal. The procedure to get access to 
these funds, together with high repayment instalments have excluded most urban families. 
The site and service schemes of the 1 970s were conceived to reach the poor. Typically, 
the government would procure the land, plan it, and have it serviced. It would then allocate 
the plots to qualifying beneficiaries who would be required to pay back the cost, fully, or in 
part, in instalments spanning a number of years. In some cases the plots are allocated with 
a "core house". Many times, a loan scheme in cash, or in construction materials has been 
part and parcel of the project. Not only have these schemes been limited in terms of the 
quantity of land serviced,, but, as documented by various studies, most have ended up in the 
hands of the better off in society,nd almost invariably, the costs for such has not been 
D.C.I. Okpala, "Aspects of Urban I-lousing and Human settlement Policies and Strategies in Africa", Habitat 
International, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1986. pp. 204-223. 
97 Richard E. Stren, "Large Cities in the Third World", in, UNCHS, Metropolitan Planning and Management in the 
Developing World, Nairobi, 1992.   
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recovered 98 
Mixed public and private sector development 
There are very few examples of successful mixed public and private sector development 
in Third World cities. Governments in many of these countries regard the private sector with 
deep suspicion. However, land adjustment schemes have been successful in a number of 
cities in South East Asia, though, commendable as the land adjustment approach is, it has not 
been as popularised as would be expected. Land pooling and adjustment schemes were 
implemented during colonial days in Mombasa, and in the Upanga area of Dar es Salaam, but 
the approach has not been adopted to an appreciable level after Independence. In Kenya, 
owners of freehold land can subdivide and service it to the governments' satisfaction, and the 
sell or develop the plots. In other cases, cooperative societies can buy the land and subdivide 
it among the members. In Tanzania, on the other hand, there is little if any such kind of 
private/public participation. 
Surgical Action 
Squatter (or, unplanned) areas eradication was high on the African governments' agenda 
after independence, but due to political expediency, only a few areas were ever removed. 
Limited upgrading was undertaken in conjunction with externally supported sites and services 
schemes. There is however, a dearth, within Africa, of home grown policies with relation to 
unplanned areas. Most governments have turned a blind eye to the growth of this sector, 
which in most urban areas, houses the majority of urbanites. There is only a few, and limited 
examples of innovative and positive policy with regard to squatter areas, e.g. in Lusaka. 99 
98 See for example: F.P. Mgullu, Housing: A study of Tanzania's national sites and services schemes, LLM dissertation, 
University of Dar es Salaam, 1978; S. Barnes, "Public and Private Housing in Urban West Africa: The social 
implications", in4vl.K.C. Morrison and P.C.W. Gutkind (Eds), I-lousing the Urban Poor/n Africa, New York, Syracuse 
University, 1982,   pp. 5-43; M.S. Halfani, Urban Management and the Implementation of an Externally financed project 
in Dar es Salaam, Ph.D Thesis, University of Toronto, 1 986; A.Osmont, "Les Banque Mondiale et les politiques 
urbaines natioiiales", PolitiqueAfricane 17, 1985, pp.  58-73; R.E. Stren, "Underdevelopment, Urban Squatting, and 
State Bureaucracy: A case study of Tanzania", Canadian Journa/of African Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1982, pp. 67-91; 
R.R. White, "The impact of policy conflicts on the implementation of a Government Assisted Housing Project in 
Senegal", Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1985, pp.  505-528. 
99 C. Rakodi, "Land, Layouts and Infrastructure in Squatter Upgradings: the case of Lusaka", Cities, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1987,   
pp. 340-370. 
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A Critique of the Market Efficiency Concept of Urban Land Policy. 
The above discourse has had the assumption that land policy is meant to help iron out 
imperfections inherent in the land market. This view discounts the fact that land policy is 
conceived and implemented by powerful segments in society. Farvacque and McAuslan 10° 
point out that land policies cannot be divorced from, and indeed, may be seen as the 
paradigm of, the wider issues of governance. The colonial period provides a good example 
of the use of land policy in favour of a minority. Despite, for example, the assertions in the 
Tanganyikan Land Ordinance (Cap 113 of 1 923) that all land in the territory was to be vested 
in the governor, and was to be used for the common benefit of indigenous populations, a 
question has to be asked as to why land should have been nationalised and placed in the 
control of a colonial governor in the first instance. The aim of such land policies was to ease 
the system of colonial exploitation by making land available for allocation to whomsoever the 
Governor deemed fit. In most cases, such persons were settlers. At a local level (e.g. that 
of a township) township and zoning rules were passed to exclude natives from European 
residential areas, or, indeed, from the townships altogether, so that the Europeans could be 
protected from health and other social hazards supposedly engendered by natives. That way, 
colonial officials were enabled to enjoy a higher standard of living given, the available 
resources, and were thus enabled to fulfil their role of colonial administration with ease. Such 
policies cannot possibly be hailed as being aimed at enhancing efficiency in the land markets. 
The above argument holds good for the post colonial era despite the change of rulers, 
since much of the post colonial policies in the Third World was a continuation of colonial 
policies. This view is made clearer with respect to land policies by Farvacque and 
McAuslan 101 who point to the general trend, since 1945,   towards centralisation of powers 
to achieve economic growth, social welfare, and national cohesion. Countries of the 
developing World were offerred apowerful, and apparently successful, model of this 
centralisation in the colonial form of government. Worse still, many Third World governments 
took the form of military, or, civil oligarchies concentrating all resources at the centre, so that 
they could retain power by rewarding supporters, as well as themselves, through the judicious 
100 
Farvacque and McAuslan, Reforming Land Policies, p.  4. 
101 
ibid., p. 3-4. 
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use of these resources. These resources included urban land, the same land that was 
traditionally a source of local power. Besides, rapidly rising land values, particularly at the 
periphery of cities, provide a source of large profits and strong economic interests. This has 
put pressure on officials and government decision makers and has made them reluctant to 
take steps to end market inefficiencies and distortions that operate to the benefit of such 
interests. 
Issues of democracy aside, it has been observed that the land laws that have been 
passed by Cameroon's indigenous leaders, as has been typical of most African countries, have 
been meant to enhance their own power and status. Conditions governing access to land are 
deliberately slanted in favour of the socially or economically powerful, and hence politically 
active members of the society, including civil servants, bureaucrats, and entrepreneurs. 102 
It is further noted that there is hardly any nation in the developing world where access to land, 
especially urban land, is not slanted in favour of the rich minority or of civil servants or 
politicians. In Nigeria, for instance, this phenomenon accounts for the fact that 92% of the 
land in high income Apapa, Victoria Island, and lkoyi areas, belongs to just 20% of the 
population of Lagos) °3 
In the area of urban land management, the question of where power to govern came from, 
and where it needed to be located, provided the rationale for land nationalisations; the 
weakening of the role of local government in land transactions, land uses and land 
development; the use of the bulldozer as a tool of land management; and top down 
management e.g. of sites and srvices projects and squatter upgrading programmes, etc. 
Mabogunje 104 notes that the allocation of publicly acquired land is the surest way of 
amassing wealth, and hence, the political importance that attaches to the Minister or agency 
that has to undertake this distribut1e function. Testimony to this is the abundance of 
102 A.J. Njoh, "Institutional Impediments to Private Residential Development in Cameroon", Third World Planning Review, 
vol. 14, No. 1, 1992, pp.  21-37. 
103 T. Agbola, "Institutional constraints on Housing Development: The Urban Areas of Nigeria: The Land Use Decree and 
the building plan approval process", Habitat International, Vol. 11 No. 2, 1987, p. 116. 
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conflicts between central and local government, between politicians and officials and between 
the officials themselves as to who should control the allocation of urban land. In Nairobi, 
concillors are known to have objected to the allocation, by ballot, of serviced plots targetted 
to low income households 105 . In Dar es Salaam, the struggle over land administration 
between central and local governments, and between various officials and politicians is 
intense (Chapter Eight). Thus land policy allocates power, wealth, and many other privileges 
in society and will therefore be controlled by the socially powerful e.g. government 
administrators, politicians, the rich etc., and can be used to enhance such powerful social 
groups' interests. 
In the light of the foregoing, the efficiency concept attributed to land policy must be toned 
down to take into account the political framework through which the various social groups 
control social power and express or defend their interests. In a situation where the tampering 
with existing land relations affects the social distribution of power and wealth, conservatism 
could reign high. It has been argued that power wielders may, for example, benefit from the 
status quo, since the whole system of impingement on the efficient working of the land 
market creates a situation of scarcity, which in turn bestows immense power and profit to 
those who are in control of land 106 . Outdated legislation, regulations, aand institutions are 
clung to, and no effort is made to tailor them to the dynamic situation of current urban growth 
in Third World countries. Instead of the limited availability of resources providing an impetus 
for innovation into what can work, the old order is adhered to, while the inefficiency of land 
policy is blamed on this lack of resources. Secrecy, (usually under the banner of protecting 
national interests) is resorted to. Even apparently simple undertakings like the availing to the 
public, of information on land planning schemes, or land available for allocation, or the names 
of beneficiaries of land allocation exercises, become undesirable. In Dar es Salaam, even 
street naming or house numbering &ppear to be too much for policy makers to enforce 
(Chapter Nine). Lack of transparency in land administration becomes the norm since this hides 
105 uNcHs, Case study of sites and service schemes in Kenya..., 
106 G. Payne, Informal Housing and Land Subdivisions in Third World Cities: A Review of the Literature, Overseas 
Development Administration, London, 1989. 
a lot of misdeeds. Farvacque and McAusla& °7 point out that, in many aspects of 
socio-economic organisation, but particularly in the area of land management, laws are 
procured and passed, or vice versa, by the economic and social elite to help them benefit from 
state activities, rather than meet any perceived need of society at large. Possession of a 
commodity like land, is the basis for obtaining, consolidating, and furthering the political and 
economic interests of particular social groups. Thus, besides the existence, and nature, of 
various regulations, the political and institutional framework within which these are introduced 
and enforced are as, if not more, crucial to the outcome. 
Therefore, much as the role of land policy in ironing out market imperfections is 
acknowledged, it is submitted here that the efficiency criteria, in both the market and social 
equity senses, need not be the motivating force behind land policy measures. Exploitation, 
racism, and corruption, social domination, and power consolidation,self interests 
advancement, and political expediency, for example, have been overt or covert motives of 
land policy at various times. At the same time, an inefficient land policy framework can be 
preferred and defended by those deriving benefit from the status quo. Many times it is the 
interests of those with power that will determine what will, and what will not, be carried out. 
1.2.5 Urban Land Policy in Africa: an Overview 
With the exception of North Africa, parts of West Africa, and the Eastern coast of Africa, 
rapid urbanisation in Africa is a phenomenon identified with the colonial era, beginning during 
the latter half of the 1 9th Century. The great majority of Africa's urban centres were 
created, or greatly transformed during the colonial and post colonial eras. Numerous towns 
were created by Europeans for their own purposes of administration and trade, and these 
played a critical role in the process of colonial political domination; and in easing the extraction 
of profits by colonial business entersises. Many towns that prospered were ports that were 
usually the termini of railway or road networks designed to tap resources from the interior. 
Urban areas were created at transportation termini or junctions, at major sources of 
extractable raw materials, and at other strategic locations aimed at easing the exploitation and 
107 Farvacque and McAusian, Reforming Land Policies, p. 42. 
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administration of the colonies 108 . Although increasingly diverse, post colonial cities in Africa 
are still characterised by performing predominantly commercial and administrative functions. 
Outside the Witwatersrand complex in South Africa and the Copperbelt in Zambia, there are 
few major industrial cities in Africa. Export-led industrialisation has not taken place. Instead 
import-substitution "dependent" industries are the most common 109 . 
Period isati on 
The evolution of urban land policy in Africa can be divided into three phases as proposed 
by Mabogunje with reference to urban planning 110 . 
The first phase runs from the late 1 9th century to 1945.   Colonial urban land policy was 
guided by the need to shape colonial cities to serve the twin aims of colonialism i.e. 
exploitation and domination. Besides, policy was characterised by racial discrimination, partly 
justified by the concern with "public" (i.e. colonial officials') health - "the sanitation 
syndrome"-, and partly in order to to create a psychological atmosphere of African inferiority, 
to ease domination, and to heap privileges in land development on the European and other 
non-native populations. There was thus, differential investment in infrastructure and services, 
and these varied according to the races occupying the various areas, on the pretext that 
different races have different requirements. This is when the roots of colonialism were sawn 
and when most legislation related to land tenure and township administration and 
development was formulated. 
The second phase runs from 1946 to 1980 and bridges the colonial and post colonial eras 
and extends to the era of the economic crisis. This could be subdivided into three 
sub-periods: 
(a) The 1946 to 1960 period, dominated by substantial investment in infrastructure, social 
108 A.M. o'connor, The African City, African Publishing company, New York, 1983. 
109  
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110 	 ,, 
Mabogunje, Urban Planning.. , p. 1 74n. 
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welfare, housing etc. partly as a result of popular agitation for better living conditions, and 
partly as a way of preparing the would be ex-colonies for continuity after the demise of 
colonialism, which was nigh in sight. The investment was a result of considerable funds from 
Britain to the Colonies provided under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of the 
1 940s. It was also the period of the Town and Country Planning Acts, urban master plans, 
and planning schemes. The colonial theme, according to Bowles, was "development" 111 . 
The 1961 to 1970 period, dominated by the euphoria about national independence and 
development, and policy was geared towards consolidating these and to adorn privileges to 
the new local rulers. The theme during this period was "modernisation". 
The 1971 to 1980 period when failure to directly manage urban development was 
accepted and recourse made to "aided self-help", exemplified by undertakings such as sites 
and services schemes and the acceptance and upgrading of unplanned areas 2 
The third phase runs from 1980 to the present, when adverse economic problems 
affecting most African economies from about the mid 1 970s became so acute, forcing new 
conceptions of development challenges. African cities are facing both an economic and 
managerial crisis. This period is characterised by governments being advised, or, trying, to 
adopt "enabling approaches", and it has brought in focus, stark evidence that African cities 
cannot hope to develop on the western industrialised city model 3 . Indeed, there are moves 
to redefine the African City to encompass self help, urban agriculture, and the urban informal 
sector. 
B.D. Bowles, "The Political Economy of Colonial Tanganyika: 1 939-61 ", in M.H.Y. Kaniki, (Ed), Tanzania under 
Colonial Rule, Longmans, London, 1979, pp. 1 64-1 91. 
112 Stren, "Large Cities in the Third World" 
113 ibid.; C. Pugh, "Land Policies and low income housing in developing countries: A review with reference to Kenya and 
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(a) Colonial Urban Land Policy (to 1945) 
In the broader context where various colonial policies were instituted to ensure the 
exploitation of the colonies, urban land policy throughout Africa was characterised by a dual 
system of access to land,aimed at restricting the rights of Africans from owning or registering 
land outside customary tenure 114 . In British colonies, a dual mandate of respecting 
customary law for the native population, and creating formal institutions and laws to 
administer land to non-natives, was in operation. In most instances, the covenants attached 
to government allocated land, e.g. land rents, premia, building covenants, etc., excluded most 
Africans from acquiring government land. The Township Ordinances of the 1 920s, demanded 
such high standards of buildings, sanitation, ventilation and low density layouts, that the 
majority of Africans were excluded on account of cost alone 115 . In countries with a sizeable 
settler population in East and Central Africa , Resident Native Ordinances of the 1920s   
defined conditions of urban residence. Cities were for Europeans, or employed Africans only. 
In other countries, colonial governments acquired deportation powers, under various vagrancy 
ordinances, against natives resident in urban areas. Cities were usually surrounded by 
"reserves" or "locations" occupied by Africans until required for other uses, or until the 
African completed his work contract in an urban area. In many instances the problem of 
African residence was ignored by underbounding the urban areas; or by the use of "reserves" 
or "native towns" where Town Building Ordinances did not apply, or were not rigorously 
enforced. Government land allocated to non natives usually carried good security (e.g. 99 
years) contrasting with annual leases typically extended to natives. 
A second major strand of ccnial urban land policy was segregation between the races 
in spatial patterning, influenced by public theories of diseases in the late 1 9th and early 20th 
centuries, which involved deep rooted fears on the part of Europeans about being infected by 
Africans and other races 116 . In 1891, it had been discovered that the mosquito was the 
vector for malaria. In 1898, British Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, wrote to the 
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Royal Society, for advice on how to control the disease. The Society replied in 1900 that, 
"segregation from the native is at present the only scheme for preventing malaria that offers 
the least possibility of success" 117 . Although not all colonial governors, or Europeans 
accepted that segregation was the answer, medical officers of health became extremely 
influential on colonial urban land policy in the early decade of the 20th century. In 1909,   the 
principal medical officers of British West African colonies held their first joint conference, and 
promulgated a policy that all Europeans should be required to live in special reservations 
seperated from the nearest African dwelling by at least 400 yards, a distance considered to 
be sufficiently wide enough as not to be transversed by mosquitoes or rats 118 . In East 
Africa, the Bransby Williams Report of 1906,   and the Simpson Report of 1913  - both Reports 
being principally on Nairobi - recommended well defined and seperate quarters for Europeans, 
"Asiatics", and Africans, in the interests of each community, and the healthiness of the 
locality, and of the country. 119 . 
Segregation was achieved through the manipulation of land grants, and government 
jurisdiction, and the legal procedures attached thereto, reinforced by physical coercion. 
Europeans were discouraged from living outside their designated areas, or inside native areas. 
In some towns, e.g. Calabar and Dar es Salaam, Africans were denied permits to repair their 
houses so that they could eventually be removed when their houses got condemned and 
demolished 120 . Major obstacles, e.g. railway tracks, industrial sites and commercial zones, 
as well as major open spaces, including golf courses, were used as "cordon sanitaires" for 
purposes of segregation. Such segregative policies are the causes of today's problems, with 
overcrowding and fabric deterioration in a number of former "native" areas in African cities, 
like Kariakoo in Dar es Salaam. 
Indigenous systems of dealingwvith land problems were constrained during the decades 
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of colonialism and could not be recast, after independence was acquired, to generate 
investment at a very different scale of new technologies. In any case, such archaic systems 
were no longer trusted by the new rulers. All the same, wilful discrimination based on the 
grade of ethnic identity, meant that indigenous populations in most of African cities lived in 
worse conditions that if more egalitarian policies had been adopted. 
The "Sanitation Syndrome" 121 thus became the greatest motivator of early colonial 
urban land policy in general, and urban planning in particular; and resulted in the creation of 
different zones with adequate community-health and general sanitary conditions for the white 
races, and an inequitable investment on such infrastructure in African locations. The danger 
to public health emanating from Africans, was exaggerated out of all proportions, to ensure 
the enjoyment of considerable privileges in land, by the European populations in general, and 
government officials in particular. According to Lord Lugard, governor of Northern, and later 
all Nigeria between 1900 and 1 91 9, investment in infrastructure in African areas was a waste 
of resources: "Such a community has no desire for municipal improvement. It neither 
appreciates nor desires clean water, sanitation or good roads and streets" 122 . Such a view 
was still being cherished in the 1 940s. The following has been written on Nairobi: 
The majority of Africans are not craving for a higher standard of living; they are 
often quite a happy folk in their squalour, dirt, and customs, which for many 
of us can only be described as wretched, degrading and revolting 123 . 
These two statements reveal another emphasis in colonial urban land policy: that Africans 
were accustomed to very low st,ndards of living, and did not want anything better, and that, 
given limited resources Europeans had to maintain the standards they were used to. In 
practice, racial segregation was used to lavish privileges to the European population, some of 
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which they would not have enjoyed back in Europe. In Nigeria, according to Home 124 , 
colonial administrators were able to enjoy a more spacious life style, with detached houses 
usually in one acre plots, clubs, race courses and other appurtenances of a country gentleman. 
Within the European residential areas, there was a measure of further segregation by class, 
with working class Europeans (such as railway locomotive drivers), kept segregated from the 
"more refined" middle class members of the British colonial administration, a situation 
reminiscent of Victorian England 125 . In Dar es Salaam, for example, the European ordinary 
Railway staff residential area, was on the opposite side of town, away from government 
officials' residences. This, however, did not hinder the colonial authorities from removing a 
native settlement (Gerezani) that existed near these railway quarters (Chapter Four). 
Segregation also' allowed the exploitation of African labour at minimum cost by keeping 
African designated areas minimally serviced. 
The policy of racial segregation used the racial mirage to achieve ulterior ends, like toning 
down the possibility of demands for better social services by Africans. It was also an 
effective tool for colonial domination. Thus besides concern with health, segregation was 
undertaken because of the "security syndrome", and in order to perpetrate the African 
"inferiority syndrome", in order to ease domination and exploitation. 
Besides its being dehumanising and apt to cause social tension, segregation was attacked 
because it was illogical and many times inequitable. For example, Africans continued to form 
a substantial, and in some cases, a majority of residents in European areas, although only in 
subservience to Europeans as huseworkers 126 . Besides, as governor MacGregor of Lagos 
argued, segregation did not remove the "source of contamination" and would lead to the 
concentration on improving conditions in White areas and to the neglect of non-European 
areas. This was in fact what happei*ied in many African cities. Instead, MacGregor called, 
124 
R.K. Home, Town Planning, Segregation, and Indirect Rule in Colonial Nigeria', Third World Planning Review, Vol. 5, 
No. 2, 1983, pp. 165-175. 
126  
Gale, ,, Segregation in British West Africa .. p. 166. 
126 
J.L.L. Comhaire, "Urban Segregation and Racial Legislation in Africa", American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, 
1950, pp.  392-397. 
47 
for the eradication of mosquitoes, free distribution of quinine, and introduction of hygiene and 
sanitation courses in local schools. After all, plague, cholera etc. were the scourge of early 
urbanising Europe 127 . Poverty and ignorance, it has been argued, should be treated as a 
social, not as a racial problem 128 . 
Measures advocated by Governor MacGregor were implemented in many urban areas, 
leading to better urban health 129 but segregation continued to be cherished because of the 
racial bigotry of many colonial officials. Lowder' 3° notes that colonial officials included "a 
few despots, many upright, but not necessarily enlightened people, and others...". Many had 
been granted considerable powers, and were relatively free to act despotically, given the 
distance seperàting them from home. 
Segregation was also inequitable. In many countries, Africans paid most taxes, but got 
back very little in return, in the form of services. In Kenya, income tax was first imposed on 
the white population in 1936,   although Africans had been directly taxed since 1901 and 
provided the bulk of government revenue; while the white population benefited most 
substantially from the services provided' 31 . In West Africa, well to do Africans were usually 
removed from their substantial residences to make room for European "reservation" 
areas 132 . 
Segregation was more stringent in urban areas with a sizeable European population, or 
where permanent European settlemetn was envisaged, e.g. Nairobi, towns of the Copperbelt 
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in Zambia, and in Zimbabwe; and was insisted upon more by colonial officials rather that by 
the unofficial European population. The principle reached its apotheosis in South Africa in 
the form of apartheid 133 . As a result, in most urban areas, European zones were well laid 
out and well serviced, while native zones developed with minimal services or building 
standards. This policy only began to lose importance in the late 1 940s, but the essentially 
segregated nature of colonial cities persists even today. In Dar es Salaam, racial segregation 
was practised, until the eve of independence. 
(b) Colonial Urban Land Policy (1946-1960) 
By 1930,   some changes were slowly taking place at the Colonial Office, and concern was 
being expressed for a strategical inroad into issues of colonial welfare. In 1929,   a 
Commonwealth Development Act was enacted, which set aside some money for social 
development.The 1 930s witnessed a number of influencial reports on poverty and ill health 
in the colonies. These included the 1939 Report of the Committee on Nutrition in the 
Colonial Empire, and Lord Hailey's African Survey of 1 938134.  It was being realised that 
colonialism would not last forever and that there was the need to create a new environment 
which would define new commonwealth relationships favourable to the colonising countries, 
after the reigns of power had been relinguished. In 1940,   Lord Hailey was asked to survey 
the likely postwar trends in Britain's overseas dependencies. In his report, Hailey argued that 
colonial development must actively promote development and welfare activities, as well as 
change rules on colonial self-sufficiency in financial matters 135 . The Second World War 
hastened change. In part, this was because many natives in the colonies became restive, 
demanding better socio-economic standards. A Statement of Policy on Colonial Development 
and Welfare, (White paper of February 1 940) outlined steps to be taken in improving 
conditions in the colonies. This formed the basis of the first Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act, of 1940,   in which a sum of five million pounds a year, was to be made available 
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for ten years, for schemes for any purpose likely to promote the development of resources of 
any colony, or the welfare of its people 136 . In 1943,   the broad lines on Colonial housing 
policy were set out in a paper on colonial affairs. 
Urban land policy, was, during this period, dominated by the ten year development plans 
using the Colonial Development and Welfare Funds. Undertakings included construction or 
improvements in infrastructure like roads, water supply, drainage, sewage networks, and 
airports; and construction of public buildings including schools, hospitals, and health and 
social welfare centres. Tanganyika had its ten year planning running from 1946 and was 
extended to 1960.   Most of Dar es Salaam's social and economic infrastructure, including the 
first government constructed African residential quarters, was constructed during the one and 
half decade before Independence (Chapter Five). 
This was also the period when comprehensive town planning was accepted in most 
colonial cities. It was a period of Town and Country Planning Acts and urban Masterplans. 
The Nigerian Town and Country Planning Act, for example was passed in 1946.   It had been 
prepared by Harry Ford, who, in 1949,   prepared the Tanganyika one which became law in 
1956.   Comprehensive town and country planning was given prominence, as opposed to 
zoning and development control of the previous era. Masterplans were undertaken for many 
urban areas. Examples include the 1948 Masterplan for A Colonial Capital, for Nairobi, 137 
and the 1949 Outline Plan for Dares Salaam (Chapter Five). Investment was made in housing 
although invariably on racial lines. Africans in urban areas were no longer considered to be 
transitory, and research was made far and wide for a "low cost" house suitable for them. A 
conference of housing administrators took place in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 1952,   to 
discuss ways and means of dealing with the question of African housing 138 . Earlier on, in 
1950,   the Vassey Report in Kenya had recommended that the government increases 
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subsidised rental housing for Africans. Sites and services schemes, known as the Vassey 
Schemes, were provided by the colonial government in a number of Kenyan towns in 1951, 
whereby serviced plots with wet cores were allocated to Africans for self construction The 
aim was to stabilise the 'African urban population. Loans in the form of building materials 
were usually provided 139 . The first African owned housing estates, like that of Bahati in 
Nairobi, were created during this period. In many colonial urban areas, thousands of 
Government quarters were constructed. Africans mainly in junior government service usually 
got the smallest and least serviced units. Several planning schemes involving construction 
of infrastructure and increasing the supply of urban land were also undertaken. 
Although still being practiced, racial segregation was giving way to segregation along 
socio-economic status lines. In Eastern Africa, this was exemplified by the Indians - some of 
whom had amassed considerable wealth during the War - taking up residences in former 
European citadels. At the same time many a European officials and non officials began seeing 
themselves as permanent settlers in Africa. To suit them, some land laws and procedures and 
conditions of employment which had previously prevented, or made it difficult for officials 
to acquire land were modified. In Tanzania for example, the Land Ordinance was amended 
in 1947 to allow the Governor to allocate land to non natives otherwise than through public 
auctions. As Lowder 14° observes, in the decade before independence, an economic class 
mechanism was superimposed on the earlier racist patterns and the policy of urban 
segregation was perpetuated with the aid of new criteria. The Royal EastAfrica Commission 
Report of the 1 950s for example recommended the creation of a stable middle class African 
population in towns based on land and property ownership. In Nairobi this resulted in the 
creation of he first African owned housing estates like Bahati. In Dar es Salaam, Block W of 
the Magomeni area was set aside for this purpose . Long term rights of occupancy were also 
allocated to Africans for the first tirn\ Construction in permanent materials was encouraged 
and long term financing facilities were set up (Chapter Five). 
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(c) Urban Land Policy during the First Decade of Independence (1960-70). 
Most African countries got independence in the early 1 960s and all were determined to 
modernise their economies in general and their cities in particular. In most countries urban 
land policy was charcterised by continuity rather than by change, because many of those 
who took over the reigns of power were trained by, and were trying to emulate, the former 
rulers 141 . Crowder argues that in most aspects of politico-socio-economic administration, 
African governments were merely carrying foward inherited codes and practices 147 . In the 
light of the attainment of Independence, and in the efforts to distance themselves with 
primitiveness, many a new governments got, or tried to get, rid of what they regarded to be 
symbols of backwardness. A number of slum/squatter areas in many countries was razed 
and replaced with modern structures, in order to give a proper picture of the new nation. The 
epitome of this was possibly Senegalese President Senghor's construction of a wall around 
the bidonvi//es of Dakar, to keep them Out of sight of the visitors as they drove to/from the 
airport 143 . Nevertheless, the policy of slum/squatter area razing was politically inexpedient, 
and in any case governments could not cope with urban growth which increased dramatically 
after independence, so that in many countries, governments turned a blind eye to the squatter 
area development phenomenon. The force behind land policy was "modernisation" 
characterised not just by the new rulers stepping into the bungalows and office blocks of 
departing colonial officers 144, but also, by the creation of new symbols of national identity: 
Skyscraper office blocks, new airports and expressways, and modern housing estates, many 
of these, ostensibly earmarked for the "masses". This was necessary in order to consolidate 
national political power and seek legitimacy for the new rulers. "Africanisation policies" of 
jobs, commerce as well as of formerly non-African urban areas were undertaken. The new 
rulers heaped upon themselves, the privileges in land formerly enjoyed by colonial officials. 
People flocked by the thousand to towns in search of better opportunities despite "back to 
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the village" campaigns and "operations', and despite rural development programmes. Many 
of these people beefed up unplanned settlements, which grew unabated. In Dar es Salaam, 
by the late 1 970s, over 60% of the City's population was living in unplanned settlements. 
(c) Urban Land Poliy During the Second Decade of Independence (1970-80). 
Towards the end of the 1 960s the concept of modernization had run its course, under the 
sheer weight of rapid urbanisation in a situation of very limited wherewithal. Lowder 145 
argues that no city in the developed world ever had to cope with sudden urban growth at the 
same time as national institutions had to be created and as local staffs, ill prepared as they 
were, took over key executive posts for the first time. The optimism that was expressed 
during the heydays of the immediate post independence period had to be tampered down. 
In terms of urban land policy, it was accepted that governments could not afford direct 
involvement e.g. in housing provision, but should, instead, work with, and reinforce peoples' 
efforts to house themselves and to improve their environment. These ideas found support in 
Turner's 146 experience in Latin America. This step down from the focus on direct provision 
of shelter was accepted not just in housing, but in other spheres of socio-economic urban life 
(like employment and income generation), and was supported by influential international 
bodies such as the World Bank 147 . The informal sector was seen as an important source 
of employment and livelihood for many urbanites 148 . Sites and services projects were 
undertaken in many cities. Unplanned settlements received some kind of government 
recognition. A number were "upgraded" and thus received some services. Burgess's protests 
against transferring the cost of labour reproduction to itself fell on deaf ears 149 . 
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It needs to be stressed, however, that sites and services and squatter upgrading projects 
were not a new invention of the 1 970s. It was accepted Colonial policy to demarcate plots, 
many times with rudimentary or no services, on which natives could build in whatever 
materials. This was aimed at relieveing the Colonial governments of having to provide housing 
for the colonised populations. In Dar es Salaam such demarcated plots were provided in such 
areas as Kariakoo from the 1 900s; Ilala in the 1 930s; and Kinondoni, Magomeni, Temeke, and 
Mwananyamala in the 1 950s and the early 1 960s. In Kenya, sites and services plots were 
provided by the Colonial government in the 1 920s in Mombasa and were known as "village 
layouts". During the same period, a scheme to "upgrade" the insanitary and overcrowded Old 
Mombasa Town, was undertaken 150 . In Nairobi, a sites and services scheme, similar to the 
one in Dar es SaIaam's Kariakoo was undertaken in the Pumwani area in the 1 920s, and in 
areas popularly known as "Majengo' in other urban areas in Kenya. Demarcated plots with 
wet cores (The "Vassey Schemes") were provided in Thika in the early 1 950s. In the early 
1 960s, modern versions of the sites and services were undertaken in Kariobangi (Nairobi) and 
Changamwe (Mombasa) 151 . The presentaion of the sites and services shemes of the late 
1 960s as being "new" approaches to dealing with the settlement problem in Africa's urban 
areas was aimed at providing a political rallying ideology to show that governments were 
really doing something about the plight of the poor, just as had been claimed with relation to 
direct provision of housing. Sites and services schemes, however, remained limited in relation 
to the shelter problem, and many of them ended up in the hands of middle to higher income 
groups in society. It is also important to note that while the majority of urbanites lived in 
unplanned areas, upgrading undertakings for such areas remained limited in scope and to a 
few showpieces, and even theQ, in relation to the externally supported projects to provide 
new sites, which have invariably ended up in the hands of higher income households. There 
is possibly not a single African country with an internally generated policy to deal effectively 
with unplanned areas apart from thêturning of a blind eye to their growth. In countries like 
Zimbabwe, unplanned areas are still being bulldozed. 
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The majority of unplanned areas lack most basics of land policy like cadastral, registration 
and land tenure records; and services and infrastructure like roads, water, sewage and 
electricity networks, and public open spaces. Many are chaotically developed, and are 
exposed to higher impacts of pollution as well as health and fire hazards. Yet these areas 
harbour between 40-90% of urbanites in many African citie& 52 . Where planning schemes 
(e.g. sites and services) have been implemented, the regulations and procedures adopted for 
developing land, as well as the standards of infrastructure, have been those inherited from the 
colonial past, have tended to exclude low income households, and have been highly 
subsidised. Resources available to governments have been limited, and as such, the planning 
and servicing of land has also been highly curtailed, making serviced land, the arena of 
struggles between the powerful classes in society. Therefore, many of the urbanites, 
particularly those living in unplanned areas, live in worse conditions than would otherwise be 
the case if a more egalitarian and efficient land management and infrastructural policy was 
adopted. 
Instead, colonial aspects of land policy (e.g. laws on land tenure and registration, building 
standards and regulations, and land acquisition and servicing by the public sector and its 
allocation for private use), continue to be upheld. Since this approach excludes (or marginally 
includes) unplanned areas, the official land delivery system serves only a minority. 
(d) Urban Land Policy During the Current Period. 
Since the mid 1 970s many African countries have been facing acute economic problems, 
while urbanising fast. The urban population in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to be 37.9% 
of the total population by the year 2000 up from 14.9% in 1960 and 24.2% in 1980 153 . 
The World Development Report for 1990 listed 79 countries in the low and middle income 
brackets, 34 (43%) of which wer&iin sub-Saharan Africa. Of these 34, 28 (82%) had an 
urban growth rate of 5% or more between 1980 and 1988.   Twenty seven African countries 
were in the low income brackets and constituted 64% of all countries in this category. 
152 P.M. Syagga, "Myths and realities of low cost housing in Africa", African Urban Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1987,   pp. 
202-2 1 1. 
153 
United Nations, Land for Human Settlements, United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, Nairobi, 1984. 
55 
Overall, the annual urban growth rate for sub-Saharan African countries was 6.2% compared 
to 4.2% for Latin America, and 4% for South Asian Countries 154 . 
Rapid urbanisation coupled with poor economic performance has taunted many a 
governments' capabilities to sustain an effective urban land policy. Unplanned areas are 
growing unabated. Land planning and allocation, land use control, and infrastructure provision 
and maintenance, have all suffered adversely. A continuously growing proportion of the urban 
population is receiving less and less services, in what has been called "the service 
squeeze" 155 . 
Such a situation has led to a major re-evaluation of many of the hitherto held approaches 
towards urban land policy. For, it has been argued, very few countries have in the past found 
the time and will to revise their legal codes and administrative procedures inherited from the 
colonial era 156 . Most practices of formal land delivery and management are ill suited to the 
social and economic realities obtaining in African cities, and have served most to limit the 
supply of land to the majority of urban inhabitants. As Mabogunj& 57 has observed, despite 
laws to the contrary, governments in Sub-Saharan Africa exercise control over restricted areas 
of urban land and in most cases, in favour of a small elite class. Pugh 158 points out that 
the legitimised formality of orthodox town planning, with the designation of legal title, the 
establishment of utilities and infrastructure, and then the residential occupation of land, does 
not fit the needs and affordability of the poor. African governments are therefore under 
considerable pressure to review their approach to urban land management with particular 
reference to land policy, e.g. to reduce the irrelevant and impracticable standards adhered to 
in land planning, registration, sveying, servicing, and development; to create an "enabling" 
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environment where informal land markets can work more efficiently; to work much more 
effectively with the private sector; to eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy and regulations; 
and to work more positively with all the urban residents, particularly those in the unplanned 
areas. 159 . This is considered necessary so that the activities of the majority form the basis 
of urban land policy, instead of the latter concentrating on the minority, while ignoring, or 
suppressing the parallel land market and informal land delivery processes. There is however 
resistance against change not only because of adherence to "received concepts" 16° but also 
because major local interests are served by the status quo. 
Conclusion 
Mabogunje 161 has argued that during colonialism, capitalist socio-economic relations 
did not effectively penetrate the colonies; so that major means of production i.e. land and 
labour were not fully commoditised. Instead of promoting capitalist transformation of their 
socio-economic relations, most African governments opted to weaken the role of the market 
in preference to direct administrative manipulation. This, in part was inherited, since colonial 
officers derived extensive privileges from administrative manipulation. (e.g. by allocating 
themselves well serviced large plots on which they lived, many times, rent and rates free). 
The result was the stark inability to undermine the "economy of affection" 162 which 
manifests itself in the informal employment sector, customary land tenure holdings, etc. 
Under such conditions the state was not under major compulsion to intervene to minimise the 
inefficiencies of the market. Instead, the state acted in a curious way to manipulate the 
privileges emanating from land policy,( e.g. subsidised housing, free infrastructure, etc.). This 
could not be sustained for long, d governments have been slowly stepping down from this 
direct manipulation, first to sites and services and upgrading schemes and now to "enabling" 
policies. But even during this step down, the system was being manipulated, as is witnessed 
by the universal take over of low indme housing schemes by the better off. 
159 Dowall, The Land Market Assessment.; UNCHS, Guidelines for the improvement...; UNCHS. The reformulation of 
Building Acts ...; UNCHS, Case study of sites and services.. 
160 Okpala, "Received Concepts..." 
161 Mabogunje, "Urban Planning.." 
162 Hyden, No Shortcut to progress. 
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The ineffectiveness and inequitableness of government programmes has led to mounting 
pressure to allow market forces to work more efficiently. It is however realised that without 
planning and regulations, land markets are likely to generate enormous harmful external costs, 
and to fail to produce public facilities, major infrastructure, and urban services. This is 
perhaps already the case in many unplanned settlements. The solution to ineffective and 
counterproductive urban land policies is seen as not to do away with government intervention 
and policy initiatives, but to find a proper balance between the public and private sector with 
regard to urban land development and management 163 . In other words, to have the land 
policy supporting private initiative. 
But it is noted almost throughout Independent Africa, that the most enduring colonial 
legacy concerns the sets of institutions which still govern most spheres of action related to 
land policy e.g. laws, the civil service, attitudes to planning, local participation, and the 
structure and content of educational and health systems. Few countries have had the 
tenacity to face the challenge of entirely new systems. Consequently, the greatest legacy is 
intangible, and lies in the crucial realm which governs how decisions are made, by whom, and, 
for whom; and how implementation is effected 164 . 
1.3 Problem Identification 
Dar es Salaam, the primate and capital city of Tanzania has grown in terms of population 
from 2000 people in 1 888 to nearly 1,400,000 in 1988,   and in terms of area, from a few 
acres to nearly 1,400 square kilometres during the same period. An observation of the 
current land use morphology of Dar es Salaam reveals that, while the city is systematically 
structured in some parts, it is developing chaotically in many others. This has resulted in 
various phenomena including: riIbon development along major lines of infrastructure; 
unplanned residential development (which now accommodates 70% of the City's population); 
poor information or control on the various developments in the city; poor or total lack of the 
usual urban infrastructure (e.g. roads, drains, water and electricity supply networks) in most 
163 Dowali, The Land Market Assessment. 
164 
Lowder, Inside Third World Cities, p. 94. 
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neighbourhoods; environmental degradation as a result of uncontrolled development and use 
of hazard lands; unco-ordinated and incompatible redevelopment of inner city areas; a fairly 
low level of functional differentiation between retail trade, offices, small scale industry and 
residences; non development of a lot of officially allocated land; an overall low city density 
in terms of population per square kilometre; and so on. All these observations strike one as 
unusual, and call for a detailed investigation. 
The above picture suggests that Dar es Salaam is not systematically structured either in 
form of functional zones, or of income levels, or of types of developments. It does not reflect 
a structure responding to either a city well ordered by government, or, to the niceties of the 
market theory. It is this kind of unpatterned, irregular, and hotch potchy development, 
inconsistent with good land use planning or with the economic theories of land use structure, 
which engendered interest leading to this study. The main aim of the study is to unravel the 
various forces that have led to Dar es Salaam's land use structure over a period of more than 
a century of development, with particular emphasis on the effects of land policy. 
There is no doubt that several factors are responsible for Dar es Salaam's land use 
structure. In the foregoing review, we have concentrated on economic, historical and land 
policy factors as having a major impact on the evolution of the land use structure of urban 
areas. Which of these factors have been more prevalent in Dar es Salaam? Specifically, is 
Dar es Salaam's land use structure, the result of market forces as possibly supported by the 
government through land policy? Two hypotheses are put forward in the light of the problem 
identification outlined above. 
1.4. Study Hypotheses 
It is hypothesised that due to the weaknesses in the formulation, enforcement and 
implementation of an effective land policy, accentuated by a number of changes in local and 
national political power structures, Dar es Salaam did not attract so much government 
attention as to influence its spatial structure significantly. As a result, the evolution of the 
mosaic of land use within the city is largely spontaneous. 
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Altenatively is hypothethised that Oar es Salaam's spatial structure has been significantly 
affected by a discriminative and segregative land policy, leading to an inefficient and 
inequitable city land use structure. 
1.5. Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of this study were: 
One, to find out the imprint on Dar es Salaam's land use structure, of the various forces 
economic, historical and policy impacts, in the light of the known economic theory of land 
uses. It was hoped to find that the market, as assisted by the government, would be the 
chief determinorof Dar es Salaam's land use structure 
Two, to find out whether the trajectory of the evolution of Dar es Salaam's land use structure 
was similar to that taken by other cities in the Region in view of: 
o 	the changing rulers in Tanzania's history to whom Dar es Salaam was like a stepchild; 
o 	the absence of a strong caucus with a clear agenda for Dar es Salaam's development; 
o 	the different political ideology adopted in Tanzania after independence. 
Three, to find out whether the motivation of land policy has been the drive for efficiency and 
equity in land uses. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
1.6.1 Data Collection 
This work is based on an extensive study of archival material covering the colonial and 
post colonial eras. In this respect, much use has been made of documents kept by the 
National Archives in Dar es Salaam, the Universities of Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, the 
National Museum of Tanzania, the Dar es Salaam City Council and the Ministry of Lands. 
This was supplemented by current data on land uses kept by the Dar es Salaam City Council 
and the Ministry of Lands. 
The second major method of investigation was participant observation. In this respect, 
Mabogunje's reservations on what he termed "the so called modern urban research techniques 
based on the relatively shallow mass interview and data collection u165 was borne in 
mind, and it was realised that interviewing may not necessarily yield all the facets related to 
land policy, land use and develoment. Consequently, opportunity was seized to attend and 
to participate in various congregations related to urban land policy. This was all the more 
opportune since Tanzania had appointed a Present/a/Commission on LandMatters in January 
1991 to look into the various problems related to land policy; and was formulating a new 
national land policy though the Ministry of Lands. The researcher was part of an early team 
preparing the deliberations on this new national land policy and acted as a national consultant 
on deliberations on urban land policy. Several meetings bringing together high ranking 
government officials connected with national land policy were attended, and opportunity was 
seized by the researcher, to discuss informally with these officials, the various aspects of past 
and current approaches to rural and urban land policy. Besides, the researcher was part of a 
team preparing the Dar es Salaam City Profile for the UNCHS-supported Sustainable Dar es 
Salaam Project. This provided opportunity to study various documents and expert studies and 
reports on Dar es Salaam. The numerous workshops and meetings arranged by this Project 
proved invaluable in providing opportunities for discussions with key officials and politicians 
on Dar es Salaam's development. 
It was also deemed necessary to be a participant observer in the study areas in order to 
learn of the woes and aspirations of land developers, which could not come out clearly in 
sojourn extending over three months in each case, was short interviews. In this respect,,  
taken in the areas of Kijitonyama, Mbezi and Mabibo (below). Participant observation and 
informal exchange of opinion with the area residents was carried out. Furthermore, in the 
case of Kijitonyama, the researcherarticipated in popular meetings aimed at "doing 
something about our roads". In Mbezi, the researcher gained first hand experience by 
collarobating with the area's developers, people trying to develop an area without any positive 
assistance from government land policy. In Mabibo, it was found very instructive to join the 
residents in their efforts to ward off ministerial land use designs for the area (which would 
165 Mabogunje, Urban Planning.. , p. 168. 
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have displaced the current residents), and, instead, to have the area surveyed and 
consolidated to respect the current users' wishes. It was an uphill task, but positive 
development was achieved, and a lot of insights into the effects of an inefficient land policy 
was gained. Besides, the researcher, has lived in Dar es Salaam for nearly twenty years. 
Finally, in order to evaluate land policy vis a vis other variables, and to identify priorities, 
a questionnaire was administered. Because it would have been impossible to cover the whole 
of Dar es Salaam, it was decided to concentrate on areas which were facing a critical 
development situation; areas which would normally call for a positive and active response 
from public authorities through land policy. It was decided to evaluate the role of land policy 
in neighbourhoods selected from such areas. 
One of such neighbourhoods was Kariakoo, an inner city area, formely a native town, but 
now under immense pressure for redevelopment, with skyscrapers mushrooming, replacing 
the mud and daub Swahili houses. Other areas conceptually considered appropriate for the 
study were : an old unplanned area which has benefitted from some upgrading; an area 
beneficiary of the sites and service programmes of the 1 970s; a new developing unplanned 
area, and a new developing planned area. Manzese, Kijitonyama, Mabibo and Mbezi were 
respectively randomly selected to represent such areas. Within each neighbourhood, an 
endevour was made to interview one hundred randomly selected house/plot owners. A total 
of 500 house/plot owners were aimed at. Selection was made through the existing 
administrative 1 0-cell leader system. In each neighbourhood, the number of 1 0-cell leaders 
was identified, and ten of thes'vere selected randomly. These latter were approached and 
10 house/plot owners from each of the ten 1 0-cell leaders were selected, again randomly. 
It may be pertinent to mention that although originally each leader had just ten houses to look 
after, today many have several timethat number; so that the interviewed houseowners had 
to be selected from a large group. The results of the interviews are presented in Chapter 
Eight. Besides the interviews, physical observation, mapping and recording of the various land 
uses in these neighbourhoods was done. 
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1 .6.2 Data Analysis 
The Concertual Framework 
Since the study has a historical dimension, historical deduction of evidence in each epoch 
was a major tool of anaI'sis; bearing in mind the various aspects of land policy, and the 
advancement of the interests of the various actors on the scene, the resultant land use 
structure, and whether or not, such can structure can be considered as being efficient and 
equitable. 
Urban Land Use Structure 
A city's land use structure is considered to be the mosaic showing various dominant 
characteristics pertaining to land pieces in an area analysed. The major kinds of land uses 
uses identified are: Institutional (including Government), commercial, residential, industrial, 
transportation, recreational and open spaces, agricultural, and hazard. Residential uses usually 
occupy the largest proportion of the built up land in most urban areas, so concentration is 
focused on this use. Other complementary criteria like the race or social or income status of 
the land users are used in this study to highlight certain important characteristics of some 
areas. 
Efficiency and Equity in Urban Land Policy 
An evaluation of land policy entails two concepts of efficiency and equity. Efficiency 
concerns the maximisation of output from given resources, while equity implies fairness or 
justice in the distribution of society's benefits and penalties 166 . In many instances, the drive 
for efficiency may reinforce or4ead to inequality. However, the theory of government 
intervention in land uses e.g. using land policy, is based on the concept that the land market 
is extremely inefficient, and also that income redistribution is desirable. Therefore in 
evaluating land policy it may be indiãtive of efficiency if the policy removes or minimises 
those imperfections inherent in the private land market, thus leading to the minimisation of 
the costs of production, living, and social interaction. On the other hand economic efficiency 
may be compromised in order to achieve social equity. Figure 1.3 illustrates that households 
and firms, left on their own operate in an imperfect land market calling for the intervention of 
166 
D.M. Smith, Human Geography: A We/fare Approach, Arnold, London, 1977 
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public authorities through land policy. If properly conceived and implemented, land policy 
should lead to efficient economic or socially equitable land markets. That is the model that this 
study accepts. 
However, land policy affects the distribution of costs and privileges emanating from the 
functioning of the land markets. It can therefore be used, or otherwise manipulated, in favour 
of one group of society against, or compared to, another. If land policy exists that is 
ineffective, or that leads to the malfunctioning of the land markets, it would be proper to 
consider such a policy to be inefficient. Table 1.1 posits the common tools of land policy 
against their intended aims. This is in fact an elaboration of the intervention of land policy 
into the working of the land market as shown in Figure 1.3. In evaluating land policy a 
question is asked as to what extent does the land policy achieve those aims. The degree of 
success or failure in this respect is taken as an indicator of the appropriateness of land policy. 
Figure 1 .3: The Role of Land Policy in Land Markets. 
Private J Imperfect HHouseholds/Firms' 	- 	Land 	Land Decisions 	 I Markets 	Policy Efficient Economic or Socially Equitable Land Markets 
M. 
Table 1.1 Aims and Tools of Land Policy. 
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Further investigation was made into how far urban residents got the benefits of land policy 
in quantities and qualities that rnere not too divergent. Where, say, only a minority were 
found to enjoy such benefits, the land policy was considered to be inequitable, however 
efficient. On the other hand, an inefficient land policy is inequitable since it is likely to hurt the 
poor and the weak in society. Thrughout this work, simple percentages have been used 
where relevant. 
1 .6.3 Data Presentation 
In each of Chapters Three to Eight, facts, affecting the evolution of the landuse structure 
of Dar es Salaam are presented in a three variable framework that is, the general political 
economy of the epoch in question, land policy impacts and economic responses. A verdict, 
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based on historical deductions as to which of the above category of factors was more 
significant in affecting land use structure is thereafter presented at the end of each chapter. 
Maps, diagrams, charts and tables, supplemented by various photographs have been 
extensively used in this work. Copies of some historical documents that are considered 
crucial to the understanding of the arguments and whose sources are not readily available, are 
included in the Appendices. 
CHAPTER TWO 
DAR ES SALAAM, A PROFILE 
2.1 Geographical Characteristics 
2.1.1 Location 
Dar es Salaam is by far the largest urban area in Tanzania with a population, exceeding 
the total for the next eight ranked urban centres. It is still the de facto seat of Government, 
despite the declaration of the inland town of Dodoma as the country's capital since 1973.   
It is the country's chief commercial, economic, industrial, educational, transportation and 
cultural centre, as well as the country's chief port. It is connected by a network of roads, 
railways and waterways not only to the rest of the country, but also to neighbouring countries 
of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Zambia and Malawi (Figure 2.1) 
The city-region of Dar es Salaam is located between 6° 34' and 7° 1 0' south, and 
stretches along the Indian Ocean coast for about 1 00km from the mouth of the river Mpiji to 
the north to the river Mbezi to the south, and includes 8 offshore islands (Figure 2.2). It has 
a total area of 1387 sq.km of which 12.5% is densely built upon, accommodating over 90% 
of the city's population. The rural part comprises more than 30 small settlements, 
increasingly being penetrated by urbanites, and dependent for their economic life on the urban 
part. 
2.1.2 Topography 
The main topographical feature of Dar es Salam is the harbour penetrating almost 1 0km 
inland and, fed by the Mzinga and Kizinga Creeks (Figure 2.3). The inner harbour measures 
96 hectares. With a width of some700m and an adequate depth (after dredging in the late 
1 950s) for current seagoing vessels, it forms a natural marine turbulence shelter which 
attracted the city's founder (Zanzibar's Sultan Seyyid Majid bin Said), and later on, the 
German colonial Government. Although the harbour entrance is tricky, it is now well charted; 
making Dar es Salaam the most important port in the country. With eleven deep water 
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Figure 2.1 Tanzania: Tanzania Location of Dar es Salaam 
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Figure 2.3 The Dar es Salaam harbour 
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berths, it handled over 92% of the country's port cargo between 1 986-1 9901, as well as 
considerable cargo from Malawi, Zambia, Zaire, Rwanda and Uganda. 
2.1.3 Physival Features 2 
Dar es Salaam's physical surface can be divided into two contrasted regions: the coastal 
plain and the inland plateau (Figures 2.4a and 2.4b) 
The Coastal Plain: Mbweni to Ras Deqe 
The Coastal plain between Mbweni to the North and Ras Dege to the South is clearly 
defined West and Nothwest of the city centre. To the west, it is some 10 kilometres wide, 
but northwards, at Kawe, it narrows to 2 kilometres, before widening to 8 kilometres at Mpiji 
River. To the south east, it is between 5 and 8 kilometres wide. Overall, this is an area of 
fairly uniform relief with gradients of less than 3%, but steeper ones exist along the slopes 
of the Minga and Msimbazi valleys. The overlying rocks are of Pleistocene era and the 
overlying soils are mainly clay bound sands. Surface exposure of the plain varies. Along the 
inland margin there is a cover of coarse washed sands (colluvium) extending out from the 
hillfoot margins. Seaward of the colluvium apron, buff to brown sands underlie the surface. 
The seaward fringe of the coastal plain in the neighbourhoods of Dar es Salaam is generally 
formed of raised coral reef limestones. The lower coastal plain has two further features: 
circular ponds, pochtharks arsmall depressions locally known as Bwa was. There are nearly 
100 bwa was within 15 kilometres of the centre ol Dares Salaam. Also there are several linear 
swamp depressions, (so-called lakes of the city), many of which result from natural valley 
damming. The lakes occupy prexisting stream-valley lines with steep banks. Their surfaces 
are generttly overgrown by swamp vegetation; and all occupy tributaries of the more 
important stream systems. The more well known of the "Lakes" are Tandale, Minyonyoni, 
Tenge, Mtkurumla, Magomeni and Mwananyamala (Figure 2.6). Some sections of the coastal 
plain are k2avily discted e.g. in the Msimbazi, Mzinga and Kizinga catchments; and 
Tarania, Economic Survey for the year 1990, Government Printer, Oar es Salaam, 1990,   Table 60. 
2 	
SeeP.H. Temple, Aspects of the Geomorphoiogy of the Oar es Salaam Area", Tanzania Nàtes and Records, No. 71, 
1970, pp. 21-54. 
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Figure 2.4a Dar es Salaarn: Land Forms 
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wherever major plateau streams debouch accross the coastal plain, as in Mbezi and the lower 
Mpiji valleys. The main valleys themselves are markedly steep sided and flat-bottomed; 
terminating in active alluvial deltas which are infilling the head of the na systems that enclose 
them. 
The Coastal Plain: Ras Dece to Kimbiii 
South-east of Dar es Salaam, the relief of the coastal plain is more irregular and raises to 
greater heights inland of Ras Kimbiji. Immediately inland of Ras Kimbiji, topography has 
special characters associated with outcrops of the lower Miocene clay-bound sands which 
give rise to a strongly marked tellis drainage, while at the coast, raised limestones most likely 
correlated to those at Wazo and Kunduchi are faulted and elevated forming seacliffs, 30m 
high. 
South of the Kimbiji-Buyuni Peninsula, the coastal plain is formed of an extensive complex 
of beach ridges between 8 and 10 kilometres wide, covered with loose tan-brown and grey 
sands. The barriers run parallel to the present coastline and deflect local drainage. Inland of 
these barrier sand ridges, the coastal plain extends with a more uniform but gradually rising 
slope some five to seven kilometres to the faulted edge of the clay bound sands prominent 
to the west of Msorwa. 
The Inland Plateau 
This is the margin of an extensive plateau extending 70 kilometres westwards to its 
boundary with the Ruvu valley. The plateau has relatively uniform relief raising to over 330 
metres above sealevel in the Puu Hills but with average elevation ranging between 100 to 
200 metres. The plateau can be subdivided into: The Hill Zone South of Dar es Salaam; the 
Pugu Hills; the clay bound sands plaau; and the raised reef Iimestones of Wazo-Kunduchi. 
The Hill Zone Sou?h of Dar es Salaam: This comprises two flat topped hill ridges extending 
south-south-west from the Mzinga Creek parallel to the coast and seperated from the Pugu 
block by a parallel depression which extends through the head waters of the Mzinga River over 
the watershed into the Southern Mbezi catchment area and the Lake Mansi depression. The 
faulted ridges show the intricate relief and dissection patterns characteristic of the eroded 
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areas of the main clay-bound sand plateau. 
Pugu Hills: These are south-west of Dar es Salaam and form the highest land area in the 
environs of the City. They represent an uplifted and tilted fault-defined block underlain by 
medium-grained off-white kaolinitic sandstones. 
• Clay-bound Sands Plateau: The largest part of the inland plateau however is underlain by 
clay-bound sands except the Pugu Hills, and the limited zones of raised reef and limestone. 
The edge of the plateau is very dissected particularly to the east as can be seen along the Dar 
es Salaam-Morogoro Road to Kibaha, but further inland, relief is more uniform. Spectacular 
gullying is common along the eastern fault margin particularly where bush has been removed 
for cultivation, or by cattle tracks. The clay-bound sands are generally soft, poorly 
consolidated and poorly-bedded and therefore unfossiferous and easily weathering. 
• Raised reef ilmestones of Wazo-Kunduchi and Kimbiji-Buyuni: Raised coral limestone 
underlie limited sections of the eastern edge of the inland plateau in the Wazo-Kunduchi area 
with outcrops rising fifty to one hundred and twenty metres above sea level. Comparable 
limestones are to be found inland of Kimbiji and Buyuni at the seaward margin of the coastal 
plain. 
General observations 
Figures 2.4a and 2.4b respectively show the land form and topography of the Dar es 
Salaam area while figure 2.5 isa simplified distribution map of soils in the area. The profile 
presented has important connotations for urbanisation and environmental management. Areas 
suited for natural vegetation are well shown, and are those areas characterised by alluvium 
or saline soils with mangrove and organic soils. The areas overlain with sandy clays and 
clayey sands are also characterised by almost flat relief. This makes such areas suitable for 
building although problems of drainage may be experienced. The dissected clays and clayey 
sands located on steeper land are perhaps not the best suited for agriculture since they are 
loose and liable to erosion, but they are also ill suited for high density urban development. 
Therefore they are best left to agricultural and low density uses. The Redzinas are good for 
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building upon, but are also good for the extraction of limestone and coral stone for building 
purposes, or for cement manufacturing. This causes pollution and environmental degradation. 
Land best suited for natural vegetation (excluding forests) is considered to be river valleys, 
swamps and lakes. Dar es Salaam has many of these which include (with areas in square 
kilometres shown in brackets) the following: The valleys of rivers Nguva/Kisarawe/Ukooni 
(2.3 sq.km ); Mbwa Maji (0.5 sq.km ); Mwasonga (2.1 sq.km ); Mwera (2.0 sq.km ); Shangweni, 
(0.5 sq.km); Kisiwani, (1.8 sq.km); Kiwanjani, (0.3 sq.km); Mzinga (including its tributaries 
of Mkokozi and Bunguni) (18.2 sq.km ); the Kizinga (including its tributaries of Kinyamwezi, 
Yombo, Kurutini, Temeke and Mzinga), (5.8sq.km ); the Msimbazi (including its tributaries of 
Kinyerezi, Luhanga, Ubungo and Sinza, plus lakes Makurumla, Magomeni, Tenge, 
Mwananyamala and Tandale) (35 sq.km ); and rivers like Kijitonyama,Mlalakuwa, Mbezi, 
Tegeta, and Mpiji with restricted areas for natural vegetation. 
Other areas considered suitable for natural vegetation are mangrove tree swamps. These 
include those at Dege/Bandanini (2.25 sq.km ); Nguva (0.3 sq.km ); Kibugumo (1.1 sq.km ) the 
Mzinga Creek fork (2.Osq.km); the Msimbazi mouth (0.5 sq.km ) Jangwani Beach (1 .2 sq.km ) 
and from Mbweni northwards along the coast (10 sq.km). 
2.1.4 Drainage 
Various rivers, streams, lakes and swamps drain the Dar es Salaam area (Figure 2.6). 
Some, like the Msimbazi river have had significant effects on the development of Dar es 
Salaam. Among the most impctant of these are, from the south northwards: the Mbezi 
river; Nguva/Kisarawe/Ukooni rivers; Mzinga river, including its tributaries of Mkokozi and 
Bunguni; the Kizinga river, including its tributaries of Kinyamwezi, Yombo, Kurutini, Temeke 
and Mzinga; and the Msimbazi River including its tributaries of Kinyerezi, Luhanga, Ubungo, 
Sinza and Lakes Mkurumla, Magomeni, Tenge, Mwananyamala and Tandale. Others are 
rivers Kijitonyama, Mlalakuwa, Mbezi, Tegeta, Nyakasangwe, and Mpiji. These rivers provide 
the primary drainage network for Dar es Salaam. A number have U shaped steep valleys and 
most have wide flood plains suitable for natural vegetation. Unfortunately, a number of these 
rivers, particularly the Msimbazi, have been subjected to uncontrolled and untreated 
discharges including industrial effluents, causing serious pollution. Valleys for these rivers, 
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which have traditionally been the target for small agriculturists, have also been the target of 
residential, and in some cases industrial development. Expansion of uncontrolled settlements 
into flood plain areas, and unco-ordinated developments that block natural drainage patterns 
have made flooding a widespread problem in the city which can last for several weeks in 
lowlying areas or in those areas with low soil permeability and/or high groundwater table 
conditions. Rivers Msimbazi, Kijitonyama, Mbezi, Mpiji and Mzinga have in the past formed, 
or still currently form, part of Dar es Salaam's boundary. 
2.1.5 Vegetation 
The coastal plain has a semi-arid vegetation with some agriculture along roads and rivers. 
At the coastal fringe, palm groves and some swamp vegetation like mangroves or reeds occur. 
Swamp vegetation is to be found in the depressions of Mbwamaji, Mwasonga, Mwera, 
Shangweni Kisiwani and Kiwanjani, while mangrove tree swamps are to be found at 
Dege/Bandarini; Nguva; Kibugumo; the Mzinga creek fork; the Msimbazi river mouth, 
Jangwani Beach, and from Mbweni, northwards. 
Woodlands and forests are found in the Western and South-western part comprising two 
forest reserves i.e. Pande and Vikindu. All natural vegetation is under considerable pressure 
to give way for urban development and agriculture, and to provide timber for building and fuel. 
2.1.6 Climate 
The climate around Dar es Salaam is greatly influenced by the monsoon winds which blow 
South to South-east from April tô'October, and North and North-east between November and 
March. The June to October period is generally cool while the December to February one is 
hot. Short rains are experienced during November to December and the long rains during 
March to May. Most of the total rains come in short downpours. The rainfall of under 1100 
millimetres a year is Elightly less than one would expect for an equatorial east coast area. 
Dar es Salaam has a hot and humid climate with small seasonal and daily variations. The 
mean daily temperature is about 26°C, the mean seasonal range, about 40°C and the mean 
daily range about 8°C. The relative humidity reaches 100% on nearly every night and rarely 




hence the preference for beach residences by colonial officials and Europeans, and hence the 
high value put on land by the Ocean, and the social struggle to control such land as described 
later in this document. In the pre-airconditioning days at the beginning of this century, Dar 
es Salaam's climate led to the design of the German residences characterised by wide 
verandahs. Dar es Salaam's climate has been a factor that was often quoted to justify 
proposals to transfer the country's capital city since colonial times. Air conditioning or other 
man-made modification to the climate is desirable and has been widely adopted in most 
residential and office space. 
2.2 The Managerial Set Up 
2.2.1 Socio-economic Setting 
Dar es Salaam remains the primate city and undisputed administrative, commercial, 
industrial and transportation dominance in the country. In 1989 it had 37.4% of the nation's 
industrial establishments, 36.3% of industrial employees, 36.4% of industrial employers and 
48.8% of industrial wages 3 . 
The bulk of the Country's employment in the service sector is also concentrated in Dar es 
Salam, a city which in 1989 consumed 62% of the country's electricity, although it had only 
25% of the country's urban population. 
The area around Dar es Salaam was traditionally occupied by a local people called the 
Wazaramo, but it is doubtful whether they form the majority of Dar es Salaam's residents at 
the moment. Raum 4 notes that, of Dar es Salaam's 16,000 residents in 1903,   three 
quarters were "tribesmen from tbe interior". Dares Salaam has been a focus of immigration 
from all parts of the country, and from Asia and Europe, so that many races and ethnic groups 
are represented in the City. It is noteworthy that among the owners of land at the periphery 
of the town are people connectecfwith the pre-colonial caravan trade, and the colonial 
plantation economy i.e. the Wanyamwezi, Wagogo and the Wamakonde. 
Tanzania, Economic Survey for the Year 1990, Table 52A. 
O.F. Raum, "German East Africa: Changes in African Tribal life under German Administration, 1892-1914, in V. 
Harlow, E.M. Chilver. and A. Smith (Eds), History of East Africa, Oxford University Press, London, 1965, pp. 163-208. 
2.2.2 Demographic Development 
Table 2.1 gives the population growth of Dar es Salaam for the past 100 years from 1 887 
to 1988 when the last population census was undertaken. The racial breakdown of the 
population is available only for the colonial period, during which various policies including that 
on land were based on the race factor. 
In the years before 1948 Oar es Salaam was a small town and grew relatively slowly at 
2.6% p.a. For the 40 years after 1948, it grew at an impressive rate of 7.7% p.a. This 
suggests that most of Dar es Salaam's growth is a post World War II phenomenon, and that 
prior to that period, the small size of the town allowed the authorities freedom to be able to 
exert control on the direction of the town's development. After 1948,   and particularly since 
Independence, direct control of Dar es Salaam's development has been less easy on account 
of the sheer numbers of people being added to the city per annum. 
Table 2.1 Dares Salaam: Population Growth, 1887-1 988 
Years 
Population  
African Asian European Others Total 
1887* 350 2,000 
1894** 9,000 620 400 10,000 
1900** 18,000 1,480 360 20,000 
1913** 19,000 2,500 1,000 22,500 
1921 20,000 4,000 600 24,600 
1931 24,000 9,000 1,330 34,300 
1948 50,765 16,726 1,726 69,277 




Sources: Population census, relevanyears except: 
* S. von Sicard, The Lutheran Church on the Coast of Tanzania 1887-1914, Almquist 
and Wiksells qoktryckeri AB, Upsalla, 1970,   p.59, and, 
** C.C. Gillman, "Dar es Salaam, 1860-1940: A story of growth and change", 
Tanzania Notes and Records, No. 20, 1945,   pp. 1-23. 
The 1988 census figures which show that Dares Salaam had grown at only 4.9% p.a. 
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from 1978 has been generally accepted unwillingly. While there has been some let up in the 
growth of the largest urban areas in subsaharan Africa, the fall in Dar es Salaam's growth rate 
from 1 0.8% p.a. between 1967 and 1978 to 4.9% between 1978 and 1988 is too drastic 
to accept. A study by a group of consultants 5 put Dar es Salaam's population in 1988 in 
excess of 1 .7 million people. Currently, the Dar es Salaam City Council estimates the city's 
population to be over 2.4 million people. 
Dr. R. R. Scott, Executive Officer, Dar es Salaam Township Authority in the 1 920s, gives 
the population of Dares Salaam as 34,000 in 1914 and 16,000 in 1921, quoting census 
figures in the latter case. It is difficult to reconcile these figures and those given in Table 2.1, 
although the observation that Dares Salaam's population fell by more than half between 1914 
and 1921 is difficult to conceive 6 . 
2.2.3 Development Perspectives 
Introduction 
Unlike the old East African coastal towns of Kilwa, Zanzibar, Mombasa, Lamu, Malindi, 
etc., Dar es Salaam is a relatively new town of the 1 9th century. The town's founder, Sultan 
Majid bin Said did not see Dar es Salaam in terms of the typical old Arab settlements like 
Zanzibar's old town. He had Dar es Salaam planned from the beginning, most probably by 
European's 7 . Majid's new town went into decline after his death when it was barely five 
years old. However any spontaneity that may have taken place during this period was soon 
to be rectified by the towns' new rulers: the German and the British colonial administrators. 
These rulers ensured that the town complied to some prepared plan. Kariakoo, the old African 
settlement which had developed on a former Sultan's plantation was in fact planned and 
regularised both during the Gf'man and British periods. It resembles similarly planned areas 
in other African colonial towns like Pumwani location in Nairobi. Dar es Salaam therefore does 
not have the "stone town" or "the old island", or the "indigenous city" that Zanzibar, 
Tanzania, Preliminary Study on Drainage for Dar es Salaam, Haskoning and M-Consult, 1989.   
See R.R. Scott, "Public Health in Dar as Salaam in the Twenties", EastAfrican Med/ca/Journal, Vol.40, No.7, 1963, 
p. 347. 
W. de Boer, Urban Renewal and Rehabilitation in Kariakoo, Dar Es Salaam. Part one: Prestudies/Recommendations, 
(Mimeo), Ardhi Institute, Dar es Salaam, 1984, p.  21. 
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Mombasa or Ibadan, (respectively), have for example. 
A general observation of Dar es Salaam's early develpment suggests that until the 1 950s, 
the city's growth was influenced by Government policy to develop in an eight o'clock fashion 
with African as well as Industrial areas growing southwestwards between Pugu Road and 
Msimbazi river, and European areas growing northwards along the Ocean. Asian areas 
remained at the hub, sandwiched in the central area, but overspilling to nearby Upanga area. 
During the 1 950s the town's boundaries were extended as new residential neighbourhoods 
mainly for Africans were planned by the government in the areas of Temeke, Ilala, Magomeni 
and Kinondoni; and as subdivisions for non African housing were undertaken on public land 
like in Oysterbay and Kurasini, and on private estates of Victoria, Regent, and Ada. 
Unplanned and Spontaneous Development 
While spontaneous unplanned settlement development has been a feature of Dar es 
Salaam since the pre-1 920 period many such settlements that grew up were usually cleared 
or regularised by the colonial authorities. After 1948,   unplanned settlements became a 
serious problem. However, with a buoyant postwar economy in the country, plus funding 
from the Colonial Welfare Development Fund, unplanned settlements growth was kept under 
check. 
The current unplanned development in Dar es Salaam is therefore a post-Independence 
phenomenon. In 1960,   the Land Office estimated that there were 5,000 squatter houses in 
Dar es Salaam. In 1963,   a survey by the Town Planning Division based on aerial photographs 
found 7,000 such houses. In 1972 a survey by the Ministry for Lands, Housing and Urban 
development found 27,981 squattai.houses accommodating 223,843 people. The Dar es 
Salaam 1979 Masterplan study identified 25 unplanned settlement accommodating 478,489 
people (60% of the City's population), in 43,501 residential units, and covering an area of 
2,349 hectares. A study of various land use and population documents indicated that in 
1988,   there were at least 40 unplanned areas in Dares Salaam covering some 5,236 hectares 
and accommodating an estimated 950,000 people (i.e 70% of Dar es Salaam's population). 
Thus a major characteristic of Dar es Salaam's growth is the preponderance of unplanned 
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development through both structure intensification in existing unplanned areas and through 
the colonisation of new areas (Chapter 7). 
Observers of Dar es Salaam's unplanned areas have noted that a cross section of all 
income groups are to be found in such areas. Moreover lack of services is not the 
distinguishing factor between planned and unplanned areas because both suffer from 
deprivation of such services 8 . Also Dar es Salaam does not have the makeshift housing that 
is typical of unplanned areas in many cities of Third World countries. A recent study of three 
unplanned areas in Dar es Salaam carried out by the Department of Urban Planning of Ardhi 
Institute throws some light on the conditions obtaining in Dar es Salaam's unplanned areas 
(Table 2.2). Buguruni, the oldest of the three, has a low incidence of the use of permanent 
building materials defined as concrete or cement blocks and corrugated iron roofs, while 
Mabibo, the newest, has 90% of its houses constructed in permanent materials. This is a 
clear indication of the confidence that developers have in their unplanned areas. As can be 
observed from Table 2.2, population densities in these unplanned areas are not as high as 
recorded for many unplanned areas in other parts of the world. Moreover 46.5% of the 
houses in Mabibo and 35% in Mikocheni had electricity while 22.6% of the houses in 
Mikocheni "A" had individual plot water connexions. This compares well with citywide 
percentages of 33.3% and 30.5% for electricity and water respectively. There is therefore 
some reasons to believe that Dar es Salaam's unplanned areas include a variety of households 
whether defined according to income or social status. 
Besides the development of unplanned areas, Dar es Salaam's growth is characterised by 
ribbon development along the rajor routes out of the city i.e. Bagamoyo, Morogoro, Pugu, 
and Kilwa Roads. The Port Access Road, opened in 1980 has helped to open up industrial 
and residential areas in the UbungBuguruni areas which were until then, undeveloped, 
compared to the distant areas of Kimara and Mbezi along the Morogoro Road. Ribbon 
development is not Tust  spontaneous but is also a result of action by the Planning Authorities 
who in their attempts to avoid built up areas, inevitably have to alienate distant lands. 
8 	A.R.L. Brain, The Political Economy of Urbanisation in Tanzania, Phd Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1 979; 
J.L.P. Lugalla, Socialist construction and the Urbanisation Process and Politics in Tanzania, Phd Thesis, University of 
Bremen, 1990. 
LEA 
Currently, for example, planning schemes are being sponsored by the Government in the Bunju 
area, more than 30 kilometres from the city centre while land much nearer to the city is still 
sparsely developed. This is an aspect of land policy which represents an inefficient form of 
land utilisation. 
Table: 2.2: Some recent data on three unplanned areas in Dar es Salaam. 
Settlement Area Total Popul- Number % buildings const-ructed in 
(Ha) Popul- ation of build- permanent materials 
ation per Ha ings 
Mabibo 24.8 4680 189 585 90.7 
Mikocheni 
"A" 31.3 5134 191 1031 44.7 
Buguruni 65.8 13355 205 1140 12.0 	 -- 
ource: uepariment OT uroan vianning, Arani institute June, 1991.   
Dar es Salaam's spontaneity in growth is not 	limited to unplanned residential 
development. There are many areas, particularly along major routes, which have been 
converted into commercial, industrial and transportation uses without the sanctioning of the 
planning authorities. Spontaneous commercial areas can be seen along Bagamoyo Road, at 
Namanga; along Morocco, Morogoro, Shekilango and Port Access roads, at Mwenge, etc. and 
in numerous other locations. 
Poor or Lack of Infrastructure 
A noticeable characteristic of Dar es Salaam's development is the poverty or lack of 
municipal infrastructure particularly roads, drains, water and electricity supply networks, and 
sewers. One can also mention the total absence of public conveniences, and the near total 
absence of public telephones. 
(i) Roads 
Many roads are in a pathetic state (Figure 2.7), although at the time of writing 
rehabilitation work was going on for some of the major throughfares. However, many 
neighbourhoods be they planned or unplanned, remain unacessible especially during the rainy 
seasons. 
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Figure 2.7 Dar es Salaam; Road Condition 
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There are only 1,200 kilometres of roads in Dar es Salaam. Of these, 200 kilometres are 
arterial, and 1,000 kilometres are collector. Only 450 kilometres are paved. The rest are 
gravel rolled or earth compacted. Only about 1 0% of the roads are in good condition while 
those which are in very poor condition include most local roads. Roads comprise less than 
0.5% of the City's area, and even when road reserves are taken into account, the percentage 
of land used as roads rises to only 2.3% as opposed to the normal proportion of 1 5%. 
Considering that ideally each plot should abutt to a road, a lot of land in Dar es Salaam has 
no direct access to roads. This not only reduces accessibility, it reduces access to buildeable 
land. This in turn, leads to ribbon development along existing roads; to overbuilding and 
overcrowding in existing accessible areas; and to settlement overspill onto hazard lands near 
existing roads. It also discourages fast development of allocated land and reduces the 
availability of land use information necessary for urban management. 
Stormwater Drainage 
There are about 1, 100 kilometres of open line ditches and 600 kilometres of piped storm 
water drainage in Dar es Salaam. Most were constructed in the 1 950s and are therefore over 
30 years old. They are mainly to be found in the city centre, the old planned areas like 
Kinondoni, Magomeni, Ilala, Upanga, Kariakoo, the Pugu Road Industrial area, Chang'ombe, 
Kurasini and Temeke; and in parts of the planned areas of Mwenge, Mikocheni and 
Kijitonyama. Most drains are reduced to insufficient bores through lack of maintenance, 
siltation or actual collapse. Unplanned areas, and many areas planned since the late 1 970s 
have no stormwater drainage facilities, while many natural drains are increasingly being 
blocked so that many parts of Dar es Salaam get flooded during the rainy seasons, and in 
many cases, roads act as drainsfhus getting badly damaged. 
Water Supply 
Water for Dar es Salaam is obtained from Mtoni and Ruvu sources. The supply is not only 
insufficient to meet the daily demand but 22% of Dar es Salaam's population have no access 
to piped water supply. Only 30.5% of the population have water supply on their plots. Many 
areas planned from the late 1 970s have no public water networks; so that in most cases 
water reaches individual plots through the expensive and inefficient individual households 
efforts. The Ruvu river is supposed to provide 269 million litres of water a day; and the 
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smaller source at Mtoni, 4.5 million litres. A study carried out in 1991 9 estimated that there 
were 60,000 private water connections in the city supplying some 800,000 people. Of these 
connections only 2,000 were metered with a 60% functioning efficiency. Of the 50 stand 
pipes surveyed, only 20 were working. The study estimated that there were 50,000 illegal 
connections. Leakage is estimated to account for 40% of water losses. With highly limited 
revenue collection, the water authority has not been able to expand the plants and network 
to supply the water quantity and quality as required; so that many areas go without water 
for days, and others have no piped networks at all. 
(iv) Liquid waste management 
There is less than 130 kilometres of sewer networks in Dar es Salaam, serving less than 
5% of the city's population. These are grouped into 11 systems and are supported by 17 
pumping stations. The network covers the city centre (constructed in the 1 950s), the Ubungo 
and Vingunguti industrial areas and a few outlying residential and institutional areas including 
the University of Dar es Salaam, Lugalo Barracks, and parts of Buguruni, Regent Estate, 
Mikocheni and Kijitonyama (Figure 2.8). The city centre system discharges to the sea outfall 
off Ocean Road where the end of the 1 040 metre long pipe lies in less than 2 metres of water 
and numerous fractures discharge raw sewage into mud flats exposed at low tide. Other 
effluent is discharged into oxidation ponds, local water courses and directly to the Ocean. 
Many of the oxidation ponds no longer operate due to the lack of maintenance. This results 
in raw sewage discharges into the surface drainage system. Untreated industrial effluents are 
also discharged directly to surface drainage systems 10 . 
Of the remaining 2.2 million people, approximately 80% have access to onsite facilities 
(70% pit latrines, 30% septic tanks), while the remaining 20% (about 380,000 people) lack 
even elementary sanitary facilities. Public authorities operate tanker lorries to dislodge septic 
tanks and pits, but few of these are operational at any given time; and in any case, many 
areas are inaccessiLe. 
Tanzania, Rehabilitation of Oar es Salaam Water Supply, Japanese International Consulting Agency (JICA), 1991. 
10 
M. Yhdego, "Urban Environmental Degradation in Tanzania", Environment and Urbanisation, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1991, pp. 
147-152. 
Figure 2.8 Dar Cs Salaam: Sewer Network 
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High water table in some areas effects approximately 40% of the on-site users so that many 
pit latrines and septic tanks overflow to surrounding surfaces and natural drainage systems. 
Unreliable water supply makes it necessary for some residents with water borne facilities to 
erect pit latrines as a precautionary measure. 
Unlike cities such as Nairobi and Harare, Dar es Salaam has no comprehensive sewer 
network. This has important implications on urban land uses because structure densities must 
be relatively low and plots must be relatively large to accommodate septic tanks and pit 
latrines. This therfore increases urban sprawl in the peripheral areas of the city in attempts 
to acquire large residential plots. 
(v) Electricity 
While Dar es Salaam consumed over 60% of the country's electricity, only 33.3% of the 
households in the city use electricity. The majority, 65.7%, are not connected to the city's 
electricity network. The supply of electricity to neighbourhoods is mainly dependent on an 
expensive and inefficient process based on individual households requests. Street lighting is 
highly restricted to a few areas, and even then, to only a few bulbs. 
General remarks on Services 
The above factors make Dar es Salaam an expensive, and potentially hazardous city in 
which to live and invest. This is in many ways related to the kind of land use structure that 
such a situation of poor land servicing yields. For example, ribbon development makes it 
necessary for some residents to change buses three times to, or from, the city centre, with 
the expenditure on fares alonêbonsuming more than twice the basic wage. Environmental 
degradation is experienced because of stress on the lands near service lines and of discharge 
of effluents into the rivers and the Ocean. Health hazards may be suffered as a result of 
overflowing waste water, or of using non piped water or piped water which is contaminated 
through leakages.' Cholera, for example, is a recurring disease in Dar es Salaam. 11 Land 
development particularly in new area gets stunted. Energy costs become very high not only 
because of long distances, but also of poor roads. 
There was a major cholera outbreak in Dar es Salaam in the month of July, 1993. 
2.2.4 Land Use Information 
Dar es Salaam's land use profile is characterized by a situation where the land use 
information, essential for efficient urban management is lacking. Most transactions in land, 
be they official or unofficial are done secretly. For example, planned land use schemes for 
most neighbourhoods are not readily available for consultation. Although once approved, land 
use schemes have some legal status under the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 
1956,   experience since the late 1 970s has shown that officials can revisit the schemes and 
"create" plots on them haphazardly; especially on public lands and in neighbourhoods that are 
yet to be densely built upon 12 . Besides, legally and procedurally, land available for allocation 
should be made public and allocated by known land allocation committees. In practice this 
is no longer the case. Official land is generally allocated outside the allocation committees by 
various unco-ordinated authorities. Most public open spaces in Dar es Salaam must now be 
regarded as endangered species. 
A noticeable feature of Oar es Salaam is the lack of street names, for all but the areas 
planned before 1970.   House/Plot numbering is also missing on the post-i 970 developments. 
This makes it extremely difficult to identify different properties for the purposes of efficient 
land management; and to keep proper records for property taxation, cost recovery; etc. This 
situation is made worse by the fact that plot/house numbers need not flow logically in a 
locality because new plots with totally different numbering systems are constantly being 
added to old neighbourhoods through haphazard "creations'. 
2.3 Urban Government 
2.3.1 Background 
The first local authorities introduced for urban areas were the Kommunal Verbandes, 
established in 1901 by the Germancolonial administration. Later, these had their powers 
curtailed and new authorities (Stadtgemaindes) were established for Dar es Salaam and Tanga 
in 1909. 
12 	
J.M.L. Kironde, "Creations in Oar es Salaam and Extensions in Nairobi: the defiance of inappropriate planning 
standards", Cities, Vol 9, No. 3, 1992, pp.  220-21 3. 
Under the British Administration,the Township Ordinance of 1920 allowed the declaration 
of Dar es Salaam to be a Township administered by a central government appointed Township 
Authority which had a President (usually the District Officer), an Executive Officer or 
Municipal Secretary, andY official members, one each from the District representatives of the 
Departments of Medical Services, Public Works and Lands and Mines, and unofficial members 
nominated by the President and approved by the Provincial Commissioner on behalf of the 
Governor. The President was empowered to appoint an Executive Officer, unless a Municipal 
Secretary was appointed by the Governor. Dar es Salaam had an executive officer till 1930 
when a Municipal Secretary was appointed. 
Efforts in the 1 920s and 1 930s to transform Dar es Salaam into a municipality were 
discouraged and frustrated by the central government until 1949 after the Municipalities 
Ordinance of 1946 had been enacted. Dar es Salaam was thus made a Municipality in 1949 
and a City in 1961. Until 1974,   Dar es Salaam was a full district of, or part of a district in, 
the Eastern Province of Tanganyika; although the urban area within the District was first 
administered by a Municipal and later by a City Council. 
When local authorities were abolished in Tanzania between 1972 and 1974,   Dar es 
Salaam lost its municipal status and became a Region subdivided into three districts of 
Temeke, Ilala and Kinondoni. Each of these was administered by a District Development 
Council. When in 1978,   local authorities were reintroduced, urban Dar es Salaam regained 
its Municipal Status and administered by a City Council; while the rural part was largely 
administered by the Dar es Salaam Regional Authorities. In 1984,   the distinction between the 
City and rural Dar es Salaam was discontinued; and the whole of Dar es Salaam is now 
administered by the City Council. It has three districts and is subdivided into 52 wards (see 
Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2). 
Dar es Salaam is a Region with a complete Regional administrative set up headed by a 
Regional Commissioner and having a District Commissioner for each of its three Districts. 
Although occassionally the boundary of powers between the Regional and City Council 
administrations is not clear cut, Regional authorities have tended to confine themselves to 
non-municipal, and national aspects of Dar es Salaam's administration. 
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Table 2.3 The Wards of Oar es Salaam, with their Population in 1988 
ILALA DISTRICT (210 km 2 ) KINONDONI DISTRICT TEMEKE DISTRICT (650 
(527 km 2 ) km 7 ) 
Urban Population Urban Population Urban Population 
Wards Wards Wards 
Kariakoo 12,569 Mzimuni 23,985 Mbagala 40,866 
Mchafukoge 8,547 Magomeni 16,944 Miburani 72,892 
Kisutu 8,358 Ndugumbi 32,736 Mtoni 39,417 
Gerezani 7,487 Makurumla 53,551 Temeke 14 91,144 
Kivukoni 5,372 Manzese 54,499 Kurasini 26,776 
Jangwani 15,320 Kigogo 21,222 Keko 42,868 
E. Upanga 9,807 Mabibo 45,963 Kigamboni 26,078 
W. Upanga 11,020 Ubungo 46,980 Charambe 18,624 
lIala 35,048 Kinondoni 42,387 
Mchikichini 15,040 Mwananyamala 72,508 
Buguruni 48,247 Msasani 51,293 
Vingunguti 33,690 Tandale 58,413 
Kipawa 36,910 Kawe 44,085 
Tabata 18,465 
Ukonga 45,203  
Total, 311,083 565,006 358,665 
Urban 
Wards 
Rural Wards Population Rural Wards Population Rural Wards Population 
Kin ye rez i* 3,048 K und uchi* 22,743 YomboVituka 13,408 
Pugu 6,226 Kibamba* 16,751 Kimbiji 6,465 
Msongola 13,351 Goba 4,753 Somangila 6,730 
Bunju 9,977 Vijibweni 2,557 




Total Rural 22,625 56,383 47,088 
Wards 
Total 33,708 621,389 405,753 
Population  
Source: Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 1988: Regional Profile, Dar es Sa/aam, Dar 
es Salaam, n.d. 
*Rura l Wards with Town Planning layouts already. 
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There are at the moment, proposals to split Dar es Salaam into three "municipalities" each 
with its own Mayor and a Council. This may improve efficiency provided major problems 
related to urban management (e.g. poor revenue collection, corruption, political interference, 
unqualified and unmotivated personnel, etc)., are tackled at the same time. The split will 
' introduce some measure of competition among the three authorities possibly leading to better 
management. The current Dar es Salaam City Council, however, is not in favour of this split 
and has been postponing making a decision on the issue. 
2.3.2 The Dar es Salaam City Council 
Dar es Salaam is administered by an elected council chaired by the Mayor. Councillors are 
elected from each ward, and they subsequently elect the Mayor from among themselves. The 
City Director who is appointed by the President of Tanzania, is the highest executive officer 
of the Dar es Salaam City Council. The Director has two Deputies (one for Dar es Salaam 
urban, and the other for Dar es Salaam rural). Since 1988,   Assistant City Directors have been 
appointed for Dar es Salaam's three Districts. 
Figure 2.9 shows the management structure of the Dar es Salaam City Council. Major 
aspects of urban development are dealt with under the Urban Planning Department which is 
made up of the sections of urban planning, land surveying, land valuation, land management 
and natural resources, the latter involving gardens, parks forestry, beekeeping and burial 
grounds. The Departments of Sewerage and Sanitation, Engineering, Health and Economic 
Planning have considerable inflqnce on many aspects of land policy and development. 
Since 1983,   Dar es Salaam's top executive post (i.e. the office of the City Director) has 
experienced a lot of turbulence. Betvëen that year and mid 1993 Dar es Salaam has had nine 
city directors, an average tenure of just over one year each. This, to some extent, has denied 
the Dar es Salaam City Council of the ability to formulate coordinated urban development and 
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Source: Dar es Salaam City Council, September, 1992.   
A lot of national authorities have considerable powers of operation in Dar es Salaam 
independent of the City Council. These include the Ministries of Lands, Water, Works, 
Communications, Energy, Education and Culture, as well as parastatals like the National 
Housing Corporation, NatioaI Urban Water Authority, Tanzania Posts and 
Telecommunications and the Tanzania Electricity Supply Company. The ruling political Party 
of Tanzania (CCM), at branch, w,rd, district, and regional levels, is fully engaged in 
authorising and overseeing land transactions particularly in unplanned areas and of converting 
public open spaces ifto private uses. Lack of co-ordination, and overlapping powers between 
these authorities and the City Council is a notable feature of Dar es Salaam's development. 
Ui 
2.4 Overview of Dar es Salaam's Profile 
Further insights into Dar es Salaam's profile can be gained by dividing the City's 
development areas into four groups: The first is the old planned areas, developed mainly 
before 1970 and including the City Centre, Kariakoo, Oysterbay, Chang'ombe, Pugu Road 
Industrial area, Upanga, Kinondoni, Magomeni, Ilala and Temeke. For most part, these areas 
need redevelopment or refurbishing to cope with current needs and opportunities. In some 
cases - Kariakoo, a former native town being the best example -, rundown houses are being 
bought, demolished and rebuilt into multistorey buildings. These redevelopment schemes 
however are not co-ordinated so that development is isolated and the existing infrastructure 
is not expanding in tune with the intensity of use to which land is being put. There is no 
general and effective land policy to deal with the problems of these old areas. 
The second group is the new planned areas generally developed or developing since 1970 
and include the sites and services areas of Kijitonyama, Sinza, Mikocheni and Mbagala, and 
the post sites and services areas of Mbezi Beach, Tegeta, Tabata etc. These areas are 
characterised by poor land servicing. Not even rough roads are ploughed into areas in some 
planning schemes where land is being allocated. Slow plot consolidation is also an observable 
phenomenon. The standard of the properties that are slowly being put up in such areas, 
however, is very high in most instances. Among other things, land policy has failed to ensure 
that these areas are serviced and development rapidly, and has produced a paradoxical 
situation where expensive buildings cannot be easily accessed because of lack of services. 
The third group is the old unplanned areas which have developed generally before 1 980; 
and which include such settlements as Keko, Buguruni, Msasani, Manzese, Mwananyamala, 
Hannah Nassif, Manzese, Mtoni and Tandika. The latter two benefitted somewhat from the 
upgrading schemes of the 1 970s, but a main characteristics of such areas is the very high 
densities to which land is put, and the irregular pattern in which land is developed. 
The fourth group is the new unplanned areas. These have developed mainly during the 
past two to three decades and include such outer areas as Kimara, Mabibo, Bunju, Mbagala 
and Ukonga. Major characteristics of these are that they are partly developed to fairly low 
densities; they include a sizeable population of people in high income and/or in influential 
901 
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positions. Land in these areas is partly put to agricultural uses. 	It should however be 
pointed out that some new unplanned areas are currently being created on land that was 
formerly considered hazard in the inner parts of Dar es Salaam like along the inner area valleys 
of rivers like Msimbazi and Sinza, and along Keko Creek; and elsewhere. These are developed 
at high densities and agriculture is not undertaken. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SHAPING THE COLONIAL CAPITAL (1890 - 1917) 
3.1. Dares Salaam and the advent of German rule in East Africa 
3.1 .1 Introduction 
Although Dar es Salaam was founded in the 1 860s and although, in the Dar es Salaam 
area, there were several small trade centres, settlements, and villages, the town's rapid 
growth and development was closely related to its choice as the seat of the German colonial 
government in 1 891; and as an important entrepot in the colonial economic set up. Dar es 
Salaam's growth therefore, bears the imprint of the colonial designs for German East Africa 
which were, in the main, to exploit the resources of the colony, and at:the same time to 
convert the colony into a market for manufactured goods. 
Two phases are normally identified when discussing the history of German colonialism 
in East Africa: a largely militaristic phase, from the 1 880s to 1907,   devoted to territorial 
subjugation and when German East Africa was ruled by military governors; and a phase of 
peace and reform (1907-1914), characterised by the rule of civilian governors and major 
reorientation in German colonial policy 1 . This phasing has relevance to the evolution of the 
land use structure of Dar es Salaam; particularly since the latter phase is also identified with 
the construction of the Central railway line from Dar es Salaam to the interior. Authorities 
too, took advantage of the peace and tranquility prevailing in the latter phase to devote more 
time to the shaping of Dar es SaPaem. 
3.1.2 Colonial Territorial demarcation in East Africa 
Bismark, the then German Imperial Chancellor was, until 1884, opposed to the direct 
acquisition of colonies by Germany. German colonialism in East Africa was consequently 
spearheaded by private interests led by Karl Peters, who, in 1 884 concluded treaties with 
local Sultans in the hinterland areas between rivers Pangani and Kingani (Ruvu) on the 
1 	J. Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979.   
Tanzanian coast. In 1885, Bismark changed hi§ mind, and was all for the acquisition of 
colonies, so that Peters' treaties concluded the previous year, were sanctioned and the areas 
concerned placed under Imperial protection, although they were at first, governed through the 
German East Africa Company. The latter had been formed by private interests to oversee the 
exploitation of the Colony. The Sultan of Zanzibar protested at this German annexation of his 
territory, but was forced to withdraw his claims by a German naval demonstration off 
Zanzibar. It was obvious that the Germans were determined to use force to achieve their 
ends. By a treaty of 1885, Germany secured, from the Sultan, privileges at Dar es Salaam 
and Pangani and a right to send certain goods duty free through the coastal strip to the 
interior. In 1886, Germany, Britain and Portugal agreed on each others' spheres of influence, 
as well as on the territories to be recognised as belonging to the Sultan of Zanzibar. Between 
1 885 and 1887, the German East Africa Company set up a number of stations which were 
both trading posts and plantations, and in 1 888 the Company was allowed by the Sultan of 
Zanzibar, to collect custom dues at the coast, to mine minerals, to regulate commerce, and 
to improve communications. 
The German East Africa Company had ambitious plans for the territory. According to 
its director in 1888, Herr Ernest Vohsen, the intention was to establish thoroughly the 
administration of the Customs. Seven main stations were to be formed each under the charge 
of two Germans. They were to be connected, one to the other, by minor stations under the 
charge of a single German official. Efficient coastguard service was to be instituted without 
delay. Two steamlaunchers had already been brought out; more were to come. As soon as 
it was found necessary, an armed force for land services would be enlisted and drilled 2 In 
this respect, the German East Africa Company's first Proclamation ordered that, with effect 
from the 1 5th August, 1888, customs on all merchandise exported from the Coast between 
Umba and Ruvuma rivers was to be pai to German Authorities at Tanga, Pangani, Bagamoyo, 
Dar es Salaam, Kilwa Kivinje, Lindi, and Mikindani 3 . This interference with established trade 
interests, and possibly the harsh ways in which the Germans treated their subjects, 
2 	Colonel Euan-Smith to the Marquis of Salisbury, June 1 • 1888, reported in, British Parliamentary Papers, The 
Zanzibar Papers, 1841-1898, Irish University Press, Shannon, Ireland, 1971. 
Colonel Euan-Smith to the Marquis of Salisbury, 26.7.1888, reported in, British Parliamentary Papers, The 
Zanzibar Papers. 
engendered a rebellion along the Coast led by Abushiri bin Salim al-Harthi. The German East 
Africa Company was unable to deal with this rebellion, and it was obvious that the German 
Government's strategy of getting and ruling colonies through chartered companies would not 
succeed. The Imperial Government had to intervene to directly supervise the administration 
and exploitation of the Colony4. In spring 1889, Captain Wissman was appointed Imperial 
Commissioner for German East Africa. He arrived with a sizeable force which fought and 
subjugated the rebels whose leader, Abushiri, was publicly hanged at Pangani in December, 
1 889. 
In June 1890, Britain and Germany agreed on the partitioning of East Africa and the 
Sultan of Zanzibar was persuaded to give up his claims over the Mainland in return for 
compensation. The present Tanzania (less Zanzibar) plus Rwanda and Burundi became the 
Colony of German East Africa. The German East Africa Company gave up its administrative 
functions over the colony to the Imperial government, and became merely a commercial 
concern. A period of full German colonialism in East Africa had begun. 
3.1.3 Imposing German Colonial Rule 
Having delienated their colony, the Germans set out to extend their rule throughout the 
territory. They met with a lot of resistance from the local population. The Germans had a 
single focus of facilitating production through the maintenance of the physical state and the 
supply of labour and were interested in getting the colony on a productive basis as rapidly as 
possible. In order to achieve this, military action had to be undertaked against local leaders 
or populations, who did not readily welcome German rule, or who opposed German plans. 
German rule was, right from the start, regimentary and characterised by a policy known as 
"Shreckl/chke/t't (frightfulness). Although Schnee argues that German policy was no more 
"barbaric" than the policies of otlr colonising powers, he nevertheless describes the 
colonised peoples as "savages" who had to be whipped 5 . Between 1888. and 1906,   there 
were no fewer than eleven insurrections against German rule in German East Africa, three of 
W. Rodney, "The Political Economy of Colonial Tanganyika, 1890-1930", in, M.H.Y. Kaniki, (Ed), Tanzania 
under Colonial Rule, Longmans, London, 1979, pp. 128-163. 
H. Schnee, German Colonialism, past and future: The truth about German Colonies, G. Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1926. 
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which lasted more than four years 6 . By far the most serious revolt was the famous Maji Maji 
rebellion (1 905-1 907) which saw nearly a third of the German Colony in East Africa pitted 
against German rule. When this rebellion was finally vanguished with serious loss of life and 
property, German colonial policy underwent major reforms. But as late as 1909,   punitive 
expeditions were still being mounted against rebellious peoples in Burundi Kilimatinde, 
Mpwapwa, and Moshi 7 . 
Because it took long to achieve complete territorial subjugation, resources for socio-
economic development (including investment in urban areas) were difficult to mobilise. Scarce 
resources had to be devoted to military operations against rebellious peoples, and confidence 
in the colony among German investors and legislators took long to get created 8 . After the 
Maji Maji rebellion, there was agitation from the German Parliament for more humane 
treatment of colonial subjects. Such a liberal phase was a pre-requisite for the entrenchment 
of colonial capitalist relationships. Later on, once defeated and colonised, Africans 
accommodated the new order submisivelly, willingly, and sometimes, even enthusiastically. 
Thus, by 1906,   African peasant agricultural production was more efficient than that of 
German settlers. By 1908 the African share of the Colony's cotton export product was about 
two thirds, and had reached five sevenths by 1 91 2. More resources could thus be devoted 
to peaceful colonial development of infrastructure. 
3.1.4 Frameworks for Colonial Administration 
Typical of German policy, the territorial colonial administrative framework was 
centralised and hierarchical, desned to keep the physical peace and ease the exploitation of 
the colony. At the pinnacle of the administrative structure was the Governor who was 
assisted by the referents of the departments and the District Commissioners. After 1911 , the 
6 	L Fortmann, Peasants, Officials, and Participation in rural Tanzania: Experience with villagisation and 
decentralization, PhD Thesis, Cornell University, New York, 1980. 
German Colonial Government, Annual Report on the Development of German East Africa, 1908109. 
8 	N. Brode, British and German East Africa: Their Economic and Commercial Relations, Edward Arnold, London, 
1977. 
Rodney, "The Political Economy of Colonial Tanganyika", pp.  134-35. 
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Governor was advised by an all German Advisory Council. Since there were few 
administrators, lower levels of the administration were entrusted to the Akidas and Jumbes 
for rural areas and Liwalls for coastal towns (Figure 3.1). The Akidas, Jumbes and Liwalis 
were usually people of coastal extraction and had the duties of ensuring law and order, 
collecting taxes, constructing roads, introducing cash crops to the natives, and ensuring 
production, regulating forest areas and organizing and controlling predatory animals. Akidas 
were there to supervise Jumbes10 . 
Figure 3.1: The German Colonial Administrative Set up 
Governor 
Advisory 	Bezirksan tmans 	Referents in 
Council (District Commissi- 	Charge of 
(After 1911) oners) Departments 
Akidas or Sultans 	 Liwalis 
(Rural) (Coastal Towns) 
Juinbes /Village Headmen 
Pursuing the policy of keeping the cost of running the colony to the minimum, the 
government not only utilised the Akidas and Jumbes, but started from around 1 900s to 
replace white craftsmen and junior civil servants with "coloured" labour which was "cheaper 
10 	Fortmann, Peasants, Officials and Participation in Tanzania, p.  8. 
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and resistant to tropical climate" 11 . The labour preferred was that of Goans whose numbers 
in Dar es Salaam increased from 98 in 1 900/01, to 250 in 1 91 3. At the sametime, the 
European population in both Dar es Salaam and Tanga decreased 12 . This move was to some 
extent copied from the British policy in British East Africa where Indians were relied upon in 
junior service in Government and other public employers: 
There can be no doubt that the Uganda Railway has a great advantage over us 
(German East Africa) because they can use comparatively cheap rates Indian 
and Eurasian engine drivers and guards, whilst we have to pay German 
functionaries who have been trained for this responsible service at home and 
have, of course, a higher standard of life than those who have been born and 
bred in a tropical country 13 . 
As we will show later on in the case of Dar es Salaam, the argument that non-Europeans 
were used to low standards of living, and could be kept, and exploited at that level was 
usually used to justify segregation in land uses, and differential wages and access to service 
infrastructure between the races. 
Administration over the German Territory was established slowly, as territorial 
subjugation was achieved. In 1891, four administrative districts were established on the 
coast. By 1903,   the colony had been divided into 12 civil and 16 military districts. As 
tranquility got established, the number of military districts was reduced so that by 1914 the 
colony was divided into 24 districts, only 2 of which (Mahenge and Iringa) were military. Dar 
es Salaam was among the early districts to be created' 4 . 
There were attempts to introduce local administration with the idea of shedding 
responsibilities from the central government. The Imperial Decree of 29th March 1901 put 
German Colonial Government, Annual Report.., 1901 /02. 
12 	
ibid. 
13 	Brode, British and German East Africa, p.  77. 
14 	
A.C. Mascarenhas, "The German Administration", in, L. Berry, Tanzania in Maps, University of London Press, 
London, 1971, pp. 106-107. 
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into effect what can be called Communal Unions (Kommunal Verbandes) for the districts of 
Tanga, Pangani, Bagamoyo, Kilwa, Lindi, Wilhelmstall (Lushoto), Kilosa, Langemburg (Mbeya) 
and Dar es Salaam. These unions were given extensive duties including the establishing of 
schools, street lighting, refuse collection, drainage of swampy and unhealthy areas, 
construction of roads, streets and bridges, distribution of seeds to natives and overseeing the 
management of cooperative village shambas (farms). The Union for Dar es Salaam had a 
further duty of guaranteeing the early Savings Bank 15 . It would appear that the unions did 
not work well, or they simply had too many responsibilities. Most were abolished in April 
1909.   Those for Tanga and Dar es Salaam were retained, but their jurisdiction was highly 
curtailed and limited to residential areas only 16 . In 1908/09 there was discussion on the 
establishment of town councils in the colony. The Order of the Imperial Chancellor of 1910 
created Municipal Councils in German East Africa. The management of municipal 
administration was to be by Town Councils (Stadtgemaindes) headed by the District 
Commissioner, and including three members and three deputy members, all elected; and one 
member and one deputy member, both appointed by the Governor. The councils had various 
duties including the upkeep of roads and public spaces; water supply; street lighting and 
cleaning; refuse disposal; and school maintenance. However, by the end of the German era, 
only Dares Salaam and Tanga had municipal council status under the 1910 Order 17 . 
3.1 .5 Establishing centres of Administration and Trade 
In the process of colonial subjugation and territorial exploitation, centres had to be 
established or selected as loci of colonial power and colonial economic designs. The earliest 
centres were customs posts and, here, the Germans simply took over those on the coast that 
were preexisting. Collection centres established by the German East Africa Company were all 
abandoned during the Abushiri Rebellion. As territorial subjugation proceeded, military posts 
had to be established in areas where'jeople where rebellious, as well as on vulnerable caravan 
routes, at centres of marine trade, at places in which European merchants and missionaries 
15 	
German Colonial Government, Annual Report.., 1901/02. 
16 	
German Colonial Government, Annual Report., 1908/09. 
17 	
C.C. Gillman, "Dares Salaam, 1860-1940: A story of growth and change", Tanzania Notes and Records, 
No. 20, 1945, pp 1-23. 
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already exercised some influence, and at the headquarters of the agents of the Sultan of 
Zanzibar or of local chiefs. Most German urban centres were characterised by a large 
imposing castle like building known as the Boma, a phallic symbol of power usually located 
on high ground, which housed most government business, and from which all town roads 
radiated. All towns/forts were centres where administration of nearby territories was based, 
where goods from the hinterland could be brought, sold, stored and prepared for export; and 
where manufactured goods could be distributed to the consumers. In this respect the Indian 
community was given a decisive role in commerce. Urban areas were not seen as generators 
of employment for the native population. A number of export related industries e.g. copra 
cleaning, or saw milling were established early enough in Dar es Salaam for example. Other 
industries were aimed at import substitution and at meeting the convenience needs of the 
bourgeoning communities. These included, in 1 901 /02 in Dar es Salaam, a brewery, an ice 
factory in Tanga and Dar es Salaam, and a soap factory in Tanga. 
In the colonial equation, Dar es Salaam was selected as the seat of the German territorial 
government and as the chief port of the colony. The general impression usually given, that 
the German government moved itself from Bagamoyo is perhaps misleading. Bagamoyo was 
an important coastal town in the 1 880s, handling the bulk of the export and import trade to 
and from the interior. Naturally, when the German East African Company arrived, they had 
to show their presence in Bagamoyo. However, the Germans had shown very early interest 
in Dares Salaam. In 1885, the German representative in Zanzibar, Rear Admiral Knorr, had 
ordered Commodore Paschen to visit the coastal settlements of Dar es Salaam, Bagamoyo, 
Sadani and the mouth of the river Pangani. Paschen recommended Dar es Salaam as the 
town suitable for a naval depot on the mainland coast 18 . A decision on where to locate the 
seat of the colonial government was announced in January 1 891. Although Imperial 
Commissioner von Wissman, (who ha. vanquished the coastal rebellion), had tried to balance 
the conflicting interests of the pro-Bagamoyo and pro-Dar es Salaam lobbies by staying at 
Bagamoyo, and turnihg Dar es Salaam into a military base, Dar es Salaam became the seat 
of he colonial government. The first German colonial Governor for German East Africa, von 
Soden, never stayed in Bagamoyo but in Zanzibar from where he later moved to Dar es 
18 	
Sir John Kirk to the Marquis of Salisbury, 28.9.1 885, reported in, British Parliamentary Papers, The Zanzibar 
Papers. 
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Salaam in April 1 891. During the 1 890 period, construction of the Governor's palace and of 
several government buildings was going on in Dar es Salaam. One can therefore conclude 
that the German colonial government selected Dar es Salaam as its seat, right from the 
beginning. 
In the colonial principles, sites selected for colonial urban centres had to be cheap to 
develop and put into operation. Dar es Salaam was selected because of its natural sheltered 
harbour. That presented a cheaper option than that of transforming Bagamoyo into a modern 
port. Besides, there were relatively fewer vested interests which would stand in the way of 
the colonial government's designs (e.g. land appropriation) at Dar es Salaam compared to 
Bagamoyo. However, Bagamoyo continued to be an important centre for caravan trade, as 
can be inferred from Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
Table 3.1 Caravan Traffic Leaving the coast for the interior: Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo 
compared, 1901-1903 
Number of Carriers Number of Loads 
Years 1901 1902 1903 1901 1902 1903 
Bagamoyo 36,869 28,298 35,337 21,027 18,742 25,622 
D'Salaam 24,017 27,515 16,180 17,589 23,334 12,991 
Sources: German Colonial Government, Annual Reports on the Development of German East 
Africa, relevant years. 
Table 3.2 Customs Revenue (Marks), Dares Salaam and Bagamoyo compared, 1901-1 902 
Export Duty  Import Duty  
Years 1901 1902 1901 1902 
Bagamoyo 114,525 117,367 146,474 145,371 	11 
D'Salaam 58,689 52,212 175,277 149,247 
Source: German Colonial Government, Annual Reports on the Development of German East 
Africa, relevant years. 
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The relatively high import figures for Dar es Salaam (Table 3.2) reflect government 
imports of equipment for infrastructure like telegraphs and roads. There were, however, no 
attempts to force caravan trade to reroute through Dar es Salaam, it being hoped that with 
superior facilities, Dar es Salaam would soon attract custom from Bagamoyo: 
Bagamoyo which was, in days of Arab rule, the most flourishing town on the 
coast had to be sacrificed. Its shallow waters were good for dhow traffic, but 
did not offer anchorage for steamers in direct communication with Europe. So 
in proportion as Dar es Salaam grew, Bagamoyo declined. 19 
On the other hand Dar es Salaam, a small native settlement in 1 890 was described 15 years 
later as: 
the best built town on the coast of East Africa. It was laid out with lavish 
disregard for cost and its wide tranquil streets bordered with flowering trees, 
its parks and gardens, its comfortable residences, its magnificent hospital and 
other buildings, give it the appearance of a German Kurort transferred to the 
tropics. 2° 
No doubt, as will be shown later, the above commentator was referring to the European part 
of town only. 
Although Dar es Salaam was declared the seat of the German colonial government in 
1891, connecting the town to the rest of the colony and improving its facilities was not 
immediately realised. This was a result of the lack of resources from Germany given the initial 
policy of colonial territorial self sufficiency, and the attractions and the better prospects that 
the northern part of the colony had, and offered, in comparison to Dar es Salaam. With the 
commencement of the construction of a railway line from Tanga in 1893, connecting Dar es 
Salaam to the interior by rail was shelved to secondary priority. There were no funds. In 
1903/04 it was reported that Tanga had the best prospects for the future 21 . 
19 	
Brode, British and German EastAfrica, pp. 24-25. 
20 	
C. Elliot, The EastAfrican Protectorate, London, 1909, p. 257. 
21 	
German Colonial Government, Annual Report, 1 903/04. 
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Up to 1901 roads to and from the interior were still very poor. A floating dock was not 
completed at Dar es Salaam harbour till 1901,   but by August, it has sunk by accident. It was 
brought to the surface and commenced work in January 1902.   By 1904 it was realised that 
in fact the dock was too small and could not handle any, but two of the smallest ships of the 
German East African Line, which had monopoly over the Dar es Salaam port 22 . 
The plan for the harbour's development existed by 1 901; but improvements did not 
really begin till 1905 when a quay was constructed at the northern harbour side. This was 
in connexion with the commencement of the construction of the central railway line. It was 
meant to influence and extend the installations concerned with the discharge and loading of 
cargo of the harbour. The Kurasini causeway was constructed at about the same time 23 . 
Dar es Salaam got a boost when a decision was finally made in 1904 to construct the 
central railway line from the town to Morogoro, some 200 kms away. Construction started 
in 1905 and the line was opened in 1907.   A later decision, in 1908,   allowed the extension 
of the line to Kigoma, the Western end of the territory, where it reached just before the 
outbreak of the War in 191424.  This decision was precipitated by the effects of the 
completion, in 1901,   of the Uganda Railway on caravan and general trade in German East 
Africa as it became much cheaper and faster to move goods by rail than by caravans. The 
number of caravans leaving Bagamoyo for Lake Victoria fell immediately the Uganda railway 
was completed (Table 3.3). As a result, custom duties fell by 13,000 rupees between 1 899 
and 1900, and by more than 14,000 rupees between 1900 and 1901. In 1901/02, there 
were 48 trading companies' bankruptcies, 12 of which belonged to Europeans. Foreign trade 
in German East Africa fell by 2m marks between 1 899-1 900. It was thus obvious that 
construction of a railway line to the to the interior was an absolute necessity to help in 
developing the territory and to preve trade from getting diverted to the Uganda Railway, and 
to other railway lines that had been constructed in the Congo and in British Central Africa. 
22 	
German Colonial Government, Annual Reports., relevant years. 
23 	ibid. 1905/06. 
24 	C.C. Glilman, "A Short History of Tanganyika Railways", Tanzania Notes and Records, No. 13, 1942,   pp. 
8-10. 
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Table 3.3 Changes in caravan traffic leaving Bagamoyo for Lake Victoria, 1899-1 901. 
Years Number of Carriers Number of Loads 
1899 6,333 - 3,399 
11 	1901 3,376 2,032 
Source: German Colonial Government, Annual Reports on the Development of German East 
Africa, 1901/02 
At the same time, the Communal Unions of both Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo decided, 
in 1 904/05, to start work on the construction of a road between Dar es Salaam and 
Bagamoyo 25 . Dar es Salaam was thus slowly being connected to the rest of the country by 
modern means, although benefits were not immediately apparent. In 1 91 2, Tanga exported 
goods worthy 666,000, more than twice Dar es Salaam's exports of only 265,000.26  This 
was a reflection of Tanga's rich hinterland. 
3.1 .6 Nationalising Land, the pillar of the Colony's Economy 
The basic principle guiding the colonial process was how to turn the colony into a viable 
economic entity which could support itself to the benefit of the colonising power. Since land 
was one of the most valuable assets the colony had, it was seen as imperative for the 
government to be able to control this asset and to utilise it in the way it deemed fit for 
achieving preset aims of economic and social viability. A plantation and settler economy was 
originally envisaged for German East Africa. Native interests were secondary to Imperial 
interests although the former were to be recognised, limited and directed. Confrontation with, 
and proletarianising of the native wato be avoided as much as possible. However, where 
Imperial interests were deemed to supersede native interests, and where all ways of reaching 
a friendly agreement Ncluding bribery through the offer of gifts) failed, force or intimidation 
i.e. the policy of schrecklichkeit could be resorted to. Settlers, in particular, and Europeans, 
25 	German Colonial Government, Annual Report, 1904/05. 
26 	A.F. Calvert, German EastAfrica, Werner Lauriae Ltd., London, 1917, p. 36. 
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in general, were to be given land for its economic exploitation. The principal legislations and 
directives affecting land during the German period were as outlined below. 
The Germans had started implementing a policy of land grabbing from 1887. Ordinance 
Number 2, issued by the German East Africa Company on August 1 6th 1888, pointed out that 
by the treaty of 28th April 1888, His Excellency the Sultan of Zanzibar, had ceded to the 
German East Africa Association, all rights which he himself possessed over the lands in his 
mainland territory. This excluded private lands and shambas. The Sultan had also given to 
the Association, all public buildings except those that he required for his private use. The 
Ordinance required that all private property in land and buildings situated in the territory, was 
to be entered into the register at the office of the District Commissioner, within six months 
with effect from 16th August, 1888. Each owner was to describe his property, its value, 
size, and boundaries, and had to prove the right of possession by purchase or otherwise. All 
property not proved to be private, and nor entered into the register within six months was to 
be regarded as public property. Land, including that for Dar es Salaam's early development, 
was therefore being acquired long before the main land legislation was passed. 
The principal German legislation to govern land tenure was the Imperial Decree 
Regarding the Creation, Acquisition, and Conveyance of Crown Land, and Regarding the 
Acquisition and Conveyance of Lands in General, in German East Africa, of 26.11 .1 895 
(hereinafter referred to as the 1895 Decree). This decree declared all land in German East 
Africa to be unowned Crownland (Herren/os Kronland) vested in the Empire, except where 
ownership, or other real rightcould be shown by private or judicial persons, chiefs, or 
communities existing among natives; and except for rights of occupation gained by third 
persons by virtue of agreements with the Imperial government. This in effect was a land 
nationalisation decree, aimed at gi1ng the Governor extensive powers to do what he liked 
with the land. The ascertainment and defining of whether land was Crownland or not was to 
take place through Land Commissions appointed by the Governor. These worked, either on 
their own, or at the request of a person seeking land. If land was appropriated as Crownland 
in areas where there were native settlements, there had to be a sufficient area reserved for 
native cultivation or other use; and also for future cultivation. This was a necessary step to 
prevent the proletarianisation of the natives, and to avoid political conflicts. 
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The 1895 Decree prohibited the transfer of ownership, or the lease of Township lands 
of more than one hectare in extent, or the lease of all other lands for a period exceeding 15 
years, from natives to non-natives without the consent of the Governor 27 . 
Instructions issued on 27.1 1.1895 with regard to the implementation of the 1895 
Decree, required that careful inquiry must be made before declaring land to be Crowniand, to 
establish bona fide rights of private persons. Also, agreements had to be sought with chiefs 
and village communities as to their rights over such land. Where no agreement was feasible, 
the Governor was to give the decision. Alienation of public land could be effected by 
purchase, or by public auction. The Governor was to decide to which authorities applications 
for land allocations could be made. There were conditions stipulating the maximum time 
within which alienated land must be cultivated, planted or built upon. Non compliance with 
these conditions entailed a penalty. Sometimes, land could revert to the government without 
compensation. This was aimed at preventing speculation. Indeed, transfer of land to third 
parties was not allowed until a half of it had been developed 28 . 
In 1 896 the governor issued a document clarifying the implementation of the 1895 decree. 
It required that, when declaring any land to be Crown Land, the Land Commissions should 
leave the natives four times the land area already cultivated, for future expansion 29 . In order 
to get the goodwill of natives, a definite sum of money was placed at the Land Commissions' 
disposal, for buying presents to the natives, in order to obtain their friendly understanding on 
land acquisition matters. If all these friendly measures failed, a report was to be made to the 
Governor, who would then resort to coercive means. 
By 1900,   the German colonial government was adopting tougher attitudes in defining 
Crownland. A circular regarding thextent of the Government's right of occupation and 
formation of Land Commissions that was issued on 29.4.1900 emphasized that all lands 
27 	
General Headquaters East African Force, Extracts from German Ordinances and Decrees in German East 
Africa, Nairobi, 1916, p.  129. 
28 	ibid. p.  142. 
29 	
ibid, p.  135. 
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which could not be proved to be private property of an individual or community was to be 
regarded as Crownland. The government recognised native rights to land only when land was 
physically occupied. Although Commissions were instructed to leave aside four times the 
cultivated land for the future, natives were to be given only so much land as was absolutely 
required under the changing circumstances and for the subsistence of the village 
community30 . However, in order not to give rise to political complications, the causing of 
hardships to natives was to be avoided. In particular, extensive seizure of unoccupied land 
was recommended only in districts which were under full effective control of the colonial 
administration i.e. where dissent could effectively be dealt with. Natives were to be 
instructed by the colonial officials on the lands which were declared Crownland during 
District tours, and in open Barazas (mass meetings). 
The Imperial Chancellor could direct that land previously taken from natives and given 
to non-natives be repossessed and given back to the natives if necessary, "in order to secure 
to the natives the continuance of their livelihood and in particular to serve them a right of 
domicile" 31 . 
The bulk of the legislation was therefore meant to secure a decisive stakehold in land in 
the Colony for use by settlers and other aliens to the country. However, the indigenous 
population had to be torelated and catered for as well. The latter's continued occupation of 
any land was permissive, in the sense that they could be moved at the whims of the Colonial 
government. The bulk of the indigenous population did not have any documents to 
authenticite their claims to land ownership. An Ordinance regarding Land Registration by 
natives was passed in 1903.   Under it, natives and other coloured persons were entitled to 
register their lands in the Land Register provided that such lands were situated in defined 
township areas 32. Nevertheless, registration of native lands was considered less urgent in 
comparison to the registration of European rights. The Order regarding the boundaries of the 
Township Area of Ear es Salaam in which natives and other coloured persons might register 
30 	ibid, p. 134. 
31 	Thid, p. 151. 
32 	ibid, p. 159. 
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their land in accordance with the 1903 Ordinance was not published till 1.6.1910. Dares 
Salaam Township was divided into several areas or 'flurs'. It was intended eventually to enter 
all plots in the Land Register (Grundbuch). European and Asian owners were dealt with in the 
first instance. Only in a few isolated cases had native holdings been ivestigated by the time 
World War I broke out33 . This was despite the fact that natives were the majority. Thus 
native interests in land were secondary to colonial interests. Their right over land was seen 
as a phenomenon to be tolerated because it could not be avoided. 
3.2. Land Policy Impacts 
3.2.1 Introduction 
It has been pointed out that colonial penetration included the acquisition of land and the 
establishment of urban centres in the colonies on which the dual purposes of domination and 
exploitation could be realised. Therefore, policies adopted for these urban centres reflected 
the purposes of colonialism. Before being specific with the Dar es Salaam of the 1 890s, it 
is pertinent to briefly refer to the early days of colonial penetration in German East Africa, 
spearheaded by Karl Peters and his German East Africa Company. 
In 1884, large tracts of land were granted "for all times" to the German adventurer, Dr. 
Karl Peters, by local chiefs in the areas of Usagara, Uzigua, Ukami, and Ungulu, under dubious 
contracts and in consideration of a few trinklets 34 . Though these grants did not directly 
affect the area around Dar es Salaam, further land occupation took place in Uzaramo, after 
the formation of the German East Africa Company in 1885. When this Company obtained 
virtual occupation of the coastal belt from the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1 888 (which included Dar 
es Salaam), large contingents of Germans invaded the coast, to take over ports, customs, 
trade, etc. 35 . 
V 
33 	
Tanzania National Archives, File No. 12589, Oar es Saloam Township Layout, Vol II. 
34 	
G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville, "The German Sphere, 1 884-98", in, R. Oliver and G. Mathew, (Eds), History of 
EastAfrica, Vol. I, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, pp.  422-453. 
35 	ibid., p.  438. 
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According to a Tanga poet, Hemedi bin Abdallah bin Saidi el Buhriy 36 : 
Kilwa na Darisalama 	 At Kilwa and Dar es Salaam 
Kuna Wazungu na kama 	 There is a plague of Europeans 
Mtu hapati kusema 	 There is no free speech 
Nti Wamezizuiya They had throttled the country 
In May, 1887, Captain Leue landed in Dar es Salaam to found one of the German East 
Africa Company's stations. He was not well received by the local peoples, but was well 
protected by a bodyguard of twelve Arabs provided by the Sultan of Zanzibar, and by a 
number of German assistants, as well as personal servants 37 . It took him sometime to find 
accommodation in an old Arab building. Once this was done, he went ahead and acquired land 
for his Company, and constructed a Boma for defence purposes. Leue was soon joined by 
missionaries from Germany: The Evangelical Mission, the Lutherans, and the Catholics 
(Benedictines). All these missionaries negotiated for land along Dares Salaam's harbour, (and, 
in the case of the Catholics, in the Kurasini area as well), with the help of officials like Leue 
and Wissman. 
The German invasion of the coast was growing and was a real threat to existing trade 
and other interests. This engendered resentment, which culminated in the Abushiri rebellion 
of 1888. Dar es Salaam, though well protected by a man-of-war, was attacked by the rebels 
during the latter part of that year and suffered some damage. In dealing with the rebellion, 
Leue demonstrated German ruthlessness by razing to the ground, all the houses surrounding 
his headquarters, to give an open area in which to see any approaching enemy 38 . Security 
at Dar es Salaam was enhanced by enlarging and fortifying the Boma, and by constructing a 
small fort at Kivukoni, at the harbour's entrance. The German garrison stationed at Dar es 
36 	quoted in, ibid., p.  438. 
37 	
C.C. Giliman, "Dares Salaam, 1860-1 940: A Story of Growth and Change", Tanganyika Notes and Records, 
20, 1945, pp.  1-23. 
38 	S. von Sicard, The Lutheran Church on the Coast of Tanzania, 1887-1914, Almquist and Wiksells Boktryckeri 
AB, Upsalla, 1970,   p. 66 
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Salaam then flushed out the Arab strongholds at Magogoni, Kunduchi, and Kisiju 39 . By the 
time the rebels were subdued, (and their leader publicly hanged), an imprint had been made 
on the local population that Europeans in general, and Germans in particular, were mighty and 
were to be feared. This came in the wake of the declining might of the Sultan of Zanzibar. 
The Dar es Salaam that Leue found was the old dilapidated Majid town, in the areas 
of the current railway station and around today's Samora Machel Avenue, India Street, and 
Market Street (Figure 3.2). It was inhabited by Arabs, Indians and natives. There were also 
a number of villages including Kizingo, Mzizima, Upanga, Kisutu, and Magogoni (Figure 3.2). 
Natives in these villages were agriculturists, fishermen, and small scale traders. Others were 
labourers engaged on the extensive coconut plantations belonging to the Sultan Zanzibar and 
prominent Zanzibari Arabs like Suleman bin Nasr el Lemki. The latter became one time the 
Liwali of Dar es Salaam. These plantations were situated at Kisutu, Kitchwele, Kariakoo, 
Gerezani, Upanga and elsewhere. There were in all, 2000 inhabitants in Dar es Salaaam: 200 
Indians, 50 Arabs, 500 slaves, and a sizeable number of Zaramo and Nyamwezi natives. 40 
Another authority however, puts the figure of Dares Salaam's inhabitants in 1 887 at between 
3000 and 4000 people 41 . 
3.2.2 Acquiring Land in Dar es Salaam for Colonial Designs. 
The Nature of the Acquired Land 
Early German land acquisitions reflected the motives of colonial rule. The harbour was 
an important physical feature of Dar es Salaam. All land along this harbour was therefore 
acquired and was soon put to uses like defence, warehousing, customs, and general 
39 	Giliman, 'Dares Salaam, 1860-1 940', p.  6. 
40 	Sucdrd, Tiw Lutlwran Church, p.  59. 
41 	
H. Schnee, Deutsches Ko/onia/lexikon Band II, Verlagvonquelle und Meyer, Leipzing, 1920,   p. 283. 
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Source: von Sicard The Lutheran church on the coast of Tanzania. 
116 
administration. Secondly Europeans wanted to be comfortable and were aware of the 
moderating influences of the Ocean on the rather hot and humid climate of Dar es Salaam. 
Thus, land along the Ocean front was acqired to build European residences. Thirdly there was 
need not to antagonise existing interests where these were of projected economic roles 
supportive of colonial designs. Consequently, in the immediate period following colonial 
occupation of Dar es Saaaam, there was a policy to avoid disturbing the old Majid town, with 
its Indian and Arab interests. 
In general however, the Government aimed at owning as much land as possible. 
Therefore, later land acquisitions covered all parts of Dar es Salaam. 
Methods of Land Acquisition. 
Colonialism entailed the interfering with the existing order. Steps had to be taken to get 
the colonisers a foothold in Dar es Salaam. Land had to be acquired for Government offices, 
officials' residences, and the military; and for import/export, and trade purposes. The 
German colonial Government used at least three major ways of obtaining land: 
Acquiring land forcibly from natives with minimum compensation; 
Land which became vested in the Government through the German East Africa 
Company or through the 1895 Decree; and, 
Land obtained through ge'uine negotiations, purchase, or exchange with the more 
prominent Arab and non native landowners. 
(a) Acquiring Land forcibly from the natives. 
Sometime around 1890, a decision was made that the land between the old Majid Town, 
the Harbour, the Ocean and northwards towards Upanga (Figure 3.2) should be acquired for 
Government business. It was suited to European occupation; was well sited in respect with 
the entrance of Harbour; and had only native (and a few Arab) interests to contend with. 
117 
We get a picture of how natives were removed from this area by reviewing the case of 
Halid bin Msuo, a native who was a landowner in this area. This information is based on a 
study and translation of German documents made by the Land Officer during the British era, 
in 1930, in response to petitions made by Msuo bin Majid and Shaha Jagna against unfair 
compensation paid to their forebearers when the Germans expropriated their land in the 1 890s 
(See Appendix 3.1)42. 
In 1890, Halid bin Msuo, and other natives were ordered to leave their settlements along 
the harbour front to make way for a European settlement. This was during von Wissman's 
rule. According to an affidavit sworn by a number of these natives: 
An official order was issued that no one would be allowed to 
continue living there (i.e. where the government buildings now 
are). 
People were compensated and received one rupee for each large palm, and 20-30 rupees for 
a house. This amount was arbitrarily determined by German officials; and was apparently 
unfair to the natives. Halid was not willing to sell his land because on the plot there was a 
grave of his father and a small mosque. He was also unhappy with the compensation, 
because he declared that he had, within the affected plot, two houses worthy a few hundred 
rupees and 65 palms. However, Halid, his brother Rasgalla and another person, all owning 
six and half hectares of land and developments thereon were paid only 200 rupees. They 
could not protest as, "all natives abandoned their plots without regard to compensation out 
of fear of Europeans." 
Although these natives were thus forcibly evicted and undercompensanted, documents 
detailing the transfer of their land to tIxe German government were presented as contracts of 
purchase (Kaufvertrags). These land expropriations were carried out by Captain Leue, then 
Officer Commanding bistrict, Dar es Salaam, from December 1890, under instructions from 
newly appointed governor von Soden (who was, until April 1891, still stationed in Zanzibar). 
According to Leue, where parties refused to sell, they were expropriated and given 
42 	
Tanzania National Archives File No 81/76: Petition by Msuo bin Majid, Dar es Salaam. All the information 
in this subsection is taken from this source. See also Appendix 3.1. 
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compensation for "distrubance". It is through such unfair means that natives were removed 
from the area between the Ocean, the Harbour and the current city centre. (See Appendix 
3.1). 
By the time the German Colonial Governor took up his seat in Dar esSalaam in 1891, 
the government area had already been, (or was in the process of being) cleared of natives. 
Government House and several government offices and quarters were also under 
construction 43 . Later, the evicted natives who were alive, realised that the German 
government was, from 1907, more accommodating. In 1911,   they complained against the 
unfair evictions of the 1 890s to the German authorities like Governor Lechenberg. However, 
the Governor, decided against them, after being advised by the German legal advisor on the 
grounds that: 
at the time in question (1890), natives, as distinct from Arabs had no right of 
private ownership in land, and that as according to Herr Leue the parties had 
received compensation for disturbance, they had no further claim in the matter. 
(Emphasis added) 
This argument was just an expedient to justify the denying of the natives of their rights 
(and also to avoid opening up a Pandora's box of claims for compensations), because the 
German government recognised African private interests in land, as evidenced by the laws 
permitting natives to register their land within townships. Land Register Records show that 
already before 1890, a number of areas were under the private ownership of Indians, Arabs, 
and Africans. 44 
The disgrunted natives did not give up their claims that easily. In the 1 930s, further 
petitioning was made to the British Administration against the 1 890 expropriations. The 
British Administration's policy in land matters was guided by the motive to uphold earlier 
German policies. Therefore, these native claims were turned down. The translator of the 
German Records during the British administration, H. Nimmo, was so anxious to ensure that 
43 	
Giliman, "Dar as Salaam 1860-1940..", p.  78. 
44 	
Karl Vorlaufer, Koloniale und nachkolonia/e stadtplanung in Dar es Sa/aam, Johann Wolfgang Goethe- 
Universitat, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1970.   
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the natives did not get their rights that, despite having evidence that the so called contracts 
of Purchase (Kaufvertrags) between the German authorities and the natives were unfair, he 
exceeded his terms of reference and introduced bias against the natives in his advice to the 
Land Officer in 1930.   He claimed that these people appeared to have hoped that 20 years 
after the expropriation happened, the relative documents might have gone astray. 
Yet at about the same time, in May, 1935, the Land Officer wrote to the Provincial 
Commissioner, Tanga, asserting that freehold land ownership had long been established along 
the Coast: 
• . .in a great many case, the right to individual ownership of land carrying with 
it as it did the right to free alienation outside of a particular group or tribe had 
become firmly established in the greater part of the area described locally as the 
"coastal belt" pnor to German occupation (Emphasis added) 45 . 
But even if the above had not been the case, the fact that land was held under customary 
tenure should not have been taken to mean the oppression of native land occupiers. 
It is therefore difficult to see why, save for racist reasons, Msuo and other natives were 
denied their rights by both colonial administrations. 
Another glimpse of German Land acquisition practice is provided by reviewing the case 
of land acquired by Government from some 20 natives in the Mtoni area in 1900 (See 
Appendix 3.2 for the German text of the contract of sale and its translation). The government 
paid only for part of the unexhausted improvements i.e. coconut and mango trees. It did not 
pay for the buildings and any other crops, nor did it pay for the value of the land, or for 
disturbance. There was no efforts whatsoever made to put the people whose land was 
acquired into an "equivalent" positio The prices offered were arbitrarily determined by the 
government. Besides, by allowing natives to continue in occupation of the sold land, the 
Government hoodwiiked them into not getting the full impact of their act, and thus avoided 
trouble, and bid for time, to remove them as and when the administrative, economic, and 
military conditions became conducive. In effect also, the government was engaging in land 
45 	
See Tanzania National Archives File No. 63, Freehold Titles, General. 
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speculation, buying cheaply from natives subdividing, and selling expensively, at the true 
market value of the land in question. 
The natives who are presented as having sold their land selling in Mtoni appear to have 
been cheated, or to have acted under duress. This is suggested by studying their "signatures" 
on the sale contracts (Appendix 3.2). The "signatures" are far from being genuine. Most are 
mere marks made by, or on behalf of, ignorant or disinterested persons, or persons under 
some kind of pressure. Only ldd bin Chaurembo and Mi shoe bin Simba, among the sellers, 
appear to have genuine Arabic signatures. The other Arabic signatures belong to neighbours 
(angrenzer) who acted as witnesses. The fact that the witnesses to such dubious land sales 
like this were literate in Arabic, suggests an alliance against the natives, between the Germans 
and the then coastal "elite" (Arabs or Arab literate persons). The latter,as we have pointed 
out earlier, helped to inpiant and entrench German Colonialism by working as administators, 
chiefly as Jumbes, Liwalis and Akidas46 . 
Thus it is clear that the German policy of intimidation (Schrekllchkeit) was generally used 
in acquiring land from the natives. German records on the values of land on reallocation have 
proved difficult to come by during this study, but it was found out that plot 26, Flur 1 (the 
current Forodhani Hotel site, shown as the Club in Figure 3.3), was acquired from the Imperial 
Government by a civil servant, Mr F.C.L. Gurlitt, then Director of Public Works, on 
20.12.1899 for 1,954.50 rupees (equivalent to Shs 3,909/=)47  The above source also 
hints at German land policy by pointing out that during the early days of German Rule, civil 
servants were allowed to acquire freehold land at half its value. This means that the value 
of the above plot was 3509 rupes (over 8,0001=). This land is in the area where Halid Msuo 
and other natives got only 200 rupees for six and half acres of land and its improvements! 
It is noteworthy that already a poliy had been instituted where land was acquired cheaply, 
and subsequently allocated at very much below its value to civil servants, a policy that is still 
being upheld today 
46 	
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Because of the importance that Dar es Salaam attained as the seat of government, land 
values shot up. However, these appear not to have benefitted the natives; because, at the 
same time as the Government was acquiring land, private German individual and companies 
were also acquiring a lot of African land by all means. Many Africans in, and about, Dar es 
Salaam were turned into tenants paying rent to German landowners48 . In an attempt to 
reverse this process, a decree issued in 1 895 prevented the transfer of land exceeding one 
hectare in size, between natives and non-natives within townships without the Governor's 
consent. This measure came too late and provided too little protection. Many African 
landholdings were less than one hectare in extent, and in any case, the Governor need not 
withhold consent. Record books of the central areas of Dar es Salaam and Tanga, show no 
African property ownership therein at the beginning of the century. 49 
(b) Land acquired via the German East Africa Company and through the 1895 Decree 
It will be recalled that German colonialism in East Africa was spearheaded by private 
interests, and that in 1887, the German East Africa Company was established in Dar es 
Salaam. The Abushiri uprising accelerated the need for direct German Imperial rule in East 
Africa, but the German East Africa Company was still an important partner in the process of 
colonial development. In an agreement of the 20th November 1890, between the German 
Government and the German East Africa Company, the Company was granted the right to 
seize and occupy all "unowned" land5° but with a proviso that the Imperial Government had 
the right to construct public structures on that "unowned" land in the interests of good 
governance and the security of the coast and the colony. The German East Africa Company 
therefore was at the forefront of l'1d seizure and acquisition on behalf of the German Imperial 
Government. This explains why Captain Leue, who was in Dar es Salaam on behalf of the 
Company, was the same person who spearheaded the process of land grabbing from natives 
(like Halid bin Msuo described above), on behalf of the Government. 
48 	Vorlaufer, Ko/oniale und nachkolonia/e stadtplanung. 
49 	. ibid. 
50 	
Deutsches Kolonia/b/ott, 1890, pp. 301-306. 
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The German East Africa Company was however always under pressure to give way to 
the colonial Government which took over the colony from January, 1 891. The Company had 
acquired extensive pieces of land in Dar es Salaam, but in 1 892 it forewent the right of 
occupation of the area cLose to the Head Customs office and the Boma up to some 3 km from 
the centre of town 51 . In November 1902, in a new agreement with the Government, the 
Company was finally forced to give up the exclusive occupation authority of the "unowned" 
land in favour of the colonial Government 52 . The Company nevertheless retained extensive 
pieces of land along the harbour and in the Government/Residential area. 
The 1895 Decree had declared as Crown land, all land considered to be unowned. Prior 
to that, in 1 894., a system of land registration had been introduced 53 . From thereon for a 
number of years, the Government called upon those with claims on land to present evidence 
to the Government supporting these claims. Those who did not turn up, or those who had 
no evidence (the majority of Africans) or those whose evidence could not satisfy government 
officials, had their land confiscated. Many Africans lost their land rights during this process 
as the registration of land belonging to natives and coloureds was the last to be undertaken 
and did not begin till 1910.   Many too, did not have the evidence to authenticite their claims 
to land ownership. 
Although the definite boundaries of how much land went to the Government are yet to 
be established, most of the city centre, land along the harbour, parts of Upanga, Kurasini, and 
the Msimbazi Valley passed on to Government ownership 54 . The Government thus became 
a major, if not the largest, landowner in Dar es Salaam. It therefore had a free hand in 
shaping, the city's morphology. Except in the case of the Government area where natives 
were required to move within six months, occupiers of government land were not required to 
remove themselves immediately larijt was acquired. This led to the continued occupation by 
V 
51 	Vorlaufer, Ko/oniale und nachkoloniale stadtplanung. 
52 	German Coioniai Government, Annual Reports, 1902103; 	Vorlaufer, Ko/oniale und nachko/oniale 
stadtp/anung. 
53 	Deutsc/ies Kolonialblott, 1894, p. 252. 
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Africans and Indians, of government land in an indefinite system that came to be known later 
on as Kiwanja tenure (Chapter Four). 
(c) Acquiring Land though genuine negotiations and purchase or exchange 
In cases where landowners were powerful people, the Government preferred 
negotiations, purchase or exchange. The case of Suliman bin Nasr el Lemky, a Zanzibari Arab, 
is illustrative. He owned extensive parts of Dar es Salaam and part of his land was in what 
later on became the Government area. Instead of getting expropriated like Halid Msuo and 
others, Suliman (who later became the Liwali of Dar es Salaam) exchanged land with the 
Government (see Appendix 3.1). The case of Scholler, the German who owned much of 
Kariakoo is discussed later, but here again the government paid handsomely to acquire the 
land. 
In all cases, part of government land was later on disposed of to private individuals after 
it had been subdivided into plots. 
3.2.3 Shaping Oar es Salaam's Early Land Use Structure 
Right from the start it was the government's intention to interfere into the land use 
structure of Dar es Salaam. This was a necessary result of the principles underlying 
colonialism which entailed government intervention for the purpose of domination and 
exploitation. These principles reflected themselves early in the land use structure of Dar es 
Salaam: 
The Principle of Domination 
(a) 	Military Aspects 
It has been argied that compared to towns like Tabora, Arusha, and Iringa, the military 
aspect in Dar es Salaam was given less importance in shaping the City's land use structure. 
This is considered to be a result of the suppression, early in the colonial period, of the 
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uprisings that posed a threat to Dar es Salaam. 55 However, it should be noted that, as far 
as Dar es Salaam was concerned, it was the harbour that was important. Besides the 
protection that could be mustered from the Ocean, since the Flotilla (Navy) was stationed at 
Dar es Salaam, it should be point out that the Governor's Palast was strategically placed by 
the harbour's entrance, and a fort was built at the harbour's mouth. Besides, a Boma was 
constructed midway along the early used part of the harbour, and the Kaserne (Barracks) 
occupied the habour's inner end. All these, plus a police barracks beyond the Kurasini Creek, 
were among the earliest government buildings in Dar es Salaam (see Figre 3•3)56  All had 
military implications. 
(b) 	Racial Segregation 
Vorlaufer argues that racial segregation was not an important element of the early 
German policy on urban land use structure 57 . Yet we have seen how the whole Eastern part 
of Dar es Salaam was seized from natives who were expelled from the area and directed 
westwards. Later on, building regulations entrenched this process. Section 4 of the 1891 
Bauordnung for Dar es Salaam (below) defined areas to be used exclusively for European 
settlement, and areas where native buildings were not allowed. Thus racial segregation was 
planned for right from the start. 
While segregation is usually presented in the context of health and differential standards 
of living, it is also important to see it as a tool of domination. It is in the rarest of social 
organisations that ruler and ruled mingle together. Usually, the rulers segregate themselves, 
and are able thereby, to physicaily and ideologically domineer upon the ruled. In the cities of 
Europe's Industrial Revolution era, segregation, based not on race, but on social class, was 
practiced. In Colonial Africa, domition was practiced along racial lines. Therefore, racial 
segregation as a product of colonial domination, manifests itself in Dar es Salaam with the 
creation of the Govèthment area, which was essentially European; the Commercial area which 
55 	vorlaufer, Kolonia/e und nachkolonia/e stadtplanung. 
56 	Gillman, "Oar es Salaam, 1860-1 940". p. 8. 
57 	
Vorlaufer, /<o/onia/e und nachkoloniale stadtp/anung. 
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was partly European, but mainly Indian; and the Niegervierteil (Native Village) which was 
mainly African (Figure 3.3). Segregation was also demonstrated in social services 
infrastructure. Thus, there were in early Dar es Salaam: a European Hospital, a European 
School and even a European Cemetery (Figure 3.3). In a situation of limited resources, 
segregation also eased the unequal distribution of available infrastructural services, with a 
concentration on European areas. 
(c) 	Administration 
Domination entails ruling, and already, we see that land was acquired early enough for 
the construction of the colonial Government's administrative buildings in the Eastern part of 
Dar es Salaam, and a long the harbour. In some cases administrative buildings doubled as 
offices on the ground floors, and as residences on upper storeys. Dar es Salaam had both the 
territorial government and the district government. The District Office (Bezirksamt) was 
constructed near the Boma, together with a prison (gefingnis) and a local court (schaurihutte) 
(Figure 3.3). 
The Principle of Exploitation 
(a) Customs and Warehousing 
The land that the German East Africa Company acquired first was along the harbour. 
This was soon passed over to the Colonial Government. Together with military 
establishments, a number of warehouses and custom sheds were among the early government 
buildings 58 , although in the earlier stages, Dar es Salaam's port facilities were primitive. A 
series of mansonry stairways and shQots, up and down which all cargo was manhandled into 
lighters, led from the natural narrow beach up the steep slope of the lowest coastal terrace, 
to sheds and warehuses perched along the latter's upper edge 59 . 




Figure 3.3: Details of Dai' es Salaani Land Uses, 1905 
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Improvements were only made after the beginning of the railway construction in 1905.   A 
well equipped dockyard was constructed on the south side of the harbour, beyond Kurasini 
Creek, accross the mouth of which, a causeway was thrown in, to facilitate access to the 
yard. Buoying of the intricate harbour entrance commenced as early as 1891, and was 
gradually improved upon. The lighthouse on the coral reef of the Outer Makutumbi was built 
between 1 892 and 1894 60  
One of the first acts of the German colonial government was the creation, in 1891, of 
a proper Customs Department under the control of a "Zo//direktor" 61 with headquarters in 
Dar es Salaam 62 . Customs sheds (Zo/Iamt, Zollamtagen) were quickly constructed along the 
Harbour (Figure 3.3), since controlling the import and export of goods was an important 
element in colonial exploitation practice. 
The Railways 
Construction of the Central Railway Line (Mittelland Bahn) from Dar es Salaam, to 
facilitate the exploitation of the interior, commenced in 1905.   The railway had a major impact 
on Dar es Salaam's land use structure in that a lot of land had to be set aside for railway uses 
like: the station, locomotive sheds, land for the railway tracks, housing for railway staff, 
marshalling yards, etc. Much of this land in Dar es Salaam was, as far as can be ascertained, 
already in government hands. The railways mainline alignment followed the 1 878 Mackinon 
Road (more or less the current Pugu Road). The line laid the basis for the future siting of the 
Industrial Area. 
Trade and Commerce 
Essentially, colonialism entaile,the exchange of goods. This too was reflected in the 
city's early land use structure. Warehousing was one aspect of commerce which was 
60 	Deutsehes Kolonialblatt, Vols 2, 3, and 5. 
61 	ZoIl = Customs 
62 	Gillman, "Oar es Salaam 1860-1940.', p. 10. 
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concentrated along the harbour. While the German Government would have preferred German 
nationalities to run trade and commerce, this was not practicable, and perhaps not desirable, 
in view of the position that the Indians already held in this sector, and in view of their 
(Indians') capability to penetrate the colony to the remotest corners, to live on extremely low 
budgets, and to mobilise their own capital. A compromise that was adopted was to have both 
Europeans and Indians participating in trade and commerce, the former concentrating on 
wholesaling, exporting and importing, and on "high order" goods; the latter, on retailing, and 
on the purchase of small quantities of products from the producers. 
The commercial area was already established during Majid's days, and this formed the 
backbone of the bazaar area around today's India Street, northwestwards (Figure 3.3). To 
the South and East of the bazaar area, commercial uses were, to some extent, determined 
by the need for warehouses to be near the harbour. Warehosing was in European hands. 
Therefore, the area nearby became mainly a European shopping area. It came to be regarded 
as the "city" of Dar es Salaam since it had the most important financial institutions of the 
time: i.e. the Savings Bank, and the Post Office as well as the more prominent Churches, and 
Hotels. 
The role of the various races 
From the above paragraphs, it can be construed that the colonial system envisaged various 
roles for various races and that this reflected itself in land uses. Colonial Administration, was 
on the whole in European hands, and a European Residential area was set up, as part of the 
general Government area. Non official Europeans participated in trade and business ventures 
and were usually allocated plots by the government or could purchase land from owners for 
their business and residential uses. Retail trade was mainly in the hand of Indians and these 
were left undisturbed in the centrakarea. The 1891 Bauordnung (below) accommodated 
Indian types of buildings in this area to make it possible for both Indian and Europeans to 
'V 
share the commercial area. The Africans were allocated the lowest role: i.e. the provision of 
domestic and plantation labour, and labour for the port, the railways, and public works. 
Others had their own roles as peasants, fishermen and small scale traders. By 1905,   Africans 
were concentrated north and westwards of the "bazaar" area and many constructed simple 
buildings and lived in clusters totally unrelated to any role in the colonial set up (Figure 3.3) 
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F] 
3.2.4 Policy Tools used in shaping Oar es Salaam's Land Use Structure 
The 1 891 Bauordnung for Dar es Salaam 
Major aspects of Dar es Salaam's early development were guided by the town's first 
Bauocdnung63 , which appeared on 14th May 1891 (See Appendix 3.3 for the original text 
and its translation). It divided Dar es Salaam into zones where various standards of buildings 
were required. Land use planning was then targetted to street layouts, land subdivisions, and 
building regulations, mainly for sanitary considerations, but also with an ulterior aim of 
legalising racial segregation. According to the 1 891 Bauordnung, the zone along the harbour 
front and eastern part of the town was: 
exclusively allocated for the European settlement, that means only European 
type of buildings are allowed in there. (S.4) 
For the next zone around India Street: 
Other buildings are also allowed, in so far as they are built of solid materials 
and do not fall into the category of native huts. (S.5) 
For the rest of Dar es Salaam towards the periphery, no types of allowed buildings were 
specified. This gave room for the construction of the simplest huts. 
All construction required a building permit. What was to be understood as a "European 
type of building" was to be decided in the first instance, by the Imperial regional officials. 
(S.6) 
The 1 891 Bauordnung was overtly racist in that it specifically set out some areas as being 
exclusive for Europeans. It also excluded native buildings from being put up in some areas. 
Besides, the building regulations applicable to certain parts of Dar es Salaam, were aimed at 
leading to a racial differentiation of Dar es Salaam's land use structure. Government officials 
63 	bau = building, ordnung = order, but the word bauordnung also implies zoning and building regulations. 
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were given powers to scrutinise applications to prove that the applicants were entitled to build 
in the earmarked areas. This provided a further measure whereby racial segregation could 
be enforced. By 1905,   Dar es Salaam was essentially developing on racial lines. Racial 
segregation was being openly invoked throughout German East Africa and a native zone was 
in the process of being laid out in the Kariakoo area of Dar es Salaam. 64 
The Government area, consisting of both government offices and officials' residences, 
was planned with straight, wide boulevards, well lavished in verdure, linking it to the old Majid 
town to the West. This kind of planning was fashionable in Europe at the time. 65 Individual 
plots were quite large; buildings mainly two storied; and a large portion of the land was given 
over to the planting of experimental botanical gardens which were not only of considerable 
scientific and economic value, but formed a great attraction to residents and visitors alike The 
Colony's rulers made sure that they created a pleasant environment for their part of the town. 
This European area was projected to develop northwards and end up in the Golf Course. This 
development was cut short by the outbreak of World War I but was completed by the British 
Administration (Figure 3.3). 
To the west of the Government Area, the Indian bazaar (part of the former Majid Town), 
remained constructed in primitive and unhygienic single storied flat roofed houses comprising 
shop and residence gradually wedging itself westwards. This was despite the stipulations 
of the 1 891 Bauordnung which required stone buildings in the area. A semi-annular street 
plan was prepared for this bazaar area, generally simulating the curve of the Harbour, and 
creating a distinct high density character for the area, compared to the low density 
Government area to the East, id the native area to the north and west. Ring development 
was another big fashion in European townplanning at the time. All streets in this area were 
converging on, and highlighting the importance of, the harbour, the most important of the 
city's physical aspects as far as colonialism was concerned. A grid pattern plan, typical of 
European 1 9th certtury working class quarters was prepared for the native area further to the 
64 	
Gillman, "Dar es Salaam: 1860-1 940..", p. 9. 
65 	
W. de Boer, Urban Renewal and Rehabilitation in Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, Part I: Prestudies and 
Recommendations, Ardhi Institute, Dar es Salaam, 1984,   p. 23. 
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west. In this native area, building in any materials was allowed, and the type of structures 
put up, ranged from the grand thatched Swahili houses (Figure 3.4) to the more simple 
structures. 
Throughout this early period racial segregation was toned down somewhat, and Vorlaufer 
points to the settling in the Tanga town centre and next to the European residences, of freed 
slaves. He also points to the settling of the Manyema, who served as German porters and 
askaris, in the Dar es Salaam zone meant for Europeans in the area currently occupied by the 
New Africa Hotel. This was after the passing of the 1 891 Bauordnung for Dar es Salaam.°° 
However by 1905,   open racial prejudice was rife in Dar es Salaam and this guided the 
development of the town till Independence. 
The decision to construct the railway had important connotations for Dar es Salaam. 
A lot of money was poured in the town, and many people, natives and non natives, flocked 
to Dar es Salaam to take advantage of the economic opportunities available. This, came when 
theories of health hazards supposedly engendered by natives against Europeans were being 
propagated (Chapter 1), and must have contributed to the entrenchment of racial prejudices. 
Both Vorlaufer and Pipping 67 show that from 1905 discussion was intense in German East 
Africa for the development of racially segregated residential quarters in townships like Kilosa, 
Morogoro, Dodoma, Kigoma, Tabora, Moshi and Dares Salaam. From 1910 racial segregation 
was elevated to an official compulsory principle in town planning in German East Africa. 
In Dar es Salaam, racial segregation was manifested in the then deliberate government 
policy to layout a native town in the Kariakoo area. Natives who had been removed from the 
Government area as well as those who were gravitating to the township had settled in what 
is today, Dar es Salaam's city ç,ntre, and were mixed up with Indians (Figure 3.3). The 
colonial government wanted the Europeans to have a stake in the commercial activities 
dominated by the Indians. The natives had therefore to be seperated from the Indians, and, 
66 	
Vo ri au fe r, Koloniale und nachkoloniale stadtplanung. 
67 	ibid; Ida van Hulten, Pipping, An Episode of Colonial History: The German Press in Tanzania, 1901-1914, 
Scandinavia Institute of African Studies, Upsalla, 1974. 
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Figure 3.4: A street in the Native Area of Dar es Salaarn, 1905. 
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Berlin, 1912, p. 97. 
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by implication, from Europeans. This was achieved by designing a special area for the natives 
(in this case Kariakoo) which would have some minimum planning standards (like street 
layouts) enforced. 
Part of Kariakoo was the Sultan of Zanzibar's Shamba on which slaves worked. About 
213 hectares in Kariakoo had been purchased by one Schoeller during the early days of 
German rule. Schoeller had formed a company known as the Sultan Plantation Company. 
There were 7250 bearing palms on this piece of land, so that Schoeller allowed natives to 
settle there, charging them land rent. He was also speculating on the future value of the land, 
which in the 1910s had reached 1-2 rupees a square metre. This was too high for natives, 
although individual Indians were already buying plots in the area. Therefore, Kariakoo was 
already occupied haphazardly when German officials started working on a plan for the area. 
With the commencement of railway construction, many Africans flocked to Dar es Salaam 
and settled haphazardly particularly on Schoeller's Shamba. By 1 91 3, according to a source 
quoted by Vorlaufer68 , the government was being enjoined by Dar es Salaam European 
residents to acquire Schoeller's Shamba for the proper settling natives. They cited a number 
of reasons: 
o 	The plantation contained 1 600 out of the 2400 native houses in the township; 
o 	There were 15,000 natives on this plantation out of the 24,000 natives in the 
township; 
1.4 
o 	The development of a native town of such a size could not be left to a private 
company which was then making money from land rent and coconuts but which stood 
01 
to lose if the area was to be replanned, since the existing structures would have to 
be demolished; 
o 	The purchase of the plantation was most essential from the sanitary point of view of 
the township; 
68 	Vorlaufer, Koloniale und nachkoloniale stadtplanung. 
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o 	Seperation between natives and Europeans as stipulated in the Bauordonung would 
only be possible if the plots and the land in this native town were under the ownership 
of the Government. 
Schoeller's Shamba was bought by the Governmant in 1914 for 500,000 rupees. During 
World War I, the planning of Kariakoo reached Karavan Strasse (today's Msimbazi Street). 
Land allocation in Kariakoo was at first well controlled, but became haphazard during the War 
period. Readjustment had to be made in the 1 920s. 
The 1914 Bauordnung for Dar es Salaam 
In the light of the new circumstances since the 1891 Bauordnung, and also in view of the 
tremendous increase in Dar es Salaam's population which had grown from 9,000 people in 
1894to 19,000in 1913, anew Bauordnung was called for. This appeared on July 1st 1914. 
Moulded along the lines of the 1 891 Bauordnung, it divided Dar es Salaam into three zones 
spelled more or less along racial lines of Europeans, Asians, and African areas, as follows 
(Figure 3.5): 
o 	Zone I was reserved for European residential quarters. Permanent residence of natives 
in this zone was only permitted with the sanctioning of the authorities. 
o 	Zone II was the business quarter were block and contigous buildings were permitted. 
Not however, houses of native style.o Zone Ill was reserved for the native quarter. 
o 	Between the native quarter and the first and second zones, there was (planned) a 
neutral zone. No newiildings were to'be elected in this part (Figure 3.5). 
War broke out a month afteçhe 1914 Bauordnung was published, so, not much was 
done to implement its provisions during the rest of the German rule. It however laid the basis 
of Dar es SalaarrYs future growth almost throught the interwar period since the British 
Administration implemented it to the letter (Chapter Four) 
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Figure 3.5: Dar Cs Salaam Zones as stipulated by the 1914 Bauorthzung 





Z ONE I 
O\A R ES S A L A A M 
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136 
The Provision of Infrastructure in Early Dar es Salaam 
The laying of roads in the European area of Dar es Salaam was relatively easy since the 
area had been cleared of all occupants. However, difficulty was experienced with the bazaar 
area and with the native town, where existing construction was unpatterned. The German 
officials prepared street layouts for these areas to which existing, and later structures had to 
conform. Not much is known on how these programmes were implemented but because of 
the limited resources available to the government, the road construction programme 
proceeded slowly, and was usually behind developments. It was reported, for example, that 
Becker Strasse, stretching from the Government Hospital to the city centre, as well as 
Wissman and So!iman bin Nasr Strasses (Figure 3.3), were laid out in 1 907/08, and that 
native huts in the way of these roads had to be demolished; but that adequate compensation 
was paid. 69 The same must have happened elsewhere although much of the adjustment 
beyond the Bazaar area was carried out during the British period. The Bazaar area remained 
"a messy, labyrinthic triangle where the Indian dukas and dwellings mingled with Arab and 
African huts, a veritable slums area defying all effects of proper municipal administration and 
sanitation... 
With regard to water supply, use continued to be made of Majid's wells till the 1 920s 71 . 
Many more were built. The use of modern well sinking methods and skilled workers from 
German permitted deeper wells, tapping more permanent water. Custom quickly developed 
that at least in the European part of town, each compound had its own water supply fitted 
with a hand pump worked by a houseboy 72 . Thus, even in a situation of poor water supply, 
the European area was well endived. Satisfactory water prospecting was carried out in the 
1900s. In 1901, excellent borehole water was found right in the harbour on the shore of 
Kurasini which was sufficient for thown and for ships. In 1903,   plans to construct pipes 
69 	
German colonial Government, Annual Report, 1907/08. 
70 	Gillman, "Dar es Salaam: 1860-1940..', p. 15. 
71 	ibid. p. 3. 
72 	ibid. p. 9. 
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to supply Dar es Salaam were in hand. This mainly benefitted the European area. 
Electricity was supplied to a limited clientele by the railways authorities after 1905.   Early 
supply was limited to the.railways itself, and to some hotels and streets in the European area. 
There was equally limited infrastructure in the form of sewers and drains. As a result 
of the anti-malaria campaign, drains were constructured in parts of the European area and 
northward into what was later to become the Golf course. Otherwise there was no system 
of sewerage and drainage for the town although plans existed. In 1907 horizontal and vertical 
measurements were taken as a basis for Dar es Salaam's sanitation network, and a general 
plan was drawn but was not implemented. 73 A sewage and drainage network for central 
Dar es Salaam was not constructed till the 1 950s. 
It can be concluded therefore that, by and large, Dar es Salaam of the pre World War 
I era was a poorly serviced town. Whatever services there were, were concentrated in the 
European area. As a general observation too, services tended to follow development rather 
than vice versa. The major impact of servicing therefore was to reflect and emphasize the 
status quo but not to spearhead development. 
3.3. Economic responses 
3.3.1 Introduction 
During the early colonial days, social groupings were conceived and policy implemented, 
on a racial basis. This kind of grouping is therefore adopted for studying this epoch, although 
it is realised that even within a broad racial group, there would be several subcategories, with 
various, and occasionally, conflictinpterests. The broad interest groups that influenced Dar 
es Salaam's development were: 
(a) 	The Europeans, subdivided into (i) the government officials, and, (ii)the non officials, 
including private firms; 
73 	German Colonial Government, Annual Report, 1 907/09. 
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The Indians, and, 
The Africans (generally referred to as "natives"). 
There were also a number of Arabs but German records on their holdings and behavior 
are scanty. Generally speaking, Arabs collaborated with the Germans against natives and the 
importance of big Arab landowners such as Suliman bin Nasr has been referred to. 
3.3.2 The Europeans 
(i) Government Officials 
The situation confronting government officials was that of having substantial political 
power, but limited economic resources. The idea however was to create, in Dar es Salaam, 
an ideal environment conducive to work in, and to run the colony. Power was used to the 
utmost to acquire a lot of land. The European area was well laid out in large plots. Trees and 
other plants were abundantly grown. A botanical garden was created. The whole government 
area was a garden city. 74 The buildings that were put up were designed in such a way 
(with, for example, extended verandahs, and steep titled roofs) as to moderate their internal 
atmosphere, and provide a cooler environment. 
While it was possible to acquire a lot of land, it was not possible to develop it 
immediately. A lot of land in the Government Area remained undeveloped till the British 
period. This was after natives and non Europeans had been ordered off that land. 
Government officials took early steps to maximise their privileges in land. Besides 
creating a superior residential and woing environment for themselves, German civil servants 
were allowed to acquire freehold land at half its market price. Many civil servants were thus 
enabled to put up substantial private property in the European residential area. 75 Thus, the 
74 	
J.E.G. Sutton, Dar es Salaam: A sketch of a hundred years , Tanzania Notes and Records, No. 70, 1971, 
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policy where government officials tune land policy to suit their own interests started during 
the German period. 
(ii) European Non-officials and German private companies. 
For successful early colonialism, migration to the colony, of white settlers and traders, 
was essential, and these were lured to come to East Africa. The colonial Government was 
anxious to see that these got land and developed it to colonial needs. Thus the land 
acquisition and zoning measures described above. 
The response was rather mixed. The German East Africa Company, the pioneer of 
German colonialism in East Africa, did acquire a lot of land either along the harbour, in the 
Government area, and in the central area. No other commercial house acquired that much 
land, although several individuals and firms owned more than one plot of land. Many of the 
developments on this land comprised of warehouses, offices as well as residences. There 
were a few hotels, workshops, and factories, and residential houses. 
According to the records kept by the Custodian of Enemy Property during the early 
1 920s, there were over 188 land lots owned by German nationals and firms in Dar es Salaam 
at the end of the German era. Most of the owners developed their plots as offices, 
warehouses, workshops, and factories. Many too combined residences on the same plots. 
Buildings were usually no more than two stories high, a reflection, not only of poor 
transportation facilities and poor general infrastructure, but also of the general precarious 
nature of incipient colonialism. A lot of land was also kept undeveloped. This was a 
reflection of lack of resorces; tit also, possibly of poor returns on property. In 1901 for 
example, private construction had nearly come to a stand still. Only one entrepreneur was 
ready to erect 3 small houses at the ve of the Government for civil servants, and even then, 
against guaranteed rent for 7Y2 years 76 . 
A number of Europeans took up agricultural land around Dar es Salaam and many were 
engaged in growing palms. Coconuts palms were relatively cheap to look after, and 
76 	German Colonial Government, Annual Report, 1901/1902. 
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commanded reasonable returns, and helped to ease land speculation. There were however 
no really big plantations around Dar es Salaam and the small that existed, produced relatively 
little 77 . The only really big plantation in the Kurasini area of Dar es Salaam, the Rheinische 
Handel P/antagengesellschaft was closed in 1901 for not being profitable 78 . The area was 
later on taken over by the Government and converted into a police detachment. 
In 1 905/06, there were about 30 European owners of coconut plantations around Dar 
es Salaam most being businessmen who aimed at earning surplus incomes, again, a reflection 
of limited resources 79 . 
This kind of situation where land could be acquired but put to little development 
encouraged speculation. It also encouraged the unplanned occupation of land. Africans could 
easily occupy land on coconut plantations, paying rent to the owners, who would allow them 
to put up temporary shelter. The case of Kariakoo described earlier was a typical example of 
this land speculation/unplanned settlements scenario. 
3.3.3 The Indians 
Indians had established themselves in East African trade long before the advent of 
European colonialism. The coming of the Germans in East Africa brought some changes in 
the sense that traditional links with Zanzibar were weakened while the coming of the Railways 
weakened caravan trade. The German colonial government was quick to realise the 
advantages of the Indians, to the aims of colonialism. Count Leo von Caprivi, who succeeded 
Bismark as German Imperial Chancellor put it clearly: "We want them (Indians) because they 
have connexions with the interr and we should not be in a position to replace them" 80 . 
However, German houses like W. Oswald and Co., Hansing & Co., and the German East 
77 	Germanolonial Government, Annual Reports, 1901/02. 
78 	ibid. 
' 	German Colonial Government, Annual Report, 1 905/06. 
80 	R.G. Gregory, India andAfrica: A History of Race Relations within the British Empire 1890-1935, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1981, p. 104; M.S. Honey, A History of Indian merchant capital and class formation in 
Tanganyika 1840-1940, Phd, Thesis University of Dar es Salaam, 1982. 
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Africa Company, were also interested in a major role in trade. A compromise had to be struck. 
Major German commercial houses made efforts to support and coexist with the Indian trader 
in business. Wholesaling went to the Germans, while retail trade went to the Indians 81 
The Indians were faced with a situation where they did not have much money to spare 
for land development. The result was for them to cluster together in the central area carrying 
out commerce and living under primitive accommodation conditions. The situation was only 
rectified during the British rule (Chapter Four). 
Within the Indian community, the German government preferred to work with Goans. 
While both Indians and Europeans found themselves in the city centre, the Europeans and 
Goanese concentrated in the area which came to be known as the European shopping area 
(Around today's Samora Machel Avenue). The Indians were concentrated nearby in the 
bazaar area (See Figure 3.3). 
The situation facing the Indians was that of limited capital accumulation, but with a 
sympathetic government which aimed at setting them up to work hand in hand with it, to 
ensure the economic exploitation of the colony. The Indians were therefore under no pressure 
either to move, or to conform to the building (zoning) requirements yet. Many lived in simple 
huts. It was the British Government which later on enforced development conditions in the 
Indian (Commercial) Area during the 1 920s and 1 930s. Even then, the process to force 
Indians to develop their plots was a hardous one and entailed the granting them of soft terms 
by the colonial government. 
1-4 
3.3.4 The Africans (Natives) 
In looking at the Africans, it is Pertinent to note that some of these were "native" to Dar 
es Salaam i.e. they had stayed in the area long before colonialism came. These included those 
who stayed in the 'arious villages around Dar es Salaam like Mzizima, Upanga,'Kizingo, and 
Kisutu. Then there were the Africans who were slaves working on the various plantations 
belonging mainly to Zanzibari Arabs. Thirdly there were those who could be described as the 
81 	
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caravan people, the Nyamwezi and Manyema in particular, but also the Yao and the Makonde. 
Finally, one can talk of new migrants, people who came from outside the Dar es Salaam area, 
to seek new opportunities. The majority of these initially came from the Uzaramo country 
surrounding Dar es Salaam. 
The reaction of these groups in the early days of colonialism is difficult to disaggregate 
given our present level of knowledge. But they all had an economic motive to come or to stay 
in Dar es Salaam. Sicard writes that although Oar es Salaam was situated in the traditional 
Zaramo territory, it was not a natural centre for the Zaramos, and the "4000 or so Zaramos 
had come because of attraction of employment", and that "if the Arabs with their large 
plantations, and the Indians with their trade left Dar es Salaam, so would the majority of 
Africans." 82 The fact that these people owned no land, and had come to seek economic 
opportunities, affected their attitude towards investing in property. 
As soon as the German administration got established in 1890, people began to flock to 
Dar es Salaam in search of opportunities. There was a lot of construction going on to create 
the new capital and this was bringing in "growing numbers of fortune seekers from upcountry 
and overseas, and the old peaceful backwater character of Dar es Salaam was being 
transformed into a bustling town" 83 . Dar es Salaam was so attractive that even slaves or 
ex-slaves did not leave the town although they were given considerable freedom. 
Despite their enthusiasm for coming and staying in Oar es Salaam, Africans were 
confronted with a psychologically demoralizing atmosphere couched in European superiority. 
They were moreover relatively'oor. Thus, the locals had no choice but to give way to the 
German Government when it expelled them from the Government area They did not go far 
though, deciding to settle just behind the Bazaar area (Figure 3.3). This was as near as they 
could venture towards their places of work in the harbour,and in the Government and Bazaar 
areas, and in the Railways. The Bazaar area is sometimes referred to as the old native town 
to distinguish if from the new one in Karikaoo. Africans who worked on plantations settled 
82 	von Sicard, The Lutheran Church on the Coast of Tanzania, p. 171. 
83 	ibid, P. 83. 
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there laying the foundation for future unplanned settlements. 
It is be to noted that in most cases the Africans built simple buildings, adhering to no 
pattern. This, to some extent is a reflection of the socioeconomic set up of the time including 
the limited resources that Africans had. de Boer argues that Africans, used to their rural 
village layouts, did not seriously stick to the European street pattern, while the Germans and 
Indians, with a completely different cultural background, were respecting the town plan layout 
and placed their buildings properly along the surveyed streets. 84 This deduction is not 
entirely correct. While it must be admitted that cultural influences were reflected in the urban 
form adopted by Africans, it is important to point out that government plans for African areas 
existed on paper but were not transformed into reality on the ground. Given the imperfections 
inherent in the land markets (i.e. private individuals ignoring public good land uses as well as 
externalities, (Chapter One), an unpatterned form of development is usually the result, where 
there is the absence of government intervention, or workable private contracts. A close study 
of Figure 3.3 reveals that where streets were instituted before settlement e.g. beyond A/cue 
Strasse westwards, adherence to street alignment is noticeable. Besides, there was the 
question of economic resources. Even for the Indian part of town, imprOvement was only 
noticeable after substantial accumulation of resources had been realised, not before. The case 
of European areas should be evaluated from the angle of superior economic and social power 
that colonial official commanded, plus the fact that most buildings and services therein were 
constructed or instituted by the Government. In the case of African Areas, construction was 
usually self-financed. 
Thirdly, it must be pointedut that Africans were usually aware of their non permanence 
in most locations. They were usually in occupation of either Government land, or private land 
owned by Germans, Arabs or othe,Africans. Thus there was no incentive to aim at higher 
levels of investment apart from the bare shelter provided by the simple huts. 
On the other hand, the Government attitude towards Africans, unlike its policy to wards 
Indians, was not promotive of property development. It was always felt by he colonial 
84 	de Boer, Urban Renewal and Rehabi/itafon in Kariakoo, p. 30. 
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government that there were more than enough of Africans coming to Dar es Salaam to satisfy 
the city's labour requirements. In later years, policies were to be adopted to try and stem 
immigration to Dar es Salaam. Given a situation of limited resources, large numbers of 
Africans were jeorpadising the standard of life that the Europeans aimed at attaining. So, the 
policy adopted was aimed at doing as little for Africans as was necessary to ensure law and 
order and public health (e.g. the layout of native areas). Colonial policy preferred the African 
back into his village. The Africans in Dar es Salaam were therefore faced with a government 
policy hostile to their interests, a policy which they had little power to control. 
3.4. Overall deductions on the resulting land use structure for Dar es Salaam. 
German colonial policy, acting under the influence of the historical epoch in question 
played a major role in shaping the land use structure of Dar es Salaam. It was colonialism that 
selected Dar es Salaam as a suitable colonial capital city, and it was colonialism that 
determined the land use necessary for its propagation. Having been thus selected, Dar es 
Salaam had to yield land for colonial purposes including administration, trade, import/export 
etc. The German East Africa Company and the German Colonial Government played a crucial 
role in acquiring, planning, and developing this land into office, commercial, and residential 
buildings; into warehouses, roads and open spaces; into transportation land; and so on. 
Much as resources were limited, the Government was also able to shape the government 
administrative area, the European residential area, the port area (including the customs) and 
to some extent, the commercial area. In the latter case, the existence of the old Majid town, 
and particularly the Indian inteièsts therein, moderated colonial policy somewhat, into some 
form of compromise which saw both the Indian and the European commercial interests being 
represented, equally, if in somewhat separated areas, within Dar es Salaam's commercial area. 
Orders, bordering to the use of force, intimidation, bribery and outright purchase, were some 
of the methods used to acquire land mainly from Africans. This land was either used for 
government purposes, or was subdivided and passed over for use by the private sector. In 
a number of cases the private colonial sector bought land in and around bar es Salaam mainly 
for agricultural purposes (the major crop being coconut palms) but also for speculative 
purposes. 
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The 1 891 Bauordnung was the major land policy document used to ensure that Dar es 
Salaam conformed to some kind of zoning scheme. This divided Oar es Salaam into three 
zones: areas where only European type of houses were allowed; areas where 
commercial/residential buildings were allowed; and areas where any type of buildings were 
allowed. This in effect divided Dar es Salaam into European, Indian and African areas, a 
situation later on confirmed in the 1914 Bauordnug. Zoning requirements in the European 
area, as well as the infrastructure therein were usually implemented through government 
investment, while it was usually the private sector that was relied upon in the Indian and 
African areas. As a result the standards of buildings, infrastructure and the general 
environment in these areas differed immensely. Throughout, the government expended 
efforts to shape Dar es Salaam, which it divided into a European area, a commercial/residential 
area, and a native town. The construction of the central railway line in 1905 brought a lot 
of money and a large influx of people to Dar es Salaam. New land uses to accommodate the 
railway infrastructure were added to Dar es Salaam's land use structure. Moreover, with the 
territorial tranquility of the post 1907 era, and a home government supportive of colonial 
investment, more resources could be expended in Dar es Salaam. The government embarked 
on an active policy of shaping the town's land uses. This included the northward expansion 
of the European area, and the deliberate planning of the native area. In the case of the latter 
area, the motive was to remove Africans, from the old native area, and locate them in 
Kariakoo, the planning of which had reached Msimbazi Street by 1916. Future German plans 
for Dares Salaam were indicated as the 1914 Bourdnung of 1st July 1914 with its division 
of Dares Salaam's land use structure into racial land zones. Although published in 1914, it 
must be assumed that the planning of Kariakoo was based on this as yet unpublished 
Bauordnung. 
The various actors had little choice but to conform to this pattern which, in the case of 
both the Europeans and Indians, was beneficial, but which was oppressive against the 
Africans. The Africns were getting pushed outwards, and their areas were hardly serviced. 
Many too had to occupy other peoples' land. It therefore appears fair to point out that it was 
policy that mainly shaped Dar es Salaam in the early day of colonial rule, although it must be 
emphasised that by the time the Germans left, a lot of Dar es Salaam's areas occupied by 
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Aricans and Indians did not conform to these government plans and much of the European 
area was undeveloped 
Even at this early stages, elements of inequality had already began to show themselves. 
It was the "poor" Africans who were being pushed out of the city centre, separating their 
work places from their residencies, while for both Europeans and Indians, the work place was 
never far from their residential places. This conformed neither to the classical land location 
theory nor to the theory justifying government intervention into land markets. Land 
consumption per capita, was highly in favour of the Europeans. The best roads of the time, 
as well as water supply, and electricity infrastructure, were all concentrated on the 
Government area. Government officials too created a policy of land acquisition that was 
favourable to them. It was neither efficiency nor equity that was behind land policy and the 
resulting land use structure for Dares Salaam. 
On 4th September 1916, the British forces occupied Dar es Salaam and the German 
Government was forced to move to Tabora. From then until 1919 permits were given to 
natives (soldiers and civilians) to build houses in Kariakoo, in a somewhat haphazard manner. 
It was only after 1922 that much greater interest was evinced in the town planning of Dar es 
Salaam. The Open Space, and the three building zones as shown in the 1914 Bauordnung, 
were defined, and the plots which had been issued without reference to any street plan were 
squared up and houses realigned (Chapter Four). The rulers had changed, but the principles 




INTER WAR GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 The British Take Over of Tanganyika and its Implications for Dar es Salaam 
4.1 .1 Major tenets of British Colonial Policy Towards Land and Labour 
World War I ended with the defeat of Germany in 1918. The bulk of the erstwhile German 
colony of East Africa, soon renamed Tanganyika 1 , became a Class B mandated territory of 
the League of Nations, administered by Britain. Part of this territory, i.e. the districts of 
Rwanda and Urundi was given to Belgium for administration. 
The end of World War I did not signify they end of colonialism. Although Germany was 
vanquished and denied repossession of her former colonies, the latter were taken over by the 
victorious powers through a policy of mandates/trusteeships. Colonial philosophy, economics 
and socio-economic relationships continued to persist during this interwar period. 
Major issues that broad colonial policy had to address were how to exploit the colony, 
and this necessitated policies on land and labour, both of which were key to production and 
both of which had effects on urban development. 
In terms of land, British Colonial policy propagated the idea that natives held land on 
communal tenure, and that iadividual land ownership was either not known prior to the 
coming of colonialism, or was limited to a few areas, e.g. on the East African coast where the 
contact with Arab culture had led to the break down of communal land tenure norms. To the 
African, land had no value before colonial conquest. It had owners; though not individual 
ones, with rights,to cultivation, and these were entitled to compensation if their land was 
A notice in the Official Gazette (Extraordinary) Vol. 1, No. 9, of January 20th, 1920, read as follows: 
Peace with Germany having been ratified on the 10th of January 1920, it is hereby notified for general information 
that with effect from the 1st of February, 1920, the occupied territory of German East Africa will provisionally and until 
furthernotice be officially known as THE TANGANYIKA TERRITORY. The notice was signed by R. H. Crofton, Acting 
Secretary to the Administration. 
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taken over for private or government use. But since no land market existed, African "owners" 
could not claim the monetary value of land 2 . 
One major purpose of this stand was to allow the colonial governments to nationalise 
native lands either without compensation on the grounds that land was ownerless, or, with 
compensation limited to "unexhausted improvements" on the grounds that Africans knew no 
value in unimproved land. The other purpose was to prevent the proletarianization of the 
African, which, it was feared, was bound to lead to trouble in the long term perspective. 
The labour policy of the British colonial administration was closely related to the notion 
of customary tenure. The African was considered to be attached to his rural area, where land 
was readily available to him, and it was not the intention of the colonial governments to upset 
this situation by creating a working class proletariat. Much as labour was required for 
plantations, mines, and in urbam areas, it was conceptualised that this would be only 
temporary wage labour, cheap, and available only when required, and back in the villages 
when unwanted. 
At least three policy elements emanating from this policy had fundamental effects on the 
land use structure of Dar es Salaam. One, African needs in land were accorded little priority, 
since Africans were considered to be only temporary urban residents. Two, Africans could 
easily occupy land particularly at the urban periphery under customary tenure. Three, the 
colonial government could acquire land from the natives with little or nocompensation, thus 
creating a situation of conflict between public authorities and land occupiers, a situation which 
has on a number of occassions led to the frustration of planning schemes. 
4.1.2 The British Takeover and Early,Administration of Tanganyika 
In 1916, British C'vil Administration was established in the counquered Northern part of 
German East Africa, and was based at Lushoto. Soon after the War, in 1919, this 
administration moved to Dar es Salaam into the buildings of the former German 
2 	Phillips, A., The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa, James Currey, London, .1989, p.  112. 
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administrators, despite that the Governor's Palace had been seriously damaged and had to be 
rebuilt. 
British Administration was formally established by the Tanganyika Order in Council of 
22nd July, 1920.   The chief representative of His Majesty's Government was the Governor 
and Commander in Chief, assisted by as Executive Council made up of the Chief Secretary, 
the Attorney General, the Treasurer and the Principal Medical Officer. There was also, an 
independent High 
Court. Save for the Colonial Secretary's general powers of disallowance, the Governor had 
powers to make Ordinances for good government of the territory, provided he respected 
existing native laws and customs. Laws and orders made before the Tanganyika Order in 
Council are generally referred to as Proclamations, and those after, as Ordinances. 
By the time Britain took over Tanganyika, certain essentials of the colonial process at 
a national level had already been achieved by the late German administration and need not be 
repeated. Territorial demarcation and subjugation was complete. Much of the infrastructure 
had already been laid, and need only be maintained, or extended. Cash crops had already 
been introduced and in some cases peasant production was quite good. New cash crops like 
tea and tobacco were introduced without much difficulty. Minerals prospecting was 
intensified. There was already an administrative set up as well as laws and orders which 
Britain could utilise as new ones were being evolved. 
The early legislation enacted included: the Regulation for Peace and Good Order dated 
22/2/1 919 under which various rules for Dar es Salaam (including those for township 
administration) were made; and the Township Ordinance of 1920.   Many laws related to land 
were enacted in 1923.   Principal anong these were: the Land Ordinance, the Registration of 
Documents Ordinance, the Land Registry Ordinance, and the Law of Property and 
Conve yancing OrcInance. 
The immediate post-war economy of Tanganyika was in a bad shape, with many of the 
former German estates in ruins and with peasant production disrupted. Public works, 
especially roads, bridges, urban and rural sewers and drains, seawalls, lighthouses, etc., were 
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in a bad state of maintenance. The British colonial policy of self-sufficiency for each colony 
underscored the importatnce of getting the former German estates going as soon as possible; 
and of an early introduction and streamlining of the customs, trade licences, and hut and poll 
taxes, all of which were functional by 1922.   
Among the urgent business that the new Government had to deal with swiftly was the 
question of enemy property. While the War was still going on, the Enemy Property (Vesting) 
Proclamation of 1917 was passed. It created the Custodian of Enemy Property with duties 
to manage the abandoned German and other enemy property in order to support the war 
efforts and to keep the economy going. Later, the Custodian was to oversee the sale and 
liquidation of this property. The sate of most ex-German property was completed by 1924,   
and its effect on the land use structure of Dar es Salaam is discussed later on below. 
A lot of latitude was given to Britain in the formulation of both land and labour policies. 
With the exception of the ruling that native laws and customs should be taken into account, 
and the rights and interests of Africans safeguarded, Britain was free to formulate land and 
labour policies as it deemed fit. Moreover, there was no requirement to hand back to 
Africans, the land acquired by the settlers, "bearing in mind the achievements of the German 
settlers, and the need to maintain and build upon the foundation they had laid." 3 It can 
therefore be argued that the mandated territory status did not confer to Tanganyika, a status 
any better than an outright colony. 
A Legislative Council with a majority of officials, but on which non-official Europeans and 
Indians were represented .was formed in 1926.   African interests were supposedto be 
represented bythe Goyernor, the Chief Secretary and the Secretary for Native Affairs. British --- 
Governor, Sir Donald Cameron wanted Africans to sit on the Council but "no African could 
be found with sufficient comnnd of English to take part in the debates of the Council" 4 . 
The non representation_of Africansallowedthe_inequitable segregative urban land policies to 
K. Ingham, "Tanganyika: the Mandate and Cameron, 1919-1931", in, V. Harlow, E.M. Chitver, and A. Smith (Eds), 
History of EastAfrica, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965, pp. 543-593. 
quoted in, W.A. Dodd, and J. Cameron, Society Schools and Pro grass in Tanzania, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1970, 
P. 39. 
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remn unchallenged for a Iong_ 
Much of the envisaged development of Dar es Salaam stopped during the First World 
War, but resumed from 1919. As a colonial major port, Dar es Saläam's port facilities 
continued to have cardinal importance in the colonial set up. After the war the harbour was 
cleared of the German obstacles. The harbour's entrance was greatly improved by dredging, 
after a careful survey of the channel. Anticipating considerable cargo to/from Dar es Salaam's 
hinterland from the late 1 920s, the government constructed a large new goods and 
marshalling yard as an addition to the existing terminal facilities of the railways, together with 
new goods sheds and a new approach line from the high ground to the wharf 5 . Dar es Salaam 
was thus again made into the most important port in the territory, handling between 48 and 
56% of all the import-export trade between 1925 and 1929 (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: Distribution of the handling of Import-Export trade among the various ports in 
Tanganyika, 1925-1 929, M. 
Port 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
Dar es Salaam 56.0 53.9 49.8 48.5 51.1 
Tanga 16.1 17.9 20.7 20.9 23.8 
Mwanza 8.6 9.4 8.7 6.6 3.4 
Bukoba 7.3 7.1 4.5 7.4 6.0 
Moshi 3.4 3.8 4.3 2.8 2.8 
Lindi 3.8 3.0 2.8 3.9 3.2 
Other Ports 4.8 4.9 9.2 9.9 9.6 
Sources: 	Colonial Office, Reports on Tanganyika Territory, His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, London, (relevant years) 
The State House was rebuilt in 1922,   partly on the old German foundation, but with 
C.C. Giliman, "Dares Salaam 1860-1940: A Story of Growth and Change", Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 20, 
1945, pp. 1-23. 
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a large additional new wing. The Secretariat offices also received a substantial new wing, but 
otherwise, no new accommodation was immediately added to that left behind by the 
Germans. Several ex-enemy properties were simply taken over for use by the colonial 
Government. Later on, though, the European residential area was extended northwards. 
The mid 1 920s witnessed considerable economic prosperity for Tanganyika. This was 
reflected in the extension of the central railway line from Tabora to Mwanza in 1924,   thus 
extending Dar es Salaam's hinterland. In Dar es Salaam itself, this prosperity was perhaps 
reflected in the huge demand for building plots by the natives. The native town of Kariakoo 
had to be extended in the early 1 920s to Ilala, where, as the government noted, construction 
was fast. But the Depression of the late 1 920s was also felt bitterly and this was reflected 
not only in the government's policy of discouraging town planning schemes, but also in the 
Indian community's protests against their being forced to take up rights of occupancy for 
urban land which they held on Kiwanja tenure (discussed below). 
As the headquarters of the colonial government, Dar es Salaam continued to receive 
considerable attention. It was among the first towns to have one of the four government 
power stations in the country. It was also the beneficiary of various public schemes including 
public housing (for Europeans), public water supply, road improvements; etc. Nevertheless, 
because of the inherited situation of poverty, the colonial policy of territorial self-sufficiency 
and the relatively lukewarm interest that the British administration had for Tanganyika 
(compared say to Kenya), central aspects of Dar es Salaam's management problems were not 
dealt with. The port remained relatively small compared to Mombasa. The town continued 
to lack a system of sewerage, drainage and sanitation, till the 1 950s. The surfacing of roads 
was still very far from even a moderate standard of efficiency in most parts of town; and 
sidewalks, even in the main shoppii streets, were in a deplorable and dangerous state 6 . 
As Africans were not represented on the Legislative Council, the colonial government 
was rarely put to task particularly, with regard to its policy vis a vis Africans in urban areas. 
Indian members for the most part, raised issues related to the Indian community and the city 
6 	ibid, p.19. 
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centre. Lack of proper representation made it easy for the Government to remove Africans 
from their areas (e.g. Gerezani), and to minimally service "native" areas (below). 
By and large, the British administration did not come up with any new approaches to 
direct Dar es Salaam, different from the colonial frameworks set up by the German 
administration. Most of their policies were similar to, or, a continuation, of those of the 
Germans. 
4.2 Land policy impacts 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The process of transforming Dar es Salaam into a colonial capital had more or less 
been achieved by the Germans, but the British administration had to deal with a number of 
issues related to the town's development. One, much of the German work in shaping Dar es 
Salaam was incomplete. In particular, the 1914 Bauordnung had hardly been implemented 
when World War I broke out. Two, Dar es Salaam was growing both in terms of population, 
area, and functions, and new issues related to land development had to be addressed. Three, 
the British administration could not continue using German legislation, and had to pass their 
own, even though the purpose of this legislation was the same. 
In this section, tools of land policy used during the interwar period are surveyed by 
analysing the philosophy behind them, and by examining their provisions, and effects on land 
uses. This is done in a chronological order in order to capture the various circumstances that 
obtained before the passage, and during the implementation, of such legislation. It must be 
borne in mind that these toolsóf land policy were conceived and implemented in a broad 
framework where colonialism was expected to work. The flagbearers of colonialism were the 
colonial officials, and in as far as th,y were implementing a policy aimed at subjugating and 
exploitating an alien people, they had to adopt policies reflecting this. Thus, many land 
policies had an open, or covert, element of dividing people along racial lines, an important tool 
of domination and exploitation. Being on foreign soil, confronted by unfavourable 
circumstances like the general poverty of the colonies, made worse by the British 
Government's policy of territorial self sufficiency; and being imbibed in notions of European 
racial superiority, colonial officials upheld and propagated zoning policies aimed at segregating 
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themselves from their subjects. Colonial policy aimed at concentrating resources on 
Europeans. Within townships, medical officers occupied very high positions and were 
regarded in considerable high esteem in the early colonial administrative set up. As has been 
pointed out above, the Pincipal Medical Officer was among the four officials who made up 
the territory's Executive Council during the 1 920s. Medical officers had a profound impact 
on land uses till the rise of the planners in the 1 950s. 
Among the important tools of land policy adopted during this period and which had 
fundamental effects on Dar es Salaam were: 
o 	The Township Ordinance of 1920,   together with the various. Township Ru/es, 
(particularly the zoning provisions) made under it; 
o 	The Land Ordinance of 1 923; 
o 	The Town (Development and Control) Ordinance of 1 936; 
o 	Direct land development by government (e.g. the construction of officials' housing); 
and, 
o 	The provision of infrastructure to the various areas. 
4.2.2 Implementation set up 
Colonial rule was essentially a one man - Governor's - rule. This resulted into the 
concentration of powers for most decisions. In the immediate postwar era, the District 
Political Officers, and later on, the Administrative Officers (district), carried extensive powers. 
By 1920,   power was firmly concentrated in the Governor and most decisions related to urban 
management particularly in Dar es Salaam, had to be referred to him. These ranged from major 
issues to trivial ones such as the growing or cutting of trees in townships. 
The Township Ordinance of 1920 empowered the Governor to declare any area to be a 
Township and to apoint, for the running of a township, a Township Authority. Under the 
Township Rules of 1923,   the Governor could appoint the 
Authority. The President had to be a Senior Commissioner or next Administrative Officer, or 
an Administrative Officer in charge of a District or subdistrict in which the townshias. 
Members were to be officials from Medical, Public Works, and the Land Departments, 
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nominated by their Heads of Departments. The official from the Medical Department was to 
be the Township Authority's Executive Officer unless the President directed otherwise. 
Issues related to township development were to be referred to the Central Town Planning 
and Building Committee created in 1922 and was made up of members nominated by 
Governor. The chairman was the Principal Medical Officer. Other members were: the Director 
of Public Works, the Land Officer, and the Senior Sanitation Officer (who was usually from 
the medical profession). The latter acted as the Committee's Secretary and its Executive 
Officer. The Committee was later expanded to include the Director of Surveys. The 
"Sanitation Syndrome", a major cencern of early urban land policy, is apparent in the manning 
of this Committee. 
Figure 4.1 is a representation of the typical flow of communication between the 
Township Authority and the Governor. Any of the authorities represented could initiate or 
raise any issue of land policy. The Central Town Planning and Building Committee was an 
advisory set up to which most town development proposals or issues were directed and its 
recommendations were usually sanctioned. Medical Officers, as can be gauged, were very 
powerful officers on issues related to urban land development. Medical considerations were 
usually put forward to justify racial segregation policies, change of township boundaries, land 
reclamation and drainage schemes, land servicing, differentiated land use schemes, building 
regulations, etc. In this respect, it may be pertinent to point out that the early Executive 
Officer of the Dares Salaam Township Authority, from 1923 to 1930, R.R. Scott, was a 
doctor of medicine. He also served prominently on the Central Town Planning and Building 
Committee. In 1930,   Dr. Scottwas succeeded as Executive Officer of the Dar es Salaam 
Township Authority, by Mr. E.H. Helps who had been recruited specifically from South Africa 
to take up the post of Municipal Secçtary, Dar es Salaam Township Authority, a position he 
held till 1946.   The outgoing District Officer (Dar es Salaam) in 1930,   Mr.•T.P.S. Dawkins had 
also served in Soufh Africa. Recourse for experience and advice on a number of urban 
development and race relation issues was usually made to Kenya, Rhodesia and South Africa. 
f/tinder such circumstances racial segregation was possibly seen as normal and essential in land 
Cdevelopment issues. 
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Source: Deduced from various Colonial Documents. 
Because of the centralisation of Authority, decision makinci was very bureaucratic and files 
would bepingponged betweenarious officials and departments for months, sometimes 
years, before a decision was made. For example, a request by the Dar es, Salaam Township 
Authority for Town Planning powers to deal with land subdivisions on private lands, made in 
1929 was not concluded till 1936.   The request for the approval of land use layouts for the 
Upanga area preparei in 1929 had not been approved by 1938 and was overtaken by World 
War II in 1939.   There was thus a lot of delay in decision making, and frustration among the 
officials administering Dar es Salaam, and among the aggrieved or interested parties. 
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4.2.3 The Effects of the Disposal of Enemy Property (191 7-1 933) on Dares Salaam's land 
use structure 
It has been pointed out earlier that the British Colonial Government took very early steps 
to ensure that enemy property was managed. The Enemy Property (Vesting) Proclamation of 
1917, created the Custodian of Enemy Property to look after this property and the Enemy 
Property (Disposal) Proclamation of 1920 allowed the sale of enemy property through public 
auctions. Two factors resulting from this disposal are of importance to the land use structure 
of Dar es Salaam. One, many township estates were bought cheaply (at about 5% of their 
value) by Indians who therefore consolidated their foothold in the City Centre. Two, under 
the Enemy Property (Retention) Ordinance of 1921,   some 99 ex-enemy buildings situated 
mainly in the European area of Dar es Salaam were removed from the list of buildings to be 
auctioned and were retained for government use, thus obtaining for colonial officials, superior 
accommodation cheaply, a policy that has been perpetrated thence. On top of that, the 
British colonial government acquired several ex-German shambas around Dar es Salaam 
(notable of which were Borman's shamba, and Busse's shamba) during the disposal of Enemy 
Property. These were later on put to pre-determined use. The conversion of Borman's shainba 
into an extension of the native town at Kariakoo, is a typical example of this policy, and is 
discussed later on below. Table 4.2 gives a breakdown of the liquidation of the Enemy 
Property among the various racial groups. Natives got very little of this land because they 
were riot in the mainstream of the monetary sector and could not therefore compete with 
Europeans and Indians. LyaII 7 notes, moreover, that the price per hectare paid by the buyers 
varied with their nationality. The Greeks paid £2.1 per ha; the British £2.8; the Indians, 
£3.6; and Arabs and Natives, .6! As it is unlikely that Arabs and Natives purchased the 
most expensive property, Lyall believes that the auctions must have been influenced somehow 
in order to produce such figures. 
I 
I , 
A. Lyall, Land Law and Policy in Tanganyika, 1918-1932, LLM Thesis, University of Dares Salaam, 1973, p. 80. 
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Table 4.2: Sale of Enemy Immoveable Property, 1917-1 933. 
Nationality of Buyers Total Area purchased 
(to the nearest ha) 
Price paid 
(C's) 




















Total 479,154 344,605 
Source: 	Tanganyika, Report on the Liquidation, Enemy Property Department, 
Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1933,   quoted in, Lyall, Land Law 
and Policy in Tanganyika. 
4.2.4 The TownshJp Ordinance, 1920 
Background leading towards the Townshiø Ordinance 1920 
Soon after the War, besides keeping the German Administrative and legislative 
framework in force4 the British colonial government passed an omnibus type of legislation 
called the Regulation for Peace and Good Order, dated 22/2/1 91 9. Under the provisions of 
this piece of legislation, the Dar es Salaam District Political Officer issued the Rules for the 
Township of Dar es Salaam 8 which came into effect on the 1St day of November, 1 91 9. 
8 
Government Notice No. 6 of 1919. 
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These rules covered a whole range of issues, including licensing, carrying of dangerous 
weapons, and regulations related to: vehicles, markets, the slaughtering of cattle, bakeries, 
milk, entertainments, sanitation, suppression of mosquitoes, the general behaviour of people 
in the townships, etc. -These regulations further defined the boundaries of Dar es Salaam 
Township and forbade the erection therein, of buildings, walls, etc., or the making of 
alterations thereto, without the permit of the District Political Officer. Using these rules, the 
Dar es Salaam Political Officer, M.A. West was able to police and regularise the native area 
at Karikaoo (below). 
The Ru/es revealed a major aspect of colonial policy: that natives wexeaIiansJ:.o..jj(ban 
areas. Under S.8 (of these Ru/es), no native arriving in the township was allowed to remain 
in there for 6 days without the written authority of the District Political Officer. The latter 
was empowered by S.1 2 to repatriate anybody to his home or district of origin. This was in 
consonance with the policy on labour and on land tenure outline earlier. The restriction on the 
natives' urban residential duration was later incorporated in the Township Ru/es of 1923.   
In 1920,   Sanitary Rules for the Township of Dar es Sa/aam were published and were 
effective from 1/9/1 920. These gave the Medical Officer of Health, powers of ensuring the 
suppression of mosquitoes and of dealing with sanitary nuisances and insanitary premises 9 . 
The Township Ordinance, 1920 and Rules made under it 
Towards the end of 1920,   the Township Ordinance was enacted 10 . It was a very 
short ordinance, with just nine sections, but it gave the Governor, powers to declare an area 
to be a Township, and to make rules for the health, order, and good government of the 
Townships. Soon afterwards, Dar es Salaam, and another 29 settlements in Tanganyika were 
declared to be townships. 
In 1922,   comehensive Township (Building) Ru/es were published under the Township 
Ordinance. Besides creating the Centra/ Town P/anning and Building Committee to be 
Government Notice No. 39 of 5/8/1 920. 
10 Proclamation No. 26 of 1920. 
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appointed by the Governor for any township, these rules provided building regulations 
applicable to Dar es Salaam and included provisions requiring that a building permit be 
obtained before erecting any, (including native), building. These rules were short lived and 
were soon replaced by-the Township Rules of 1923, effective from 1/4/1923 for all 
townships in the country. These rules combined the 1919 Rules for the Township of Dares 
Salaam, the 1920 Sanitary Rules for Dares Sa/aam, and the 1922 Township (Building) Rules. 
The updated Township Rules allowed the Governor to appoint a Township Authority which 
would be the land development manager of a township. Section 94 of these Rules (shown 
in later documents as Section 84), gave the Governor, powers to prescribe, by notice in the 
Government Gazette in respect to any township, areas: 
in which residential buildings of European type only were to be constructed; 
in which residential and trading buildings may be erected; and 
for native quarters only. 
In 1924,   Building Areas for Dar es Salaam Township according to the above scheme 
were published 11 . The areas defined to correspond with (a), (b) and (c) in the paragraph 
above, were called Zone I, Zone II and Zone Ill respectively (Appendix 41). This definition 
corresponded in area with the zones as defined under the 1914 German Bauordnug for Dar 
es Salaam. (Figure 3.5) 
The Township Ru/es were amended in 1930 by removing those rules related to buildings 
(i.e. Section 86-1 33) and re-enacting them as a separate piece of legislation, called the 
Townships (Building) Ru/es of 1930 (effective 1/5/1931). The "balance" of the Township 
Rules were further amended in 1933 to redefine the building areas where only native quarters 
were allowed, to be areas where biifdings of any type were allowed. This amendment was 
aimed at legalising, retrospectively, and at allowing, in future, the erection of non-native types 
of buildings in the native areas. The amendment was necessitated by the fact that already 
many Indians and other non-natives were putting up buildings in native areas. The building 
areas (zones) for Dar es Salaam were republished in 1934 to reflect the above changes. 
11 Government Notice No. 160 of 11/6/1924. 
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Critique of the Townshiø Rules 1920 
These rules were too ambitious. They included so many items, ranging from the 
prevention of pollution to water supplies and regulating rickshaws, to regulating native 
behaviour, including their period of sojourn in townships, and their engagement in various 
forms of entertainment. The rules were also makeshift and not well laid Out to flow logically. 
With regard to building areas, the Township Rules never defined what was meant by 
"European buildings", "residential and trade buildings", or "native buildings". Moreover, the 
concern with residential buildings, say in Zone I, did not take into account the already existing, 
or future, office, industrial and commercial buildings. This definition of the building areas 
would appear to have been copied from the German 1914 Bauordnung without much 
alternation, to suit the circumstances referred to. Since the philosophy behind the 1914 
Bauordnung was racial segregation, section 94 (later 84) of the Township Rules was aimed 
at achieving the same. That the rules were badly presented was perhaps a reflection of the 
heavy workload which must have confronted the law drafters in 1923.   In that year alone, 
thirty four ordinances were enacted. Some of these, like the Land Ordinance, the Native 
Authorities Ordinance, the Poilce and Prisons Ordinance, and the Customs Tariff Ordinance 
were at the very core of colonial governance. 
Other provisions of the Township Rules, and of the Township (Building) Rules relevant 
to this study were concerned with: structural safety, health, ventilation, and sanitary and 
public health provisions, all important and traditional safeguards during this early period of 
urbanisation. But these set such high standards for buildings that only a minority could afford 
them. The colonial answer to this paradoxical situation was to provide zones where simple 
buildings were allowed, and to make sure that these were always at a considerable distance, 
and usually separated by open space, or other lines of cleavage, from European residential 
areas. 
' p 
While much of the 1930 zoning reflected the status quo, with its ancestry in the German 
period, the application of Zone I regulations northwards of the Residential area into Upanga 
was to cause a major problem to the Township Authorities since the area was already 
occupied by natives who were freeholders, and who had already constructed, and continued 
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to construct, native huts in this Zone I area; and used the area for agricultural purposes. 
The definition of Dar es Salaam into three building areas was, as we will see later, 
translated into dividing the town in racial zones. This remained the case until well into the 
1950s. However, Indians infiltrated both Zones I and II, sometimes causing negative 
reactions from the Zone "owners", both Africans and Europeans. Government provision of 
services varied with the three zones with a concentration, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, on Zone I. 
The Township Ru/es (in conjunction with the powers emanating from the Land 
Ordinance) were used to define the various zones in Dar es Salaam on the ground. In this 
respect, the Rules were used to clear the Open Space; to remove natives from the city centre, 
and to try to remove natives from Upanga (under the pretext of the illegality of native huts 
in these areas); and to remove natives from the Gerezani area (under the pretext that most 
huts in the area had been constructed without authority). Before describing and analysing 
these particular cases, a study must be made of the cornerstone of Land policy in the country: 
the Land Ordinance of 1923.   
4.2.5. The Land Ordinance 1923 and related legislation 
Provisions of the Land Ordinance 
In all colonies it was found almost paramount to pass legislation to regulate the tenure 
of land. In Tanganyika this was the Land Ordinance of 1923. It drew a lot from the 
experience of British Colonialism in Northern Nigeria. It was enacted in a framework where 
the terms of the Mandate (thou weak) had stipulated that "native interests" should prevail 
when passing laws related to land, but also where the colonial government wanted to control 
land, since this was the backbonef the economy. The result was a piece of legislation 
purporting to protect native interests while in effect it concentrated all powers over land in 
the Governor; althogh there was a little leeway for the few holders of freehold tenure granted 
or recognised by the German administration. The Land Ordinance was worded in such vague, 
and sometimes contradictory, terms, that the Governor could use its provisions to pursue any 
desired policy. Major provisions of the Land Ordinance were as follows: 
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o 	All the land in the Territory, whether occupied or not, was declared to be public, 
vested in the Governor, for the use and common benefit, direct or indirect, of the 
natives. In exercising his powers, the Governor was to have regard to native laws and 
customs obtaining in the area in question. 
o 	Private titles to, and interests in, land, lawfully acquired before its coming into effect 
were recognised. However, such titles or interests had to be proved to the Governor's 
satisfaction within five years of the Ordinance. 
o 	The title to use land was the Right of Occupancy which the Governor could grant to 
both natives and non natives, but this could not exceed 99 years, and the area granted 
could not exceed 5000 acres without the sanction of the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. 
o 	The rent to be charged for land being granted to non-natives for the first time, was to 
be the highest offer made at public auctions. Normally the land was allocated to this 
highest bidder. 
o 	Transfer of land from natives to non-natives, unless sanctioned by the governor, was 
prohibited. 
The Land Ordinance gave extensive powers to the Governor and was considered vague 
and possibly anti-native by, among others, the Permanent Mandates Commission, particularly 
when it came to defining whatubIic Land was, since it appeared that customary tenure fell 
under Public Land. For the opposite to be the case, i.e. for customary tenure to the regarded 
as private land, lawful acquisition hd to be proved and this was certainly impossible in the 
case of customary tenure. It appeared therefore that the Land Ordinance had converted 
customary land intO' Public Land under the control of the Governor. But, while this was so, 
holders of customary land had not originally been granted this land by way of a Right of 
Occupancy - the Governor's tool for granting land. In order to address this anomaly, the Land 
Ordinance was amended in 1928.   Both the right of occupancy and the occupier were 
redefined as follows: 
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Right of Occupancy means a title to the use and occupation of land and 
includes the title of a native community lawfully using or occupying land in 
accordance with native laws and customs.(Emphasis added). 
Occupier means the holder of a Right of Occupancy and includes a native, or 
a native community lawfully using or occupying land in accordance with native 
laws and customs. (Emphasis added) 
The result of this redefinition was that there were two kinds of a Right Occupancy: 
o 	a granted one referring to the land directly granted by the Governor; and, 
o 	a deemed, granted one, referring to land occupied under customary tenure. 
This in effect confirmed customary land as public land vested in the Governor, but whose 
duration of tenure, like freehold interests, was indefinite, and which carried no covenants. 
Some criticisms of the Land Ordinance 
The Land Ordinance was said to fundamentally recognise the rights of. the natives to the 
usufructu of the land in sufficient quantity to enable them to provide, not only for the 
sustenance of themselves, but also for that of their progeny. But, judging by its provisions, 
this was never stated anywhere except in the preamble which had no legal force. Provisions 
which could be interpreted as giving security of tenure to those holding land through 
customary tenure were oblique and not backed by any effective sanctions. No procedure was 
laid down to investigate customary rights. Native Laws and customs were never properly 
defined, nor were their paramefrs for dynamism and change ascertained. 
The beographical jurisdiction 24.  any community using land lawfully under customary 
tenure was never defined; nor was it made clear whether sections or individuals in a 
Community could ritove to another society or area and still use land according to "native laws 
and customs". No procedure was laid down to ascertain customary rights where land was 
to be alienated. There was no statement that land could not be alienated contrary to the 
wishes of the local communities. There were no provisions to specify the amount of land to 
be left to native communities for their current and future needs in the case of alienation. 
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Finally, there were no provisions for compensation in case African land was alienated 12 . 
These important safeguards were left to Administrative Policy. 
Besides, the Land Ordinance did not address the question of migration by natives 
within the territory. It left vague the question of freeholds obtained, or implied, by 
prescription along the coastal belt, and at the fringes of urban settlements. It was aimed at 
patronising the natives, but it did not address the dynamism emanating from socio-economic 
changes taking place over time. What for example, if natives sold their land? Would customary 
tenure end? If so, would the purchaser be a squatter on public land? 
The non-granting of freehold tenure to natives was not meant, as might be construed, 
to protect native interests but to weaken them. Freehold tenure, as the case of Upanga 
discussed later on below shows, would have made it difficult for the colonial Government to 
tailor the use of land to its needs, thus the coining of the Land Ordinance in terms vague 
enough to be applied to any situation; and the denying of the natives of freehold tenurial 
status 13 . In implementation, only very weak efforts were made to investigate native titles 
in the country in general, and about the urban fringes, in particular. 
The creation of a dual system of getting access to granted land, one for non natives 
through auctions, and the other for natives through administrative allocation, in a situation 
where Africans could not compete monetarily on equal footing with other races, served to 
exclude Africans from choice (particularly commercial) urban plots, thus perpetrating racial 
segregation and unequal access to economic power in urban areas. 
The real functions of the Land Ordinance were: 
o 	In relation to African land held under customary tenure, to vest its legal control in the 
state, while inserting other provisions vague enough to be interpreted as actually doing 
the oppo&te i.e. giving security of tenure to Africans; and to justify, in legal terms, 
12 For the amplification of some of these criticisms, see Lyall. Land Law and Policy in Tanganyika, pp.  66-72. 
13 A.L. Mabogunje, Perspective on Urban Land and Urban Management Policies Policies in SUbsaharanAfrica, World Bank 
Technical Paper No. 196, Washington, 1992. 
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any future shift in administrative policy towards land. It was a land grabbing act, 
garbed in benevolence to Africans. It gave near absolute powers to the colonial state 
over the tenure, use, and development of land; 
o 	To establish an attenuated form of private property (in the form of granted Rights of 
Occupancy) suitable for a small class of settlers, but whose security of tenure to land 
was tenuous, given the powers vested in the Governor with respect to the granting 
and cancelling of Rights of Occupancy, and the regulation of land use development; 
o 	To preserve the already alienated land in the North-east of the territory for settlers 14 
The Land Ordinance satisfied the two conditions of general colonial policy outlined above 
that is, the non-privatisation of land considered to be owned by natives, and the non-
proletarianisation of the African. It also created a framework where land could be acquired 
cheaply by the governor, and the occupiers replaced. 
The issue of African freeholders of land, acquired, for example, by prescription (below), 
and the difference between this and customary tenure was left (and still is) vague. 
Other Legislation related to land tenure 
As was the case in other colonies, the British Colonial government enacted the 
Registration of Documents Ordinance 1921, early in its administrative era. It was meant in 
particular to have people with claims in land to come forward and register them with view of 
minimising/reducing claims andounterclaims. The Ordinance was later on repealed and re-
enacted as the Registration of Documents Ordinance of 1923 whose section 21 prohibited 
dealings in land between natives and non natives without the sanctioning of the Governor. 
ION 
This provision was also enacted as Section 11 of the Land (Law of Conveyancing) Ordinance 
of 1923,   and also as Section 8 of the Land Ordinance. 
While as a general rule, colonial policy did not recognise freehold land tenure among 
14 Lyalt, Land Tenure and Policy in Tanganyika, p.  64. 
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natives, there were areas where it was considered that customary tenure had broken down 
and individual tenure was the norm. Such areas were seen as the whole coastal belt (though 
not presicely defined) and around inland towns like Tabora. Section 11 of the Land Registry 
Ordinance of 1923 allowed natives who could prove that they, or their ancestors, had been 
in continuous occupation of the land for 30 or more years prior to the coming into effect of 
the Land Ordinance (i.e. since 1 893 or earlier) to claim freehold title. This did not apply where 
land was held under customary tenure, but it will be observed that: (a) 30 years continuous 
occupation was arbitrarily determined; and that, (b) proving this occupation was difficult. At 
any rate, as was the case during the German administration, no effective policy was 
undertaken to investigate these African titles. 
The Effects of the Land Ordinance on Dar es Salaam's Land use structure 
Several actions undertaken by the colonial government in shaping Dar es Salaam were 
based on the Land Ordinance and are described below. These included: the removal of 
Africans from the central area and directing them to Kariakoo and Ilala; the clearing of the 
Open Space; the use of the grant of a Right of Occupancy as a way of enforcing development 
conditions e.g. during the conversion of Kiwanja tenure into Rights of Occupancy; the 
allocation of short term rights of occupancy to Africans in urban areas thus discouraging them 
from developing permanent structures; and the offering of choice urban plots through public 
auctions to non-natives. 
4.2.6 Shaping Dar es Salaam's land use structure through land policy 
The German Leaacv 
The Dar es Salaam that the Germans left behind was partly well ordered, as in the case 
of the Government area and partsf the central area; but was partly chaotic, especially in 
the bazaar, and the hold" native area. The new native town, Kariakoo, had been planned by 
the Germans to Ivf'simbazi Street, but its development particularly during the War periodi, had 
not gone in accordance with what the been planned for. 
The Dar es Salaam District Political Officer was anxious to get the German 1914 
Bauordnung for Dar es Salaam. Once this was obtained, the authorities.went ahead to shape 
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Oar es Salaam according to the provisions of this Bauordnung whose building areas (zones) 
were published under the Township Ru/es in 1924 (Appendix 4.1). Thus, the major tool of 
urban land policy during this period was the zoning scheme for Dar es Salaam prepared in 
1914.   It was faithfully adhered to by the British administration. First of all, they tried to slot 
the various races in their proper zones, although as time went by, this practice proved difficult 
to maintain. Second, within the zones, efforts were made to regularise and direct land uses 
internally. Thirdly, consideration had to be given to the question of new, land to cope with 
demand for urban land (Figure 4.2). In all these processes the issue of public health was 
usually put forward to justify racial segregation. In the following paragraphs the various steps 
taken to adhere to the zoning scheme for Dar es Salaam are presented. 
The Clearing of the OIen SDace, 1 921-1 932. 
As has been pointed out above, the German government had prepared a Bauordnung in 
1914 which divided Dares Salaam in three zones. Zones land Ill were to be seperated by 
a Neutral Zone (later on known as the Open Space) in which there would be no buildings. 
Having obtained the German Bauordnung, the first major British undertakings were: 
regularising and extending the native zone in Kariakoo and llala, and clearing the neutral zone 
of existing, (mainly native) buildings. It should be stated at the outset that the hitherto 
propagated view that the Open Space was cleared as a result of fire outbreaks 15 seems to 
discount the fact that it was deliberately planned by the German colonial government. 
According to some British colonial officials, the neutral zone was planned by the 
Germans: (a) as a lung; (b) to seperate those classes who use WCs, from those who use 
more primitive methods of disposing waste matter; and, (c) to provide an open space for fire 
protection. These reasons are given in a document written in 1930 and are based on 
hindsight 16 . It is suggested that ttese reasons were considered but were not the most 
crucial. The sanitation standards between Indians and Africans, for example, could not have 
been much different' since all lived at extremely high densities and relied on pit latrines as a 
15 see for example, J. Campbell, "The State, Urban Development and Housing", in, N. O'Neil, and K. Mustafa, Capitalism, 
Socialism and the Development Crisis in Tanzania, Avebury, Aldershot, England, 1990, pp. 15 2-1 76. 
16 See Tanzania National Archives File No. 10477, Compensation for Houses removed by Government. 
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major mode of sanitation. This was later on confirmed by colonial administrators in respect 
of the commercial area 17 . The main reason why the Open Space was planned to be 
between the commercial and native zones (not, as was more common elsewhere, between 
European and native zones) was that the Germans wanted a stake in the commerce and 
property in the commercial area which was already colonised by the Indians as well as 
natives. The Indians however were prominent in trade, and were being groomed to be even 
more so, while natives were not. If natives were removed and seperated from the Indian 
(Commercial) area, they (natives) would, indirectly be seperated from the Europeans in the 
commercial area. Moreover, the European residential area was at some considerable distance 
from the commercial area, and between these two areas, was a European shopping area and 
functional buildings and factories (e.g. the Brewery, see Figure 3.3) and a north-west/south-
east thoroughfare. 
The Open Space had originally been planned to be 300 yards wide, although for some 
reasons this was reduced to 150 yards. From 1921,   the Administrative Officer for Dar es 
Salaam took steps to prevent the erection of new buildings in the area earmarked for the Open 
Space, although its width was not fixed and settled till 1 92418.  In order to remove people 
from this area, the Township Authority decided to apply the Township Rules of 1923 in a 
curious manner. Under the provisions of these rules, permission was required to erect a 
building. "Erection't of a buiding was defined by the Township Authority to include rebuilding 
a wall that fell down, on the arguement that if each wall that fell was rebuilt, a new building 
would result. Therefore, whenever the wall of a house in the earmarked open space 
collapsed, or fell into such disrepair as to necessitate major reconstruction, the Township 
Authority refused to grant permission to repair, and then could come in and demolish the 
building as being unfit for human habitation (rules 98 and 107, Township Ru/es). So, 
gradually buildings disappeared frorthe Open Space, although natives were in most cases 
unwilling to move. No compensation was paid to those required to move since they had built 
IV on public land. The purpose of denying the natives permission to repair was to let their 
17 See Tanzania National Archives File No. 4/15, Housing in Zone 2, Dar es Saiaam Township,. where, in February 1945,   
the Medical Officer, G.A. Wilson, described the pit iatrines in the Commercial (i.e. Indian) Area as the iast word in filthy 
disposal, and where people lived up to 11 in one room. 
18 Tanzania National Archives File No. 12589, Dar es Salaam Township Layout. 
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on public land. The purpose of denying the natives permission to repair was to let their 
buidings to run down and thus allow the authorities to take land without compensation. 
In 1926,. 	after complaints against the denying of permission to repair, and the obvious 
danger to public health that this policy entailed, the Governor set up a Commission of Inquiry. 
This recommended that rather than refuse permission to repair, each house should be given 
a "remaining life" period not exceeding 10 years. Permission to repair could be given provided 
this did not affect the "remaining life" of the building in question. This approach upheld the 
principle of wanting to take land without compensation, but avoided the adverse public health 
effects emanating from denying permission to repair. Most of native houses were arbitrarily 
given a remaining life of 3 years from July 1927 and notices to quit were issued. Some 170 
native houses were affected. Realising the futility of fighting with the government, most 
natives had moved by mid-January 1930.   They were no doubt aware of what had befallen 
the natives in Gerezani Village (below). However, some 63 houses whose owners had ignored 
the demolition notices served from 1927,   remained in the area. These belonged to Swahilis 
(21), Arabs (10), Indians (31), and Goans (1). The District Officer and the Director of Medical 
Services were urging for the immediate removal of these houses, arguing that there should 
not be discrimination in implementing the law, since it was mostly natives who had obeyed 
the orders to move while those who remained behind were mainly non-natives. In the wrangle 
that ensued, the Provincial Commissioner, Eastern Province, inspected these buildings and 
found them still physically fit, so their "lives" were extended for another two years. This was 
simply a way to favour the non-natives and to avoid confrontation with them, for, as long as 
permission to repair continued to be granted, buildings would continue to be fit. It had 
however been agreed, in 1 92ÔYthat the buidings' lives would not be extended beyond the 
"remaining lives" as originally determined. 
But even after the expiration of that extra period, these people were still unwilling to 
move citing, inter ãfia, the World Depression. The Governor however, got tough and would 
not accept any pleas for extension of time, or for compensation. Even the case made by the 
District Officer on behalf of five Africans who were elderly, infirm, very poor, incapacitated, 
(in two cases, blind) and without wherewithal to demolish let alone to rebuild their houses, 
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were not entertained 19 . After March 1932 the government decided on a court action to 
remove the remaining, mainly non native occupiers. 
By the mid-i 930s the Open Space had been cleared of all buildings. Natives, and others 
were removed from this area because the land was public and was earmarked to serve 
colonial zoning interests. The altenative plots that were allocated to some, were distantly 
located in Ilala. The investment which the natives had made in their houses was deliberately 
made to deteriorate and condemned to demolition without compensation. The fixing of the 
"remaining lives" period was done arbitrarily considering that house repair was originally 
prohibited. Only hardship could have been caused to natives in the process of clearing the 
Open Space since they had to undergo costs of demolition and rebuilding. This was indeed 
admitted by some colonial officials. Commenting on the growth of Kheko Settlement to the 
south of Gerezani, (Figure 4.2) the Dar es Salaam District Officer, W. Fryer, summed up the 
situation by pointing out that: 
During the past 12 months, several hundred natives houses have been removed 
from the Open Space area and Gerezani Village. When it is realised that the 
average house was one of 4 or 5 rooms and that each room housed a separate 
family, the amount of inconvenience to which natives have been put, and the 
extreme difficulty many experienced in getting accommodation sufficiently near 
their work, can readily be realised 20 . 
Conversion of Kiwanfa Tenure into rights of Occupancy 1 926-1 93221. 
As will be recalled, much of the commercial area had been acquired by the government 
during the German era but occpiers, both natives and Indians, were left unmolested for the 
time being. They continued to construct haphazardly in any materials. This kind of rather 
indefinite tenure on government land, and akin to squatting, came to be known as Kiwanja 
tenure. It was permissive occupatn, though, since occupiers paid rent to the government, 
and tenure was teminable at 6 months notice. Once the Open Space had been defined the 
19 Tanzania National Archives File No.10477, Compensation for Houses removed by Government. 
20 Tanzania National Archives File No. 52/Al1, Kheko Village Settlement. 
21 Tanzania National Archives Files Nos 12248 and 94/A, Kiwanja Tenure, Conversion to Rights of Occupancy. 
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colonial government turned to the commercial area, in order: (a) to remove natives from there, 
and, (b) to force Indians to improve their buildings and the general environment of the 
commercial area. Two methods were used. One was to deny natives permission to repair 
their houses, and later serve them notices to quit as was the case with the clearing of the 
Open Space. The other was to force Indians to take up Rights of Occupancy, which 
incorporated expensive building and land use covenants. 
Kiwanja tenure existed in other urban areas in the territory so that Circular No 31 of 1926 
was issued by the Chief Secretary to all Provincial Commissioners to the effect that all non-
natives occupying land on Kiwanja tenure be given, before October 2, 1926,   notices to quit 
ending their tenancy within six months i.e. on 31st March 1927. For some legal and 
administrative reasons, the deadline to convert these tenancies was extended to 1932.   The 
aim of ending Kiwanja tenure was to get higher land rents, to improve building and 
environmental conditions in the commercial area without the government itself spending the 
money, and, to remove natives from some areas. The government was willing to negotiate 
with the affected non-native land occupiers to remain in occupation (without necessarily 
abiding by the expensive building conditions) provided economic rent was paid. The tenancy 
would then be converted into a year to year one, terminable at six months notice, until 
converted into Rights of Occupancy. The Land Ordinance required that Rights of Occupancy 
could be obtained by non-natives only via public auctions, but permission was being sought 
from the Secretary of State to waive auctions in the case of non-native holders of Kiwanja 
tenure. It was later decided that those occupiers who had complied by the notice to quit and 
had applied for Rights of Occupancy before 31 December 1927,   or those in occupation of the 
land since 1923,   would be grand Rights of Occupancy without going through auctions. This 
meant that those people were naturalised at where they were, although they had to pay 
higher rents and abide by building cvenants. 
In 1926,   som'537 non-native Kiwanja tenants in the commercial and Kariakoo areas of 
Dar es Salaam were issued with notices to quit 22 . Most ignored thesenotices. By mid 
1931, some 500 still held over. The Indians, who were most affected by this move, 
22 Tanzania National Archives File No. 94/A, Kiwanja tenure, conversion to Rights of Occupancy, Dar as Salaam. 
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protested vehemently to the government, claiming that they had no money to pay the higher 
land rents and to abide by the expensive building covenants. A Kiwanja Tenure Holders 
Committee, with one D.K. Patel as its Secretary, was formed in October 1931,   to protect 
Indian interests. The Committee made various representations to the colonial government, 
as a result of which, land rents were reduced, the period in which new buildings specified in 
the Rights were to be completed was extended from two to four years, compensation for 
existing building was increased to reflect disturbance, and in the case of hardship, each case 
was to be considered sympathetically. Because of their economic importance, and as they 
were better organised, the Indians were able to extract concessions from the colonial 
administration, a privilege that was not usually accorded to natives. 
While some categories of Indians were granted Rights of Occupancy without going 
through auctions, and, as shown above, the government was prepared to be flexible with 
regard to rents and building covenants, no privilege of the sort was extended to natives. They 
were simply required to move out of the commercial area and go to Zone Ill. Some 334 
native house owners were affected. The case of HuVura bint Islam 23 illustrates the plight 
of the natives. She was a widow and her family had lived at No. 4 Kitumbini Street, for over 
55 years by 1951. As the government did not want native houses in the area, she had been 
denied permission to repair her house and was under notice to quit. Although she had a 
lucrative offer for her plot from a non-native buyer, since she could not herself meet the 
building conditions required for the area, the authorities would not let her sell the plot since 
the land belonged to the government and could only be disposed of via public auction, which 
she could in no way win, in which case she could only receive the value of her unexhausted 
developments, i.e. the value ofer house which she had been denied permission to repair for 
years. This is what befell the majority of Africans in the commercial area. They were forced 
to leave, often empty handed, to sJrt a new life in the native zone. 
On the other'hand, despite their earlier protests, the Indian community by and large 
complied with the requirements of the Rights of Occupancy, particularly after the Depression. 
Gradually the central area was regularised, and rebuilt. In 1936,   the Land Division pointed out 
23 Tanzania National Archives File No. 255, Land: Transfer of Property, natives to non natives. 
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that there were no more plots in Dar es Salaam held on Kiwanja tenure: 
The period of grace for demolishing condemned buildings and for carrying out 
the necessary improvements to convert existing buildings into approved 
buildings expired during the year and it is noticed that there has been a large 
addition to the number of modern, habitable and sanitary buildings in the bazaar 
area of the township 24 
The effect of this process was two fold. One, it outlawed continued native residence 
in the commercial area, and the few remaining natives, like Huyura binti Islam mentioned 
above, were always under pressure to move to the native area in Kariakoo and Ilala. Two, 
the Indians got cemented in the commercial area. This slotted in very well with the zoning 
designs of the 1914 German Bauordnung, as later on reproduced under the Township Rules 
of 1923,   made under the Township Ordinance of 1920.   
The Kisutu Improvement Scheme, ca 1 928 25 
At about the same time as natives were being removed from the Gerezani area (below), 
an improvement scheme had been prepared for Kisutu, an inner city area between the Open 
Space and Bagamoyo Street (currently Morogoro Road). The scheme entailed the preparation 
of a layout for 34 commercial residential plots. The existing occupiers had to be removed. 
Because these were mainly Indians, the Governor, while expressing satisfaction with the 
whole scheme, saw no justification for evicting the occupiers in the arbitrary manner 
proposed, and ordered that they should be paid compensation for their properties, plus 50% 
of the compensansation to reflect disturbance. The total compensation bill amounted to 
21,000/= (Compare to jus'over 1,000/= for the Gerezani natives, below). He further 
ordered that these Indians should be informed that the Government proposed to prepare a 
layout for the land and to sell it,id that they should be given alternative plots upon which 
to build. The term and conditions of the sale of the plots were given as 99 year leases with 
buildings whosevalue was to be no less than 20,0001= for plots facing the Commercial 
Street and 15,000/= for all others. Such conditions excluded all natives. 
24 Tanganyika Territory, Land Division, Annual Report for 1936, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1937, p. 9 . 
25 Tanzania National Archives File No. 29/A/1 63, Rights of Occupancy, Kisutu Area. 
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Thus when it came to Indians, government policy was considerate, but when it came 
to natives it was absolute. This unfair treatment of some races was in fact pointed out by 
officials during the clearing of Gerezani. Officials noted that those being moved from Kisutu 
were being compensated while those being moved from the Open Space were not, and that 
this could incite trouble 26 . 
Dealing with early native søontaneous settlements in Dar es Salaam 
Together with the efforts to abide by the zoning provisions for Dar es Salaam, the 
authorities addressed their attention to the development of spontaneous native settlements 
within or about the township boundaries. Three examples are dealt with here. They all reveal 
various, sometimes contradictory, facets of colonial urban policy. The Gerezani settlement 
was swiftly dealt with and removed because it was contagious to a new European residential 
area. The Kheko one was ignored because it was far from the nearest European settlement. 
The Upanga one pitted the Town Authority against the Central Government and could not be 
removed partly because the residents put up a protest. 
(a) Removing the Native Settlement at Gerezani, 1 92927 
Early in 1929,   Senior Health Officer, Dr. H.B. Follit, wrote to the Executive Officer, Dar 
es Salaam Township Authority, expressing concern over the development of a native 
settlement at Gerezani (Figure 4.2), which had grown from a few scattered huts to over 106 
of these, covering a wide area of private land, extending, on the one handto the banks of the 
Gerezani Creek, and, on the other, to within a few yards of the compounds of the European 
Railway employees' housing: "The conditions are thus almost ideal for the production of a 
malaria outbreak among Europdhs". 
He complained that the huts were constructed of any materials, and sanitation was very 
bad. When natives needed mud, he went on, they would scoop it from anywhere. There 
were therefore, sevral borrow pits along the banks of Gerezani Creek: "in a situation best 
calculated to nullify the efforts of the anti-malaria staff". He called for an urgent policy to 
26 Tanzania National Archives Fine No. 12589, Dar es Salaam Township Layout. 
27 Tanzania National Archives File No. 12589, Dar es Salaam Township Layout. 
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determine the boundaries of this native village and particularly: "the distance from existing 
and prospective Railway European houses within which no native huts should be permitted". 
In their recommendations to the Chief Secretary, both the Dar es Salaam Township 
Authority and the Provincial Commissioner supported the removal of the natives from 
Gerezani. The Township Authority Executive Officer, Dr. R.R. Scott, believed that natives 
should be evicted at three months notice and that the area should be properly laid out for 
native habitation, provision being made for roads of access etc. He, added however: "the 
proximity of the area to the new European railway quarters ---- makes it undesirable to permit 
natives to occupy it." 
In mid-i 929, the Governor approved the demolition of the native huts in Gerezani as 
soon as altenative sites could be found. He promised compensation should this be necessary. 
On 10th November 1929,   a meeting was convened by the authorities in the Gerezani area and 
all natives were given three months notice to move. Only two huts were not to be removed: 
that belonging to Halimi binti Fundi (who with her half-sister Mwanaasha binti Fundi, was one 
of the two freehold owners of the Gerezani land), and that of Hemed bin Said (husband of 
Mtumwa binti Ally, who was the other of the Gerezani land owners). The rest of the huts, 
132 in all, were to go. Only 37 hut owners who had constructed before the passing of the 
Township Rules of 1923 (which required that a permit be obtained before constructin a hut 
in a Township) were judged as being entitled to compensation. The amount of compensation 
for these 37 hut owners was calculated by the District Officer to be only shillings 1, 1 97/ = 
(see Appendix 4.2 for the list of the payees). No compensation for disturbance was paid. 
Altenative land was offered muA to the west of the township, beyond the offensive factories 
sites (Figure 4.2) 
That the whole exercise was unfair, is reflected in the Governor's fears, when he queried 
whether the Gereza1i settlers had accepted the removal orders and compensation "at these 
rates". He was however confident that trouble could be dealt with: 
If there is opposition, there is ample means of overcoming it under the law, but 
it is always safer in these cases to find out before hand if the settlement is 
agreed upon. 
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Fortunately for the administration, all natives accepted compensation and all had moved 
before August 11, 1930.   However, only 47 of the 132 people who were allocated plots west 
of the offensive factory site accepted them. This reflected the distance of these altenative 
plots from workplaces for these natives which were mainly in the harbour. It also reflected 
the natives' inability to meet the building conditions required by the Township Authority (even 
for native type of buildings). 
It was however sad that the natives did not put up any protest. This might have been 
partly because, as the District Officer observed, the majority were "strangers to Dar es 
Salaam". At leasX two grounds of protest were in order. One, the area occupied was private 
(freehold) land occupied with permission from the owners to whom rent was being paid, and, 
as the Upanga case (below) shows, natives were entitled to stay there. Two, the area was 
actually in Zone I/I earmarked by the Government for native settlement (Figure 3.5). The 
problem would appear to be the intrusion in this native area, of European Railway Housing, 
and this necessitated the removal of natives to keep them far from Europeans! If the 
Authorities were unhappy with the quality of the huts that the natives were putting up, the 
solution was not to remove them, but to collaborate with them to improve these huts as well 
as the general environment of the settlement. 
During the Gerezani saga, an issue was raised whether the colonial government was 
obliged to provide land for natives wishing to build in Dar es Salaam. It appeared to some 
officials that the government was not under any such obligation. In practice, however, since 
some natives were required in ' rban areas, many could not be repatriated anywhere, and 
many more kept coming to the township, there were restricted efforts to provide demarcated 
plots to the natives, in the interests,j health and sanitation, although these had to be some 
distance from European residential areas. Colonial policy was always caught in a dilemma. 
It wanted only a highIy limited number of natives in the townships, but it could not control 
the natives' movements. Thus the hostile policy toward the natives' land needs. 
The Gerezani case demonstrates how medical reasons were invoked to achieve racial 
segregation. The same reasons were used unsuccessfully to try to remove natives from 
I 
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Upanga area, and also to extend the Dar es Salaam township boundaries 'in the area near the 
high income residential area of Oysterbay. 
(b) Kheko VillaQe Settlement 28 
This Settlement grew up near the southern boundary of the Dar es Salaam township, on 
high ground, East and South of Gerezani Creek (Figure 4.2). The area consisted of freehold 
land owned by Akida bin Mzee 29  and Suleman bin Nasr, and of government land, and of land 
whose ownership was unclear to the District Officer in 1930.   
As was the case with Gerezani, the Township Authority expressed concern that new 
native huts had been erected, or were in the process of being erected at Kheko without permit 
as required by the Township Ru/es. There were 27 huts on Akida bin Mzee's land, 15 of 
which were new, i.e built during 1929 or thereabouts. Only 5 however, belonged to 
newcomers. The other 10 owners had upgraded their houses from the small  bandas they had 
occupied previously. On Suleman bin Nasr's land were 53 native buildings, 38 of the owners 
having been on this land since before 1929. The number of new houses.was 38 belonging 
to 15 new corners, and 23 old residents. On public land, there were 13 huts of which 4 had 
been constructed since 1929.   Occupiers on Suleman's land were paying ground rent of 
between 3 to 6 shillings. On the land west of the Creek, whose ownership' was unclear, there 
were 9 new huts built by people evicted from Gerezani Village. The total number of buildings 
was 107. They ranged from simple bandas to a good proportion of 3to4 roomed houses 
costing between 5001= and 800/= to build. There were signs everywhere of intended 
building activity (despite the Depression). 
1.4 
According to the District Officer, there were various reasons why Kheko was popular: 
it was near to the docks, wharves and railways where many natives worked; there were no 
building plots in Kariakoo, while Ilala (where plots were available) was fairly distantly located. 
Finally, rooms could be let at 5/= a month, a very excellent return on any capital invested. 
28 Details taken from Tanzania National Archives Files No. 52/Al1, Kheko Village Settlement. 
29 Today, part of Kheko is still known as Keko Akida. 
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The District Officer suggested that the area be Zoned "Zone Ill Extension", and that steps 
be taken to regularise the buildings, and to deal with those natives who had constructed since 
1923 without permits. It is of interest to note that the District Officer, W. Fryer, who had 
overseen the removal of the Gerezani native settlement (above), and who was adamant 
against natives in Upanga (below), was the same and one advocating a somewhat liberal 
attitude with regard to Kheko. The reason for this was because Kheko was: 
approximately a mile from the nearest European or non-native dwellings. 
Gerezani Creek forms a well defined line of cleavage and is the natural physical 
barrier separating the settlement from the already zoned areas in town. 
Therefore, no. action was taken. With the exception of an area redeveloped after 
Independence, Kheko is still an unplanned settlement. The above, however demonstrates that 
colonial policy was only interested in native settlements where it conceived that non-native 
life could be adversely affected. 
(c) The Abortive Attemlt to remove natives from the Urancia Area, 1931, 1935 30 .  
Having triumphantly removed natives from Gerezani, the Open Space, and from parts of 
Dar es Salaam's town centre, the colonial authorities addressed themselves to the question 
of natives occupying the Upanga area, to the north of the Government and European 
Residential Area. Upanga was within Zone I of the Township and abutted the Ocean (Figure 
4.2). It was not just natives who were living there. There were many Indians, Arabs, and 
Europeans, but the Town Authority's attention was vented on the natives. 
In May 1931, the Dar esalaam District Officer, W. Fryer, issued an order that natives 
should demolish their houses and remove themselves from Upanga area. He promised, where 
possible, to find altenative plots JRr those interested, in the extension of the Native Zone in 
Ilala. 
Unlike the Gerezani case, this order was not taken meekly by the affected natives. Seven 
30 Tanzania National Archives Files Nos 81/85, Petition by Mwinyi Waziri bin Mwinshehe and others of Upanga, and 
12589, Dar as Salaam Township Layout. Unless otherwise, shown information in this subsection is taken from the 
above two files. . 
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of them: Mwinyiwaziri bin Mwinshehe, Mwinyikheri bin Akida, Mohamed bin Tambaza, Kidato 
bin Mwinyi Abdallah, Abdallah bin Mfaume, Mwinshehe bin Mwinyikondo and Mmanga bin 
Mwinyimkuu, on behalf of themselves and of others, submitted a petition to the Chief 
Secretary with copy to the Provincial Commissioner protesting against the removal order. 
They argued that Upanga was their birthright, that they could not see any reasons why they 
should be ordered out, that they would be unable to replace what they had already developed 
in the area, etc. Much as they revered the Chief Secretary, calling himthe "Father of the 
people", "King of the whole Country of Tanganyika", and "elder of the town", and much as 
they referred to themselves as being stupid, they were firm in their message that they would 
not move (see Appendix 4.3 for the petition). 
Contacted for his reaction on the petition, the District Officer put up a strong case for 
the removal of these natives from Upanga: 
o 	Erection of native houses was not allowed in Zone I of Dar es Salaam Township, in 
which Upanga was; 
o 	Many huts had been built without the permission of the Township Authority, but with 
permission of shamba owners; 
o 	He had sent for shamba owners to see him but many had not turned up; 
o 	The interests of non-natives had to be protected so that property values did not 
depreciate because of proximity to native huts; 
o 	There was the danger of fire spreading within the native huts and to non-native 
property; and, 
o 	Township Ru/es should i't be breached so openly. 
He nevertheless considered it unfaio prevent natives from building ontheir own land since 
they could not afford putting up a European house. Moreover, their shambas had valuable 
coconut trees. Asn interim measure, he had allowed only one hut per native shamba, so 
that owners could keep an eye on their coconuts, but the development of the conditions as 
they were in Upanga could not be tolerated in Zone I. 
In his advice to the Chief Secretary, the Provincial Commissioner, EF. Brett, pointed out 
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that the petitioners were African freeholders living on the land, long before it was declared 
Zone I in 1924.   They kept their shambas and had built and allowed to be built by their 
relations, native houses in the area. The Township Authority as well as the District Officer 
feared that another Gerezani Village was in the making, although these landowners had no 
means of building new houses elsewhere, and removing them would appear to be illegal 
without recourse to the LandAcquisition Ordinance. Yet the Provincial Commissioner seemed 
to contradict himself when he added that none of them (natives) had any right to remain 
where they were. 
The central government, on advice from the Attorney General, decided that removing 
existing natives from Upanga under section 84 of the Township Rules (which empowered the 
Governor to declare building areas in townships) was illegal. As the law did not apply 
retrospectively, only construction undertaken subsequent to the passage of the Township 
Rules in an area demarcated as Zone I had to be of European Type. Hardship was only likely 
to befall the natives when their huts fell in such a disrepair that to repair them would amount 
to erecting new buildings. 
This central government outlook differed from that of the Township Authority, which 
understood the rule to exclude natives from Zone I areas altogether. Because of this 
government ruling, natives were not removed from Upanga in 1931 as alleged by Fimbo 31 . 
Indeed some, like Mwinshehe bin Mwinyikondo and Kidatu bin Abdallah, both signatories of 
the protest petition to the Chief Secretary, were still in the area in 1950 and were actually 
bought out by Indians 32 . 
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In December 1935,   the local colonial authorities again raised the issue of continued 
native residence in Upanga wherealready there existed 99 huts, and 60 native owned 
plantations. In his memorandum to the Chief Secretary, the Provincia! Commissioner, G. 
Webster, pointed ot that Health Officials wanted the huts to removed, "in the interest of 
31 G.M.M.Fimbo, Law and Urban Housing: a Study of State intervention in Urban I-lousing in Tanzania, Phd Thesis, 
University of Oar es Salaam, 1988. 
32 Tanzania National Archives file No. 255, Land: Transfer natives to non-natives 
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public health with the least possible delay". Much as he was aware that the natives derived 
livelihood from their land in Upanga and had no other possessions, "the methods of life of 
these natives are a constant menace to the health of the non-native community", and that this 
was no doubt realised when, "the entire area was placed within the European residential zone 
in which residential buildings of European type only may be erected". 33 
The Township Authority suggested that natives be allocated altenative plots, on 
Government land on Busse's Shamba on the Pugu Road, much to the west of Ilala and that 
recourse should be made to the Land Acquisition Ordinance to effect the getting rid of natives 
from Upanga. Not only were natives entitled to generous terms, the Provincial Commissioner 
went on, "but also the importance of accommodating them justifies them". The Health 
authorities, he wrote, were again pressing for the "urgent removal of these people". 
Upanga natives were however not removed and it should be of interest to wonder why 
this should have been the case while the natives in Gerezani were swiftly removed. 
The Attonery General's advice, that removing natives under •section 84 of the 
Township Rule was illegal was only partially correct. The District Officer had pointed out that 
many huts had been put up withoutpermission after the area had been declared Zone I in 
1924.   Thus, some of these had been "illegally" erected (ie without the permit of the Township 
Authority). One, therefore, cannot see any legal difference between the situation in Upanga 
and that in Gerezani. The reasons why the central Government chickened out of removing 
Africans from Upanga was because in the first instance, these people did put up a strong 
protest which could not be 'nored easily, coming as it did from this kind of people (the 
Shomvis), who had settled in Dar es Salaam for over four centuries. Any attempt to remove 
them would have caused trouble.rhe colonial central government administration would have 
preferred a voluntary solution. In his note to the Attorney General on the Upanga issue, 
33 The Township Ru/es however, did not overtly define any area as "the European residential zone' as asserted here by 
the Provincial Commissioner. 
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Assistant Chief Secretary, G.F. Sayers, doubted whether at that time (June 1931), 
a purchaser could be found by native residents of Upanga who would be 
prepared to pay a reasonable price for the land, and build a European type 
house.There is also the fact that a native is not necessarily tempted by financial 
inducement to abandon land which his father and forefathers had owned and 
cultivated. 
In the Gerezani case, the Government had simply produced compensation money and did not 
dilly daily with legal niceties. 
Secondly it was becoming apparent that Upanga would mainly be an Indian and non 
official European settlement. Many non-natives had already acquired freehold interests in the 
area. Government officials did not want a major stake in Upanga, having leapfrogged it and 
started a European officials' settlement at Oysterbay since the late 1 920s. Commenting on 
a proposal made in 1927 by the Acting Governor to sell or lease out government properties 
at Seaview (part of Upanga) and create a residential suburb at Msasani (Oysterbay), the 
Central Town Planning and Building Committee, which favoured the scheme, ruled out the 
purchase of land West of Upanga Road for an officials' settlement since "this is the only 
available land for the non-government community" 34. At the same time, non-native plot 
owners in Upanga (particularly the Indians), were urging the Township Authority: 
that land situated to the West of Upanga Road should be laid Out in building 
plots and streets should be demarcated -------so that owners know what is 
required of them, and prospective buyers be in position to acquire building 
plots. 
It was obvious that natives in Upanga would sooner or later be replaced, and the central 
Government did not want to complicate matters for itself and to remove natives on behalf of 
Indian and other non-native land s1Deculators, although the local authorities appeared to be 
bent on achieving just that. 
Thirdly, as will be shown below, the Government was during this time resisting pressure 
to introduce a comprehansive town planning legislation, pressure which emanated in a large 
34 Tanzania National Archives File No. 20399, Proposed Suburb at Msasani. 
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measure from the continued haphazard development of Upanga. Removing natives from 
Upanga would have exposed the Government to the whole issue of Town P.lanning for Dar es 
Salaam which at that moment the Government was not prepared to address. For the time 
being therefore Upanga was to be left unmolested. All the same, the attempt to remove 
natives from Upanga reflected the prejudices that European officials had, and how they 
viewed the solution of the native problem in terms of segregation and distance from non 
natives, which was the basis of implementing the zoning provisions for Dar es Salaam. At 
the same time, the Upanga case revealed the contradictions between the two echelons of 
Government ("local" and "central"), and the independent use of Government power 
sometimes in a contradictory manner and not necessarily in the interests of private capital. 
Internal reorpanisation and extension of the zones 
Although Dar es Salaam's zoning mainly emphasized the types of buildings allowed, it 
divided the town into three areas on a racial and functional basis. Zone. 1 became mainly a 
European Residential area, although the freehold land in Upanga was owned and occupied by 
natives, Indians, Arabs and a few Europeans. We have seen above, the attempts to remove 
natives from Upanga. Europeans in Zone I were mainly officials although there was a number 
of non officials as well, engaged in private business. Zone II was occupied as a 
commercial/residential area by Indians and a few Europeans, all engaged in commerce, trade 
and some manufacturing. Zone Ill, also referred to as the Native Quarter or Native Town, was 
occupied by natives although there was an increasing number of Indians taking up trading 
plots, and (later) renting rooms in native houses, although this latter was illegal unless 
sanctioned by the Governor. 
This section reviews how the three zones developed till 1945 bearing in mind the 
processes described earlier of movinnatives from various parts of the town. 
Zone 
This can be divided into roughly seven parts. (a) The area by the harbour front and east 
of the commercial area which comprised of the port and its appurtenances (including 
warehouses); (b) The area put to Government offices; (c) the area put to officials' residences 
and generally referred to as the Residential Area. It was generally south of the Golf Course 
and included the botanical gardens; (d) the Golf Course, which had been laid by the Germans 
and included grounds for other sport and non native cemeteries; (e) the Upanga area, which 
was by 1935,   largely freehold land put to coconut plantations; (f) the European residential 
area at Seaview; and, (g) the European reidential area at Oysterbay accross the Msimbazi 
River, (Figure 4.3). Land put to government buildings, officials' residences,and recreation 
grounds had, in the most, been earlier acquired by the Germans. 
British officials simply took over former German residences, but as these proved 
insufficient for the existing requirements, some ex German private properties were 
"nationalised" by getting them withdrawn from public auctions during the sale of the Enemy 
Property in 1922,   and by buying them at administratively determined prices. As demand for 
officials' housing was considerably high, another 12 houses were constructed in the late 
1 920s on Government land at Seaview. On advice from one Dr. A. J. Or'enstein, an American 
who had worked as medical adviser for the German colonial government, and who, since 
1 91 3, had been working for the South African mines, Oysterbay was selected as a European 
settlement, although it was then outside the township boundaries. Writes Dr. Scott, then 
Executive Officer, Dar es Salaam Township Authority: 
I did not meet Ornstein until 1927 when he introduced me to his mine hygiene 
in Johannesburg. After that, he visited us on several occasions and advised us 
to build our new residential extension at Oysterbay on the sea front, north of 
the old township, a breezy site which has proved a great success but which in 
1919 had to be reached by canoe 35 . 
In 1927 a serious accommodation problem was facing government officials in Dar es 
Salaam. A scheme was thus çi,awn up to erect a number of quarters in a "pleasant and 
healthy site, at a distance, two or three miles from Dar es Salaam", at Oysterbay. The 
scheme, which cost £169,600 was funded from surplus balances, i.e. from general 
taxation. 36 Construction started ir1 928 and by 1932,   40 units laid out at super low 
densities with a lot of open space and greenery were ready for occupation. A bridge37 was 
35 R.R. Scott, "Public Health Services in Dares Salaam in the 1920s", EastAfrican Mod/ca/Journal, Volume 40, No.7, 
1963,   pp. 339-353. 
36 Colonial Office, Report on Tanganyika Territory 1928, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1929, P.  85. 
37  Named ,, Salander • after the first Director of Public Works in Tanganyika. 
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Figure 4.3: Details of part of Zone I and Zone II, Dar es Salaam, 1940 
- 	DETAILS OF ZONE I & Ii 
1940 









H.., boll IIU - 1107 ............ 
190$ • 1119 .......... 
.do. 1122 - 1940 ...........- 
tonal boundary 	 — 
Source: Giliman, "Dar es Sala.am, 1860-1940" 
188 
/ 
constructed accross the Msimbazi Creek in 1929 to replace an earlier temporary one, and this 
facilitated the northward extension of Dar es Salaam. 
While it was a medical officer who suggested the extension of the European settlement 
to Oysterbay, it was medical reasons that were put forward to demand the extension of Dar 
es Salaam's boundaries to include Oysterbay. In a letter addressed to the Chief Secretary in 
April 1931, the Township's Authority's Executive Officer, E.H. Helps, on behalf of the 
Authority, and having obtained the approval of the Central Town Planning and Building 
Committee, requested the extension of Dar es Salaam's boundaries for two reasons 38 : 
o 	One, the Medical Officer of Health had reported that there were prolific breeding places 
for anopheline mosquitoes in the area just outside the township boundary infesting the 
Government quarters at Oysterbay, but he had no jurisdiction over it, so, "it is 
considered to be essential, in the interest of public health, that the area should be 
brought within the Township for administrative purposes." 
o 	Two, native huts were cropping up indiscriminately in the area and there was no 
authority to control the situation. Moreover, "Malaria carriers have been discovered 
in some of these huts and they cannot but be regarded as a danger to public health". 
In August 1931,   the governor approved the extension of Dar es Salaam's boundaries North 
of Salander Bridge to include Oysterbay. (Figure 4.5) 
Early Oysterbay was not popular with the officials. The Acting Director of Medical 
and Sanitation services, Dr. l-iOwen, noted in July 1931 that the suburb was overgrown 
with grass and had many borrow pits. Proposals were made by both the Medical Officers and 
by a Committee of Ladies set up tojpok into the issue, that a small native village or common 
sleeping quarters for natives be erected within walking distance of Oysterbay to ease the 
problem of domestl'c servants, since it was observed that most workers did not want to sleep 
38 
Tanzania National Archives File No. 19825, Dar es Salaam Township, inclusion of Oysterbay. 
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in the servant quarters provided. The idea was however not approved by the Governor 39 , 
although later o "boys' villages" to serve Oysterbay were planned for, at Kinondoni and 
Msasani (see Chapter Five). 
Beyond the township boundaries, the Oysterbay area was put to various uses including 
the quarrying of building stone, sisal plantations, saltworks and native cultivation. Various 
documents show that European Officials wanted to keep non Europeans out of Oysterbay. 
The views with regard to making Upanga an Indian area in order to prevent Indians from living 
in Oysterbary are presented later, but the case of Honourable Kassum Sunderji Somji, Member 
of the Legislative Council, an Indian tycoon of the late 1 930s, illustrates the European 
officials' attempts to keep Oysterbay for themselves 40 . Kassum was the owner of a salt 
factory at Oysterbay which he surrendered to the Government in 1938 in return for a plot of 
land with a 33 year lease on which to build a residence. The plan that Kassum submitted to 
the Authorities for his intended residence was beyond the wildest expections of the European 
officials who described it as "terrifying", "likely to spoil the best site in Dar es Salaam", 
"unsightly", "Tower of Babel", "obstructive", etc. Besides, it was feared that Kassum might 
elect to live in Oysterbay, in a dwelling that dwarfed the existing European officials edifices. 
The view of the Central Government expressed by the Acting Governor and Chief Secretary, 
D.M. Kennedy, (who incidentally was wont of making overt racist statements), was that 
Oysterbay should be kept free for occupation by persons of a European standard of living. 
Officials tried to convince Kassum to Cut the scheme down and the government offered to 
rent his house at £250 p.a; and to take it at the end of the lease with Compensation at 
valuation. Furthermore, Kassum was offered an extension of the lease from 33 years to 99 
years if he submitted plans for a'single storey house acceptable to government. So anxious 
was the government to keep Kassum away from Oysterbay! 
Throughout this period, Zone I remained more or less as described above, but with 
Upanga providing ascene of Contention between the natives, the non natives, and between 
39 
Tanzania National Archives File No. 19825, Dar es Salaam Township, inclusion of Oysterbay; and File No. 26177, 
Native Quarters North of Salander Bridge. 
40 The following is taken from Tanzania National Archives File No. 25555, Utilisation for the Area formerly occupied by 
the Salt Factory at Oysterbay. 
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the Township Authority and the Central Government. To solve this problem special legislation 
had to be passed in the late 1 940s (Chapter Five). 
Another interesting' observation was the creation of a new European cemetery at 
Kinondoni (but just outside the township boundaries) in the late 1 930s (Figure 4.5). The area 
was occupied by natives who were removed protesting against the unfair compensation given 
to them, and based on unexhausted improvements. In the case of one Saida binti Fundi who 
had been in the area for 15 years, compensation did not even cover her own input in clearing 
and tilling the land 41 . Her case clearly illustrates that the basing of compensation on 
unexhausted improvements was not aimed at preventing speculation, but at making it possible 
of the Government to acquire African occupied land at below its value. This was justified by 
the colonial philosophy which upheld that Africans knew no value in bare land, and were 
therefore not entitled to it; and in later practice that all land was either publicly owned, or 
was held under customary tenure. 
Zone II 
The conversion of Kiwanja Tenure into Rights of Occupancy described above, improved 
the environmental conditions of the commercial area. However, the triangle between Market 
Street, India Street and Kitchwele Street (Figure 4.3) remained highly, overcrowded and 
insanitary. A number of small scale industries e.g. soap making, soft drinks manufacture, 
and mill grinding, had also been established in the commercial area in the 1 930s. This was 
not unusual since the Germans had, for example, a brewery in this area (Figure 3.3). Medical 
Officers however insisted on the seperation of industry from commerce and residences, so 
an offensive factories area was'id out beyond Ilala native settlement (Figure 4.2). Various 
notices to quit were issued to Indian factory owners to move from Zone II. Many refused to 
move. The policy was inconsistently enforced, some Indians being forced to move to the 
offensive factories area, others being allowed to remain behind (see Appendix 4.4 for a typical 
petition). The tendeçcy was therefore for all to remain in the commercial area. The offensive 
factories area failed to take off mainly because it was distantly located and lacked the 
necessary infrastructure. Zone II however, was getting overcrowded and an outlet to relieve 
this pressure was urgently required. This was to be found in the native zone and in Upanga. 
41 see Tanzania Nationa' Archives File No. 488, New European cemetery, Dar es Salaam. 
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Zone Ill (Kariakoo and Ilala) 
With the British military occupation of Dar es Salaam in 1 91 6, proper control of the 
erection of buildings could not, until 1 91 9, be enforced. Construction was haphazard and 
did not necessarily conform to the German plan. From 1919 to 1921, the Dar es Salaam 
District Political Officer, M.A. West, with two assistants, undertook the task of realigning the 
houses in Kariakoo 42 . This was done partly through persuasion, and partly through denial 
of permits to build, or to repair or complete buildings. Many houseowners were forced to 
move without compensation. The authorities however were not sympathetic to these native 
developers and were capitalising on their non aggressive behaviour: 
Although the native population may be regarded as exceptionally docile, and as 
willing to regard as an order, what may more accurately be described as 
persuasive positions, we must not lose sight of the fact that the land belonged 
to the Government, had been acquired for the purpose of building a model 
township of which the plans were in existence, and to which the existing street 
confirmed, and that the plots were held on one year's lease - the much 
discussed Kiwanja tenure, now regarded as terminable by six months notice. 
At the same time, since it was obvious that the number of plots earlier demarcated in 
Kariakoo was insufficient to cope with demand, the land west of Msimbazi Street up to the 
Msimbazi River valley, was demarcated into plots. By August 1923,   600 of these were ready 
for issue. The market, disused since the War when it served as a Carrier Corps Depot, as well 
as the non-native trading plots around it, were formerly opened for business by the Governor 
at that time (Figure 4.4). 
By 1929,   there were so many native applicants for building plots that the government 
agreed to demarcate and issusome 600 plots on Borman's Shamba, a 500 acre ex-enemy 
property acquired for the government at auction for about £4,000, "for public purposes". 
This was yet another example of continuity with German policy. It will be recalled that the 
German government had purchased Schoeller's Shamba in Kariakoo in 1914 for settling 
natives. The newvsuburb, seen as the extension of the native Town, was named "liala" by 
42 
Unless otherwise shown, information in this subsection is taken from Tanzania National Archives File No. 12589, Oar 
es Salaam Township Layout. 
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the Governor, after the district in Rhodesia in which Dr. Livingstone died 43 . A market square 
and some trading plots were demarcated at the site, and a small temporary market shed 
erected (Figure 4.2). 
The colonial policy of segregating natives in Dat es Salaam had a built-in functional 
contradiction, for at the same time, the policy encouraged Indians to run trade in the native 
area. This was done by including a "non-native trading area" within the native zone. This, 
according to a government document, was necessitated by "various administrative, sanitary, 
and aesthetic reasons". This trading area included a large piece of land around, and near the 
new market in Kariakoo, and along Kitchwele Street, and other main thoroughfares carrying 
good frontages, Plots were allocated by way of auctioning Rights of Occupancy. The rights 
included expensive building covenants. A group of plots round an open square was set aside 
as a "native trading area". But none of these were taken up by the ordinary native. Rather 
than conceding that natives were facing unfair competition (since the prime sites were given 
to non-natives, for example), the government thought the native did not have the trading 
instinct, "sufficiently developed to run the business of a shop in competition with the non-
native already established" 44 . 
Besides, as a result of overcrowding in their own zone, and as a way of looking for 
business openings, many Indians were seeking accommodation in the native area, 
accommodation which they could in some cases convert into shops. Some Indians were 
actually buying houses or plots from natives. Seeing the futility of fighting this process, the 
government decided to amend the Township Ru/es with respect to building areas to legalise 
the de facto construction of non-native houses in the native zone. The argument given was 
that zoning provided minimum, but not maximum standards. The terminology of the building 
areas for zone Ill was therefore chged to read: "an area into which buildings of any type 
could be built", provided authority was obtained45 . 
43 General Notice no. 1088 of 4.10.1930. 
44 Tanzania National Archives File No. 12589 Dar es Salaam Township Layout. 
45 General Notice 14 of 11/1/1933. 
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Broader Town Planning Issues for Dar es Salaam in general, and the attempts to plan Upancia 
in particular, 1 929-1 945 
The late 1 920s and early 1 930s witnessed the world depression and adverse economic 
circumstances in Tanganyika, but it was during that time that two personalities, John H. 
Pashen and E.H. Helps, took up employment in Tanganyika. The former came as a 
Government architect who at the same time turned to town planning. The latter was 
employed as a municipal secretary for Dar es Salaam. Both came with considerable 
enthusiasm for developing Dar es Salaam: Pashen, as far as town planning was concerned, 
and Helps, with respect to both town planning and municipal status. 
Realising that Dar es Salaam was growing without any kind of planning save for the 
implementation of zoning and building provisions, Pashen prepared a comprehensive planning 
scheme for the town but with particular emphasis on, and reference to, the Upanga Area. 
The scheme was placed before the Governor in 1929.   The governor found it good but, "in 
advance of the present wealth and credit of the country" 46 . However, he sent it to the 
Central Town Planning and Building Committee for further scrutiny, and Pashen was made 
Committee member. While the Committee commended the principles underlying the scheme, 
it was realised that town planning powers were required. The Committee was asked to 
prepare a draft Town Planning Ordinance, but in the meanwhile the Government was 
requested to make Pashen's scheme for Upanga, legal, as it would take long before a Town 
Planning Ordinance would be ready. This latter proposal however was opposed by the 
Attonery General. In 1930 tI Governor, most unenthusiatically approved portions of the 
layout for Upanga: "they may certainly govern themselves accordingly", he wrote, but the 
surveying of land in accordance w1 this approved layout hit major obstacles. As the Land 
Officer pointed out, Upanga originally was, and to some extent still remained, owned by 
natives "with the rsult that the plots are very irregularly shaped, the boundaries following the 
limits or vagaries of the cultivation as it existed in each case when the plots were 
demarcated". Legislation was required to deal with this situation. Inquiries were sent to 
46 Tanzania National Archives File No. 13483, Town Planning Scheme for Dar es Salaam, Volume I. 
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Kenya for advice on the implementation of the Mombasa Town Planning Scheme since it was 
similar to that being proposed for Upanga. From Kenya it was learnt that the Mombasa 
Scheme involved the pooling, readjustment and redistribution of plots with the landowners 
surrendering portion of their land for the necessary roads. Mr. H.E. Fitzgibbon, planning 
engineer from Kenya, was invited to Dar es Salaam in September, 1930, to advise on the 
planning of the town. He had glowing words for Pashen's scheme for Dar es Salaam and 
proposed how to go about implementing it. Nevertheless, no support was forthcoming from 
the central government47 . Recourse was also made to the Bombay Town Planning Act of 
1915, plus other documents related to the planning of Bombay. Indeed, the Governor 
suggested reference to the then recently passed Nigerian legislation which had made it 
adequate compensation, the return to the owner of a reduced portion of his land which had 
been acquired compulsorily and improved by the laying of streets, open spaces etc. Yet, he 
(the Governor) was against a comprehensive scheme for Dar es Salaam. He directed the 
Central Town Planning and Building Committee to constrain itself to the Pashen Plan as far 
as it related to Upanga, arguing that it was impossible to put the larger scheme into effect 
wholesale in the old areas without setting up a costly and large organisation and providing it 
with funds, "which for the present might be spent in a more productive manner" 48 . 
But even in the case of the proposed limited Upanga Scheme, legislation was necessary. 
Seeing the futility of proposing a comprehensive Town Planning Ordinance, the Central Town 
Planning and Building Committee drew up new Township Ru/es in 1932 to give the Township 
Authority powers to deal with new layouts, particularly to control, the subdivision and the 
laying down of streets, and incidental questions, on private land. These rules however were 
not acted upon by the law officers who claimed to be very busy throughout 1 93349•  By mid-
1 935, the Attorney General had not acted on these rules, and on being reminded by the 
Committee, he continued dilly dallykn9, refusing to contemplate general town planning 
47 Tanzania National Archives File No. 19350, Report of the Municipal and Town Planning Engineer (Mr. H. E. Fitzgibbon) 
Kenya, on the procedure for carrying into effect the Town Planning Scheme for Dar es Salaam. 
48 . 
ibid. 
49 Tanzania National Arcives File No. 23243, Town Planning, subdivisions of Plots and Roads. 
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Figure 4.4: Details of part of Zone III, Dar es Salaarn, 1940. 
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legislation, but proposing that the scope should be limited to just the existing schemes like 
that of Upanga, because, 
the danger with such comprehensive legislation is that unless it is framed in 
relation to existing schemes it sets up an ideal which is beyond the means of 
the government or the local authorities to realise. 50 
From the central administration's point of view, the town planning issue in Dar es Salaam 
was chiefly Upanga which was under considerable pressure for development. It was 
moreover the first major freehold land within the township faced with the problem of how to 
develop. The existing legislation i.e. the Township Ordinance and its Township Rules were 
mainly building regulations and did not contemplate town planning or street planning with 
consequent readjustment of private properties necessitated by an approved scheme. 
In March 1936,   Township (Amendment) Rules were made under the Township 
Ordinance, "to avoid the imminent danger of an important area of land in Dar es Salaam 
township being ruined by uncontrolled development". These Rules prevented the laying out 
of streets on land, or its subdivision, fencing, hedging or demarcating, without authority. The 
Rules however were challenged in the Courts by would-be developers as ultra vires. As a 
result, the government hurriedly prepared and passed the Town Development (Control) 
Ordinance of 1936,   as a control and preventive measure, but not an actual instrument of 
development. The Ordinance, applied to Dar es Salaam in 193751,  required that building 
plots on private land should not be subdivided without prior approval, and that private streets 
giving access to public streethould not be constructed without approval. It, moreover, 
regulated the use of land and buildings in designated building areas. 
In January 1938,   the Township Authority raised once more the issue of the Dar es 
Salaam planning sc4eme, particularly in relation to Upanga in the light of the 1936 Ordinance, 
and since, with respect to West Upanga, "owners were clamouring to the Township Authority 
50 ibid. 
51 General Notice, 242, 1937. 
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wanting the area planned so that they can place plots on the market" 52 . 
The Acting Governor, D.M. Kennedy, who, as Chief Secretary had on previous occassions 
opposed Pashen's planning scheme for Dar es Salaam, had by 1938 changed his mind, 
praising Pashen as being well grounded in town planning and agreeing that every day that 
passed without proper planning trouble was being stored up. The reason for his change of 
heart, however, was because he wanted Upanga planned, otherwise Indians would go to 
Seaview and Oysterbay, "areas which we have decided should be kept as far as possible for 
persons of a different standard of living" 53 . 
He decided that Pashen should be made a Town Planning Advisor, and directed that his 
salary be raised. He pointed out that Pashen had been crying in the wilderness for years, and, 
if opportunity arose, the government should get on with rectification of past mistakes. Small 
schemes already approved should be executed as funds became available, while proposals of 
replanning schemes for Dar es Salaam were welcome. 
The Acting Governor had opened up a Pandora's box. In June 1938,  . 	six proposals for 
widening and improving parts of central Dar es Salaam, as well as the Upanga scheme, were 
submitted for approval and funding. The government was alarmed. It noted that the schemes 
were "bezerk", and that the Township Authority "flies rather high". It was also noted, rather 
gratuitously, that the submitted schemes did not cover the native and the bazaar areas which 
were a "disgrace" to Dar es Salaam. As a result, all these schemes were shelved and nothing 
really got going till after World War II. That was the farthest the Pashen Plan ever got to 
implementation. Dar es Salaan1' development remained therefore ad hoc during this period. 
52 
Tanzania National Archives File No. 13483, Townplanning Scheme for Dar es Salaam, Volume I. 
53 	. ibid. 
198 
Agitation for Municiral Status for Dar es Salaam54 
Towards the late 1 920s there were proposals and agitation that Dar es Salaam should 
be given municipal status. Thus the appointment of Mr. E.H. Helps of the Administrative 
Office, Cape Town, as Municipal Secretary for Dar es Salaam township. Mr. Helps arrived 
in Dar es Salaam in 1 931 and the outgoing Governor, Sir Donald Cameron, wanted him to set 
up a municipal board for Dar es Salaam as well as for the towns of Arusha, Moshi, and Tanga, 
"if my successor agrees". 
Immediately, there was opposition against municipal status from various officials. The 
Treasurer lamented the high cost of setting up such establishments. There was also the issue 
of a Common Roll and representation of non-British Europeans. Mr. Helps was therefore 
warned not work on the assumption that there could be a radical change from administering 
the townships in the near future. According to Acting Governor, D. J. Jardine, a municipality 
was never likely to be a success in a place like Dar es Salaam because not sufficient members 
of unofficials would be able to spare the time for municipal work and because of the fear of 
increased taxation. Besides, "the whole issue bristles with racial and other difficulties". 
Preparing a reply to a question posed by Hon. S.B. Malik in the Legislative Council in October, 
1931,   the Provincial Commissioner, Eastern Province, F. Brett, agreed that a municipality for 
Dar es Salaam was premature. 
In mid-i 934, Mr. Helps, sent notes to the Chief Secretary on the question of establishing 
municipal governments for certain towns in the territory. The views were influenced by South 
African practice, and recommended suffrage restricted to Europeans only. The issue was 
shelved as the government hano intention of establishing municipal governments. Helps 
was thanked and consoled that his paper had been "read with great interest" 55 . 
In early 1936,   the Township Authority pressed for the establishment of an autonomous 
municipality for DaY es Salaam. Again the Treasurer opposed it for financial reasons. The 
Deputy Chief Secretary, G.F. Sayers, put upabravado, that the government was not wary 
54 Tanzania National Archives No.1 3834, Dar es Salaam, Municipality, General. 
55 Tanzania National Archives File No. 22307, Municipalities, Establishment of, 
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of unofficial majority in a municipality, but was worried that Dar es Salaam had a floating 
population lacking civic spirit. The Chief Secretary, D.M. Kennedy, put it more bluntly. Not 
only did he agree that Dar es Salaam had a floating population, but also he was "afraid of 
control by persons whose wealth may be great, but whose standard of living was low". 
Nevertheless, as was usual with the government when under pressure, it was agreed in 
mid 1936 that the Municipal Secretary, H.E. Helps, should prepare a DraftLocal Government 
(Municipalities) Ordinance. This he did, and his proposals were sent around for comments, 
but were not acted upon. Helps was also allowed to visit East London and Cambridge in S. 
Africa, as well as Nairobi and Mombasa in Kenya, and to get views from North and South 
Rhodesia, on issues relating to municipal administration. These efforts however did not bear 
any fruits. 
In the late 1937,   the Government was again questioned on a date for a municipality for 
Dar es Salaam. The Government said this was still far off, but the Deputy Chief Secretary, 
G.F. Sayers, advised on a slow process beginning by increasing the number of nominated 
officials, devolving powers to the township authority to make township rules and to have a 
say in expenditure. Powers for rating as well as elected representation could be given later. 
Nevertheless, the Governor decided in early 1939 that the issue of a Municipality for Dar es 
Salaam was pre-mature. 
It is therefore important to note that in issues of urban and land administration, Dar es 
Salaam was, throughout this period, under the control of central government which tended 
to be conservative and slow inacting while the Township Authority was all for speed and 
action. The procrastination with granting Municipal status was chiefly a result of racial 
prejudice by colonial officials againthe bulk of the residents of Dar es Salaam. 
Infrastructure and 'ervices rrovision: cieneral observations 
As a broad generalisation, the Government was not in the forefront of providing 
infrastructure to guide new development or to encourage efficient land usage. Dar es Salaam, 
as shown earlier, remained poorly serviced. Roads were poorly surfaced, and there was no 
comprehensive sewage or drainage network. Native areas remained poorly serviced as the 
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example of Ilala Native area (below) illustrates. Figures for water supply (Table 4.3) 
between 1933 and 1938,   Europeans in Dar es Salaam consumed, per capita, betw 
gallons of water per day. By contrast, the Africans consumed only between 0.68 and 0.88 
gallons per day per capita. 
Table 4.3 The Supply and Consumption of Water by the Various races in Dar es Salaam, 
1933-1 938. 
Years Consumption p.a Population Gallons per capita 
I 	('000gallons) 1 served 
perday 
europeans 
1933 16,675 1350 34 
1934 . 15,223 1350 3.1 
1935 15,752 1350 32 
1936 16,208 1350 33 
1937 16,458 . 	 1350 33 
1938 18,651 1350 .43 
Aars 
1933 24,466 8900 7.5 
1934 25,203 8900 7.8 
1935 28,304 8900 .8.7 
1936 33,477 8900 10.3 
1937 49,382 8900 12.5 
1938 46,631 8900 .14.5 
Afroans 
1933 6393 22,700 .75 
1934 6368 22,700 .77 
1935 5636 22,700 .68 
1936 6296 22,700 .76 
1937 7490 23,550 .87 
1938 7551 23,550 .8,8 
Source: Tanganyika Territory, AnnuuI Reports of the Public Works Department, Government 
Printer, Dar es Salaam, relevant years 
Even poIicg, essential for property development and safe urban residence, was 
inequitably provided. For example, it was stated in the Legislative Council in November 1935,   
that the number of night police patrols, exclusive of inspecting staff, in the three zones of Dar 
es Salaam was: 34 for Zone I; 28 for Zone II; and only 17 for Zone Ill (Table 4.4) 
Thus, the number of night patrols in Zone I was twice as many as the number in Zone Ill, 
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despite the fact that Zone Ill was badly lit. 
The status of the roads in the three zones of Dar es Salaam is reflected in the Township 
Authority's road maintenance programme for 1938 (Table 4.5). Only 30.2% of the budgetted 
expenditure was earmarked for Zone Ill which had only earth roads and a limited length of 
metalled roads. While nearly 14,000 feet run of colas roads were budgeted for resurfacing 
in Zone I, there were no such roads in Zone Ill. While 12,000 feet run of earth roads were 
earmarked for maintenance in Zone Ill there were no such roads in Zone I. 
Table 4.4: Police Patrols at night, Dar es Salaam, 1935 
Area No. of Patrols 
Zone 
Non-native residential area excluding Seaview and 
Oysterbay 24 
Seaview and Oysterbay 10 
Zone II 
Commercial area 28 
Zone Ill 
Native Area including llala 17 
source: 	uovernmenx uazeue, ioveuiuur, 
Table 4.5: Dar es Salaam's Road Maintenance Programme, 1938. 
4 
Road Length for maintenance (feet) 
Zone I Zone II Zone Ill 
Type of Roads 
Colas Roads 
to~
l 1,700 - 
Metalled Road' 13,950 11,600 5,800 
Earth Roads - -  12,000 
Total Budgeted Expenditure 
(Tshs) 13,700 14,420 12,170 
Source: Tanzania National Archives File No. 18835, Dar es Salaam Roads, Volume I. 
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The relatively high expenditure per unit of road for Zone II is a reflection of the agitation 
that was going on at that time (and expressed by the Indian Members of the Legislative 
Council, for example) for better roads in the commercial area. While by 1939 the general 
status of the roads in Dar  es Salaam was bad, roads and drains in the African area were the 
most neglected (Appendix 4.5). 
The above are just examples of how native zones were generally neglected by the 
colonial administration and this was admitted on a number of occasions by the colonial 
officials themselves, as the following two examples show: 
o 	( In 1944,   Governor, Jackson, in a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Oliver Stanley, pointed out that houses in Zone III had neither piped water supply nor 
waterborne sanitation, and in almost all cases, no electricity56 . 
o 	Noting that the Native Municipal beer Hall had made profits totalling £2332 over the 
three years to 1939,   the Chief Secretary, D.M. Kennedy, suggested that these funds 
(profits) should not be taken to General Revenue (as was the practice). Instead he 
advocated the setting up of a Native Weffare Fund which should be used to improve 
amenities for the native population who lived in native towns. This was not a bad idea 
since the capital expenditure in native zones for the previous five years was only 
£2200 i.e. less than the profits made by the beer Hall in three years. Commenting, one 
official wrote: 
I do not know whether any plans for the betterment of the native 
township have er been worked out or whether we have any 
idea of what we want ... lt is up to government to provide at least 
the minimum amenities for the native township of Dar es 
Salaam, and this, in my opinion, we have failed to do. 
His suggestion for betterment, however, were: the clearing of the Open Space, and the 
improvement of th' beer H all! 57 . 
56 Tanzania National Archives File No. 24387, Vol. II, Improvement to Native Houses. 
57 Tanzania National Archives File No. 26602, Dar as Salaam Township, Native Welfare Fund. 
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Another official expressed similar sentiments: 
The problem of Dar es Salaam Township can be stated simply. It has been 
governed for years by gentlemen the interests of the majority of whom have 
been confined exclusively to the non-native commercial and residential areas 
with the result that the native areas have been sadly neglected 58 . 
The question of poor provision of infrastructure and services to native areas is further 
illustrated by the case of Ilala native area. 
Infrastructure and Service Provision: The Case of Ilala Native Area 
Thus a notable feature of land policy with regard to native areas was the usually limited 
level of services and infrastructure in these areas. In 1932 for example, there was just one 
stand pipe to serve the 600 houseowners of Ilala. There was only one public toilet in the 
area. There was no refuse collection service. There was no streetlighting or police patrols 
so that theft was common. In the light of this situation, native residents of Ilala submitted 
a petition to the Provincial Commissioner requesting: police patrols, piped water, electricity, 
and toilets. (see Appendix 4.6 for the petition). The Provincial Commissioner's reaction was 
generally hostile: "They have no hope of getting electric light I supposett, he wrote to the 
District Officer (Appendix 4.7). 
The introduction of a municipal tax of 10/ = for every native hut owner in Dares Salaam 
in 1932 brought about a difference of opinion between the District Officer, who felt that 
natives in Ilala should be exempted until the normal municipal services were made available, 
and the the Provincial Commissioner, who, insisted that liala residents should pay; and that 
every endeavour would be rade to ensure they got the services for their money. liala natives 
were therefore made to pay the municipal tax. But none of the promised services were made 
available for a very long time. 4n 1939,   another petition was presented to the Provincial 
Commissioner, 
demanding paved roads, a post office, and a hospital (Appendix 4.8). This again was not 
acted upon. Only in the early 1 950s when native zones had been located very near European 
58 ibid. 
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residential areas (e.g. at Kinondoni) were officials alarmed at the possible adverse effects of 
keeping native areas unserviced. Commenting on the concern expressed by some officials on 
the non servicing of new African areas in 1 951, the Member (Minister) for Lands and Mines 
wrote to the Member for Social Services: 
This is no new problem, it has always been with us in areas such as Ilala, but 
no one has worried much owing to its remoteness from contact with low 
density housing 59 . 
Thus not only was Dar es Salaam poorly unserviced generally, but also, native areas suffered 
the worst from poor servicing. Native areas were deliberately located at a distance from 
European areas in. order to make it easy for them to be denied of the usual infrastructure and 
services, although as the case of liala demonstrates, natives paid their taxes. 
4.2.7: The Impacts of Land Policy on the Land Use Structure of Dares Salaam (1918-1 939) 
The first two decades of British colonial administration in Tanganyika were characterised 
by a generally lukewarm and hostile attitude to urban development. The colonial government 
was, as a broad generalisation, contented with doing what it considered to be the bare 
minimum to ensure what it regarded as a liveable environment, particularly from its own point 
of view. In this respect it is noteworthy that the very first laws passed by the colonial 
administration were the Peace and Good Order Regulations of 1919  and the Township 
Ordinance of 1920,   both meant to ensure that there was some kind of brganisation and 
control in urban areas, since this was where the administrators lived. 
However, there was no dynamism whatsoever in urban development in general or with 
regard to Dar es Salaam in particula, It was sufficient to abide by the zoning provisions of 
the late German administration. This was partly because of Tanganyika's status as a 
mandated territory. Colonial administrators were in Tanganyika to do a job of governing and 
go back home. Indeed, until the late 1940s, the terms of tenure in Tanganyika for most 
administrators, did not exceed four years. 
59 Tanzania National Archives File No. 41949, Health and Sanitary Measures, Dar es Salaam. 
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The land use structure of Dar es Salaam was profoundly affected by the British 
colonial government's policy of implementing the zoning provisions left behind by the 
Germans. These provisions were basically racist. As a result, Dar es Salaam was divided into 
the European area; a Commercial/residential area (mainly inhabited by Indians); and a native 
area. The latter two were separated by an Open Space, cleared of native and other structures 
in the 1 920s and 1 930s. The planning of all these areas predated the British Administration, 
but the native town had to be regulated internally, and extended from Kariakoo into Ilala. The 
European area was extended northwards by the Ocean, to Oysterbay. For the European area, 
the Government inherited most of the buildings but constructed new ones at Seaview, 
Oysterbay, and Gerezani. The Commercial/Residential area underwent fundamental 
transformation when the Government forced Indians to take up Rights of Occupancy, and to 
abide by building covenants therein. Limited improvement schemes (like that of Kisutu) were 
undertaken for the central area, although most improvement was left to private action. 
Abiding by zoning provisions had two advantages: One, the government could be seen 
to be doing something to manage the urban areas. Two, by seperating the races, the 
administrators were able to distance themselves from natives who were not only feared as 
disease carriers, but also, their manner of life (including their wealth) was seen as a danger 
to European races. Segregation allowed the concentration of the meagre resources on 
European and other non-native areas, and allowed this to be justified on an ideological 
framework of variable standards of living to which the various races were used and entitled. 
Anything outside this, as proposed for example by the Township Authority on several 
occasions, was opposed by the central government. Only a highly limited amount of 
resources was considered justifiable to be spent on urban development. Regulatory, control 
and directive measures were seen as being sufficient and cost-effective. 
In this scenario, where resources from the central government were limited, and where 
the local and central administration was hostile to natives, it was the native majority urban 
dwellers who suffered most. They were pushed from various areas, and were directed to 
areas set out for them. These were both relatively and absolutely very poorly serviced, and 
inconveniently located. There, poverty could reproduce itself and be perpetrated. Petitions 
by natives to have the government service their areas usually met with cold response. 
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Unplanned development was also taking place as government policy was slow and 
sometimes, inappropriate to cope with the problems that manifested themselves. Upanga, 
for example, remained a bone of contention between the Township Authority, the Central 
Government, and nativa and non-native freeholders. The problem of Upanga was not solved 
till the 1 950s. The Gerezani native unplanned settlement was removed, but that at Kheko 
was spared. The basis of policy in both cases was racism. The whole policy was geared at 
achieving and perpetrating racial segregation. Medical, but occasionally economic and social 
reasons were used to justify racial segregation. Comprehensive town planning was however, 
highly discouraged by colonial officials so that development control in .Dar es Salaam was 
adhoc. 
The moderating effects of the central administration against some of the excesses 
proposed by the Township Authority was not so much to favour natives as to avoid being 
drawn into situations of confrontation, or, where resources would have to be spent on urban 
development. Thus the refusal by the central government, to accept various townplanning 
schemes for Dar es Salaam, or to pass comprehensive town planning legislation. There thus 
lacked, in the overall administration of Dar es Salaam, a central concept as to how the town 
should develop. 
The policy of allocating land by auctioning it to non-natives ensured that natives were 
kept out of choice, particularly trade, plots. Access to, and consumption of, most public 
service infrastructure was inequitably distributed over the township's space with native areas 
getting the very least servicing. The whole policy was inequitable, not only in terms of 
servicing, but also in other asects of land policy. For example, native holders of Kiwanja 
tenure were excluded from being considered for conversion to Rights, of Occupancy even 
where the terms of offering these Wqhts could be (and, were indeed), varied to suit individual 
or group circumstances of non-natives. Another example was the choice of the locations for 
areas zoned for 1hative occupation. These did not consider the distance factor from 
workplaces. 
A major result of colonial land policy for Dar es Salaam was a township segregated 
along racial lines although Indians had penetrated both Native and European areas by the end 
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of the period under review. Moreover, the policy initiated a ribbon land use pattern, alongthe 
Ocean northwards for Europeans and along the Central Railway line and Pugu Road for 
natives.lt may be pertinent to point out that while European settlement was being planned to 
grow northwards to take advantage of the moderating effects of the Ocean, the native area 
was being pushed south westwards away from the Ocean. Near this latter area, moreover, 
were planned the offensive factory sites. This made the cost of overcoming distance 
particularly burdensome to the natives. Some chose to set up unplanned settlements in areas 
like Kheko and Gerezani, which were near their places of work; only to be removed by the 
Government in the case of Gerezani. Besides, this deliberate policy of urban sprawl made the 
provision of services very expensive. Both water (tapped at Gerezani) and electricity (from a 
power plant at Kurasini) had to cross long distances, bypassing native areas, before being 
distributed to European areas like Oysterbay. Natives who were living at high densities and 
therefore cost effectively using land were the ones denied most services, while Europeans 
living at low densities, were lavished with most, if not all, the services then available. The per 
capita cost of servicing European areas must have been very high indeed. Moreover, officials 
paid neither house rent nor rates. Neither did they pay for services like water and electricity 
lavished on their areas. The observation that the Germans had laid out Dar e Salaam oblivious 
to costs (Chapter Three) was being repeated during the British Administration. 
4.3 Economic Responses 
4.3.1 Framework of Interest Groups Affected by Land Policy 
As in the pre-War period, government policy was implemented. within a racially 
segregated framework, so that is pertinent to continue identifying interest groups in terms 
of races. These groups were: 
The Europeans, subdivided into officials and non-officials; 
Other non-iatives, particularly Indians who were mainly traders, although there were 
a number who were government employees. Others in this category were the Arabs 
(although in a number of legal and government documents these were classified as 
natives). 




railways; and on coconut and other plantations belonging to Europeans, Arabs and 
Indians. Many too were employed as domestic servants, and some, as junior 
government officials. Others were small traders, subsistence farmers, and fishermen. 
The interests of the various social groups were expressed through social associations 
and clubs, trade unions, and adhoc groups. The Europeans had their own club. There was 
an Indian Association as well as an Arab Association. A Tanganyika Territory African Civil 
Service Association was formed in 1922 and was active in Dar es Salaam between 1925 and 
1928,   championing the interests of African clerks. A quasi political African Association was 
formed in 1929,   carrying with it most members of the Tanganyika Territory African Civil 
Service Association. As a result, the latter collapsed, but was revived as the Tanganyika 
African Civil Servant Association in 1944.   A Railways African Association, was founded in 
1929 but was most effective during the War in 1945. An Association of Cooks and 
Houseboys (Chama cha Wapishi na Mabo,) was formed in Dodoma in .1939,   and opened a 
branch in Dar es Salaam in 1941.   
The first Tanganyikan Trade Union as opposed to Staff Associations was formed by 
Asians in response to a Trade Union Ordinance enacted in 1932.   It was called the Union of 
Shop Assistants of Tanganyika 60 . Registered in 1933,   this Union lapsed in 1940.   In 1937,   
the Asiatic Labour Union, an organisation formed mainly by Sikh carpenters, organised the 
first serious strike in Dar es Salaam. Labour action started in the 1 920s among Civil Servants. 
It went through the service and transport sectors and reached the industrial workers in the 
1950s. Thus, during this period, there was agitation for, and expressiondemanding, better 
living conditions. This had 'cnsiderable effects on Dar es Salam's land use structure 
particularly during the post-i 945 era. 
4.3.2 Europeans 
Euroreans OfficiaI 
Unlike their German counterparts, British colonial Officials were, until 1 947, forbidden 
60 Information on trade unions is taken from, J. Iliffe, "Wage Labour and (Jrbanisation", in, M.H.Y. Kaniki, (Ed.), Tanzania 
under Colonial Rule, Longmans, London, 1979, pp. 278-306. 
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from taking up land and property in the territory. Officials had therefore to depend on their 
employer, the Government, for their land use requirements, particularly housing and land 
services. The government took care of these interests by constructing housing estates for 
its officials e.g. at Seaview, Oysterbay and Gerezani and by taking over various German 
properties some of which were previously privately owned. While shortage of accommodation 
among officials was expressed on several occassions, and while several officials had to share 
houses, or had to be housed in private estates, the colonial government, by and large, took 
care of its officials. 
The separation of officials from land ownership adversely affected their interests in land 
development. This would, for example, help to explain the government's nonchalance with 
regard to the orderly development of Upanga. As was to be the case later, officials were as 
yet not worried about the racial effects of allocating land to non-natives through public 
auctions. This was to change when officials got interested in acquiring land in Tanganyika. 
The Land Ordinance had to be amended in 1947 to suit the needs of these officials (Chapter 
Five). On the other hand, officials got accustomed and addicted to obtaining land services 
cheaply and this has continued to afflict land policy. 
Eurooean non-officials 
Little information has been obtained about the behaviour of these. It would appear 
that many took up agricultural estates. Several acquired freehold land within and about the 
Dar es Salaam township, either by way of purchasing Enemy Property, or through private 
negotiations. Important landvners who ran agricultural operations outside the Dar es Salaam 
township boundary and who affected the town's development in the 1 950s, included the 
owners of Helvetia and Victoria dairies; one John Zavellas, a Greek, who ran a Sisal Estate 
on government land at Msasani;hd Ursino and Regent, both Greeks who owned freehold 
estates just outs,de Oar es Salaam. The colonial government later on allowed them to 
subdivide these estates into high class residential areas. European non-officials may not have 
been active players in the shaping of the land use structure of Dar es Salaam within the 
township boundaries of the 1 930s. Perhaps, partly because of this, government policy 
concentrated in its interaction, on Indians and natives. 
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4.3.3. Indians (and Arabs) 
The main government policy was directed towards Indian land holdings, but during the 
process, a number of Arabs were affected as well. The following discussion is concentrated 
on Indians. Arabs are mentioned where they affected or were affected by land policy. 
Response to policy is analysed in relation to (a) the Commercial area (b) The Upanga Area, and 
(c) Other Areas. 
(a) the Commercial Area 
Like their German predecessors, the British Administration regarded the Indians as an 
important social group, for its role in manning the commercial sector in the territory. There 
were some 23,800 Indians in Tanganyika in 1 931. Writing in 1934,   one Tanganyika 
Colonial Official noted: 
On the whole, the Indian of the frugal, petty shop keeping class which is the 
most numerous, serves as a useful and necessary link between the European 
and the Native. Dealing, as he does, mostly in cotton piece goods and in 
hardware, he acts as a retailer for the manufactured products of Europe, which 
are distributed by the large firms on the coast and elsewhere 61 . 
Indians were therefore seen as indispensable by the colonial government, although they were 
hated by both the Africans, and the European settlers, as underhand fellows. Promotion of 
the Indian meant the maintenance of an alien (and hence, politically more amenable) group to 
perform functions which would otherwise have been carried out by Africans in commerce, 
skilled trade and the civil service, a phenomenon unwanted at the time since it would have 
hastened the challenge to colonialism. Besides, Indians had predated colonialism in East 
Africa. The colonial governmeñ' therefore adopted policies averse to the participation of 
Africans in trade in competition with Indians. The African Credit (Restiiction) Ordinance of 
1923,   for example, ensured that Africans could not be advanced sufficient credit to allow 
them to compete with Indians. The colonial government also favoured Indians traders, by 
demarcating important commercial plots in the native zone of Dar es Saláam e.g. around the 
market and along the major thoroughfares, into a "non-native trading area". Indians were also 
favoured during the allocation of long term Rights of occupancy in the central area of Dar es 
61 E. Reid, Tanganyika without Prejudice, London, 1934, p. 144. 
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Salaam, during the conversion of Kiwanja tenure, at the very same time as natives were being 
removed from there to go to Kariakoo and Ilala. 
Moreover, Indians were allowed early representation on the Legislative Council in 
1926 while Africans were not represented till two decades later in 1945.   Besides being 
favoured, Indians had a capacity to organize themselves and defend their group interests 
especially since they were aware of their indispensability to colonial designs. In 1922 for 
example, they successfully fought off government efforts requiring them to pay more taxes, 
and to keep proper business books in English, by refusing to open their shops until the colonial 
government withdrew the new taxes and other conditions. 
In terms of reactions to government land policy, Indians (and Arabs) were among the 
very last persons to move from the Open Space, and only moved when the government had 
resorted to legal actions. Indians too, by and large, ignored the government notice of 1926 
requiring them of take up Rights of Occupancy by 1927.   Only when a second deadline was 
approaching in 1932,   did the Indians form a Kiwanja Tenants Committee under the auspices 
of the Indian Association to protect the interests of Kiwanja tenants. In their presentations 
to the Governor, the Committee argued that the rent required upon taking up a Right of 
occupancy was too high; and that the period for putting up the required structures was too 
short. They wanted this extended from two, to ten years. Besides, they pointed out that 
compensation for existing buildings was too low. Finally, they wanted the deadline to end 
Kiwanja tenure extended. As a result of these protests, land rent was reduced, the period in 
which the required building had to be completed was extended from.2 to 4 years, and 
compensation was raised to refrect disturbance. The deadline for ending Kiwanja tenure was 
however not extended, but individual cases of hardships were entertained by the Governor 
and individual decisions given. SevaI Indians were allowed to keep their plots without going 
through the procedure set out in the Land Ordinance, that required land rent for non native 
plot allottees to be"determined by the highest bidder through public auctions. 
It is of interest of ponder as to why Indians should have objected at being required 
to take up long term Rights of Occupancy of highly valuable city centre plots. Apparently the 
Indians wanted to keep their valuable city centre plots, and to continue making money at 
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those locations, without, at the same time, having to invest in expensive buildings 
commensurate with the value of that city centre land; and without having to share the 
benefits of this high land value with the government, in the form of higher land rents. Indians 
too have been observed elsewhere to be highly reluctant to invest in immoveable property, 
until they have utmost confidence in the socio-economic system in which they are operating, 
and even then, until they have accummulated adequate, surplus capital.. 
On its part, the government was determined to ensure that Dar es Salaam's Centre 
area did not develop into, or remain, a slum. The public health factor was a major aim behind 
requiring Indians to take up long term Rights of Occupancy. The colonial government wanted 
Dar es Salaam's central area reorganised, ordered, and redeveloped to acceptable standards, 
but without itself spending the money. The government was also aware that the Indians had 
sufficient, or could get access to sufficient, capital to redevelop the central area. It was 
aware, for example, of the way the Indians had bought many of the township's ex Enemy 
Property (some of which had been resold at considerable profit). Besides,.the land in question 
was government land and the government felt entitled, and under obligation, to have it 
developed to standards it considered appropriate. 
Thus, while several conditions in the Rights of Occupancy were eased and while 
several individual cases were presented and considered favourably, the Government, later on, 
got tough against recalcitrant Kiwanja owners who refused to take up longterm Rights of 
Occupancy. The Land Officer advised the government to give no further concessions since 
many of the petitioners were not necessarily poor people and many had other properties which 
they let. He pointed out that Ear es Salaam was likely to improve in the following 16 years, 
while rents could only be revised after 20 years (i.e. in 1952 or later). Despite their earlier 
protests, the Indians took up theights of Occupancy and invested in modern buildings, 
giving Dar es Salaam's city centre, a major facelift. The Land Department was happy to report 
for the year 1 938that: 
During the year, in accordance with the terms of conversion of Kiwanja Tenure 
into Rights of Occupancy, the demolition of old unsuitable premises continued 
with even greater celerity than previous years. The results are striking, and 
anyone who knew the bazaar area of the township a few years ago cannot fail 
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to be impressed by the altered appearance of that area with its towering 
buildings of modern design in place of the low, ramshackle and unsightly 
buildings of the past62 . 
As it is unlikely that the Indians constructed these buildings with their personal savings, there 
must have been some financial arrangements to help with land development. The Indians 
realised soon enough that the colonial government was working in their favour, although the 
economic problems of the early 1 930s, and uncertainty over the future of Tanganyika, were 
genuine reasons working against capital investment in fixed property, and were invoked by 
the Indians against their being forced to take up longterm rights of occupancy. From the mid-
1 930s, however, the Indians embarked on rebuilding the commercial area. 
(b) the UanQa Area 
Although Indians in East Africa are known to live at very high densities, the commercial 
area was proving too small for them as their numbers grew, particularly since, as British 
citizens, they could move to Tanganyika very easily. (Overcrowding in the commercial area 
is discussed in Chapter Five). Several Indians, Arabs, and a few Europeans had bought or 
otherwise obtained freehold land in the Upanga area since as far back as the German era. 
According to a study made by Land Officer, A.R. Cotton in 1936,.(at a time when the 
Township Authority wanted natives out of Upanga), the following Indians (including Goans) 
and Arabs had their records of land tenure in Upanga traceable to the 'German Grundbuch or 
other land records: Suleiman bin Nasr, Saleh bin Abdallah, P. de Souza and C.S.C. de Souza, 
Ramji Gulamali, Abdulhussein Mulla, Adamji and Sons, Muni Abdallah, the Patel Brotherhood, 
Rahim Abdullah, Rajibhai Rajibhai, Abdullah Shariff, Jafferali Nurmohamed, de Souza Junior 
and Co, R.F. and J.C. Noronhav1usaji Daudbhai, Gulamhussein Mohammedbai, and Karimjee 
Jivanjee and Company. These however were only some of the plot owners whose records 
could be easily traced in 1936.   In addition there were many natives but whose interests in 
land were not recorded 63 . 
62 Tanganyika Territory, Annual Report of the Lands Department, 1938,   Government Printer, Oar es Salaam, 1939, p. 
37. 
63 Tanzania National Archives File No. 12589, Dar es Salaam Township Layout. 
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It would therefore appear that Indians and other non-natives had already penetrated 
Upanga by the mid 1 930s, yet, as seen above, the Township's and the District Authority's 
anger was vented against Africans (natives). Therefore, it appears plausible to conclude that 
the authorities' insistence on removing natives from Upanga was aimed at promoting Indian 
and other non natives' land and property interests. Because the central government was not 
coming forward with a clear land development policy for Upanga, a number of owners 
decided, in the mid 1 930s, to subdivide the land and to sell or develop parts as they deemed 
fit. The Township Authority was put in an awkward position where it did not want Upanga 
to develop haphazardly, but where the central government was not forthcoming with any 
relevant town planning legislation or layout for the area. It is these pressures to redevelop 
Upanga by Indian and other private individual land owners, which brought about the 
enactment of the Town Development (Control) Ordinance in 1936 which has been discussed 
above. 
(c) Other areas 
Other non native Dar es Salaam landowners appearing in the records include Ahmed 
Abed, Sulliman Daya and Abdallah Shariff, all in Ilala; Gulamhussein Mohamed Nasser Jidani 
in the Kurasini area; Hannah Nassif in the Kinondoni area and All bin Said in the Pugu Road 
area. The land held by some of these persons was invariably later on developed haphazardly 
and in most cases, the localities have retained the names of these former land owners (e.g. 
llala Shariff Shamba, Buguruni kwa Daya, Kinondoni Hanna Nassif). Ali bin Said (an Arab) 
appears in the records as a person who subdivided and sold a lot of Industrial land along the 
Pugu Road (Chapter Five). 
4.3.4 The Natives (Africans) 
(a) Africans in General 
While the general colonial elicy towards Indians was positive, that towards natives 
was hostile, or, at best, lukewarm. Government policy was perhaps best expressed by the 
District Officer, Dar es Salaam, in October, 1928,   when he made a request to the Central 
Town Planning and Building Committee for plots to accommodate natives who were under 
notice to move from the Open Space. He thought such natives were really entitled to 
government plots, and if these plots were to be granted the government would have met its 
obligations, and: 
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I do not ask for more. The Native Township is now quite large enough for the 
accommodation of what I term the legitimate needs of native occupation 
together with the labour requirements of the town 64 . 
According to the District Officer, many natives were not wanted for the township's good 
governance or servicing. His idea was that labour villages or compounds could be established 
at accessible and convenient positions which would be outside the township, but near enough 
to be controlled by the Administration, and would therefore come under the Sanitary Ru/es 
for Minor Settlements. (Such a labour village was established at Kigambo.ni, in the 1 950s. 
See Chapter Five) 
It is this kind of negative attitude that natives faced from colonial officials. The docile 
African reaction to hostile government land policy when removing natives from the Open 
Space, the central (Commercial) area, and Gerezani, has been described, as has the protest 
against removal of the natives from Upanga. The petition by the natives of llala for some land 
servicing has also been described. The investment in the Kheko unplanned area by natives, 
some of whom were expellees from Gerezani, the Commercial Area, and the Open Space, has 
also been dealt with. 
Africans, however, were keen to invest in urban property, if only. the policy was 
positive. The demand for plots in the native zone had already led to the extension of this zone 
to the valley of the Msimbazi in the 1 920s, and to Borman's shamba (named Ilala by the 
Governor) in the mid 1 930s. Despite the lack of services in the native areas, and the distance 
from employment opportunities, , colonial report noted: 
the erection of native houses has proceeded at a rate so rapid as to cause one 
to ponder where the capital comes from to enable natives to build such good 
houses in so short a time65 . 
The observations ma1e in respect of Kheko (above) that Africans occupying freehold land 
64 Tanzania National Archives File No. 12589, Dar as Salaam Township Layout. 
65 The Report is entitled: "Notes on Buildin9 Plots in the Native quarter of Dar es Salaam", in Tanzania National Archives 
File No. 12589, Dar es Salaam Township Layout. 
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were putting up new expensive houses, or upgrading the old small bandas (huts), lends 
credence to the view that hostile government policy and precarious security of tenure over 
land, were as much a cause of Africans putting up temporary huts, as' was sheer poverty. 
The ideology of native rurality and backwardness should be seen within this framework. 
Since, moreover the government provided only limited number of plots, many Africans chose 
to settle outside the town's boundaries, mainly on private land. 
(b) African Government Officials 
The Tanganyika Territory African Civil Servants Association attempted to champion 
the interests of African government officials in getting a stake in land development but with 
dismal results. 
The Association started in 1926 by requesting the government to help its members acquire 
houses in the township by way of a government sponsored housing scheme to be acquired 
on terms of tenant purchase, by clerks earning not less that Shs. 140/ = a month, who would 
be given a loan of up to 75% of the cost of constructing the houses.. The Association 
suggested houses with corrugated iron sheets roofs as opposed to thatched roofs. Reacting, 
the Governor formed a Committee, chaired by the District Officer. The Medical Officer of 
Health, and a nominated educated African, were members. The Committee was to consult 
with the Honourable Treasurer and the Land Officer, to see if the Association's proposals 
could be acted upon. He hoped the Committee "will not raise hopes in the minds of Africans 
which it may be impossible to realise." He further observed that Africans built only in mud, 
wattle, and thatch; houses that could not be insured against, so there would therefore be no 
security against advances of p'ilic funds. The District Officer (T.P.S. Dawkins) did not 
approve the Swahili house (which the African was expected to build if given a chance). It 
required frequent repairs; was insanjry; and was difficult to be rid of pests. He, instead, 
proposed the construction of modern houses by government to be rented by Africans. 
At the Committee's meeting in November 1927, attended by African clerks, B. 
Madalito, and S. Chiponda, and three other senior clerks, it was agreed that a pilot scheme 
involving five type "A" houses for married men, and one block type of houses for single men, 
be erected and should be provided with water and electricity. These would be for renting to 
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Africans, as the tenant purchase scheme seemed impracticable, given the cost of these 
buildings and the low wages of the Africans. A site was proposed in what was later on to be 
the Open Space. The scheme was quite modest but the Governor considered and rejected 
it: "It is not proposed to proceed with the scheme which is considered too ambitious and 
costly". 
The governor, instead, suggested that members of the A fr/can Civil Servants Association 
be helped to get plots as near government offices as possible. The Association followed this 
up, and in July 1928,   wrote to the Chief Secretary, asking the government to assist them to 
secure plots near their offices. The Provincial Commissioner (E.F. Brett)'s advice to the Chief 
Secretary stated that there was no chance of these African Government Officials being 
allocated plots even in Zone Ill, since all plots were (to be) allocated to natives being moved 
from Zone II and the Open Space. The existing plots would not suffice for this purpose, let 
alone for new applicants. In any case he did not think it was fair to allocate the African.clerk 
with land, just because he was a government employee since he could leave government 
service any time. His suggestion was that Government should acquire land across the harbour 
at Magogoni for a native residential area. (This proposal was to be implemented later on in the 
1950s) 66 
Thus, the early efforts by the African Civil Servants to get preferential treatment in the 
acquisition of land and property in the township failed, sabotaged by the Governor in the case 
of housing scheme, and by the Provincial Commissioner in the case of, building plots. This 
was not perhaps surprising since colonial officials themselves were not allowed to own land 
in the territory and must have rarded their junior co-civil servants as getting too ambitious, 
too soon. Let it be noted as well that the Association's request was not in favour of all 
Africans but was limited to the interests of Civil Servants in general, and those earning over 
1401= per month, in particular. Seeds of division within the African ranks, particularly the 
drive for preferentiul treatment in land matters by civil servants, were, being planted. Most 
members of the African Civil Servants Association joined the African AssOciation when it was 
66 Tanzania National Archives File No. 12589, Dar es Salaam Township Layout, and File No. 4/3 Housing 
Accommodation, African Government Employees. 
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born in 1929.   This later became the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) which 
championed the cause for independence and whose members formed the post colonial 
government. These people must have looked back with nostalgia to the colonial era, and 
must have determined to set matters related to the Civil Servants' acquisition and 
development of land, "right". This is discussed in Chapter Six. 
4.4 Overall deductions related to the evolution of the land use structure of Dar es Sataam 
during the interwar period 
The British colonial government was possibly not as interested in the overall development 
of Dar es Salaam as were the Germans, and this may have been in part a result of the 
stringency policies adopted after the War. The British government did not therefore propose 
or undertake any land development schemes for Oar es Salaam which were substantively 
different from those left behind by the Germans. Their scope was limited, mainly to fulfilling 
the 1914 Bauordnung, save for the extension of Zone Ito encompass Oysterbay, and the 
extension of Zone Ill to Ilala. They also opposed any comprehensive town planning approach, 
and would not provide any legislative framework to achieve this. Their argument was usually 
that town planning was premature and too costly for Tanganyika. Any direction towards 
Municipal status for Dar es Salaam was opposed for a number of reasons which included the 
cost of running the municipality, as well as a racial bias against the residents of Dar es 
Salaam. The Dar es Salaam harbour was only slightly improved. It remained and operated 
as a lighterage wharf till the late 1 950s. The Depression and the German claim for colonies 
in the 1 930s added to the British colonial authorities' lukewarm approach to Dar es Salaam. 
It is thus probable that had the Germans not left, Dar es Salaam would have experienced a 
more dynamic land development policy. 
Lack of African representation on the Legislative Council as well as the colonial 
attitude towards Africans (whom it regarded as backward and best suited to the rural areas 
where land for subsistence and economic undertakings was available), caused the colonial 
government to address land development issues concerning Africans in Dar es Salaam 
negatively. 
However, despite this lukewarm government attitude to Dar es Salaam, the major 
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impact on Dar es Salaam's growth emanated from government policy through the 
implementation of the Dar es Salaam building areas scheme planned by the Germans and 
published in 1924 under the Township Rules of 1923.   This implementation involved the sifting 
and sorting of Dar es Slaam's population into three major racial groups of Europeans, Indians 
and natives, a policy already pursued by the Germans. Direct government undertaking e.g. 
the construction of Quarters (mainly for Europeans), the provision of roads, and the 
distribution of water and electricity networks added and facilitated racial fine tuning in terms 
of land uses. Colonial officials, though forbidden to take up land, used land policy to enhance 
their interests e.g. in terms of living comfortably, in quality housing, on choice plots, but free 
of charge. 
The responses of the various interest groups operated within a government 
determined land use framework. Most actors were forced against their will to adopt certain 
land use/development decisions. The Open Space was cleared and the evacuees resettled 
against the will of its occupiers. Certain native settlements were forcibly removed. Attempts 
were made to remove others. Natives in the commercial area were compelled to move out 
to areas reserved for them in Ilala and Kariakoo. But even in such areas, commercial plots 
were reserved for non-natives. Indians in the city centre were forced to take up Rights of 
Occupancy and to redevelop the commercial area. Market forces of supply and demand were 
hardly the determinants of the resultant land use structure. In the case of Upanga where the 
demand for land was being overtly expressed, the government buried its head against 
facilitating the working of the market which it could have done, e.g. by adopting or providing 
planning proposals for the area. Theoretically (as explained in Chapter One), it was the duty 
of government to assist Upara to develop regularly, but this it avoided doing. 
The impression obtained frornhe above discourse is that both the central and township 
authorities had fairly narrow goals for Dar es Salaam. They saw the town as a settlement in 
which Europeansnd Indians had to stay and in which some natives had to be tolerated. The 
general approach to land use was negative. It was mainly confined to defining who should 
live where and what should or should not be constructured where, within a general framework 
of public health and sanitation considerations. Dar es Salaam was not seen as a living socio-
economic entity in which various social groups, and various economic opportunities had to 
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Figure 4.5: Dar es Salaam, 1940. 
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be integrated. Apart from the original German policy, British land policy was, on the main, 
reactive, determined by adhoc responses to crisis situations. The general urban economy (if 
Dar es Salaam was so conceived) was seen in fairly narrow terms of employment for 
Europeans, Commerce for Indians and menial and casual jobs for natives. The two powerful 
social groups (i.e. the Europeans and Indians) were only marginally committed to Dar es 
Salaam, while the natives who would have been committed to the town were powerless. 
The general level of infrastructure standards in Dar es Salaam was low, and was not 
equitably distributed among the town's residents. Europeans took the lion's share, while 
Africans got the least. 
Important issues like employment, social integration, and political and civic 
development, were only marginally considered. Thus, Dar es Salaam was a phenomenon 
devoid of central dynamism or of a longterm perspective. It was a town made up of social 
and geographical entities encased in a kind of parochialism, couched in terms of different 
needs for different races. Metropolitanism expected of an urban area, with social and 
economic integration and interaction, was not there. Officials did not, for example, care that 
natives lived near their place of work because the issue of employment was marginal to 
colonial policy. It was sufficient that natives were in their own zone with some minimal land 
ordering, and away from the Europeans. 
In the broader theory of colonial exploitation and domination, Indians were favoured 
because they were a positive asset in this process. The racial group that was oppressed most 
by government policy was the natives (Africans). These were removed from various 
locations, anddenied the privileges that were made available to other races. This oppression 
was justified under an ideology purbrting that natives were a health hazard to other races 
and were not used to high standards of living. The colonial policy of straitjacketing people 
into racial groups was not progressive. Complemented by lack of dynamism in the overall 
conceptualisation of land development, this policy led to overcrowding in both the Indian and 
native areas; and to social strife between the various races; like when the Indians 
"overflowed" into the native areas (Chapter Five). Lack of dynamism, affected both the 
Indians and natives adversely in certain aspects. Much as it was realised that the city centre 
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was getting overcrowded, no efforts were made to regulate Upanga; although it was clear 
that Upanga would be the area for expansion of Indians from the city centre. The native areas 
was even more adversely affected. No building plots were provided for Africans outside the 
areas of Kariakoo and Ilala, both prepared before 1930.   Between them, these two areas 
comprised just over 2000 plots. This was all that was provided for the thousands of natives 
in Oar es Salaam during the 60 years of German and British colonialism till 1950.   The plots 
that were demarcated were to cater mainly for those already in the town. For the 
newcomers, the policy kept but a blind eye. This led to overcrowding, ahd.to the occupation 
of available land haphazardly. 
The vision of natives as a backward lot did not match the realities that natives were 
coming in large numbers to Dar es Salaam. The 1 940s were to witness various demands 
from natives for better standards of living. A new post-war phase was ushered in, dominated 
by the decolonisation process and the planning for the post colonial era. Land policy was to 
play its part by embracing town and country planning legislation, direct active government 
land development, attempts to address the question of African urban employment and 
residence, and so on. These and other factors that shaped the land use structure of Dar es 
Salaam in the post war era and discussed in the following Chapter. 
As narrated earlier, Dar es Salaam was growing, and by the mid-i 930s, its boundaries 
had to be varied from those inherited from the Germans, to encmpass new areas particularly 










POST WAR GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (1940-1 961) 
5.1 Colonial Philosophy on Post War Development and its effects on Dar es Salaam's growth 
Urbanisation in most African countries began to grow at high rates during the 1 940s, in 
response to further capitalist penetration of the rural areas, as well as the declining living and 
economic conditions in the countryside. By the end of World War II, colonial policy had 
already been redefined from one of territorial self sufficiency, to one of Colonial Development 
and Welfare. This change was necessitated by the impeding decolonisation and, the need to 
prepare for the future relationships after independence, between the former coloniser and the 
former colonies. 
Moreover, there was need to create a new impression of concern against socio-economic 
backwardness, and to meet some demands of the restive colonised populations. Investment 
in Development and Welfare in the colonies was seen as the answer. 
Britain as the colonising power put up the Colonial Development and Welfare Funds and 
colonial Governors were encouraged to draw up Ten Year Development Plans for their 
territories. In Tanganyika, a document known as "An Outilne of Post War Development" was 
published in 1944. This was followed, in 1946, by a "Ten Year Development P/an for 
Tanganyika" (hereinafter referredto as The Plan). This guided Tanganyika's development until 
superseded by the Vassey P/an, in 1961. The Plan had considerable impact on urban 
development in Tanganyika in general, and on Dar es Salaam in particular. It provided for 
investment in urban infrastructure ike roads, drains, sewers, public buildings, housing, 
airports, ports, and water, electricity, and sewage networks, social infrastructure (like schools 
and health centres) and so on. 
Everywhere, but particularly so in urban areas, the African was aspiring to, and demanding 
better living conditions. There was agitation for independence by the colonised peoples. 
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Labour problems were acute, and workers easily allied themselves with nationalist movements 
to fight colonialism. In Tang anyika, a nationalist Party, the Tanganyika African National Union 
was formed in 1954 out of the former Tanganyika African Association 1 and went about 
mobilising the population to demand independence. 
While Dar es salaam's population was 25,000 in 1939 it had more than doubled in 1949 
to 69,277. This growth, mainly through immigration, undermined living conditions and 
threatened jobs and housing. Moreover, housing supply had fallen somewhat during the War, 
due to retrenchment measures. A report of the Dar es Salaam District Commissioner and 
District Officer submitted to a meeting of the Native Affairs subcommittee held on 22/7/1 947, 
noted that there were in Dar es Salaam 45,000 Africans as opposed to 33,000 before the 
War. There were however only 3127 native houses, all privately provided, in the town (Table 
5.1). The occupancy rate per house of 10 persons before the War had therefore gone up to 
15, leading to serious overcrowding. 
Table 5.1: Native Houses, Dares Salaam, 1947 
Area No. of Native 
Houses 
Remarks 
Zone II, Kariakoo, Ilala 2084 Plots demarcated by both German and 
British Administrations. 
Zone II, Upanga Kisutu Natives unwanted in these areas and 
173 earmarked for removal 
Unzoned, Keko, 




Source: Tanzania National Archives File No. 24387, Improvement of Native Houses, 
Vol. II. 
In September, 1931, the Governor approved the grant of a Right of Occupancy in terms of Circular. No. 4 
if 1926,   over the plot at the corner of New (now, Lumumba) and Kariakoo Streets to the Tanganyika African 
Association at a rent of 61= p.a. for use as a Library and as a meeting place. This later on became the TANU 
headqurters. See Tanzania National Archives File No. 29/A/1 92, African Association. 
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A 1942 report of inquiry into the wages and cost of living of low grade African government 
employees found that 87% of government employees in Dar es Salaam received a wage on 
which they could not subsist. 2  Thus, there were various industrial actions, the most serious 
being the Dockworkers strike of 1947,   which resulted into the Government addressing itself 
to issues of wages, shortages of essential commodities, urban squalor, and housing. In 
October 1955 the Tanganyika Federation of Labour was formed. 
There was no more denying of the existence of a wage labour problem. Workers in 
permanent employment became increasingly restive against colonial rule and supported 
nationalist movements. Labour strife, high rates of urban growth, together with the new 
postwar colonial strategy based on "development" necessitated government action with 
respect to urban land development and African housing. In Dar es Salaam, action ranged from 
the panickly constructed temporary African housing of 1947,   (below) to a more concerted 
effort of providing government quarters for renting by Africans; of provision of demarcated 
plots for self-construction; and of instituting financial provisions to assist Africans desirous 
of being house owners. 
Moreover, by the late 1 940s, capital accumulation among the Indians had reached 
proportions allowing them to invest in industry. At the same time, a new strategy of capitalist 
relationships between the colonisers and the colonies were evolving, envisaging import 
substitution industrialization. In terms of land uses, it was deemed necessary to create, or 
expand "Industrial Areas" in townships. In Dar es Salaam, an Industrial area was thus laid out 
along the Pugu Road, to take advantage of Pugu Road itself, and of the railway line. 
Nevertheless, the colonial state still believed in its civilising mission as well as in the racial 
superiority of the colonising and nonative races over Africans. At the political level, the 
principle of the racial parity in political representation that was being advocated in Tang anyika 
was not so much as'a measure of equality, but of superiority of the minority races. At a land 
use development level, racial segregation of the foregoing decades was still being advocated 
in the 1 950s. Europeans still considered it within their prerogative to determine the location 
2 	Tanzania National Archives File No. 30598, African living conditions in Dar as Salaam. 
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of African areas, the kind of infrastructure to be provided therein, as well as the type of 
housing appropriate for the African's pocket and mind. Investment in housing and other 
infrastructure continued to vary according to race, with Europeans consuming the most, and 
Africans, the least. 
Continued racial prejudice against Africans was perhaps a reflection of the misjudgment 
by Europeans of the speed of the decolonisation process. But it served to intensify the 
nationalist struggle and to identify the colonising races as "the problem" to be dealt with. 
After Independence, the new rulers stepped into the shoes of the former colonisers and 
continued with the previously entrenched socio-economic relations. 
stopped here 
5.2. Land Policy Impacts 
5.2.1 Key Policy Tools used in the Post War Era 
The situation described in the preceding section produced a mixture of policies that had 
fundamental effects on the land use structure of Dar es Salaam. For the first time, the 
Government addressed itself seriously to the issue of native housing in urban areas. Broader 
cognizance was taken of wider issues in town planning and land development. A 
comprehensive Town and Country Planning legislation was enacted. Dar es Salaam was given 
municipal status and a considerable amount of public funds was invested in the town in public 
infrastructure and services, public buildings, and housing. Land was demarcated and made 
available for private construction under various planning schemes. Access to land and land 
services however, continued to be along racial lines. 
Notable among the policy tools that affected Dar es Salaam's land use structure were: 
the Land Ordinance, the various planning schemes made under the Town Development 
(Control) Ordinance of 1936,   and the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1956.   The 
other major tool vs direct government intervention through provision, of infrastructure, 
construction of housing and public buildings, provision of land for private development, 
provision of finance, control of overcrowding in residential areas, and cooperation with the 
private sector. Investment undertakings of a national character like the construction of trunk 
roads and airports and the expansion of the harbour, also had considerable effects on Dar es 
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Salaam's development. 
5.2.2 Details of Policy Tools and their effects 
The Land Ordinance (Amendment), 1947. 
The Land Ordinance of 1923 continued to be the major piece of legislation governing land 
tenure. However, in December 1947,   it underwent an important amendment which removed 
the necessity to have public land allocated to non-natives through public auctions. This had 
important connotations for the future access to land by non-natives (particularly European 
government officials) in Dar es Salaam. 
Presenting the Bill to amend the Land Ordinance, the Director for Lands and Mines outlined 
before the Legislative Council, the reasons which had necessitated the amendment: 3 
o 	Allocating land by auction was inequitable and farce since a person could undergo 
considerable expenses and trouble to look for land only to be later on outbid by another 
person; 
o 	Collusion was possible, (and possibly rife) during auctions particularly among 
established traders in townships; 
o 	A lot of people (particularly Indians) had made money during the War and had no way 
of using it except inflating land prices. Many would-be property owners with money 
to build might not get land continued to be sold through auctions. 
o 	If land became too expensive, house rents would unnecesarily go. up; 
SON 
o 	Land auctioning was not operating in the best interests of the native. Allocating land 
administrativel'y allowed the Governor to scrutinise each case of applicant individually; 
o 	Mere bidding (especially in the case of agricultural land) did not ensure that land was 




In order to demonstrate that land prices had gone through the roof, the Director cited various 
examples of how plots sold at auctions fetched prices that far exceeded the Government's 
wildest expectations as shown by the upset rents (Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2: Upset rents compared to Rents obtained at auctions, selected areas, 1947 
Town Type of Plots Upset Rent Rent at Which sold 
at auctions 
Mbeya Commercial 180/= - 2401= 37001= 
Dar es Salaam Godowns 130/= 1750/ = 
Dares Salaam Commercial 1091= - 320/= 20001= - 2625/= 
Arusha Residential 5-6 times 
upset rent. 
Arusha Commercial 10 times upset 
rent. 
Source:Tanganyika, Proceedings of the Legislative Council (Hansatd), 21 st session, 
10th December 1947,   Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1947.   
To those who may have favoured the retention of the system, the Director pointed out that 
the public auctioning of land was not being abolished altogether, but the Governor's hands 
were being untied so that he culd have some discretion in deciding on the mode of land 
allocation appropriate for the circumstances. 
Some of the shortcomings of the land auctioning system presented by the Director had 
been pointed out a' problems way back in the 1 920s. The land "discoverer" problem had 
been presented before Governor Cameroon by the Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province 
in April 1928.   The Governor had dismissed it as a serious problem although he had directed 
that future land for pastoral and agricultural use to be offered for auctioning should be 
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identified by the Government and not by individuals. Apparently this had not been done. 4 
Again the problem of collusion among buyers had been pointed out earlier in July 1928 by the 
Chamber of Commerce, Dar es Salaam. The Government had however insisted then that it 
would stick - 
to the system of land auctioning. 5 Thus, there wasa fundamental reasons why the colonial 
government sought to change the system at that particular time. 
Discussing the Bill to amend the Land Ordinance, it immediately became apparent that the 
Honourable Members of the Legislative Council were divided along racial lines, all Indian 
members opposing it (in favour of continued land auctioning); and all European and African 
members supporting it (against land auctioning). (See summary of views, Table 5.3). 
The pattern of views shown in Table 5.3 supports the contention that the Indians had the 
money the buy up all auctioned land. That is why they were all for land auctioning. The 
position of Europeans was different. In the 1 920s, colonial administrators had seen 
themselves as temporary residents in Tanganyika and cared the least whether or not the 
Indians bought all the land. In the late 1940s,   many European officials could see the end of 
colonialism (and their own careers) coming sooner than later. Indeed many would be retiring 
and could see their future being in Tanganyika rather than back in the United Kingdom. Thus 
their need to acquire land in the territory. But they could not, in this respect, compete with 
Indians to buy land if it was offered at public auctions. It is also suggested that as far as 
social status was concerned, Africans were slowly rising (at least politically), while Europeans 
were on the decline, thus the coincidence of interests of these two social groups against the 
lnthans. 
The colonial government's propojj to amend the Land Ordinance went hand in hand with 
the creation of conditions under which Government Officials could acquire land in Tanganyika, 
which they had hith'rto been forbidden to do. General Order 460(e) (Amendment slip No. 
134) provided conditions under which officers might, with the approval of the Governor in 
Tanzania National Archives File No. 12203, Land Ordinance, Bidding by Auction. 
ibid. 
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Table 5:3 Stand of Legislative Council members with regard to the Land Ordinance(Amendment) Bill, 1947, 
Member Stand Taken Summary of Reasons given 
INDIAN MEMBERS 
Hon. V.M . Nazerali Against .Auctions had worked well thus far 
.Development conditions existed in Rights of Occupancy (to 
prevent speculation) 
Hon. I.C. Chopra Against .Auctions had worked well thus far. 
.How was the Governor going to select the right man for a 
piece of land? 
.How about those already paying rents determined at 
auctions? Were these rents to be revised downwards? 
Hon. A.M.A. Karimjee Against The Bill discriminated against the Indian community 
EUROPEAN MEMBERS 
Hon. the Rev. R.M. 
Gibbons For .Auctions shut out natives and were subject to collusion 
Hon. M.A. Carson For .Auctions gave land to the wealthy. 	In India, they were trying 
to break up big landowners. 
Hon E.C. Phillips For .Land values had gone through the roof. 
.Bill would help those not so wealthy and especially 
demobilised soldiers to be able to own a house. 
.Opponents of the Bill had benefitted immensely from the War 
and were then very wealthy. 
.Land ownership should not be related to wealth. 
Hon. Major S.E. duToit For .BiII gave something to demobilised soldiers who gave up 
every thing while away in War while those left behind made 
bags of money and would buy up all land. 
Hon. J.H.S. Tranter For .(no further views given) 
AFRICAN MEMBERS 
Hon. Chief M.H. Abdiel 
Shangali For .(no further views given) 
Hon.Chief K. Makwaia For .(no further views given) 
Hon. Adam Sapi For .(no further views given) 
Source: Tanganyika, Proceedings the Legislative Council, (Hansard), 21st session, 10th December 1947. 
Council, acquire land in the Territo? subject to assurances, and the Governor's satisfaction 
that the land was to be acquired bona fide for purposes of residence or farming, and not for 
speculative purposes. 6 Circular Letter No. 27 of 1947 expounded on the terms of land 
development by officials, which would normally be limited to preparing for the relevant 
6 	Information in this paragraph is taken from Tanzania Archives File No. 12481142, Acquisition of Land by 
Government Officials, Details of the Executive Council's Approval. 
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official's retirement by such measures as the building of a house and farm buildings, the 
planting of trees and the establishment of a herd of cattle. Written permission from the Chief 
Secretary was required before the officer could engage in the production of crops or animal 
produce for sale prior to retirement. Staff Circular Letter No. 153 of July 1951 loosened 
matters somewhat when it allowed officials to apply for permission to acquire small holdings 
for residential purposes at any time during their service (not just before retirement) though the 
approval of the Governor in Council had to be sought. This encouraged many officials to 
apply to be allocated rural or urban land 7 . 
Despite the Indian members' objections, the Land Ordinance (Amendment) Bill of 1947 
was carried. Section 14 of the Principal Ordinance was varied thereby empowering the 
governor to allocate land to both natives and non natives at any rent he deemed reasonable. 
In most instances such rent was lower than what could be fetched in the market. 
In the case of Dar es Salaam, this Amendment, as well as the relaxation of conditions 
by which officials could acquire land, coincided with the availability for alloöation to would be 
developers, of plots in the Oysterbay and Msasani areas towards the end of 1947.   A 
Committee appointed to advise the Government on the disposal of residential plots in 
Oysterbay suggested that these plots should be allocated administratively rather than through 
auctions. Thus there is reason to believe that the amending the Land Ordinance in 1947 was 
geared towards making it possible for European Official to acquire land in those choice areas 
of Dar es Salaam (but also elsewhere), in the light of the changing circumstances under which 
they were economically disadvantaged. 
1 ,4 
It is of immense interest to note that as soon as Oysterbay was allocated, the land 
office issued a circular in April 1948 directing that in future, all Rights of Occupancy over 
building plots offered for disposal in Townships, Minor Settlements and Trading Centres must 
be advertised callingfor tenders in terms of premiums. The government fixed the annual rent 
to be charged, but the premium was to be determined through tendering. Only in "special 
For example, Mr. L. Sylvester White, chief Town Planning Officer, applied to the Chief Secretary in November 
1951 for consent to acquire land in Lushoto in order to establish a "pied-a-terre" to which he could eventually 
retire. Approval of the Governor was obtained the following month. See Tanzania National Archives File No. 
12481/42, Acquisition of Land by Government Officials, Details of the Executive Council's approval. 
cases", and where it was in the public interest to do so, would Rights of Occupancy be 
disposed of other than by the tender system. In June 1948 another circular was issued by 
the land office directing that even short term Right of Occupancy be disposed of through a 
locally advertised tendering system. 8 
The tendering system however appears to have been mainly confined to commercial 
and industrial plots. Residential plots in the planned schemes of the late, 1 940s and 1 950s 
continued to be allocated administratively. 
The Town DeveloDment (Control) Ordinance, 1936 
Although the Town Development (Control) Ordinance was mainly a preventive 
measure and not actually an instrument of development, its Part Ill concerned zoning plans 
and building areas, and allowed the preparation of planning schemes. It was brought into 
operation over a number of towns including Dar es Salaam after the War. 9 Various schemes 
were prepared for Dar es Salaam using this legislation. For example the proposals to vary and 
extend the boundaries of the Dar es Salaam Commercial Area (Zonell) in 1951, were 
approved by the Governor in Council under section 24, sub-section (4) of this Ordinancec) ° 
The Upanga Area Planning and Development Scheme was prepared and approved under the 
Ordinance. Planning Schemes for Parts of the Pugu and Kilwa Road Industrial area were 
prepared and gazetted under this Ordinance. 11 
All the same, being a product of the era when the government was averse to town 
planning, the 1936 Ordinance was very much inadequate, and did not give authorities 
sufficient powers to deal witIlssues like the acquisition of private land in order to effect 
exchanges and to adjust claims. Thus the passing of a special Ordinance for Upanga area, 
.(Upanga Area (Planning and Dev/opment) Ordinance, 1949). The Town Development 
8 	Tanzania National Archives File No. 205, Vol. Il, Land Alienation Policy. 
Tanzania National Archives File No. 23831, the Town Development (Control) Ordinance (Cap 103). 
10 	Government Notice No. 152 of 23/5/1 952, Town Development (Control) (Approval of the Dar es Salaam 
Commercial Zone Planning Scheme) Order of 1952.   
11 	General Notice 863, 13/4/1956. 
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(Control) Ordinance of 1936 was repealed and replaced by the Town and Country Planning 
Ordinance of 1956.   It is however proposed that most planning schemes for Dar es Salaam 
conceived in the 1950s   were influenced by ideas incorporated in the Town and Country 
Planning Ordinance of 1956 since it was already drafted in 1949 but was not made law till 
1956. The Town Development (Control) Ordinance continued to be used as an expedient by 
the proposers of planning schemes some of whom were the drafters of the Town and Country 
Planning Ordinance. 
The Town and Country Planning Ordinance, 1956 
The Town and Country Planning Ordinance, 1956, is currently the principal Town planning 
legislation in Tanzania. It is therefore considered pertinent to delve into it in more details. 
(a) Background 
It will be recalled that as early as the 1 930s, it had been realised that a comprehensive 
town planning legislation was necessary for the proper urban land development and 
management (Chapter Four). The Government however, was against such a comprehensive 
town planning approach which it regarded as an expensive undertaking and a luxury which 
the Territory could hardly afford. For partly the same reasons, the colonial government 
opposed the granting of municipal status to urban areas in the country. Dixon notes that up 
to 1947,   town planning in Tanganyika was rudimentary. The Township Rules, the Town 
Development (Control) Ordinance, as well as Land Laws, were all applied to provide little more 
than the orderly layout of plots within the separate zones which were maintained partly by 
administrative regulation of building types and conditions under which leases could be held. 
Increased rural urban migration, land tenure laws that restricted non-natives to Crown Land 
within the urban boundaries and bad siting added to the growing congestion in the African and 
Indian areas, and as a result, "periur?n growth developed, usually a collection of native huts 
lying just outside the boundaries without health or sanitary controls, only administered by 
nominally responsibl'e native authorities". All these led to the urgent need.for comprehensive 
town planning 12 . 
12 	
A.J. Dixon, The Evolution of Indirect Rule and the development of rural and urban local government in 
Tanganyika, 1940-1961 • B. Letters Thesis, University of Oxford, 1969. 
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In 1944,   the future of Dar es Salaam's development was discussed. At a third meeting 
of the Dar es Salaam Township Development subcommittee held on 1 9th June 1944,   it was 
agreed that comprehensive town planning was essential for Dar es Salaam, and that a town 
planning engineer be appointed as a matter of first priority. It was further agreed that a 
£12,000 native housing scheme be embarked upon without delay; that a source of water 
supply to Dar es Salaam be investigated; and that a Municipalities Ordinance be enacted at 
an early date. Finally, it was agreed that a Town Planning Ordinance was necessary to allow 
the preparation of a new town plan. 13 
In 1947,   a London firm of Engineers, Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners where engaged as 
advisors to the Town Planning Unit which was set up under the Director of Lands and Mines. 
Mr. Harry L. Ford of this firm was invited to Tanganyika to act as a Town Planning Advisor 
on various town planning schemes for Dares Salaam (and to advise on the planning of Kilwa 
and Mtwara). Among Ford's undertakings was the preparation of a Plan for Dar es Sa/aam 
(discussed later). He also circulated a Draft Town Planning Legislation which was later on 
modified and enacted as the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1956.   
(b) Maior Provisions of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance 1956,   as amended in 1961 
The Ordinance gives powers to the Minister responsible for Town Planning to declare 
an area to be a Planning Area (S.13). For each planning area there is an Area Planning 
Committee which in the case of a municipality or city like Dar es Salaam is a Municipal or City 
Council. The Minister is responsible for the preparation of the development scheme for a 
planning area but may delegate his powers to the Area Planning Committee. A scheme 
prepared by the Area Planning,ommittee must be approved by the Minister. Copies of 
schemes must be placed before the public for their comments and objections in writing, before 
approval by the Minister. 
Powers are giver,under section 26 and Schedule I for the preparation of planning schemes 
to provide, inter a/ia reservation of areas, zones and sites for various uses for residential, 
industrial, commercial, institutional and agricultural uses. Part IV of schedule I allows the 
13 	Tanzania National Archives 27/8, Townships and Minor Settlements Development Scheme. 
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regulating and controlling of the density of development in any area either by limiting the 
number of buildings of any type which may be constructed on, or in any area or plot, or by 
limiting the number and size of plots in any area. 
Two major types of schemes are provided for: a general planning scheme and a detailed 
planning scheme. Planning schemes may make provisions for all or some of the following: 
Roads, public services, use of land, building or structures regulation, and amenities. No 
development is allowed in a planning area without a planning consent given by the Area 
Planning Committee which is also responsible for the controlling of development in a planning 
area. 
Section 27 and the Third Schedule allow land in a chaotically developed area to be pooled 
together, replanned and redistributed among the owners. The President (S. 45) may acquire 
land in a planning area in order to have it developed according to a planning scheme. 
Compensation is payable. S.50 awards the compensation as being the value of such land on 
the date of declaration plus the value of any development carried out thereafter with planning 
consent, determined according to existing land compensation laws. Section 78 empowers the 
Minister to prepare regulations for the better carrying out of the provisions and purposes of 
the Ordinance. Under this section, Town and Country Planning Use Classes Regulations were 
made in 1960 specifying the various use groups to which land is to be developed in the form 
of buildings, including dwelling and other residential buildings, shops, offices, public buildings, 
warehouses, industrial buildings, etc. 
The Town and Country P/a/Thing Ordinance, provided new bases of differentiating between 
land uses, away from the crude zoning (building areas) of the Township Ru/es but had 
sufficient provisions to allow the continued differentiation of urban dwellers along racial or 
social-economic status lines (e.g. by varying the densities for different areas) as had the 
Township Rules. 
The 1956 Town and Country Planning Ordinance created a national Town and Country 
Planning Board to maintain control of all future urban development. The Board however, was 
abolished in 1961 as it proved unworkable and its duties were taken over by the Minister 
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responsible for Town Planning. The bad relations between the Chief Town Planning Officer, 
(L. Sylvester White) and the local authorities accelerated the abolition of the Board (see 
Chapter Seven). Town planning was up to 1947 put under the Public Works Department. 
Then it moved to the Oepartment of Lands and Mines, and in 1956 it was put under the 
Minister responsible for Local Government. Until 1956,   the Town and Country Planning Board 
lacked legal powers, but it influenced most planning schemes for most urban areas in 
Tanganyika, including minor settlements. Provisional planning schemes existed for 30 centres 
by 1955,   dividing their land use pattern into residential, commercial, and industrial zones, with 
sites for public buildings, open spaces and land for future development. These schemes 
accommodated the many thousands of new plots surveyed between 1949 and 1 95514 
(c) Some Criticisms of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance 1956 
Several criticisms can be levelled against the To wn and Country Planning Ordinance. These 
include the concentration of planning powers in the Minister; the slow speed provided for the 
preparation and approval of planning schemes; and the failure to address the issue of land 
ownership. 
Table 5.4 summ arises the procedure and time schedule envisaged by the 1956 Ordinance, 
with respect to planning schemes. From the schedule, it can be deduced that the Town and 
Country Planning Ordinance provides a snail slow process of preparing planning schemes. The 
most optimistic time for preparing a scheme is one and half years, but as shown in the 
schedule, most steps, particularly those involving the Minister, have no time limit so that the 
preparation and approval of planning schemes takes an indefinite period. 
The Ordinance provides a highly centralised and bureaucratic system of preparing and 
approving planning schemes. Most Qwers are vested in the Minister. This is a reflection of 
the centralised authority system operating during colonial rule. It is difficult to see why it 
should be the Minist'€r who must decide that a certain area should be declared a planning area, 
and not the local authority or the inhabitants of the area doing so in consultation with the 
Minister. The Minister has the final say on an area's planning scheme despite the opinion of 
14 	
Dixon, The Evolution of Indirect Rule and Local Government in Tanganyika. 
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Table 5.4:Time Schedule Envisaged by the Town and Country Planning Ordinance 1956, in respect of Planning Schemes 
Step/Action Time Span Remarks 
1. Preparatory period. Minister, in consultation with Local Unspecified It takes very long before a Minister 
Authority, declares area a plan'ning area can decide to declare an area a 
Planning Area 
2. Preparation of a general Planning Scheme for a Planning area Unspecified It takes very long. 
by the Minister or if be has delegated his powers to it, by the Misunderstandings and lack of 
Area Planning Committee communication between Minister 
& the Local Authority can occur 
3. Approval for publication of a General Planning Scheme by the Unspecified It takes long before the Minister 
Minister decides on the issue 
4. Publication of a General Planning Scheme and its deposit for Unspecified It takes long for Minister/Area 
public inspection Planning Committee to publish the 
scheme or makes it open for 
inspection 
5. Receiving objections 2 months 
6. Depositing copies of objections for further public scrutiny and 1 month 
representations 
7. Submission of the scheme plus objections to the Minister for 1 month 
his decision 
8. Minister approves general planning scheme with/without Unspecified It takes very long for the Minister 
modification to make up his mind 
9. Decision by Minister, or by the Area Planning Committee to Unspecified Can take very long 
prepare a detailed planning scheme for a planning area 
10. Informing land owners of intention to prepare detailed 6 months 
scheme. Land owners may prepare their own scheme 
11. Preparation of a detailed planning scheme for a planning area Unspecified It takes very long for detailed 
(by the Minister or by the Area Planning Committee) planning schemes to be prepared 
12. Approval for publication of a detailed planning scheme by Unspecified It takes long before the Minister 
Minister decides on the issue 
13. Publication of a detailed Planning scheme and its deposit for Unspecified It takes long before Minister/Area 
public inspection Planning Committee publishes the 
the scheme or avails it for public 
inspection 
14. Receiving objections 2 months 
15. Depositing copies of objections for further public scrutiny and 1 month 
representations 
16. Submission of scherte plus objections to the Minister for his 1 month 
consideration and decision 
17. Minister approves detailed planning scheme. Unspecified It takes very long. 
the Area Planning Committee, or, the various objections submitted. Such concentration of 
power is typical of the colonial era where the Governor ' s consent had to be sought even for 
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such trivial decisions as the cutting or planting of trees in townships. While.concentrating the 
powers, the Ordinance gives no sanctions against a Minister or other Authority who takes 
long to give a decision, or gives an inappropriate or an incompetent decision. It is significant 
that most steps involving the Minister have an indefinite time schedule in which the Minister 
must act. Moreover the whole process is bureaucratic and does not provide for decentralised 
operations. Plans must be published in the Gazette (which, for example, has a very restricted 
circulation and is not read by most urban residents); must be deposited somewhere for 
inspection; and objections must be made to somebody in writing. It all implies that the 
authority is fixed somewhere and the afflicted should go to it. The Ordinance does not 
provide for the authority itself to go out and consult the people and make decisions with 
them. 
The slow speed at which the bureaucratic set up responds to changes and needs of 
urban development is largely to blame for today's unplanned development and the continued 
failure of the local authorities to manage rapid urban development in a city like Dar es Salaam. 
The other criticism of the Town and Country Planning Ordinace is the failure to address 
and appreciate the issue of land ownership within, and about the boundaries of urban areas. 
Planning areas are usually declared over land which is occupied. Under the Land Ordinance, 
all land in Tanzania is public unless private ownership was proved by 1928.   We have argued 
above that theoretically even customary tenure is public land since rights of occupancy are 
deemed to have been granted. Yet most land in urban areas is occupied by people who need 
not fall squarely into customary land tenure. Referring to the whole colonial period Dixon" 
notes that the colonial adminisation failed to give sufficient attention to the land tenure 
problem so that valuable urban freeholds lay undeveloped for the whole of this period, while 
the more basic reforming of customy rights upon which the organic growth of towns with 
settled African populations was never tackled. While the Town and Country Planning 
Ordinance provides 'for the preparation of planning schemes, it hardly addresses itself to the 
question of land on which planning must be done. The question of land ownership between 




Drafters of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance 1956 were perhaps addressing a 
slow growing well endowed situation addressed by the United Kingdom's Town and Country 
Planning Act of 1932,   on which the 1956 Ordinance was based. They were not addressing 
a situation of rapid urban development and change, coupled with unstable administrative set 
ups and limited resources. 
On the other hand, the criticism levelled against the Town and Country Planning Ordinance 
in Tanzania, that it does not give room for consultation particularly with those occupiers of 
land which is to be planned or upgraded, needs to be moderated. Section 24 for example, 
allows the occupiers of land which has been declared a planning area to submit their own 
planning scheme to the Planning Authorities. 16 In practice, this opportunity is hardly afforded 
to those occupiers. In most instances too, planning schemes are not made public to invite 
objections (see Chapter Eight). Land pooling and redistribution provided for under section 27 
and the Third Schedule, has possibly not been used outside the Upanga Planning Scheme, 
which predated the 1956 Ordinance. In some respects, therefore, the "top down" and non-
consultative approach adopted by the officials responsible for town planning today does not 
have its basis in law, but rather in administrative practice. If the consultation provided for in 
the Town and Country Planning Ordinance was to be applied fully, and much as the Ordinance 
itself has its own shortcomings, a good number of the problems currently encountered in 
urban planning in Tanzania could be ameliorated. Given the widespread violation of 
consultation and public participation provisions of the Ordinance, it is likely that a number of 
planning schemes prepared by the Ministry of Lands for Urban Tanzania are illegal. The 
Ordinance is nevertheless weak in that it does not clearly give the public, powers of redress 
against planning authorities. Hdiever, it enhances the powers of public authorities over land 
uses, powers which have been used to advance the interests of those in authority. 
14 
16 	It is suspected however that this provision was put in to allow European and Asian freeholders within, and 
at the fringes of urban areas, to be able to propose their own planning schemes and thus avoid the 
complications of land acquisition and compensation. 
240 
Direct intervention by Government 
(a) The Ten Year Develoøment and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika 
During the period under review, the government was able to intervene directly and affect 
land use, using funds provided for under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, and the 
Ten Year We fare and Development Plan for Tanganyika. This intervention involved: the 
provision and improvement of infrastructure; land acquisition for various planning schemes; 
direct development of European, Asian and African housing, and of various public buildings; 
and cooperation with the private sector by the provision of plots for the construction of 
residential and industrial buildings, establishing housing finance institutions, and encouraging 
and advising private landowners to subdivide their land. Investment decisions of a national 
character (e.g. the construction of the Dar es Salaam- Tanga Road, under which scheme a 
bridge was constructed across the Msimbazi River at Jangwani in 1953. (which in turn opened 
up the Magomeni area for development), affected Dar es Salaam's land use structure. The 
construction of a new airport and its appurtenances at Ukonga (in 1 954) also affected the 
development of Dar es Salaam. The town's harbour which was until 1956 only a lighterage 
wharf was expanded in capacity by the construction of three deep water berths. 
The Ten Year Welfare and Development Plan for Tanganyika (1947-1956) (hereinafter 
referred to as the Development Plan), earmarked considerable expenditure on urban 
development. According to Dixon", urban areas took more than their fair share of capital 
investment during the duration of the Development P/an. Table 5.5 summarises the proposed 
expenditure during the 1 947-56 period and as revised in 1950 to take account of higher 
prices. 
A new Colonial Development atjji WelfareActmade available extra funds p.a from 1956.. 
As a result a new schedule for planned expenditure for the period 1 955-60 was prepared 
(Table 5.6). It willbe seen from both Tables 5.5 and 5.6 that urban areas were allocated 
substantial sums of money under the various categories of expenditure. 
17 	
ibid., p. 23. 
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Table 5.5: Earmarked Expenditure (f's) Ten Year Development and Welfare Plan for 
Tanganyika 
Category of Expenditure Original P/an (1 947-1 956) Revised (1 950) P/an 
Conservation and 
Development of Natural 
Resources 2,958,500 4,355,191 
Communications (including 
Railways) 6,944,800 8,783,000 
Social Services 5,250,500 2,934,000 
Township Development 1 1 129,500 3,573,000 
Public Buildings and Works 1,000,000 3,480,000 
African Urban Housing 300,000 1,230,000 
Miscellaneous 300,000 115,000 
Total 17,883,300 24,450,191 
Source: Tanganyika, Revised Development and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika 1950-
1956, Government Printer, Dares Salaam, 1951, p.  10. 
Between 1 950-1 955, £370,000 was spent on Township roads and surface drainage. Out of 
this, £140,000 was spent in Dar es Salaam. The new airport (opened in 1954) cost 
£880,000. Some £2,010,000 was spent an improving Dar es Salaam water supply. The 
supply of water doubled to 2,000,000 gallons per day, although this was still insufficient to 
meet the Municipality's demands. Thus it was decided to proceed with the plan to tap water 
from Ruvu, 45, miles from Dar es Sq aam, which would supply 3,500,000 gallons per day. 
The cost of this was expected to be £1,500,000. The sewage scheme for Dar es Salaam was 
approved in 1949.   Ily 1956 it was already constructed and operational. It covered the central 
area of the Municipality and cost some £450,000. Industrial site development was also seen 
as being important. £100,000 was earmarked to provide serviced areas fOr industrial sites. 
The money was to be recovered from premia. £40,000 was earmarked for the drainage of the 
Msimbazi Creek as an anti-malarial measure. Large areas were to be reclaimed in the 
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Msimbazi Valley, to be utilised as playfields. The area was also intended to provide a 
permanent parade ground for use on ceremonial occasions. Construction of the Dar es Salaam 
Group Hospital had cost £690,000 by 1955 and required another £234,000. A medical 
training centre and hostels were to be built in Dar es Salaam at a cost of £1 90,000, while a 
Table 5.6: Earmarked expenditure (f's), Ten Year Development 
and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika, 1956 - 60. 
Items of Expenditure Amount (f's) 
Development of Natural Resources 4,950,000 
Communications 7,470,000 
Urban Development 3,21 5,000 
Electricity 2,000,000 
Social Services: 
- 	 Medical 1,400,000 
- 	 Education 3,793,667 
- 	 Broadcasting and Films 100,000 
Public Buildings 1,950,000 
African Urban Housing 970,000 
Total 25,848,667 
Source: Tanganyika, Development Plan 1955-60: Capital 
Works Programme, Dar es Salaam, 1955.   
clinic at Magomeni was to cost £22,500. The Dar es Salaam Technical College was to be built 
at a cost of £280,000. £2,075,000 was earmarked for the Railways and Ports. Besides, the 
Government planned to spend £7m between 1 948-1 956 on Dar ds Salaam Harbour. Work 
was undertaken on 3 deep water berths, and was completed in 1955. Some £25,000 was 
spent on constructing the maternity wing at Dar es Salaam Hospital; £100,000 on Dar es 
Salaam Council Chamber Offices; £35,000 on the Government Press and £250,000 on 
n 
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relocating the King's African Riffles barracks from the harbour area to Lugalo. A small 
proportion of the £1,230,000 spent on the Dar es Salaam-Tanga road was expended in Dar 
es Salaam. 
As of 1955,   £3 000,000 had been spent on staff (European) housing since 1948.   
Another £1,000,000 was earmarked. The new expenditure (1 955-1 960) on Public Buildings 
(under which staff housing was) was £1,950,000, and most of it (about £1,600,000) was 
earmarked to be spent in Dar es Salaam. 
(b) Inequity in allocating the Development Plan Funds 
It should be pointed out at the outset that the funds of the Development Plan were 
inequitably allocated between the races, with Europeans getting the most, and Africans, the 
least. The example of the expenditure on housing and schools illustrated in Table 5.7 
illustrates this point. 
The unit cost for European housing for example, was between 1 0-30 times the unit cost 
for African Housing, and between 2-5 times that of Indian housing. The cost of the Indian 
Primary School at Upanga was three times that of the African Primary School at Mnazi 
Mmoja, while the cost of the European school exceeded by 5 times, the cost of the African 
Middle School. This was despite the fact that Africans were much more numerous than the 
other two races so that the investment per capita for Africans was extremely low. This kind 
of inequality was perpetrated to the very eve of Independence. 
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Table 5.7: Select Expenditure on various races in Dar Salaam, 1950s. 





1955 Ukonga 53 Quarters and 2 shops Africans 180 
1955 Ukonga 6 "0" Type Govt Houses 
Grade "A" Europeans 2150 
1955 Ukonga 5 "E" type Govt Houses 
Grade "A" Europeans 3440 
1956 Upanga Indian Primary School Indians 58,412 
1956 Mnazi Mmoja African Primary School Africans 18,506 
1956 lIala 200 Quarters Africans 177 
1956 Kinondoni 96 Quarters Africans 185 
1956 Kinondoni 3 "F" Type Govt houses Europeans 4800 
Grade "A" 
1957 Chang'ombe 4 Type VI Quarters, Indians 1150 
Housing"B" 
1958 Magomeni African Middle School Africans 7539 
1958 City Centre, 
Burton Street European School Europeans 37,755 
1959 Chang'ombe Asian Primary School Indians 1 24,417 
Source: Tanganyika, Annual Report of the Public Works Department, Government Printer, Dar 
es Salaam, relevant years. 
(c) Maior Housing Schemes Undertaken 
European Housing 
During the late I 940s, the housing situation for government European Officials was 
desperate. A total of £4,000,000 was spent an European housing (referred to as staff 
housing) during the period under review. The houses were mainly located in the Kurasini area 
and at Oysterbay in Dar es Salaam. 
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Asian Government Housing 
A total of 500 units of Asias Government housing, each costing £1,000 was projected. 
About 350 of these were to be in Dar es Salaam. Most were constructed in the Chang'ombe 
area. 
African Housing 
From the early 1 940s the Government accepted the provision of housing for Africans. This 
was conceived at four levels:- 
African Government Housing: This was meant for Government employees in outer 
stations and not in townships. 
ii. 	African Urban Housing: This was meant for all Africans and not just government 
employees. The colonial government did not appear to want to favour its African 
staff, since we have seen earlier how it refused to help them with access to housing 
or building plots (Chapter Four). Experimental buildings were carried out in order to 
produce a cheap, economic house in permanent materials. The types and kinds of 
rents charged for these buildings are discussed later, but such "quarters" as they 
became to be known, were constructed in the Ilala, Temeke and Magomeni areas of 
Dar es Salaam. As a result of the Dockworkers strike of 1947,   the Government was 
catapulted into conceiving a plan to put up, by April 1948,   1 000 temporary houses for 
Africans in order to relieve overcrowding, and force down house rents. These houses 
were expected to last 5-10 years and cost each, £45. The plan backfired miserably. 
Only 79 houses were e'Thr constructed at Ilala, but to such low standards that conflict 
soon arose between the central government which, in view of the accommodation 
shortage in Dar es Salaam, defended these houses but loathed to maintain them, and 
the Municipal Authorities who found the houses unfit for human habitation and 
considered them the responsibility of the central government. By the end of 1953,   the 
temporary housing scheme was in shambles, but even demolishing these ignominious 
structures became a cause of conflict between the Municipal Council and central 
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government. 18 
A total of £2,200,000 was spent on African Urban Housing during the duration of the 
Development P/an. Some £1,600,000 was possibly spent in Dares Salaam since it 
had been planned to provide African Housing in a ratio of 5 for Dar es Salaam to 2 for 
other urban areas. African urban houses cost around £21 6 on average, compared to 
£1,000 for Asian houses, and to between £1,500 - £3,000 for European houses. 
Besides, funds for African urban housing were to meet all the expenditure connected 
with such schemes including expenses of administration, construction, internal roads, 
site preparation, land acquisition, and installation of water supplies and other 
incidentals. 19 Therefore, the amount spent on actual African Housing was highly 
limited. 
Sites and Services Plots 
Although the concept of sites and services is usually related with the World Bank in 
the 1 970s, it has been shown in Chapters Three and Four that both German and British 
Colonial governments demarcated plots in the Kariakoo and Ilala areas of Dar es 
Salaam, where construction in any materials by Africans was allowed. These were the 
early sites and services schemes in Dar es Salaam. Such policy was continued in the 
1 950s in areas of Temeke, Magomeni and Kinondoni and across the Harbour at 
Kigamboni. In these areas, plots were demarcated and issued to Africans on short 
term tenure, for self construction. Nearly 8,000 plots were demarcated during the 
1 950s on both government land, and on land acquired from its owners. It was hoped 
that land would be full7serviced before allocation, but in most cases, plots were 
allocated with rudimentary or no services. 
The African Urban Housing Loan Fund 
The fourth I'veI at which African housing was conceived was for the better off 
18 	Tanzania National Archives File No. 36707, African Housing Scheme. Dar es Salaam Temporary Housing. 
19 	Tanganyika, Revised Development and We/fare P/an for Tanganyika, 1950-1956, Government Printer, Dar 
es Salaam, 1951. 
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Africans who wanted or were encouraged to construct permanent houses in urban 
areas to be provided with financial assistance, and longer security of tenure. For this 
reason, the African Urban Housing Loan Fund was set up in 1953 to meet this need. 
With a deposit of £75, applicants could borrow up to £500, to be repaid over 20 
years at a flat rate of Shs. 1 2/50 per £1 00 per month. 2° By 1954 only a few loans 
had been sanctioned but it was hoped that applications would pick up. By 1960,   the 
demand for loans had grown to exceed the available funds. The maximum amount 
borrowable was raised to £1 ,000 and the interest rate was to be raised to 6% (from 
4% in 1 953)21  Certain areas in Dar es Salaam (e.g. Block W in Magomeni) were set 
aside for allocation to beneficiaries of this loan fund. 
(d) African Urban Housing and Changes in Colonial Policy 
It may be wondered why during the 1 940s, colonial policy accepted the policy of African 
Urban Housing, which was before then just not on the agenda, and housing was not 
considered outside the labour lines provided for under the Master and Servants Ordinances. 
The acceptance of African Urban Housing was an offshoot of the acceptance of African labour 
as a permanent phenomenon in urban areas as compared to the earlier period when African 
labour was seen as casual and migratory and therefore entitled to just temporary shelter. 
The second reason leading to the acceptance of African urban housing was to cultivate 
the goodwill of the Africans towards the colonial government, particularly after the labour 
disturbances of the 1 940s, and"in the light of the impending decolonisation. There was a 
feeling among colonial officials that the Africans regarded the colonial government as 
uncaring, as far as their problems were concerned. A Memorandum on Housing in Dar e.s 
Sa/aam written for the Executive Council in the mid 1 940s argued that the Government should 
put up 30 modern hbuses for Africans in Zone III of Dar es Salaam: 
20 	Tanganyika, Development P/an 1955-60: Capital Works Programme, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 
1955. 
21  Colonial Office, Tanganyika Report for 1960, Her Majesty ,  s Stationery Office, London, 1961, p.  121. 
One of the difficulties at present in Zone Ill is that the African is convinced that 
the Government is not interested in his housing; this feeling makes for political 
unrest ... If the building of these 30 houses cost £1 2,000, it will be a cheap 
price to pay to preserve peace and good order in the African Community during 
the next five years. 22 
Commenting on the necessity of the temporary African Housing Scheme in October 1947,   the 
Provincial Commissioner, Eastern Province, impressed upon the Chief Secretary that: 
the scheme will have immense goodwill value and will convince many Africans 
that Government is making real effort to solve their present difficulties. 23 
It is notable as well that in the Ten Year Development and Welfare Plan, African housing was 
prominently categorised, while European housing was "hid" within Public Works and Buildings. 
The third reasons was to tackle overcrowding which was then rife in both Zones II and Ill. 
In Zone III it was made worse by the influx of Asians who took up the best properties that 
there were, and who could pay higher rent for any accommodation they desired. According 
to the Tanganyika Standard of 15th February, 1945, Africans could hardly pay 10-15/= a 
month as rent for a room, while Asians were willing to pay 201=. A letter of 5th February 
1945,   by the Honorary Secretary of the Tanganyika African Government Servants Association 
to the Chief Secretary complained of bad housing conditions for Africans pointing out that all 
good housing in the African quarter was being taken up by Asians, replacing Africans. He 
suggested the provision of temporary housing for Government employees; the expulsion of 
Asians from the native area; th,control of house rent in the native area and the provision to 
African employees, of "quarters". The Chief Secretary brushed these suggestions aside, but 
hoped that the then already sanctioned experimental programme for the construction of 
permanent houses for Africans w'uId ease the situation somewhat. The problem was 
formidable and groiing, especially as a result of Dar es Salaam's rapid increase in population 
22 	"Memorandum on Housing in Dar es Salaam", in, Tanzania National Archives File No. 32982, Shortage of 
Housing in Zones II and Ill. 
23 	Tanzania National Archives File No. 36707, African Housing Scheme, Dar es Salaam Temporary Housing. 
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which had grown from 41,000 people in 1939 to 55,000 in 1945 14  The Government could 
no longer ignore this issue. 
There were various discussions and deliberations concerning the issue of African urban 
housing. In October 1943,   a meeting took place between various high ranking officials in the 
Tanganyika Government including the Chief Secretary, and Mr. A.C. Jenkins, Director, Native 
Lands, Southern Rhodesia, who had studied native housing from Kenya southwards. Views 
were exchanged on the whole issue of native housing in Tanganyika. It was agreed that 
Native housing in urban areas was desirable and that the problem of resources would soon 
be solved by the provisions of the Co/on/al Development and We/fare Fund. It was agreed to 
insert £2000 for an experimental native housing scheme in Dar es Salaam in the 1944 
Territorial estimates. 25 
In 1943 the Labour Office proposed the control of natives moving to Dar es Salaam, but 
at the same time urged the Township Authority to expand the native town and extend to it, 
medical, educational and recreational facilities (including a better and more hygienic native 
beer hall!) and to institute a proper native housing scheme. 26 Among the views circulated 
concerning the native housing scheme were those of Municipal Secretary, Dares Salaam, E.H. 
Helps, who supported the idea of constructing "garden villages housing" for natives as was 
being advocated by one Mr. Hutton who had designed and constructed a garden village in the 
Makongeni Area of Nairobi. He suggested that Kariakoo should be relaid piecemeal into a 
garden village. 27 Unfortunately Mr. Helps' views were just p.a.'d. 28 by the District 
Commissioner but this goes to prove that the idea of native housing had caught on. 
24 	
Tanzania National Archives File No. 32982, Shortage of Housing in Zones II and Ill. 
25 	
Tanzaflia National Archives File No. 4/1 2 Native Housing Scheme, Oar es Salaam: Minutes of a meeting 
convened to discuss matters with Mr. Jenkins, and other matters related to Native Housing, Dar es Salaam. 
26 	
Tanzania National Archives File No. 23/8, Township and Minor Settlements Development Scheme. 
27 	ibi. . d. 
28 	
p.a. (put away) and n.f.a. (no further action) were common abbreviations used by officials who did not intend 
to deal with the issues presented to them. 
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Besides accepting to construct completed houses, the government accepted to provide 
demarcated, and, hopefully, serviced plots, where Airicans were to be encouraged to hecome 
house owners by constructing traditional or modern type houses. Unlike the previous era, 
better amenities, i.e. roads, water supplly, markets, schools, recreational grounds and so on 
were being stressed. It was also proposed to set up an African I-lousing Company to take up 
the functions of housing development from the central government. The Company was never 
formed, though. 29 
Thus, African Urban Housing was conceived under three major concepts: the economic, 
the political, and that of public health. These concepts affected the location of the earmarked 
African residential areas in Dar es Salaarn (refer to Figure 5.2). 
The economic concept aimed at providing planned areas for African housing in relation to 
labour supply to the economy of Dar es Salaam. Africans were conceived to have three areas 
of employment. 
o 	The Docks, for which a settlement was planned at Kigamboni; 
o 	The Industrial areas along Pugu Road, for which a settlement was planned at Temeke; 
and 
o 	The High Income Areas of Oysterhay for which a settlement was planned at Kinondoni. 
In the above three areas, plots were earmarked for allocation to employers, as well as to 
individual builders. 
WN 
The political concept aimed at getting the goodwill of the Africans towards the colonial 
government. This was centred on the Government providing complete. houses for Africans - 
the so called "quarters" - in llYa, Magomeni and Temeke, and on providing plots in 
Magomeni, Teme and Kinondoni for self construction in traditional materials without 
financial assistance; or in permanent materials, with the help of the African Urban Housing 
Loan Fund. 
29 	Tanganyika, Development Plan, 1955-60. 
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The public health concept centred upon the drive to reduce overcroWding in the native 
zones of Kariakoo and Ifala. The area earmarked to take surplus African population was 
Magomeni where over 3000 plots for self construction were provided. 
5.2.2 Institutional Set Up for Implementing Land Policy 
Much of the land policy during the 1 940s and 1 950s grew out of, and was closely knit 
with, the Ten Year Development and Welfare P/an which was handled by the Development 
Commissioner. A major implementing agency of the Development Plan was the Public Works 
Department, under the Member (Minister) for Development and Works. This Department was 
responsible for the construction or supervising the putting up of public building (including 
Government, and African housing); as well as of much of the infrastructure e.g. roads, 
bridges, water networks, and drains and sewers. Typically, the Department would construct 
or oversee the construction of such infrastructure and then hand over the completed works 
to the Municipal Council for management. 
The Member for Lands and Mines, and in particular, the Land Officer, was responsible for 
all issues related to land including acquisitions, grants, transfers, and the registration of titles; 
land surveying; and town planning. With the appointment of the Town Planning Advisor (who 
was later renamed Chief Town Planning Officer) in 1947,   all issues related to Town Planning 
originating from the Municipal Council, or from other Government Departments were referred 
to the Chief Town Planning Officer for advice and ruling. With the expansion of local 
government business, the Member for Local Government became very important in all issues 
related to Municipal developmht. Distantly related to urban land use was the Director of 
Medical and Sanitary Services whose role became merely advisory, and was getting confined 
to issues of direct medical consequpce like mosquito control. Here, he however overlapped 
with the Director of Public Works who was responsible for drainage, sanitation, and water 
supply services. Th'e role of the Medical Officer in Land development was becoming less and 
less significant compared to the 1 920s. There was also the member for Social Services who 
influenced policy towards Africans. At the same time the role of the Governor in issues 
related to Dar es Salaam's land use development was no longer as direct as it used to be in 
the 1 920s and 1 930s. Nevertheless, planning schemes and many other undertakings had to 
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be approved by the Governor in Council. 
At the local level, the Provincial Commissioner, and the District Commissioner were 
important overseers of land development (and other) issues in Dar es Salaam. In fact, in 
1950,   it was decided to create a District of Dar es Salaam whose boundaries coincided with 
those of the Municipality. 30 Prior to that, Dar es Salaam was part of either Kisarawe, or 
Uzaramo Districts. A series of strikes in 1950,   convinced the government that Dar es Salaam 
Municipality had to be brought closer to the District Administration "to bring the government 
closer to the people, therefore pre-emptying situations of strikes" . 
A major change in the administrative status of Dar es Salaarn, w.as.the town's attainment 
of Municipal status in January, 1949 under the Municipalities Ordinance (Cap 106) of 1946.   
The latter had been drafted in 1936,   and reviewed in 1944,   but for reasons discussed in 
Chapter Four, it was not then enacted into law till 1946.   The Municipalities Ordinance gave 
the Governor powers to declare any area tobe either a Municipality, or an urban district. It 
- --.- 	 -. 
provided powers for the appointment of Municipal Councils and for the regulation of their 
business. It provided for the financial viability of the councils, and.gav.ethem legislatiyenth. 
executive powers, including those related to town planning and land development. In its 
original form, the Municipalities Ordinance combined powers contained in the Township 
Ordinance (including the Township Rules) as wells powers for rating. The Ordinance was later 
scaled down as some of its powers were provided for in other later legislation, including the 
Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1 956, and the Local Government (Rating) Ordinance 
of 1952.   Though passed in 1946,   no municipalities were proclaimed till 1949.   The Acting 
Chief Secretary told the Legisla"tive Council in 1946,   that the Municipalities Ordinance was 
an enabling legislation and "the time has perhaps not yet quite arrived, when all that remains 
to be done is to order a large supply of mayoral chains of office". 32 Some preparations, 
particularly the Councils' financial aspects were yet to be done, thus the delay in declaring Dar 
30 	
General Notice 173 of 28/7/1 950. 
31 	
Tanzania National Archives File No. 39159, African Administration: Dar es Salaarn Municipality. 
32 	Tanganyika, Proceedings of the Legis/ativeCounci/,(Hansard) 20th Session (Hansard), 1945146, Parts III, IV 
and V, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, n.d., p.  173. 
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es Salaam the first Municipal Council in the Country. 
1n1950, the Dar es Salaarn Municipal Council formed several Committees, nearly all of 
which had some duties related to land uses although, in this respect, the Town Planning 
Committee, the Housing Committee and the Highways and Works Committee were the most 
important. O.cirilpfficials, the Municipal Engineer was a key persoo as far as land use, 
development was concerned. He proposed and implemented land use layouts, and land 
servicing schemes, subject to their approval by the Chief Town Planning Officer in the 
Department of Land and Mines. The_Municipal African Affairs Officer was consulted on most 
matters related to the access and development of land by Africans. 
It can be summed up that the land policy for Dar es Salaam was implemented at two 
levels: the central government level where most development plans (i.e. capital expenditure) 
were conceived and implemented; and the municipal level where day to day management was 
undertaken. Occasionally, though, the Municipal Council had their own capital works 
schemes as well. Land development policy, implementation schemes and finances emanated 
from the central government sometimes in consultation with, sometimes without consulting, 
the Municipality. Inevitably, there were several instances where the central government acted 
without informing the Council. In April, 1950,   for example, the government sold, or otherwise 
allocated shop plots at Oysterbay without the knowledge of the Municipality. 33 It was also 
usually a matter of contention as to who between the central government and the Council, 
was responsible for servicing government land, or maintaining the infrastructure there upon. 
Central government powers over land use and development in Dar es Salaam was 
1 overwhelming, but power overlaps, and conflict over policy were common between the 
Council and the central Government, a situation that persists todate. 
33 	
Municipal Council of Dar es Salaam, Minutes, 1950,   p.73. 
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5.2.4 Shaping Dar es Salaam's Land use Structure through Land Policy 
The Leadbeater Plan for Dar es Salaam: Mid to late 1 940s 
With the prospect of the end of the War in sight, and with development plans being 
mooted, it was obvious that Dar e Salaam's land use development would receive some 
considerable official financial support. The Township Authority was therefore anxious to have 
a town plan ready. Pashen's P/an, prepared in the 1 930s was, by mid 1944,   found to be 
conflicting with so many of the existing township establishments (e.g. the Open Space) that 
it required serious revision: A town planner was therefore urgently required. In May 1945,   
a Local Government Engineer employed under the Directorate of Works, Mr. H. Leadbeater, 
was engaged to deal with preliminary matters relating to Town Planning and Housing Schemes 
throughout the Country, and was asked by the Township Authority of Dar es Salaam to 
advise on: the general town plan for the township; a pilot native housing scheme; the 
provision of plots for all official, industrial and commercial requirements, and, the extension 
of the various zones and township boundaries. Lack of a town plan was seen as a hindrance 
to the release of plots for housing, commerce, industry, public uses, etc. There was also the 
question of overcrowding in a number of areas. Urgent attention needed to be directed to the 
questions of: 
o 	Upanga, a freehold area which had been in demand for years, and whose owners were 
restive; 
o 	Industrial sites required by important commercial houses; 
o 	School sites then being demanded by the Director of Education; 
o 	Extension of the African town to relieve overcrowding. 34 
In his advice, Leadbeater suggested five zones for Dar es Salaam, based on racial and 
functional considerations as follow' 
Zone I, residential, to include the Government Area, Upanga, Oysterbay, Kurasini, and a small 
part of Keko. This was meant for the use of Europeans and Asians; 
Zone II, commercial, being part of the city centre adjoining the Government area, and also 
parts Oysterbay, and parts of Gerezani. This too was meant mainly for European shopping; 
34 	
Tanzania National Archives File No. 13483, Town Planning 5cheme for Dar es Salaam, Vol II. 
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Zone Ill, Bazaar, being the Indian commercial/residential area in the town centre for Indian 
residence, and general shopping; 
Zone IV, African, i.e. Kariakoo and Ilala, extended outwards, as well as Kinondoni, 
Mwananyamala, and Regent Estate, meant for African residences; 
Zone V, Industrial, that is the Pugu Road - Temeke Area as extending Westwards, and the 
Port Area. 
In this plan the old concepts of seeing land uses in the terms of races was upheld. However, 
an important divergence from earlier practice, was the proposals for an Industrial area. 
It would appear that there were no efforts to implement this plan to any substantial 
degree. Though it was gazetted in November, 1946,   it was declared abandoned in early 1947.   
It is not clear why there was this quick turnabout but it possible that the antiplanning 
tendency in government, of the 1 930s and 1 940s, was still lingering in the minds of the 
officials. The other reason could be the fact that the Municipal Authority was not yet in place. 
A third reason could be personality clashes between officials. The plan, however had 
considerable influence on the decisions to site of a number of planning schemes in Dar es 
Salaam, including: the European residential areas in Kurasini and Oysterbay; the commercial 
neighbourhood centres in Oysterbay; the African zones in Kinondoni and Mwananyamala and 
the industrial area along Pugu Road, and the various changes to the zone .boundaries of the 
main commercial area. 
Important planning schemes for Dar es Salaam in the late 1 940s were conceived before 
Harry Ford's "Plan forDares Satham" discussed below. Thus the Leadbeater Plan can be said 
to have been the basis of most planning schemes in Dar es Salaam,in the 1 940s, and 1 950s. 
Its five zone scheme was adopted iW number of documents related to Dar es Salaam's land 
use development. 35 
35 	
i See for example, General Notice 863 of 13/4/1956 n relation to the Industrial Areas. 
256 
Harry L. Ford's P/an for Dar es Sa/aam, 1949.   
While the need for comprehensive town planning had been argued since the 1 930s, the 
1 940s made the issue more pressing. Urban areas were getting larger and more complicated 
and it was no longer possible to be satisfied with the zoning and building regulations under 
the Township Ordinance. Just as the Colonial territories were required to prepare 
Development Plans, so was it deemed necessary that even urban areas, particularly the larger 
ones like Dar es Salaam, should have their own plans. Some aspects of urban development 
would be included in the territorial development plans, but the question of town planning, 
particularly the aspects of land ordering, in part to accommodate the funds provided under the 
Development Plans, required to be addressed. In Tanganyika, this resulted into the 
appointment in 1.947, of a firm of Consulting Engineers, Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, of 
London, as Town Planning Advisors to the government of Tanganyika with the tasks of: 
preparing planning schemes for a number of urban areas in the country, including Dar es 
Salaam; setting up a Town Planning Division within the government departments; and 
preparing a Town Planning Ordinance. 36 The firm selected Mr. Harry L.Ford, ARIBA, MTPI, 
who had some experiences elsewhere in Africa, as the key person to undertake these tasks. 
Town planning was only one of the firm's assignments in Tanganyika. It was also deeply 
involved in two major civil engineering undertakings: the construction of the Tanga - Chalinze 
- Dar es Salaam road which opened up the Magomeni area in Dar es Salaam; and the 
construction of the new Dar es Salaam Airport which was opened in 1954.   Between 1945 
and 1949 various adhoc planning schemes were prepared for various townships throughout 
Tanganyika, in between the drafting of the Town Planning Ordinance, and the preparation of 
a comprehensive planning scheme for Dar es Salaam. 
In looking at the future of Dar es Salaam, Ford proposed three types of residential uses: 
low density which he assumed to b,? European housing; medium density which he equated 
to Asian housing, and high density which he assumed to be African housing. No theoretical 
or practical reasonswere given for such proposed access to land consumption based on race. 
He proposed a further four zones for functional uses i.e. commercial, inoffensive industry, 
special (a term he preferred to "offensive") industry, and open space. Special reservation 
36 	A.M. Armstrong, "Masterplans for Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: The Shaping of an African City . Habitat 
International, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1987, PP.  135-145. 
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Figure 5.1: A Plan for Dar es Salaam, 1949. 
Source: Armstrong, "Masterplans for Dar es Salaam" 
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areas were made in his P/an for Port works and the Railways. Some of the land was classified 
"undetermined" and was to be frozen or developed only for agriculture. Building without 
permission on such land was to be forbidden. Ford's planning area extended beyond the 
Municipal Boundaries, where development would require permission under the Town Planning 
legislation, but not necessarily the approval of the Municipal Council. This was aimed at 
controlling development outside municipal boundaries. 37 
Besides racial and land use segregation, Ford's plan for Dar es Sal aam 38 (Figure 5.1) 
proposed generous open spaces which he called "breeze lanes", arranged in a continuous form 
in the direction of the prevailing breezes. Some were to be put to playing fields, schools, etc. 
"Also of course,. they form the segregation between the various use groups". 39 
In planning residential zones, Ford complained that the biggest problem he was facing 
was the difficulty of making provisions for the needs of the different races. "In Tanganyika, 
no racial zoning is provided and unless it is introduced, it will be difficult to create satisfactory 
zones." 4° The layout for Oysterbay, for example, assumed the area to be for Europeans and 
Upanga for Asians. With Asians already in Oysterbay, Ford pointed out, services needed 
serious revision. 41 
The areas which Ford proposed for low density residential uses were: Oysterbay, the 
central Dar es Salaam area around the botanical gardens, Kurasini, and a part of Pugu Road. 
He further proposed that the elevated land at the Observation Hill (most of which later became 
the University of Dar es Salaam) be laid out as a high class residential area since it was "the 
finest and most elevated residential area close to town", and he opposed the proposed siting 
37 	Armstrong, "Masterplans for PAr es Salaam", suggests that Ford limited himself within the municipal 
boundaries. This was not the case and Armstrong was certainly aware of Ford's proposals for the 
Observation Hill, (most of which area is currently occupied by the University of Dar es Salaam), which was 
outside Jhe Municipal boundaries. 
38 	Tanganyika, A Plan for Dar es Sa/aani: Roport, Sir Aloxandor Gibb and Partners, London, 1949. 
39 	ibid, p. 30 
40 	ibid, p. 33 
4' 	ibid. 
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of the King's African Rifles cantonment near this area. 42 For medium density residential uses 
Ford proposed Upanga, Kinondoni, Chang'ombe and Kurasini. For high density residential uses 
he proposed Kariakoo, Ilala, Temeke, Magomeni, Kinondoni and Msasani. He also proposed 
the reduction of overcrowding in the old native area of Kariakoo, and the institution there of 
breeze lanes and more open spaces. For Industrial uses he proposed the Pugu Road, a small 
site at Gerezani for bulk oil, and a small area at Msasani where there was already a sisal 
decorticating factory. For commercial uses, he decried the uncontrolled development that had 
taken place since the War in the commercial area and proposed the decentralisation of retail 
trade to commercial areas earmarked for the planned neighbourhoods. While he favoured the 
"ruthless replanning of the commercial area", he was nevertheless aware that economy did 
not permit such a course of action. 43 
It will be realised that many of Ford's proposals drew heavily on the existing land uses and 
on the earlier Leadbeater P/an, and many of the town planning schemes had already been 
conceived. Ford was aware that his P/an fell short of "any grandiose town planning 
scheme". 44 The P/an itself, while adopted by the Municipal Council in 1950,   does not appear 
to have had a direct impact on the land use structure of Dar es Salaam. Most of what it 
proposed was already being implemented while hardly any of its novel proposals were 
implemented. Moreover, it does not appear that the P/an was ever given legal status e.g. by 
getting the approval of the Governor in Council, or by being gazetted. Nevertheless, Ford, 
(and his successor, L. Sylvester White) were regarded in high esteem in Government and were 
consulted on most town planning issues. Ford's contribution was mainly in "fine tuning" the 
existing or earmarked proposals, differing, agreeing, or criticizing here and there 45 and 
generally delaying action. For this, he invited upon himself, the wrath of the Press which, 




ibid, p. 82. 
44 	
ibid, p. 1. With this in mind, it does not seem proper to call Ford's P/an for Dar es Salaam, a "masterplan', 
as is generally upheld. 
45 	
See for example Tanzania National Archives File No. 13483, Town Planning Scheme for Dar es Salaam Vol 
II (late 1940s period). 
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in medium and low density areas, (which (houses) nevertheless were allowed by the 
government), in a situation of acute shortage of accommodation. Town planning in general 
was accused of leading to land shortage and to overcrowding. 46 
It is submitted that Ford's contribution to the land use structure of Dar es Salaam was 
mainly the ideological reification of racial and land use segregation concepts in land uses, 
despite that such concepts were fast losing currency. It is true, for example, that both the 
German and early British governments had planned African residential areas at high densities, 
but except for racial bigotry, and perhaps imported notions of Western European working class 
living, it is difficult to see why this should have been considered to be the appropriate 
standard for Africans. Given that for the most part, African areas were not considered worthy 
servicing, and given that Africans were poor, residential areas planned for them should have 
been at low density, and the European areas at high density. Yet it is the opposite that 
usually happened. European areas, expensive to service per capita as they were, got most 
infrastructure and the cheap to service African areas got the Least. Observation should have 
also indicated to Ford that Asians, for the most part, lived at high densities. The concept of 
planning medium density residential areas for them must be seen as an attempt to "gentrify" 
them as being second in line after the Europeans. Finally there cannot have been any town 
planning principle justifying different standards of land servicing for different races, or making 
it of necessity the securing of seafront and/or elevated sites for the recluse of Europeans. The 
low esteem in which Ford regarded Africans did not tally with the changing political situation 
in Tanganyika (and elsewhere in the colonised world). He was apparently unaware that 
Africans would be in control of their countries in ten years' time. 
(1 	Ford's Plan for Dar es Sa/aam reflected the planning ideas then in currency in the Western 
\World, i.e. the Garden City movement, and the burgeoning neighbourhood unit concept 47 . 
Because of this, lavish open space provision, and land use segregation, were resorted to. 
These were space consuming, leading to the uneconomic spreading of Dar es Salaam. The 
Plan, like earlier land use and development practice' was over-concerned with matters of 
46 	See Leader, Tanganyika Standard, 14/8/1947. 
47 	Armstrong, "Masterplans for Dar es Salaam', p.  136. 
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public health and physical aestethics. The planning for a separate industrial zone was 
discriminative against the small scale industrial establishments, while concern with racial 
segregation hardly addressed the question of the economic life of Dar es Salaam except 
perhaps with relation to the planning of "boy's villages" near European residential areas. 
Finally, the P/an hardly addressed itself to the question of implementation. It is submitted that 
while the major impact of this plan was in the realm of ideology rather than physical realities, 
this ideology led to the implementation of a land use structure in the favour of the few 
Europeans and Indians. It produced an inefficient and uneconomic urban form for Dar es 
Salaam. 
Land Use Schemes Earmarked for Africans 
(a) The Ilala directly constructed African Housing Scheme 
Ilala was the first government sponsored African housing scheme in Dar es Salaam 
conceived in the early 1 940s. Pressure was mounting on colonial governments from the 
Colonial Office requiring them to address the question of African Housing. In April 1942,   the 
attention of the East African governors was drawn by the Colonial Office to the details of 
some of the recent housing experiments in the South African Municipalities in view of the 
important developments in native housing then being projected or actually carried out in 
various African colonies 48 . Even African employees were pressing the government. In 
August 1944,   one Jeremiah Mukondya of Morogoro Township wrote to the District Officer 
Morogoro, urging the government to build or buy houses for its African servants since all good 
housing was occupied by Indians, and, bad housing "causes sickness. 49 Commenting on 
the above, the Dar es Salaam Township Authority agreed, and had recommended for 
consideration of the post war planning committee, that government schemes for housing its 
employees be initiated. "In most tritories to the South the municipalities have housing 
schemes for Africans, they added. 
48 	Tanzania National Archives File No. 24387, Improvement to Native Houses, Vol. II. 
49 	
Tanzania National Archives File No. 4/3 Housing Accommodation, African Government Employees. 
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In a meeting between various Tanganyika officials and Mr Jenkins referred to above, it 
was agreed to set aside £2000 for an experimental native housing scheme in Dar es Salaam 
in the 1944 territorial budget. The area decided upon for the location of this experimental 
native housing scheme was Ilala, where it had earlier (1943) been suggested that the 
government acquire the 153 acre shamba belonging to an Arab, Mohamed Abeid, opposite 
the Msimbazi Mission (Figure 4.5), and erect thereupon a "better class residential suburb for 
artisans and clerks". 50  It was proposed that in this scheme, lodgers be prohibited to prevent 
overcrowding, and that adequate light, water, roads, sewerage transport and other public 
services be considered. Some 261 houses, the majority 2 roomed, with an external pit latrine, 
and a kitchen, and constructed of cement sand blocks for walls and thatch for roofs were put 
up as part of the African Housing Scheme at Ilala between 1946 and 1 950.51 
The Ilala African housing scheme was the early product of the epoch of native housing 
in urban areas. It was perhaps influenced by Southern African practice. It was undertaken 
as a political gesture to seek the goodwill of the Africans. Thus, it was sited at llala, near the 
native houses, so as to highlight the difference between the government provided housing, 
and the dilapidated self-constructed native houses. In part, it was also aimed at relieving 
overcrowding in Zone III. It was aimed at being cheap, thus the use of thatch, but this did not 
tally with the drive for "permanence". As such, the thatched roofs were later on replaced 
with clay tiles. During the 1 950s, experimenting was going on on a new ideal African house. 
The Ilala design was therefore not adopted at Temeke or at Magomeni, but due to the location 
of the area, and the low rents, the llala quarters proved to be extremely popular. 
Nevertheless, the government soon realised that this "direct construction" strategy could 
not solve the problem of African housing. In later schemes, it remained only part of a wider 
strategy which included the demarcion of plots for self-construction. 
50 	Memorandum on the proposal for the extension of Zone Ill, prepared by M.J.B. Molohan and A.H. Pike on 
27/7/1 943. See Tanzania National Archives File No. 24387, Improvement to Native Houses, Vol. II. 
51 	Colonial Office, Tanganyika Report for 1948, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1949,   p. 177. 
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Figure 5.2 Dar es Salaam, 1957. 
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(b) The Kigamboni Minor Settlement Scheme 52 
As far back as the late 1 920s when the African Governments Servants Association was 
pressurizing the government to help its employees either to own urban houses, or to acquire 
plots near their places of work, the Provincial Commissioner Eastern Province, E.F. Brett, had 
suggested to the Chief Secretary that an African residential area be planned for at Kigamboni 
(also known as Magogoni) just across the harbour. The idea was not immediately taken up by 
the Government, partly because local medical research in mosquitoes and in malaria, was 
showing that the malaria carrying mosquito (anopheles funestus) could cross the harbour 
especially with good on shore winds, and affect the European residential area. Indeed a 
number of mosquitoes definitely bred at the Kigamboni area, had been caught in October 
1935, in Government House as well as in the (European) Residential area. 53 
The dictates of the post war era however overrode such anti-malaria fears, and by 1950,   
the government had acquired the large piece of land at Kigamboni, hitherto owned by the 
Berlin Mission, and put to little economic use (Figure 5.2). An Africa settlement scheme was 
designed, and applications for plots were being received and processed in 1950.   
The African settlement at Kigamboni was conceived with the labour supply to the docks 
in mind. The government idea was that stevedoring and other companies with operations in 
the harbour should be encouraged to take up land and to build for their African employees. 
Among the employers earmarked and encouraged to take up this land were: the Tanganyika 
Boating Company; the African Wharf age Company and the East African Lighterage Company. 
The Labour Commissioner wrote to these firms inviting them to a meeting with himself to 
discuss the whole issue of emiI'oyer provided housing at Kigamboni. The response of these 
companies was poor, so that in December 1950,   the Acting Member for Development and 
Works asked the Provincial CommisDner, Eastern Province, to allocate to individual Africans, 
200 out of the 500 plots reserved for Employer Companies, but to survey another 200, so 
that the reserve nunber of 500 plots be maintained should these companies require them. In 
52 	
Unless otherwise shown, information on this scheme is taken from Tanzania National Archives File No. 11/3, 
Land for Africans at Magogoni. 
53 	
Tanzania National Archives Files No. 23159, Malaria Research: Scheme for drainage of the Kivukoni Area; 
and No. 31630, Malaria in Dar es Salaam. 
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all, some 1,000 plots were demarcated at Kigamboni, and by January 1951, 500 had been 
allocated to individual Africans at an annual rent of 61= paid in advance. Kigamboni, being 
the first land provision scheme for Africans since Ilala was allocated in the early 1930s,   
attracted considerable demand, especially from employed Africans. Partly because of 
communication problems, the area developed slowly, so that in January, 1951, there were 
only 150 residents in Kigamboni. 
An interesting administrative problem that cropped up was whether Kigamboni should 
be brought within the boundaries of Dar es Salaam, since it was then, without them, and 
there was concern that the usual Township Rules to protect public health might not apply to 
the area. It was decided to gazette Kigamboni as a Minor Settlement. 54 The rules applicable 
to Minor settlements were considered adequate for the protection of Dar es Salaam's public 
health. The idea was to avoid making Dar es Salaam too large, for effective management, but 
at the same time, to avoid the siting of an African settlement near Dar es Salaam (particularly 
near the European Residential Area) which could be a public health menace to the 
Municipality. The compromise was a Minor settlement status which would allow the African 
labourers to put up housing at fairly low standards. It also allowed some minimum public 
health controls but at the same time did not oblige the government to provide infrastructure 
expected of a township. In this respect, it is noteworthy that instead of a piped water supply, 
the government floated a tender for the construction of wells and boreholes within Kigamboni. 
(C) The Temeke African Settlement Scheme 
Temeke was considered for an African residential urban settlement in tandem with 
policies of labour supply to Dar es Salaam's emerging industrial area along Pugu Road. At a 
meeting that took place at the Secretariat in March 1938 regarding sites for African Housing, 
the area of Temeke Village, betweethe Veterinary and the aerodrome (then at Kilwa Road) 
(Figure 5.2) was considered suitable since it had various advantages. it was almost wholly 
government land with only about 30 native dwellings on it. But more important, the 
inoffensive factories site was shortly to be developed nearby. "A settlement here would form 
a reservoir of labour for the factories", it was pointed out. A tentative layout for 525 houses 
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General Notice 272 of 15/12/1950. 
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and a further area where large employers of labour might erect accommodation for their 
employees was presented. It was also pointed Out that there was another 200 acres of 
government land available westwards, where 1000 houses could be accommodated with 
ease. The question was whether it should be for the government to build, and if so, at what 
standards, or whether the plots should be allocated to Africans to build for themselves. 55 
In the end the government decided to put up a number of 'quarters", and at the same time, 
make available a lot of land to Africans for self construction. 
i. Temeke directly constructed "Quarters" 
The construction of Temeke Quarters began in 1950.   By September, 1951 the first houses 
were ready, and by January 1953,   some 242 houses had been completed. The rent for these 
houses was determined at 521=, 35/= and 261= per month for a 3, 2 or 1 room house 
respectively. A Miss Gold, Woman Welfare Officer trained in the Octavia Hill methods of 
Housing Management, was employed and was available for help. She suggested that 
households could spend up to 20% of their income on housing, thus it was decided that 
nobody would be allocated a government quarter in Temeke, unless they were wage earners 
with a salary of at least 1501= per month. 56 Thus the quarters were only available to the 
cream of the Africans. 
Temeke quarters were originally quite unpopular. The rent was considered extortionate, 
the area lacked services, and was too far from the city centre, and was y"et to be served by 
public transport. Thus, of the 242 houses allocated by December 1952,   half remained 
unoccupied in 1953,   although everyone on the waiting list had been offered 
accommodation. 57 
The Temeke quarters were copstructed when experimenting was still going on an 
economic house for the African. The quarters built slightly later at Magomeni were cheaper, 
and the rents towel'. 
55 	Tanzania National Archives File No. 12859, Dar es Saiaam Township Layout. 




ii. Temeke Sites and Service Plots 
Together with the construction of the Temeke quarters, several hundreds of plots were 
demarcated and allocated in the area, beginning in 1950.   At least 1,500 plots were 
demarcated but the figure may have exceeded 3000 by 1960.   Within the Temeke settlement, 
it was found necessary to include trade plots, "to save occupants to go to Dar es Salaam.' 
These trade plots were allocated for 33 years, at an annual rent of 100/= plus a premium 
equivalent to 5 year rent paid on allocation, and a covenant to put up a building not less than 
10,0001= in value. 58 Unlike was the case with the Magomeni settlement which was meant 
to relieve overcrowding in Kariakoo, the Temeke settlement was earmarked to provide labour 
to the nearby industrial estate, thus the need to have trade plots in the area i.e. Temeke 
residents were not expected to be frequent visitors of the Dar es Salaam's centre. It was 
perhaps for this reason that connecting Temeke to the city centre was not considered a 
priority and the Dar es Salaam Town clerk, C.W. Baxter complained to the Director of Public 
Works in April 1952 that "the only access road to the expanding African District of Temeke 
was still untouched". 59 
(d) Magomeni African Settlement Scheme 
The selection of Magomeni (Figure 5.2) as an area suitable for an African Housing 
Scheme in the late 1 940s and early 1 950s, was forced as much by circumstances, as by the 
area's geographical location as the next in line for urbanisation after Kariakoo. Magomeni, 
however, was inaccessible, since there was no bridge over the Msimbazi River at Jangwani. 
Access to Magomeni was possible on foot except at the height of the rainy season, but motor 
vehicles could not cross the Msimbazi Creek. 
For this reason, while contemplating a site for the infamous temporary African Housing 
Scheme in 1947,   Magomeni was jyen second priority to the area beyond Ilala. The latter 
was seen as not only accessible, but also as a natural extension of the existing town. 
However, the privae Indian land owners in the Ilala area (like Abdul Shariff, Suleiman Daya 
and the Gullamhussein Brothers) could not reach an agreement with the government on the 
58 	Tanzania National Archives File No. 11/44 Land: Temeke Minor Settlement. 
59 	Tanzania National Archives File No. 18835, Dar es Salaam Roads. 
issue of compensation, arguing that since their land had hitherto not been zoned for African 
housing, which depressed land values considerably, they were free to put it to the highest 
valuable use, on which they therefore based their claim for compensation. Because of this, 
the government began to seriously think of the siting of the temporary African housing 
scheme in Magomeni. 6° 
The area earlier contemplated for this purpose was about 130 acres across the Msimbazi 
Creek, to the West of the northern portion of Kariakoo. Most of it was by March 1948,   
outside the township boundaries, but within the proposed new ones which were adopted in 
1949.   It was as yet unzoned. The area was elevated, 25 to 30 feet above the Creek, with 
mainly sandy soils. It was also well drained and cool due to the fact that the breeze came 
from the Ocean down the Creek, without interruption. It had natural springs of good quality 
water, sufficient for between 800 to 4000 families. This was besides the Msimbazi River 
whose water could also be used. Extensive anti-malarial drainage works had been undertaken 
in adjoining Creeks, and the incidence of malaria was not likely to be higher than elsewhere 
on the outskirts of the town. These facts induced the Provincial Commissioner Eastern 
Province to suggest that, as an alternative to the African Housing Scheme, the area was also 
suitable for a non-native residential area. 61 A major disadvantage of Magomeni was its 
inaccessibility to direct vehicular traffic from the municipal centre. It was also heavily 
cultivated by natives, the principal crop being coconuts. 
Magomeni was not in the end selected for a temporary African Housing Scheme, which 
in any case foundered, but for two major permanent African Housing Schemes: A scheme 
where the government constructed complete housing units (the so called 'quarters"), and a 
scheme where demarcated plots were provided on which Africans may themselves build, 
either in semi-permanent materials (a6 in the earlier cases of Kariakoo, Ilala and Temeke), or, 
in permanent materials in which case finance could be obtained from the African Urban 
Housing Loan Fundset up in 1953.   The problem of Magomeni's accessibility was solved 
when the Tanga-Dar es Salaam Road was constructed through Magomeni, and a bridge built 
60 	
Tanzania National Archives File No. 36707, African Housing Scheme, Dar es Salaam Temporary Housing. 
61 	
Note to the chief Secretary, from the Provincial Commissioner, Eastern Province, 23rd March 1948,   in, ibid. 
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over the Msimbazi River in 1953.   Some 740 acres in the Magomeni area was compulsorily 
acquired by government in 1951 for the African Housing Scheme 62 . 
Magomeni Quarters 
Experimenting had been going on since the mid 1 940s using various building designs and 
materials, in order to come up with a type of a house which would be 'economic' i.e. whose 
rent, (based on the cost of construction), could be paid by the African without subsidy from 
the government. Taking cue from the Temeke Quarters whose cost proved to be rather high, 
a type adopted for Magomeni was one of precast concrete piers; 3-inches thick  hollow blocks 
walls; concrete floors; and tiled roofs; constructed in blocks of four units. Lavatories were 
the pit type, with four compartments over each pit (one for each housing unit in the block). 
The kitchens were externally constructed as small outbuildings, each with two units. Services 
like water or electricity were not connected. The economic rent was worked out at monthly 
rates of 121=, 20/=, and 29/= for one, two or three room units respectively, a major 
improvement on the Temeke Quarters. By December, 1953,   450 houses had been completed. 
Magomeni Sites and Services Plots 
For the larger part of the Magomeni area, the government demarcated several thousands 
of plots which it allocated to Africans throughout the 1 950s, for construction in any materials. 
Applicants scored highly if they had large families, a high income, large savings, and if they 
intended to use cement/concrete for foundations and floors, or debe" (crushed tins) or iron 
sheets for roofs. For example, a person who elected to use thatch (presumably the poor) 
would score naught ("0") while the one who elected to use the expensive "debe" or iron 
sheets would score 20 points. "Ey the end of 1958, 3107 plots had been demarcated, and 
1 782 surveyed and allocated by the District Commissioner, as shown in Table 5.9. It will be 
observed that the point system used to allocate these plots was skewed in favour of the 
"cream of the poor", a policy that has been perpetrated todate. 
The duration of the Rights of Occupancy over most of the allocated land was one year. 
Plots were to be put to residential uses only. Subletting to non-natives'vvas prohibited and 
62 	
General Notice 689 of 28/4/1951. 
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Table 5.9: Magomeni Plots, November, 1958 
Blocks Plots Available Plots issued Blocks Plots available Plots allocated 
1 25 All A 56 44 
2 25 " B 75 52 
3 25 " C 72 62 
4 25 " D 115 
5 48 " E 41 41 
6 48 " F 76 52 
7 32 " G 137 104 
8 134 " H 64 22 
9 24 " I 189 
10 64 " J 127 76 
11 48 K NIL NIL 
12 25 " L 36 36 
13 23 " M 101 95 
14 91 N 110 
15 36 ' 0 95 95 
16 23 ' P 80 
17 8 0 84 
18 14 " R 122 
19 39 S 143 94 
20 153 ' T 111 3 
21 92 " U 120 
22 1 " V 134 
23 3 " W 111 
Total 1006 1006 2099 766 
= Unsurveyed 	='Hanna Nassif 	= Reserved for the African Housing Loan Fund 
Source: Tanzania National Archives File No. 11/38 Right of Occupancy to Africans. 
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the Right could be revoked if such subletting took place 63 . Over 100 plots in Block W were 
reserved for the beneficiaries of the African Urban Housing Loan Fund. These plots were 
larger, carried longterm Rights of Occupancy, and beneficiaries were expected to construct 
on them houses in modern materials. 
Like was the case with Temeke, land servicing remained a second priority to land 
demarcation and allocation, so that by the end of 1958 the government was contemplating 
putting a moratorium on the further development of Magomeni until services could be 
instituted to new areas before plots were allocated. 64 
(e) The Kinondoni African Settlement Scheme 
During the 1 930s, and with relation to the Oysterbay residential area, it was noted that 
domestic employees in Dar es Salaam did not like to live at their places of work. The 
suggestion by a Committee of Ladies set up to look into problems of Oysterbay, that a 
houseworkers' village be established near Oysterbay, was turned down, but with the 
expansion of the European residential areas, both by government and the private sector (like 
Kingsway Estates Ltd., and Regent Estates Ltd), there was a general consensus among 
colonial officials that there should be a high density (i.e. African) residential area near these 
mainly European areas. In his planning proposals for Dar es Salaam, Leadbeater had 
earmarked Kinondoni as an African residential area. In his plan for Dar es Salaam, Ford 
supported the concept of "houseboys" towns. In Ford's opinion, low density plots, the most 
common of which were 1 acre in extent, were difficult to provide with sewers or hedges, but 
at the same time smaller plots were inconvenient, if servants quarters were built in. Since he 
favoured smaller low density plots, he suggested the introduction of "boy's towns" at 
convenient distance from low density areas, but within easy walking range to them. With 
proper control, he argued, such "bo ,ys towns" could be made most attractive; and be free 
from any criticism which might be levelled against them from the health aspects. He therefore 
planned for an Oystrbay with smaller plots, but with African residential areas sited nearby 
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Tanzania National Archives File No. 11/38 Rights Occupancy to Africans. 
64 	
see note from Deputy Provincial Commissioner to the District Commissioner 18/10/1 958, in Tan7ania 
National Archives File No. 11/38 Right of Occupancy to Africans. 
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at Kinondoni, and at Msasani. 65 It would appear that Msasani high density scheme did not 
take off, although an unplanned settlement developed in the area. The KinOndoni scheme was 
realized when over 700 plots were demarcated in 1950,   on Government land, to the West of 
Bagamoyo Road (Figure 5.2). 
The Kinondoni scheme was similar to the schemes of Magomeni and Temeke in terms 
of planning standards, procedure of land allocation, development requirements and dearth of 
land servicing. Unlike Magomeni and Temeke, there were no 'quarters" constructed at 
Kinondoni. Instead, plots were issued for construction in whatever materials. But in view of 
its location near low density housing, Kinondoni's non-servicing caused a stir in colonial circles 
(Chapter Four). As a result, it was decided that in future, new high density residential areas 
should be provided with some basic standards to avoid public health danger particularly to 
residents of the low density areas. 66 
Land Use Schemes Earmarked for the Asian Community 
Besides the city centre, and the trade areas in the native parts of Dar es Salaam, the 
government earmarked two major schemes for Asian residential occupation i.e. Upanga and 
Chang'ombe (Figure 5,2). Upanga entailed a land pooling and redistribution scheme for private 
construction, while Chang'ombe was government land demarcated to provide plots for the 
construction of complete housing units by the public or private sectors. 
(a)The Upanga Area Planning Scheme 
The unsuccessful efforts by te Township Authorities to remove natives from Upanga, and 
to get a planning scheme for the area in the 1 930s have been described in Chapter Four. By 
the early 1 940s, there was little jorry about continued native occupation of Upanga. 
Instead, the Government was ready to see Upanga regularised and made ready for 
development on modern lines. There were several reasons why Upanga had to be regularised: 
First, was to reduce overcrowding in the city centre, and in this respect, some developers 
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Tanganyika, A P/an for Oar es Sa/aam. 
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Tanzania National Archives File No. 41949, Health and Sanitary Measures, Oar es Salaam Municipality. 
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were allowed to put up temporary acccommodation in the area. 67 Second was to give Asians 
a planned area in which to invest, considering that they had considerable resources at their 
disposal. The altenative was for the Indians to expand, on a large scale, into the native area, 
and into Oysterbay, both of which happenings were deprecated by the Government. 
Prior to its regularisation, Upanga consisted of approximately 100 different holdings, for 
a larger part, irregular in shape, most unsurveyed and undeveloped, and with no access roads, 
electricity water or other amenities. The land was held by both natives and non-natives, the 
latter slowly buying out the former. The area comprised of some 470 acres bounded by the 
Msimbazi Creek, portions of Bagamoyo Street, Sultan Street, Kisutu Street, Upanga Road and 
Ocean Road (see Figure 43)68• 
A preliminary planning scheme for Upanga was published in 1946.   This formed the basis 
of the large scale planning scheme of 1948.   Meanwhile, special legislation was drafted to 
enable the execution of the scheme. This became the Upanga Area (Planning and 
Development) Ordinance (Cap 283) of 1949.   The purpose of Cap 283 was to allow the 
appointment, by the Governor, of a Committee, whose duty would be to plan Upanga, i.e. to 
provide piped water, open spaces and roads, and to subdivide the land into plots for 
residential and business purposes, and for public uses (e.g. schools, places of worship, 
hospitals, etc). As this land was freehold in private ownership, the Cap 283 gave powers for 
the whole land to be pooled i.e. for each of the owners to lose rights to a particular piece of 
land, but to be reallocated another piece which would be 75% of the size of the original piece. 
The 25% of land contributed by all owners was to be used for the provision of roads, open 
spaces, and other public purpes. The authorities were given powers to form roads, and 
other public infrastructure, and charge either the whole or part of the costs against the 
owners of the land. In July 1949,   the Upanga Area (Planning and Development) Committee 
was appointed. The members were: the Land Officer (Chairman), the Town Planning Advisor, 
67 	
In July 1947,   Yusuf Jaffer Daya was given permission to erect 20 temporary (i.e. mud and pole, and makuti 
(thatch)) houses on his freehold Shamba off upanga Road to relieve congestion in the Commercial area. The 
tenants were to be recommended by the Township Authority, who would also determine the rent. See 
Tanzania National Archives File No. 13483, Town Planning Scheme for Dam es Salaam Volume II. 
68 	
Government Notice 808, 7th August, 1946.   
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and the Chief Surveyor. Others were Jafferali A. Meghji, and Municipal Councillors P. 
Everett, O.K. Patel, and J. Scott-Barrett. Later on, an African, Mr. S.M.O. Mtamila was 
added. 
The Upanga Planning Scheme, whose aim was to convert the 100 or so holdings into 
between 900 - 1 000 plots, was ready in July 1 95069  and was adopted in 1 951. No major 
objections were presented against it by the land owners except that places of worship, burial 
grounds, and other sacred places should not be tampered with. Surveying started in 1952 and 
in that year alone, 753 plots were demarcated. Another 370 were surveyed 10 years later in 
1962 as additions to the earlier plots. 70 
In order to ensure some finality in plot ownership in Upanga, the Land Registry 
Ordinance was amended. Prior to 1949,   land registration was optional. From 1 8th March 
1949,   an amendment allowed the Governor to order compulsory registration in any area he 
considered it necessary and within a timeframe specified. Failure to comply with the order 
could lead to the forfeiture of all rights in the land in question. Immediately, an order for 
compulsory registration was made in respect of a 2 square miles area in Dar es Salaam's City 
Centre and in respect of the Upanga Area. The closing date for application for first 
registration was 31st December, 1949. A study of the applicants for the registration of land 
in the Upanga Area gives some idea of the ownership of Upanga land, just before the adoption 
of the new planning scheme for the area. Results of study of the gazetted applications for first 
land registration related to plots in the Upanga Area between 1 946-1 950 are given in Table 
5.10. 
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General Notice 1119 of 7/7/1 950. 
70 	
Mwanasamba, The Success and Failure of the Upanga Area Planning and Development Scheme (Cap 283 
of 1949), Diploma Project, Ardhi Institute, Dar es Salaam, 1991, p.  16. This work, however, would appear 
to be highly unreliable and should be read with caution. 
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Table 5.1 0: Gazetted applications for First Registration under 
the Land Registry Ordinance, Upanga Area, 1946-1 950 
Applicants  
Indians Other non natives Natives Total Years 
(Europeans, Arabs, 
Goans)  
1946 8 2 - 10' 
1947 ii 2 1 14 
1948 11 6 1 18 
1949 95 10 3 108 
1950 30 16 4 50 
Total 155 36 9 200 
% 77.5 18 4.5 100 
Note the impact of the compulsory registration order of March, 1949 
Source: Tanganyika Gazette, relevant years. 
By far the majority of the appplicants (77.5%) were Indians. These had been acquiring land 
from the natives over the years. To some extent, this was the result of government policy 
which had since the mid 1930s   encouraged the market forces to remove natives from 
Upanga. During the World War II, as we have seen, Indians made bags of money. Upanga 
became 'their target. There was some conflicts within the colonial administrators whether it 
was opportune for Africans to sell their land to non-natives. In mid-i 950, the Provincial 
Commissioner Eastern Province, was opposed to the idea, arguing that land had been a source 
of income for Africas for years. In awote to the Member for Local Government in June 1950,   
the Provincial Commissioner protested: 
The displacement of these Africans for the value of comparatively small sums 
representing the difference between the price the coconut tree could fetch if 
sold to other Africans or to non-natives, does not appear to me to be altogether 
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justified or desirable. 71 
This was a complete turnabout from the stance taken by the Provincial Commissioner Eastern 
Province in the 1 930s, when he constantly urged the central government to remove natives 
from Upanga. As nevertheless, the views in the above protest were against the current, the 
Member for Local Government's reply was that the issue would be discussed at a Provincial 
Commissioners' Conference. Meanwhile the transfer of land from natives to non- natives was 
going on unabated. By mid 1951, Government policy, as stated by the Member for Land and 
Mines was that the government did not favour the exclusion of non Africans from African 
areas, since this would amount to racial reserves, contrary to the Trusteeship principles and 
African wishes. The point should be to ensure that the non-African did not swindle the 
African. 72 Section 11 of the Land (Law of Property and Conveyancing) Ordinance,( Cap 
114), of 1923,   prohibited the transfer of land from native to non native without the consent 
of the Governor. In 1950,   and in order to speed up such transfers especially in the case of 
Upanga, the Governor delegated his powers of consent to the Director for Lands and Mines, 
and to the Land Officer provided disposition was recommended by the District Officer 73 
It will be seen that the government was actually in favour of the transfer of Upanga land 
from the natives. The reference to avoiding racial stratification presented in the above 
paragraph should be compared to the conditions under which land was being allocated to 
natives at about the same time, within their native designated areas like Magomeni. Here, 
occupation of such land by non-natives (e.g. through subletting) was prohibited and was a 
serious breach of the conditions of the Right of Occupancy and could lead to its revocation. 
Using its powers of refusing consent, the Government ensured that natives were not 
cheated by crafty Indians. This had various effects. First, the Africans were given "offers 
they could not refuse". Some of the signatories of the Upanga petition in the mid-i 930s were 
offered between 4Shs. 30,000/= and 140,000/= for their land (see later on below). These 
71 	Tanzania National Archives File No. 255, Land, Transfer of property between Natives and non-natives. 
72 	ibid. 
73 	General Notice No. 914, 7.6.1950. 
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were fantastic sums at the time, which forced even those with scrupples about family tombs 
to sell their land. Only a handful of natives including Mohamed Tambaza, and possibly the 
family of Mfaume were still in Upanga in the mid 1 950s. 74 It is however indicative of the 
discriminative nature of the colonial land policy that even with such large sums of money, 
natives could only find their way to "their" areas in Kariakoo and Magomeni or further out, 
but not to the City Centre, or Oysterbay for example. Building covenants in the Oysterbay 
required that the building put up should be no less than £2000 (Shs 40,000) in value, which 
some of the sellers of Upanga could have fulfilled, if only they were allocated the land. 
Second, by ensuring that the natives got reasonable offers for their land, the colonial 
government made it appear as if it was standing for native rights, a measure which had some 
considerable political significance. Ulteriorly, however, the government favoured and eased 
the buying of natives out of Upanga. Thirdly, by insisting on a high pri.ce for native land 
bought by non natives, the government was applying the hitherto held principle of "non 
proletarialisation" of the native, who, though losing usufructary rights on his traditional land, 
should be paid high enough to be able to set themselves up elsewhere. There was little 
chance that the natives would remain in Upanga in the wake of the Indian onslaught, bUt the 
government should not be accused of turning a blind eye when its subjects were being ill 
treated. 
Because they already owned the area, implementation of the Upanga Planning and 
Development Scheme meant that it was mainly Indians who got back the land after its pooling 
and replanning. While the Upanga Scheme excluded Africans, it was nevertheless an example 
of a successful application of the principles of the land pooling and redistribution approach, 
and it borrowed immensely from the application of this approach in some Kenyan towns, 
particularly Mombasa. The Upangscheme was what can be termed basic, as opposed to 
a full, land pooling and redistribution scheme. It involved the demarcation of roads, and other 
public use land, butthe actual financing for the construction of some of these was organised 
separately. The cost of making good Upanga Road, for example, was established in 1955 to 
be around Shs. 291,220/=. The Municipal Council contributed Shs. 66,319/=, and the 
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A secondary school in the Upanga area is named after Tambaza, and there is a "Mfaume" Road. Tambaza's 
mosque, though greatly extended and modified still stands on United Nations Road in Upanga. 
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balance was apportioned over the premises fronting, joining or abutting this road. 75 Other 
services like electricity, and in some cases, sewers and drains were paid for outside the main 
scheme. Upanga also benefitted through the construction in the area, by government, as well 
as by the private sector (particularly the Ismailia Community), of several public buildings and 
institutions including a number of schools and a major national hospital (then, called Princess 
Margaret, now, Muhimbili Hospital)). 
It may be wondered why the government opted for a land pooling and redistribution 
scheme, as opposed to using compulsory purchase powers. Three reasons may be given. 
First, the government would only have found it necessary to acquire the land if it intended to 
bring some other people in the area. The colonial government wanted Upanga for Indians who 
were already the majority in the area. It did not earmark the area for other races, so there 
was little need of acquisition. Second, Upanga land was already high in value so that 
negotiations for acquisition would have been protracted, and compensation prohibitive. Third, 
some of the owners of Upanga were very powerful people socially and economically and 
included His Highness the Aga Khan, the families of Karimjee, Adamjee, Hirji, Mehta, Visram, 
de Souza and Gomes, and other important business names. Others included Abdullah Shariff, 
Sheikh Seleman Nassoro El-Lemki, once Liwali of Dar es Salaam, Hanna Nassif, Hassanali 
Abduihussein Patwa, Mohamed Suleiman Daya, Habib Jamal WaIji, Mohamed Suleman Versi, 
and Habib Punja. An important Greek businessman, one of the richest men in Tanganyika in 
1950,   George Nicholaus Arnautoglu, and a famous Doctor and Municipal Councillor, Dr. R.F. 
Noronha were among the owners. For the above reasons, the Government chose to 
cooperate with these people, rather than to resort to compulsory purchase powers. In the 
case of the poorer land owners,'The the Africans of Magomeni, compulsory purchase powers 
were readily resorted to. 
Therefore, Upanga developed as an Asian, and to a lesser extent, as a European area and 
it is still regarded sb even today. The addition of nearly 400 plots in the area, soon after 
independence, in 1962,   allowed the acquisition of land in Upanga, by several of the then 
prominent Africans in government service, service, business, and so on (See Chapter Six). 
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(b) The Chang'ombe Asian Housing Scheme 
While Upanga was a residential area earmarked to be developed by the private sector, 
for Indians and a few other non-natives, Chang'ombe (Figure 5.2) was designed as an area 
to be developed by both the public and the private sector. By 1950,   the Chang'ombe 
Planning Scheme had been completed and in 1950 and 1951 at least 121 Asian Houses had 
been earmarked for construction each costing £1000.78  At the same time, some 100 plots 
at Chang'ombe were allocated to the East African Railways and Harbours for construction for 
their Asian staff. 77 
The Government too intended to make land available for the poorer Asians to build for 
themselves, but was not sure of their response. In October 1950,   applications were invited 
from people who wanted plots in this medium density housing zoned area. Plots would be 
7000 sq.ft, allocated at an annual rent of 701= p.a; a premium equivalent to 5 years rent; and 
a minimum building covenant of 20,000/=. The area would be surveyed as soon as demand 
was ascertained. 78  The demand was overwhelming and a select Committee had to be set 
up to recommend plot allottees. The condition of plot allocation, however, had been so 
designed as to exclude most Africans. 79 
It is not certain why Chang'ombe was selected for an Asian residential scheme but the 
fact that Chang'ombe was government land, and that there would be employment in the 
nearby Industrial area may have been major consideration. The earmarked residents of 
Chang'ombe were Indians in the public service, or the poorer Indians in the private sector who 
could not buy their way into Upanga and who were not wanted in Oysterbay. On the other 
hand, to consider an Indian housng scheme for, say, Magomeni would have complicated land 
acquisition negotiations. (by pushing up the price for land, for example). 
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Land earmarked for European residential uses 
The major scheme earmarked for European residential use was the Oysterbay. There was 
a smaller scheme at Kurasini, put up in part, in connexion with the Groundnut Scheme of the 
1950s.   Within Oysterbay, and in parts of Kinondoni, the Government constructed several 
senior officers' bungalows although there were also junior houses and a hostel. 
While land policy continued to be conceptualized along racial lines' it proved no longer 
possible to segregate Europeans from the better off Asians except in government constructed 
housing. Thus it is necessary to bear in mind that schemes earmarked for European 
residences also attracted Asians. Some of the latter were better off economically when 
compared to Europeans. 
Private freehold land owners within the Oysterbay area e.g. at Kingsway, and at what 
was then known as the Victoria and Helvetia Dairies, were encouraged to subdivide their land 
into low density plots, so that some 250 plots were available and many were put to the 
market. These form part of the current Regent Estate (Figure 5.2). The rest of this section 
will concentrate on Oysterbay. 
The Oysterbay Planning Scheme 
From early days, Oysterbay was seen as an area suited to a European residential 
settlement. Except for a small part along Queen's Drive and Kingsway knOwn in 1952 as the 
"Millionaires' corner" 80 the whole of the Oysterbay extending into Msasani Peninsula was 
government land. 
The soil in Oysterbay is of coral formation with a thin soil layer and this has in the past 
attracted stone quarrying in the ar. Small scale stone quarrying is still taking place. The 
coral formation is excellent for building foundations although it makes gardening difficult. The 
long coastline provi'des a good breeze to moderate the effects of the high humidity in Dar es 
Salaam. The coral reef extends below the Ocean, but there are number of good spots for 
bathing facilities. For a long time, a good part of Oysterbay was used as a sisal estate. This 
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attracted African settlements near the estate. The Msasani village, for example, was deriving 
livelihood as much from fishing as from the sisal estate. 
The Qysterbay Planning Scheme appears to have been conceived around 1945,   in 
anticipation of the Colonial Development and Weffare Funds, as an area of extension of the 
European Government residential area. At the same time or a little later, it was decided that 
Oysterbay should be offered to the "general" public as well; "general" being limited to those 
people, or corporate bodies with the ability to put up expensive buildings. As its President, 
S.B. Malik, noted in November 1947,   the Dare Salaam Township Authority wanted OysterbaY 
to be a "first class residential suburb". 81 
By February 1947, Oysterbay was ready for development. Its planning was greatly 
influenced by the views of Harry L. Ford, Town Planning Advisor to the Government. 
Construction started in 1947 on a number of government houses meant for European 
Officials. Plots were, each, one acre in size. Each plot had, besides a huge bungalow with a 
large sitting room, but with only one, or two bedrooms, a garage and a servants' quarter. As 
Dar es Salaam was then experiencing a shortage of accommodation for officials, construction 
of temporary or semi permanent houses in Oysterbay was allowed. 82 
Ford planned for 730 plots at Oysterbay to accommodate 2695 Europeans, 1 540 Asians 
and 3760 Africans. The latter were to be house servants and the figure was based on the 
assumption that government quarters would have each, a boys' quarter with 2 rooms and that 
in each of the room would be a "boy" and his wife, i.e. there would be 4 Africans per 1 plot. 
He however was quick to point bbt that this high African figure should not be cause for alarm 
since the Township Authority would allow only one boys' quarter per plot, and he was 
advocating for the institution of African (boys') villages near low density area. An example 
was the proposed Msasani High Density area that he had planned to serve Oysterbay. The 
number of Africansw,as therefore likely to be much lower than the above figure. 83 it was 
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also assumed that there would be 4 Asians per 7 Europeans. Therefore, according to Ford's 
plan, plot owners in Oysterbay were supposed to be Europeans and Asians (though Ford 
thought this made town planning difficult since each race required different standards). 
Africans were to be in the area just as domestic servants. 
That Africans were completely unwanted in Oysterbay can be gauged from the colonial 
officials' attitudes, when in early 1948,   it was found necessary to establish a police post in 
the area. Harry Ford, the Town Planning Advisor, suggested that the African police lines 
should be West of Bagamoyo Road (i.e. in Kinondoni) where an African Housing Scheme had 
already been planned. The Commissioner for Police put it even more bluntly. In a note to the 
Member for Law and Order in May 1948,   he pointed out that the Oysterbay police post had 
been planned to be in the Oysterbay shopping centre but: 
As the shopping centre is in the middle of the European residential area, it is 
not possible to site the living quarters for African Police in the near vicinity of 
the Police Station. 
He, like Harry Ford, suggested a site in the new African area 84 . 
A meeting convoked in October 1947 to discuss Ford's layout scheme for Oysterbay, 
resolved that the Right of Occupancy over the Msasani Peninsula land (alienated for 99 years 
with effect from 1928 and used as a sisal estate) be revoked with the least possible delay so 
that sufficient land be made available to enable the comprehensive planning of the area. It was 
further agreed that half the number of plots in Oysterbay should be allocated administratively, 
rather than through public auctions, to avoid speculative buying, and that short term rights 
of occupancy could be givento a maximum of 5 years during which allottees could put up 
temporary structures. 
In November 1947,   the Goverment appointed an Qysterbay Committee to advise on how 
to dispose of Oyterbay plots, two hundred of which were nearly ready, and the final total 
was expected to be in excess of 600. Services were to be provided later. The Committee 
was composed of Mr. D.R. Macdonald, (Ag. Director, Lands and Mines) (Chairman); Mr. D.A. 
94 	Tanzania National Archives File No. 37124, Police Post at Oysterbay. 
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Barry, (President, Dares Salaam Township Authority); Mr. P.H. Hutchinson (Land Officer); and 
Mr. E.C. Lingham Lees, (Secretary). 85 There was no African member on this Committee.. 
The Committee suggested, inter alia, that Oysterbay plots should be allocated 
administratively and not through auctioning. After the Land Ordinace (Amendment) of 1947,   
it was possible for non-natives (for whom Oysterbay was earmarked) to be allocated land 
without going through public auctions. It suggested, morover, that rents should be between 
300/= and 500/= per acre per annum, plus a premium equivalent to 5 years' rent; that 
temporary buildings should be allowed; and that permanent buildings that would finally be put 
up, should be no less than £2000 in value. These recommendation were accepted by the 
Government, and that is how Oysterbay was allocated. Even if they had been considered for 
allocation, which they were not, Africans would have found such conditions, with the 
exception of permission to put temporary housing, difficult to abide with. 
Meanwhile the government called tenders in May 1949 for the construction of 50 
"European" type houses, each with a garage, and servants quarter. The average cost per 
house worked out at at £3062 per house, well above the minimum proposed by the Qysterbay 
Committee. In June, 1949,   tenders for a further 50 houses were called. 86 
What is remarkable about Oysterbay is that it was planned mainly on government land, 
to the deliberate exclusion of Africans as lessees, even when initial development conditions 
were made slightly less stringent e.g. since temporary buildings were allowed. The selection 
of plot allottees, as well as the high building and rent covenants effectively, excluded Africans. 
It is also likely that some non-Africans were finding the covenants difficult to meet, since the 
number of houses put up by corporate bodies, as opposed to individuals is remarkably high. 
Of the 81 applications for building approval in respect of Oysterbay submitted to the Municipal 
Council in 1950,   42 were from individuals (8 from one person only, Hanna Nassif), and 39 
from compan i es . 8 lf it should be recalled that a third of the plots were developed by the 
85 	Tanzania National Archives File No. 13483, Town Planning Scheme for Dar es Salaam, Volume II. 
86 	General Notice 917, 30/611 949. 
87 	Municipal Council of Dar es Salaam, Minutes, 1950. 
284 
Government, it will be seen that individual plot developers in the Oysterbay where perhaps 
in the minority. 
Oysterbay was allocated to both Europeans and Asians despite Chief Secretary D.M. 
Kennedy's desire to exclude the latter from the area in the late 1 930s. The assertion that 
Oysterbay was a purely European area is therefore not quite correct. The collusion between 
Europeans and Asians to divide up Oysterbay to the exclusion of Africans in an example of 
the constantly changing alliances forged between the colonial government and the population 
under them as explained theoretically in Chapter One. It did not appear strange to the 
Township Authority's President, Dr. S.B. Malik (an Asian) to state that Oysterbay must be a 
first class suburb, although when the Land Ordinance was being amended in 1947 to make 
it easy for Europeans to be allocated Oysterbay, the Asian members of the Legislative Council 
objected strongly arguing for the retention of the auctioning system. It then appeared that 
the Europeans and Africans were one against the Asians. But once the amendment was 
carried, and since Europeans did not want Africans in Oysterbay, the alliances soon changed 
and Europeans and Asians sat together on the Oysterbay Committee and allocated this area 
to themselves. Africans were not even thanked for their support for the Amendment of the 
Land Ordinance in 1947 in the Legislative Council; an amendment which favoured Europeans. 
The Industrial Area 
Although the building areas of Dar es Salaam in the mid- 1 930s did not specify any area 
for idustrial uses, the Dar es Salaam Township Authority set aside an area beyond Ilala as an 
offensive factories area (Figure 4.2) and tried to force small scale industries then being run 
by Indians in the Commercial a'ea, e.g. soap making, grain milling etc, to move this area but 
with dismal results. The industrial area was then meant to serve objectives of public health, 
and since it could be argued that many of the industries in the commercial area were not a 
danger to public health, (and moreover since the government failed to service the offensive 
factories sites) mauy remained in the commercial area. 
By the mid 1 940s though, a more sophiscated approach to the siting of industries was 
deemed necessary. In the first instance, the demand for industrial land, both from local 
(mainly Indian) entrepreneurs, and also from overseas (mainly British) firms was considerable. 
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Industrial land was required for manufacturing, commodity processing, and storage and 
warehousing. Capital accumulated by the Indians over the years, and particularly during the 
War, was seeking outlets, while the Development P/an meant the expansion of the territory's 
purchasing power, and therefore, a market for many products. Perhaps as a result of 
international competition, many firms within the developed world started to embark on import 
substitution industries in the colonies to protect their markets. In other cases, industries were 
required to process local products for sale to the developed countries. An industrial area with 
plots served with the necessary infrastructure was therefore deemed necessary, so sited as 
not to be a nuisance, or to cause public health hazards to high status residential areas, and 
to be able to reap the benefit of complementarily and locational economies. The colonial 
government was on its part supportive of industrialization for the employment opportunities 
to be provided, and for the revenue which would accrue to it (the government). 
Industrialization also meant a new phase in the development of capitalism, whereby the 
colonies would now be expected to purchase capital goods, and commodity inputs rather than 
finished consumer products. 
The German administration had earmarked the land along Pugu Road for industrial uses, 
mainly because of the railway line. The British government concurred with this and acquired 
for the government, much of the land along Pugu Road, formerly in the hands of German 
nationals (e.g. Busse's Shamba) However, the demarcating and allocating of this land in the 
mid 1 940s when it was required, proved evasive partly because of lack of a town plan, but 
also because of the dearth of resources to service it. As a result, private landowners led the 
way and started demarcating and selling or leasing industrial plots. Prominent among these 
was Sheikh Ali bin Said, an Ar freehold land owner, who, during 1947 and 1948,   sold or 
leased industrial plots to companies like the Lever Brothers, the United African Company, the 
Twentsche Overseas (T) CompanyTemeke Timber Works, Bombay Flour Mills, Mohamed 
Abdulla Bharmar, Colonial Construction Company, and Commercial Printing Works, as well as 
to several GreeksY These private subdivisions were later on incorporated in the main 
government industrial area scheme. 88 
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The Leadbeater P/an of 1945 earmarked the Pugu Road-Temeke Area as Zone V. 
Industrial. Ford modified on this by differentiating between the inoffensive industries, and the 
offensive (which he preferred to call 'tspecial") industries. The latter were to be much to the 
West of Pugu Road. Throughout 1948 and 1949,   and throughout the 1950s   plots were 
demarcated, serviced (with roads, water and railway sidings), and auctioned to those requiring 
them. Typical condition of alienating these plots were that the highest bidder in terms of 
premium was usually allocated the land. Tenure was usually between 33-99 years. Other 
condition included a 5 year rent premium to be paid in advance, a reserve premium to meet 
unexhausted developments, various fees, as well as minimum (though expensive) building 
covenants. From 1952,   a road frontage premium and a railway siding premium were payable 
as well. 
The land on which most of the early industrial area was sited, belonged to the 
government, although a number of natives were settled on it. Between November, 1947 and 
May 1953,   about 160 natives were removed from the Chang'ombe areas South of Pugu 
Road, to make way for the industrial sites. Some 69,0001= was paid as compensation. 89 
Slowly the Industrial Area developed taking advantages of both the railway and the Pugu 
Road, as well as the Port, and the government designated residential areas (Temeke and 
Chan'gombe) to support it. Spontaneous settlements also grew up in response to income 
earning opportunities. These included Keko Toroli, Vingunguti and Buguruni (Figure 5.2). 
The designating of a separate industrial area was a reflection of the then held ideas of 
largescale capital intensive industrialization, as the propeller of "developments'. It has however 
been argued that his was at t6A expense of small scale industries which were later on to 
provide most of the required employment. 90 
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Infrastructure Provision 
Sewerage and Drainage 
Proposals for the sewerage and drainage system for Dar es Salaam had been prepared 
in the 1 930s by a firm of Engineers, Howard Humphreys, but no action had been taken for 
want of funds. During the early 1950s some £525,000 was made available to the central 
government for the institution of a sewage disposal and surface drainage system in Dar es 
Salaam. The scheme was restricted to the commercial, and to the old European residential 
areas around the Botanical gardens. These areas were considered to be "the more important 
areas of the Municipality". It was moreover stated that any further extension should be the 
responsibility of the Municipality. 91 Towards the end of the 1 950s both the Upanga area and 
the Industrial area had been provided with sewerage and drainage facilities. The rest of the 
Municipality, that is the part occupied by Africans, remained unserviced in this respect and 
this adversely affected the high density areas to a much higher degree than it did the low 
density areas where large plots allowed the convenient institution of septic tanks. 
Electricity Supply 
Public supply of electricity in Dar es Salaam was first set up by the Germans, serving the 
Railway Workshop and part of the town. In 1920,   a Government Electricity 'Department was 
formed under the General Manager, Railways to take over and operate the public supplies left 
by the Germans. It operated very arduously, hampered by lack of capital. In 1931, two 
private companies were formed to supply public electricity to Tanganyika. One was the Dar 
es Salaam and District Electric Supply Company Limited (DARESCO), •which was given 
monopoly to supply electricity to the towns of Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Tãbora, and Kigoma 
and to an area of a 60-miles radius of the Post Office in each town. Preferential rights were 
given to this Company for the remainder of the territory except in an area of 60 miles radius 
centred upon the Grand Pangani FalIwhere the monopoly for the power supply was given 
to the second company, known as the Tanganyika Electric Supply Company Limited, 
(TANESCO) 92 . 
91 	Tanganyika, Development Plan 1955-60, p. 19. 
92 	J.P. Moffett, Tanganyika: A Review of its Resources and their Development, Government Printer, Oar es 
Salaam, 1955,   p. 706. 
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In its early days, DARESCO operated a power plant at Kurasini, in Dar es Salaam, and 
had by 1954,   7997 customers in the Municipality. 93 In 1953,   a review of the workings of 
the two companies was carried out by a consultant who urged the further development of 
hydroelectric power as well as the amalgamation of the two companies 94 . In the revised Ten 
Year Deve/opmennt Plan, £2,000,000 was set aside to help in the bulk supply of power from 
Pangani Falls, and in the amalgamation for the two Companies. 95 On 1st March 1957, 
TANESCO and DARESCO were merged to form a new TANESCO which was until 1992,   the 
monopolist supplier of power in the country. 
Public electricity supply to Dar es Salaam was not equitably supplied'to the residents of 
Dar es Salaam and this was admitted by Governor Jackson in 1 9446  We have also seen 
inChapter Four, how inhabitants of Ilala unsuccessfully demanded Street lighting in the 
1930s.   It will be noted as well that it was illegal to connect electricity to most types of 
buildings put up by natives. 
Street lighting was non existent in native areas, and the police complained regularly that 
the absence of street lighting in these areas was causing increasing crime. In response, a 
meeting took place in January 1946 between the Municipal Secretary, the District 
Commissioner, the Director of Public Works and the Manager, DARESCO, and it was agreed 
to institute street lighting in parts of the African areas i.e. part of Bagamoyo Street (Kisutu) 
and Mkunguni, Msimbazi, Swahili and Livingstone streets in Kariakoo. llala too got street 
lighting at the same time. 97 Street lighting in native areas was thus a result of concern with 
public security in existing areas. Many existing and new planned residnential schemes for 
Africans in the 1 950s howevelf not connected to electricity. In 1954 a Consultant's 
report noted that: 
93 	Colonial Office, Tanganyika Report for 1954, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1955,   p. 49. 
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In Dar es Salaam the capital town of the territory, the main illumination of the 
town centre is provided from shop window lights, and in most African 
residential areas there is no street lighting at all 98 . 
(C) Water Supply 
11' 	As described above, the Mtoni water supply scheme was found inadequate, and during 
the Development P/an it was decided to tap water from the Ruvu river, 45 miles from Dar es 
Salaam. The Ruvu water scheme was approved in 1954,   and was completed in August, 
1959,   costing some £2,000,000. As in the earlier period, most of the public water was 
consumed by the non native community both absolutely, and per capita. 
While it was realised in colonial circles that water supply was an important service in 
urban areas, supply to African areas was conceived in terms of communal water kiosks. The 
government quarters constructed in the late 1 940s and 1 950s were not designed to have 
individual piped water connexions. But, as is discussed below, even when it came to public 
water kiosks, water supply to African areas remained highly restricted. 
(d) Roads 
As a general observation, a number of Dar es Salaam central area roads were greatly 
improved in the 1 950s, in line with the new drainage and sewerage networks. The 
Development Plan set aside £1 50,000 for Dar es Salaam Roads and Surface Drainage. In 
1952,   Dar es Salaam had 116 miles of roads of which the Municipal Authorities were 
responsible. Out of these, 53 miles were bituminised. 99 The central government generally 
accepted the initial bonstructin of roads in Dar es Salaam's developing areas, but 
maintenance lay with the Council. As was the case with other services, provision of roads to 
new developing areas earmarked for Africans remained minimal. As Moffet 10° noted of the 
early 1950s:. 
of recent yes, the town has expanded so rapidly that it has been difficult to 
maintain and construct roads to meet development. 
98 	Egerton. Report on Electricity Supplies, p. 9. 
99 	Moffet, Tanganyika: A Review of its resources, p. 127. 
100 	ibid., p.  140. 
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Besides, the relationship between the Council and the Public Works Department (which 
constructed the roads) was anything but cordial. The Public Works Department, in a drive to 
keep costs down, usually aimed at standards which the Council considered to be low. An 
example was the Kinondoni Estate Access Road which, in June 1954,   the Council estimated 
to cost £7900, a sum considered too high by the government which, instead offered, £6400. 
The Council refused to undertake the work, and warned the Public Works Department that it 
(the Council) will not accept to maintain the road, if it was constructed to standards lower 
than those required by the Council. By August 1954,   the road had not yet been constructed 
and the Police were complaining that lack of access road to the Kinondoni Native village had 
led to the cancellation of police patrols, and in that year alone there had been 30 break-ins and 
2 murders. The. Council insisted that the standard of the road must be high as to 
accommodate public buses. On the other hand the government made it known that it would 
not construct an access road suitable for heavy buses and in fact reduced the standard of the 
road further to a cost of £4300, "although this is hardly likely to please the Municipality. 101 
The Municipality was accused of demanding standards which were too high, and of being 
unreasonable. Thus the Dar es Salaam road programme was not only inadequate, but it was 
also engrossed in controversy between the Government and the Council, reminiscent of the 
1 930s when the then Township Authority was suggesting action while the government was 
insisting on non action. The result was poor, and low grade servicing for Dar es Salaam. 
(e) General observations on the servicing of African Areas in Dar es Salaam during the 1940s   
and 1950s 
As we have pointed out above, the express acceptance and adoption of a broad policy 
referred to as African Housing, was a novel policy forced on the government by realities of 
the time and the projected future p,pjicies in relation to the colonies. Since the question of 
"economics" and resources was important, the colonial government elected to do only what 
it considered to be important for it to be seen to be doing something about African housing. 
Construction of "economic" complete houses for renting to Africans, and demarcating of plot 
101 	Tanzania National Archives File No. 18835, Dar es Saiaam Roads. 
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for Africans to build for themselves were seen as being basic. The provision of services could 
wait. 
This policy of allocating land without services prompted complaints from the Medical 
Officer of Health in 1951. In a note to the Member for Social Services, he pointed out that 
the high density areas demarcated in the Oar es Salaam's town Plan were conspicuous by a 
complete lack of any controlled development. He cited the Kinondoni African area which was 
some 300-400 yards from the low density (i.e. European) residential zone where housing and 
amenities had been provided consistent with a satisfactory state of environmental hygiene and 
sanitation. In the African Village however, demarcated plots only had what he called 
"doubtful earth roads". Nothing whatsoever was done to drain the area, or to provide 
roadside drainage or to control building standards or to prevent overcrowding, or to have 
provided, an adequate system of sewerage and refuse disposal. He further pointed to the 
shallow, water-filled pit latrines, and complained of the health dangers that such as situation 
posed to urban life. 102 Commenting on these, the Member for Lands and Mines agreed that 
the problem of African areas non servicing was not new, but no one had worried in the past, 
owing to the remoteness of such areas from low density housing. 
The Medical Officer of Health's views were echoed by the Chief Town Planning Officer, 
L. Sylvester White, who in a Memorandum to the Member for SocialServices written in 
December 1951,   produced a hypothesis which identified the African as being solely to blame 
for the low quality of environment (i.e. low quality housing, unserviced land, etc) in which he 
found himself in Dar es Salaam. In his opinion, the African could not afford to build anything 
more elaborate then an ordinar, mud and wattle shack, and could only afford the most 
elementary means of sanitation. This was a result of the African's low productivity which put 
him at a low economic level; his low earning capacity which limited his expenditure on 
housing; his low taxation capacity vich made him unable to pay for the public services like 
drainage, street sweeping, refuse removal, police, education, and public health; insufficient 
industrial potential for development works in hand, partly again due to the African's low 
productivity; unrestricted immigration of Africans, most of whom unproductive, to the towns 
thus increasing demand for houses; and the unfortunate apathy and lack of skills of the 
102 	
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African who was satisfied with too low a standard. The vicious combination of cause and 
effect was shown by White diagrammatically (Figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.3: L. Sylvester White's viscious combination of cause and effect as far as the African 
urban environment in the 1950s   was concerned. 
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This was a gross distortion of facts. White did not mention that most European houses, 
which the beneficiaries enjoyed cost free, were usually constructed and serviced with public 
funds. He also did not mention tjt it was, usually in the case of African areas that 
economics (i.e. undue emphasis on costs) was brought in. As was noted in January 1 939: 
Surely the native town deserves something when officials who pay no rates 
have their hedges cut and their drives gravelled for nothing 103 
103 	Minute written on 31/1/1959 in respect of Native Welfare in Townships. See Tanzania National Archives File 
No. 26602 Dar es Salaam Township, Native Welfare Fund. 
The hostile attitude of colonial officials against Africans in urban areas; the inferior, badly 
located, unserviced land which was usually allocated to Africans (As White himself noted in 
his Memorandum cited above: "Africans have until recently been turned loose on more or less 
virgin land which is neatly marked out in plots but where public services exist only as marks 
on a plan."); the precarious status of tenure of land allocated to Africans; the lack of any 
financial provisions to help in housing construction; the artificially depressed wages; etc. 
were all potential causes of Africans investing minimally in buildings and the environment. 
As a result of the Medical Officer of Health's complaints, a meeting of officials took place 
in January 1952.   and was attended by the Members for Development and Works, and Lands 
and Mines; the Director of Medical Services; the Chief Town Planning Officer, the Municipal 
African Affairs Officer and the Provincial Commissioner. It was agreed that some minimum 
(basic) services were required in areas zoned for high density (i.e. African) housing, but it was 
insisted upon that the provision of such services should not add to the costs and therefore, 
land rent. It was proposed that any new area should have the following done before land 
allocation: drainage of any swamp or depression; provision of minimum water kiosks and 
stand pipes and provision of skeletal roads, but not too many of these as paths could be 
sufficient. Municipal bylaws could be used to regulate the standard of pit latrines. As will be 
noted, these suggestions were not radical as far as land servicing for Africans was concerned. 
All the same, it would appear that little was done, so that in October 1958 it was found 
necessary to call another meeting to discuss land servicing in African areas 
This meeting was attended by the Provincial Commissioner, the Town Clerk and the 
Member for Local Government. 104 It was noted that both the Government and the Municipal 
Council had been aware for sometime then, of the almost complete lack of such services as 
rOads, drainage and street lighting irthe high density (i.e. African) residential areas of Dar es 
Salaam, which arose because of the urgent need for additional housing units to accommodate 
the rapidly increasing population. Indeed, there were some new housing areas which were 
inaccessible to Municipal cesspit emptying and garbage vehicles. This caused serious public 
health concern. The government, in view of this situation, agreed to give £20,000 p.a. for the 
104 	
Tanzania National Archives File No. 11/38 Right of Occupancy to Africans. 
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following three years (1 958-6 1) to be matched by an equal sum from the Municipal Council, 
but it was realised that the total sum of £120,000 would only "touch the fringes of the work 
required". It was agreed to freeze development before servicing in the area of Magomeni but 
to allow this to continue, without services in Kinondoni, Temeke and Kigamboni, partly to 
avoid political complications since land development had proved popular with Africans. It was 
agreed that the cost of installing services in Magomeni would perhaps not be prohibitive since 
standards aimed at need not be high, and that a premium of 50/= per plot be levied to meet 
these costs, the balance being provided by the government and the Municipal Council. 
It does not appear that these proposals were implemented. 	Until the eve of 
Independence, African areas were poorly serviced, it being generally accepted that the 
standard of the level of services in these areas could be kept very low. The ideology behind 
this was that Africans were not used to a high standard of land servicing and could do 
without most facilities, and in any case they could hardly afford to pay the boncomitant costs. 
It seems pertinent to wonder why, in the light of the purpoted lack of resources, and the 
poverty of Africans, no efforts were expended to mobilise th Africans' own resources, to 
service their areas. Three reasons are submitted. First, mobilising Africans for self-help would 
have meant their wholesale acceptance in urban life, and the colonial government was not 
quite ready to take that stance. Second, mobilising Africans for self help would have 
compromised the colonial government's powers of land development control including the 
rationale of giving Africans only short-term titles. Third, the colonial officials' own experience 
was for the government to provide the services, and they held their paternalistic view of 
civilising the African. Mobilising the Africans for self help in urban areas would have implied 
that the colonial government had failed in its civilising mission. Such attitudes are still upheld 
todate. It is submitted that the status of land servicing could have been higher had the 
colonial government worked with the people. 
CooDeratinp with the Private Sector 
The major scheme whereby the colonial government cooperated with the private sector 
to shape Dar es Salaam's land use structure was that of Upanga described above. Smaller 
schemes involved the encouraging of private land owners to subdivide the land with the 
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advice of the Town Planning section. In this respect, the Government envisaged that such 
land owners would contribute to low density plots, and it was considered in 1950 that at least 
250 plots could be expected from private subdivisions. 105 Typically landowners would 
submit a subdivision plan -to the Council for approval, and then go ahead and market the plots. 
Among the subdivision submitted to the Municipal Council in 1950 were those of Shariff 
Shamba in Ilala, and those of the owners of Helvetia and Victoria Dairy in the Oysterbay area. 
No private land subdivisions were earmarked for high density (African) housing since this was 
considered to depress prices. 
5.2.5 Policy impacts on the land use structure of Dar es Salaam during the 1950s; An 
overview. 
It has been shown in this section how tenure policies were modified, and how land 
acquisition, land use regulation, planning and economic resources investment powers were 
all used to achieve certain predetermined land use patterns which were for the most part, 
based on racial and functional attributes of the residents of Dar es Salaam. It has also been 
argued that land policy was responding to wider colonial policy considerations which included 
the acceptance of African residential permanence in urban areas, and the conceptualisation 
of their housing and land use needs in terms of their earmarked employment opportunities, 
and in terms of public health considerations as well as political expediency. It has, further, 
been shown how infrastructure usually followed development rather than vice versa, and how 
African residential areas remained minimally serviced. To some extent, some of these policies 
reflected the wider colonial/capitalist perspective which required the widening and deepening 
of the market in the colonies, the stabilisation of labour, and generally, the preparation of the 
colonies for take over by the indigenous populations. Other races were catered for in areas 
different from those reserved for Afans, but in Oysterbay, at least, Asians and Europeans 
were converging. Large non-native private owners of land, like the Upanga freeholders and 
freeholders in Msasani and Ilala were helped by the government to regulate their areas and 
to develop the land in the way approved by the government. 
10$ 	
Tanzania National Archive File 42656, Acquisition of Land. 
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Contradictions and disagreements between officials as to what was the correct poiicy 
to adopt have been alluded to, but the trend in land policy was unmistakable. The land use 
structure of Dar es Salaam during this period reflected past policies (e.g. racial segregation), 
but was also indicative of the future (e.g. the acceptance of African urban housing). 
5.3 Economic Responses 
Since land and most other government policy was conceived and implemented in racial 
perspectives, it is considered proper to analyse the reactions of the various actors on the Dar 
es Salaam land use scene in the 1940s   and 1 950s in terms of race. Africans, Asians and 
Europeans are discussed in sequence. 
5.3.1 Africans 
Africans were moving by the thousands to Dar es Salaam, so that the Municipality's 
population rose from 69,277 people in 1948,   to 128,742 in 1957,   an annual growth rate of 
7.1%. This growth brought pressure on existing housing so that overcrowding in the native 
area was rife. In 1939,   an official report had drawn attention to the "grave" position in Dar 
es Salaam, with 30,000 natives living in 3000 huts, without land for settlement and with 
more than 4000 of the males unemployed. 106 During the War and immediately after its end, 
the situation could only have become worse. There was pressure on the existing 
accommodation in the native area, a pressure made worse by the penetration to thia area, of 
Asians as a result of an equally grave accommodation crisis in the commercial area. The 
Asians were willing to pay rent several fold what the African was paying and as a result, 
African landlords with better houses were throwing out African tenants and taking in Indians. 
In October, 1944,   the Director of the Intelligence Unit Bureau reported to the Provincial 
Commissioner, Eastern Province, tht.there were 111 Indians renting houses in African areas. 
In February 1945,   a special mass meeting of the African Government Servants Association 
decided to bring bere the Chief Secretary, the issue of Asians residing in the African town. 
A letter was written to the Government proposing the construction of temporary houses for 
106 	
Rhodes House Library, Afr. MSS S.870 (H.H. McCleary, "Extent and Conditions under which natives are 
Occupying land on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam Township".) quoted in Dixon, The Evolution of indirect Rule 
in Tanganyika, p.  26. 
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government employees (which idea the Chief Secretary rejected, but which was to adopted 
in 1947 for all Africans at the proposal of the Provincial Commissioner). It further proposed 
the expulsion of Asians from the native quarter, and the control of • house rents. The 
government's proposed -solution was not to let Ilala to non-natives, and to stop leasing 
Kariakoo plots, to non-Africans, although the latter area already had too many Indians in it, 
a fact which it was decided not to publicise as doing so could cause ill feelings. 107 
The government's attempts to put a clamp on the leasing of property to non natives in 
natjve areas met with little success. For a start this letting was allowed in 'exceptional" 
circumstance, and secondly, many transactions could be carried out illegally. The attempts 
to "preservet' the native areas for natives only was not only racist but sometimes it worked 
against the poorer African property owners who were thus disabled to repair their houses, 
leading to the creation of native ghettoes. The case of Fatma, a native landlady in Sikukuu 
Street, Kariakoo is illustrative. 108 
In November 1948,   Fatma, through her lawyer, sought from the Government, sanction 
to lease her property to a non-native (an Indian clerk). The lawyer pointed out that while there 
were people who would be willing to pay and ask no questions, Fatma wanted a clean deal 
and was even prepared to take out a Right of Occupancy (which would have meant her paying 
of higher land rent). She needed the rent money to complete her house. The Land Officer 
declined consent pointing out that, since January 1948,   government policy was that there 
should be no further leasing of native property to non natives. The lady was warned that her 
Right of Occupancy would be revoked if she let her house illegally to a non-native. Despite 
the lawyer's plea that here was no reasons why a native should not better herself, the 
government declined sanction. This should be compared with the Land Department's policy 
with relation to Upanga where connt to transfer land from native to non-native was being 
given smoothly ostensibly, to avoid racial segregation. It will be seen therefore that this 
policy was not conceived in the interests of the native, but in that of the colonial state i.e. to 
107 	
see Tanzania National Archives Files No. 4/14, Housing in Zone 3 Dar es Salaam, Penetration by Indians, and 
32982, Shortage of Housing, Zones II and Ill. 
108 	
Details taken from Tanzania National Archives File No. 255, Land Transfer of property between Natives and 
non-natives. 
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preserve law and order by depressing rents, to prevent the displacement of natives, and to 
avoid racial strife. This view was paramount over the economic interests of natives. The 
policy benefited existing tenants who paid low house rents. They however, must have lived 
in a degraded environment. This however was of no consequence to the colonial government 
since its own policy aimed at cutting down house rents in the wake of the 1947 labour 
disturbances, was to erect very low grade temporary housing for natives which soon turned 
into a public health hazard. Landlords suffered from depressed rents while new migrants 
could do nothing but move into existing housing, aggravating overcrowding. This issue, in 
part convinced the government that new housing areas for Africans were required, thus the 
African housing schemes described above. 
African Government employees had for long agitated for government housing. While the 
government African "quarters" were for all wage employees, government workers must have 
got preferential treatment so that in 1950,   75% of the tenants in liala quarters were 
government workers. 109 Except for the Temeke scheme, which proved initially unpopular 
because of high rents, and distance from the town, the "quarters" proved popular, though by 
1951 complaints were registered from Ilala, where a Tenants'Association had been formed, 
that the Municipal Council was not responding to requests for house repair and maintenance. 
The plot allocation scheme proved popular as well, despite the lack of land services. 
Most of the applicants were longtimer residents in Dar es Salaam and many expected to 
remain there permanently. Construction was mainly in wooden poles and thatch, and the 6 
rooms Swahili house designed to take in lodgers was preferred. By 1958,   the waiting list for 
Magomeni plots was 2,000 applicants, although it was pointed out that only 30 turned up 
whenever called, indicating that effective demand for the plots was waning, and also possibly 
that Africans were taking up plots in the informal sector. By 1958,   the government was 
confident to report that there was no housing shortage in Dar es Salaam and elsewhere having 
been mostly solved by the people themselves °, at least a far as renting units and building 
109 	Municipal Council of Dar es Salaam, Minutes, (Housing Committee 16/6/1 950), 1950. 
110 	Colonial Office, Report on Tanganyika for the year 1958, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1959,   
p. 155. 
plots were concerned. Plots too continued to be available in the Kigamboni area in the late 
1 950s suggesting that the initial popularity of this area waned when the more accessible 
schemes became available. 
In the foregoing Chapter, reference was made to the growth of unplanned residential 
areas at Gerezani, Upanga and Kheko. While Gerezani was removed, and Upanga regularized 
unplanned settlements were growing. Kheko continued to expand. Another such settlement 
developed at Chang'ombe Toroli and grew in response to the siting of the Industrial area 
nearby. Though just outside the Township boundary authorities proposed the removal of this 
settlement as well as that at Kheko in the 1 940s, in order to from a green belt between the 
Township and the surrounding rural areas as an effective way of combating malaria in the Dar 
es Salaam. 111 The Director of Medical Services, Dr. R.R. Scott, was all for the prevention 
of the growth of native settlements South Pugu Road, arguing that native huts provided food, 
as well as hiding places for mosquitoes. Clearly his views had not changed since the 1 920s. 
He had measures taken under the Defence (Control of Buildings: Uzaramb District) Regulations 
of 1943 to prevent the construction of native huts in areas surrounding Dar es Salaam. 
Nevertheless, unplanned developments continued to spring up at Buguruni, Kigogo and 
Msasani. 
It is however to be noted that in all of the planning schemes discussed above, existing 
native land occupiers had to be removed. In some cases i.e. that of the Industrial Area, 
natives elected not to confront the government, but to just receive compensation and move 
elsewhere. In other cases, Ianacquisition orders were not taken meekly, as was the case 
of Mwinyigogo bin Mwinyimkuu and his relations, with reference to their land at Mzimumi in 
Magomeni which the government wanted to takeover in 1951 vide General Notice 689 of 
28/4/1951. In his letter to the Aing Governor (E.R.E. Surridge), Mwinyigogo protested 
against the intended land takeover, pointing out that the land in question had been the 
occupation of his ancestors for 400 years then. These ancestors were interred there. It was 
being used for agriculture, and the clan intended to be burned there. They had been required 
to register their land (first registration) and although they had complied and paid the requisite 
see Memorandum on Proposals for the Extension of Zone II, in Tanzania National Archives File No. 24387, 
Improvement to Native Houses, Vol II. 
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fees six months previously, no titles had been issued, and instead, all they saw was the notice 
of the Government's intended acquisition of their land. He pointed out that they already lost 
their land in Upanga and if this Magomeni land was lost as well, they would have nowhere 
to go and would be destitute. It is not known for sure what transpired afterwards, but 
Mwinyigogo was called to see the authorities. 112 It would appear that his land (plots 
121,122,1 23, and 124, Flur I) was acquired all the same since it appears in the land classified 
as belonging to Government in General Notice 1007 of 31/3/1 958. 
Not all the land acquired in Magomeni in 1951 was built upon or demarcated into plots 
so that in 1958 tenders were floated for the collection of coconuts on this Government land 
in Magomeni, Mbulahati/Kigogo, Magogoni and Kurasini. 113 It is submitted that these large 
expanses of undeveloped government land were "forgotten" by the authorities after 
Independence leading to genuine squatting on these areas. 
5.3.2 The Asians (mainly Indians) 
Indians presented a variety of reactions to the above described scenario, depending mainly 
on their economic status. As Tanganyika was British territory, immigration from India became 
much easier, and by 1944,   there were many Indians coming into the country in abject poverty 
"of mind and currency." 114  These simply overcrowded with their families in trading shops 
in the commercial area. The government's proposals to deal with this, situation by way of 
restrictive covenants proved impractical. Shortage of building materials due to War 
restrictions were also to blame, but even when these were partly relaxed, applications for 
building permits was low i.e. property was not a profitable venture then. So the Economic 
Control Board (a War time obundsman) allowed "austerity" buildings in the commercial area. 
There was also a suggestion by the secretary of the Economic Control Board that Asians 
should be encouraged to go back t4ndia, by making a steamship available for repatriation. 
112 	
see Tanzania National Archives tile No. 11/40 Land, Sundry complaints on shamba and plot Matters. 
113 	
see General Notices 1006. 1007, and 1009, of 3113/1958, and 1008 of 2/4/1958. 
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Tanzania National Archives File No. 32643, Proposals to deal with overcrowding' in business premises. 
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This idea however, was not taken up. 115 Party because of the grave accommodation 
situation in the commercial area, Asians overspilled to the native areas aggravating the 
accommodation situation there, and causing social tension. The more prosperous Indians 
however, invested in the city Centre, acquired residences in the old (former European) 
Residential area and in Oysterbay, and acquired land in the Upanga area. While the 
government was opposed to the overspill of Asians to Zone Ill, apparently since this was likely 
to cause discontent, social tension and homelessness among Africans, it supported the 
Asians' purchase of native property in Upanga and in the city centre. Thus referring to the 
intended purchase of House No. 2, Mtendeni Street (belonging to an African)(Figure 4.3) by 
one Mr. Afzal Khan, the Dar es Salaam District Officer, on forwarding the relevant documents 
for consent to the Director of Lands and Mines in November 1947,   recommended the 
purchase, since: 
The house is situated in the Kisutu area, which is not reserved for Africans and 
which forms a natural area of expansion for non-natives living in Zone 11.116 
It was noted by Harry Ford 7 that there was, after the War, heavy. Asian demand for 
accommodation in the central area, and that the speculator was cashing on the boom. Much 
of the buildings in the area went largely uncontrolled in the form of additional floors, and the 
engulfing of open spaces. There was little thought for building lines, street widths or Street 
layouts. The central area was getting more and more congested, so that densities in the 
Commercial area, according to the 1948 population census, varied between 72 and 198 
people per acre. In part, this made the Government to regularize Upanga for Indians. 
The Indian, and other non-ntive acquisition of Upanga was going on during the German 
colonial era, but it was intensified during the late 1 930s and the 1 940s so that while there 
were some 60 native landholdings (id some 100 native huts) in Upanga in the mid-i 930s 
less than 10 native landholders applied for registration between 1 946-1 950, in spite of this 
registration havingTheen made compulsory in 1949. We have seen previously how 
115 	ibid. 
116 	
Tanzania National Archives File No. 255, Land, Transfer of Property, Natives to non natives. 
117 	Tanganyika, A P/an for Oar as Salaam, pp. 73-79. 
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government policy made it administratively easy for Indians and other non-natives to acquire 
Upanga, although in so doing, it tried to ensure that the right price was paid. This can be 
illustrated by the cases of Mwinshehe bin Mwinyikondo, and Kidatu bin Abdallah, both 
signatories of the 1931 petition against the intended removal of natives from Upanga. 118 
Mwinshehe owned 2.28 acres of freehold land in Upanga, being plot 70/61, Flur II. In 
October, 1950,   he was approached by Messrs G.M. Chavda and H.K. Patel, who wanted to 
buy his land for 30,000/=. The Acting Land Officer (J.R. Kennedy), to whom matters were 
directed for consent, considered the value of the land to be 42,0001=, and noted that the 
value would be even higher when the land was divided into the earmarked 12 plots under the 
Upanga Scheme. The would-be buyers then offered the 42,0001=, arguing that Mwinshehe 
was putting up a building in the African area of Ilala, which included a small shop, and was 
hard pressed for money and wanted to use the proceeds of the sale for his Ilala building 
scheme. The Land Officer was still unhappy with the price but was prepared to give consent 
if the Provincial Commissioner felt that: 
The African concerned appreciates the value for money and really requires a 
large sum to enable him to proceed with his building ... . If you feel that such 
is not the case, perhaps he could be persuaded in his own interest to wait a 
few months longer. 
Mwinshehe was interviewed and the District Officer reported that he needed the money and 
the deal had to be concluded by April, 1 951. Apparently however, Mwinshehe knew the value 
of money as well, and did not sell yet. He was bought by Ismail Kassam and Badrudin Shariff 
in May 1951, for 70,000/=. 119 , 
Kidatu bin Abdallah, together with relations: Balrashi bin Salehe, Yahaya bin Salehe, 
Madia bin Salehe, Mwakungu bint Horera, Saida bint Horera, Suluhu bin Njani, Abdallah bin 
Salehe, Mwamambo int Salehe, Mwatatu binti Horera and Badi bint Horera, owned 150,512 
118 	Details are taken from Tanzania National Archives Files Nos. 255, Land Transfer of property between natives 
and non-natives, and 11/40, Land, Sundry complaints on Shamba and Plot Matters. 
119 	
To appreciate the value of this money, let it be known that two decades later, in the early 1 970s, one could 
buy an acre of land at the outskirts of Dares Salaam for just 2001=. 
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sq.ft. of land being plot 64 Flur Ill, Upanga area. In May 1951 a deed of transfer in which 
140,0001= had been offered, had been executed by Patel and Co. (Advocates) for the 
transfer of the land to a non-native, and was forwarded to the Land Officer for consent. Since 
the land in question would have worked out at 14 plots in the Upanga Scheme, the District 
Commissioner considered the offer of 10,000/= per plot to be too low, so the deal fell 
through. Meanwhile Kidatu had earlier required that the Upanga Scheme should not disturb 
his family's cemetery. On reading through the deed above, and finding no mention of the 
family tombs, the District Commissioner concluded quite erroneously: 
I presume his religious scruples over the tombs of his ancestors have been overcome 
by the offer of so many thousand of shillings. 
On the contrary, Kidatu had insisted on the walling off of the family cemetery. It was for this 
reduced area (i.e. excluding the cemetery) that another offer of 1 50,0001= was made to 
Kidatu by Ismail Kassam and Badrudin Shariff in June 1 951. This, the Dar es Salaam 
Municipal African Affairs Officer (A. Maddocks) thought was reasonable, but the Land Officer 
still thought that the land could fetch higher in the open market. Nevertheless the deal was 
concluded. 
Two points are noteworthy from these two examples. One is the patronage which 
European Officials accorded themselves vis a vis Africans, who were portrayed as not 
knowing what was good for them. Two, was the drive by Asians to buy African land at prices 
which they knew to be lower that the land could fetch in the market. 
After the Upanga Scheme,b.ad been prepared, and land redistributed, the Indians became 
the main developers of the area. The Ismaili Indians were possibly the most prominent, and 
we describe their reactions in further details. 120 
Unlike the Hindus, Ismailis came to Tanganyika to settle permanently, and Ismaili Khojas 
(i.e. Hindus converted to Islam) are the majority of Indian Community in Tanzania. The 
majority of them migrated to the country between 1900 and 1940 on the advice of His 
120 	
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Highness the Aga Khan, who required them to leave farming and take up trade and economy. 
Among the early well known Ismailis who came to Tanzania were Sewa Haji Paroo (1851-
1897), Allidina Visram (1863-1916) and Tharia Topan. Most went into business but diverted 
into smallscale industry when conditions so dictated. In the 1 920s, the Aga Khan directed 
the formation of the Jubilee Insurance Company, a non profit making body incorporated in 
Kenya, to lend money to anyone seeking a loan, and could produce two guarantors. The 
interest was set low at 6%. In 1946, another company, the Diamond Jubilee Investment 
Trust Company, was set up to help Ismailis throughout East Africa to put up commercial and 
residential buildings, lending money at low interest rates to first mortgagors. From 1945,   the 
Ismailis in East Africa were advised to diverse into agriculture and industry, since Africans 
were coming up,.and would be encouraged to take up trade to replace lndins. Agricultural 
ventures did not fare well, but commerce and industrial undertakings, as well as investment 
into property did well. In the early 1950,   the Aga Khan suggested a scheme whereby every 
Ismaili family in East Africa should have a home, "if poor, a small one, an apartment, a room, 
but absolutely his own". Building societies were then formed to help Ismailis who could not 
build their own houses. Initially single storey buildings and bungalows were put up. Later on 
apartments were preferred. 
The first scheme in Dar es Salaam centred upon the Chang'ombe Construction Company, 
founded in 1953.   Many plots were taken up in the Chan'gombe area and bungalows put up. 
These were sold for a deposit of 8000/=, and a monthly rent of 275/= covering the 
instalment and interest charges. After the construction cost was met in 1969, the housing 
scheme became free. The second scheme was in Upanga where two and three bedroomed 
apartments were constructed ard sold to Ismailis. For a deposit of 70001=, and a monthly 
rent of 240/= one could get a 2 bedroomed apartment. For a 9000/= deposit and a monthly 
rent of 260/=, one could get a threeedroomed apartment. The scheme started in 1955 and 
the apartments were fully paid for in 1970.   There was a variety of apartments. The most 
expensive ones we'e the 48 Crescent Flats which were sold for between 62,000/= and 
66,0001=, with an initial deposit of 25,000/= and the balance to be paid in five years. The 
cheapest (2 bedrooms) cost 22,0001=, with an initial payment of 40001= and a monthly rent 
of 100/=. There were 42 Ismaili building societies in Dar es Salaam in 1975 with a total 
investment of Tshs 21m/= mostly in Upanga. All these borrowed from the Diamond Jubilee 
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Investment Trust Company and the Jubilee Insurance Company, and by 1955,   £2,100,000 
had been given to these as loans to individual Ismailis on mortgages on buildings. At least 150 
houses were constructed in Upanga. Besides, various educational and social institutions, 
including the famous Diamond Jubilee Hall, were put up. 
Finally, it will be noted that the Industrial area in Dar es Salaam was for the most taken 
up by Indian entrepreseneurs. For the Ismailis, this was in response to the Aga Khan's advice, 
but for the Indian community in general it was felt that they would be less vulnerable, and, 
if anything, more powerful, if they concentrated on industry in addition to commerce. 
All this was done with the encouragement of the colonial government, and it is submitted 
that this was a continuation of the trend which in the 1 920s helped the Asians to virtually 
take over all land in the commercial area of Oar es Salaam. It was all part of the 
responsibities which the Asian Community was supposed to handle and play in the wider 
capitalist relationships. The Asians were, on their part, out to make money. They had judged 
the situation in Tanganyika in particular, and East African in general, to be secure enough to 
allow investment, growth and profit making. On its part, the colonial government saw the 
Asian community as the right persons to man the territory's commercial and industrial 
ventures, and it was doing what it could to help within the constraints of the colonial setup. 
Viewed this way, the interests of the Asian community, and the colonial state as agents of 
capitalism, coincided. 
5.3.3 The Europeans 
We have seen earlier how the colonial government amended the Land Ordinance in 
1947 to enable the governor to allocate land to non-natives otherwise than through public 
aUctions. This made it easy for Eopeans, particularly officials, to acquire land in the 
Oysterbay area of Dar e Salaam. At the same time, government policy aimed at encouraging 
employers to put up housing for their employees and we have shown above how several 
companies took up plots and constructed for their senior officials in Oysterbay. Among key 
companies owning plots in Oysterbay were: Brooke Bond (East Africa), K.J. Properties, 
Lehmans (Africa), African Merchantile, East African Lighterage, Cable and Wireless, East 
African Oxygen Acetylene, Wigglesworth, Riddoch Motors, Dalgety's East Africa, East African 
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Airways, African Trading, Smith Mackenzie, and Car and General Equipment. 121 
As a general rule, temporary buildings for the first three years of the Right of Occupancy, 
(but extendable to five years) were permitted. Besides, Oysterbay allottees were not required 
to pay the road frontage premia when these were introduced so that although Oysterbay was, 
initially, not well serviced, infrastructure was soon extended to this highly valuable land 
without the allottees contributing to the cost. Thus the government was all out to help 
Oysterbay people acquire land cheaply, develop it at moderate speed, and have it later on 
serviced at full public cost. This was only made possible because colonial officials wanted a 
stake in the area. This kind of approach to land policy is still upheld todate. 
5.3.4 Economic responses: an overview 
One major economic response during the period under review was the rapid migration 
of people to Dar es Salaam. The aftermaths of the War created a situation of optimism 
among households on the one hand, and situation where the government could spend more 
on urban development on the other. There was pressure on the government to act to relieve 
overcrowding, regulate land uses, provide housing, improve infrastructure, and generally, 
manage urban growth. Because of its sounder economic standing as a result of the funds of 
the Ten Year Development and Welfare Plan, plus a buoyant post War economy, the 
government was able, within the limits of its own conceptualisation of what urban land uses 
should be, to undertake various planning schemes, which generated enthusiastic responses 
from the various actors. Where the government was slow to act, asin the cases of the 
Industrial area, Upanga, the City Centre as well as in the cases of government land left idle, 
spontaneous activity took ple, but this was later on incorporated in the government's 
planning schemes. The Government policy of zoning for the various races was producing 
mixed result. In the native areas, jRning was supported by African tenants, but opposed by 
landlords and Indian tenants who wanted to occupy native houses. Acquisition of native land 
for town planning 1§chemes generated some limited reaction from Africans, but by and large, 
many accepted government terms. 
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Most development took place in response to, and in accordance with government policy. 
Even private freeholders of land were advised to have their land subdivided in a certain 
directions. There were only a few happenings outside government dictates e.g. the unplanned 
development that were taking place at places like Keko, Toroli, Msasani, Kigogo, and 
Buguruni. 
5.4 Overall Deductions on the Evolution of Dar es salaam's Land Use Structure in the 1940s   
and 1950s 
The major historical happenings of the period were World War II; the agitation for better 
conditions of living by Africans; and the decolonisation process. In anticipation of the latter 
two, the colonial government had been posed for change since the late .1 930s. The past 
policy of territorial self suffiency seemed to have failed. Territories like Tanganyika, remained 
poor, and under such conditions, remained a poor current or future market for consumer or 
producer goods from the mother country, and remained a poor produces of raw materials. 
Poor colonies were also hapless to be handed Independence to. The colonial territories had 
therefore to be "developed". Roads, railways bridges, airports, ports etc,'were constructed 
or expanded. Mines were opened up and natural resources tapped. Social welfare, in the 
form of expanded education and health facilities, for example, was improved. All these were 
incorporated in the Ten Year Development and We/fare Plan which was the major backup of 
urban land policy in Tanganyika during the period. This had major effects on the land, use 
structure of Dar es Salaam, since it allowed the improvement in infrastructure, as well as the 
conceptualisation and undertaking of the various residential, and functional land use schemes 
within the Municipality. 
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Colonial policy with regard to African labour changed, and labour stability in urban areas 
was accepted, at least for those wit employment. This was in part, in responses to the 
emerging import substitution industrialisation. If labour was accepted for permanent residence 
in Dar es Salaam, it Was not only to be employed, but to be housed as well. Schemes to 
ensure the supply of African housing were undertaken. The directly constructed houses were 
earmarked for the upcoming African "cream". Although the standards adopted were much 
lower in comparison to European or Asian housing, these schemes were considered a major 
uplift for the African. For some of the African "cream", opportunities to own modern urban 
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housing were provided through the loans of the African Urban Housing Loan Scheme. 
Demarcated plots were provided for self construction. 
Housing schemes were also prepared for the Asian and European communities. There 
were publicly constructed complete houses for renting or occupation free as part of the 
employment. There were also demarcated plots for private construction. The standard of 
housing, land and housing services and size of plots differed with race, Europeans getting the 
most and Africans the least. The principle of public health could not be avoided, thus the 
concern with overcrowding in the Indian and native areas. The solution to this was also 
sought in creating new Africa housing schemes. The non-servicing of African areas continued 
to create concern in terms of public health dangers throughout the 1 950s, particularly when 
unserviced African areas got sited too near the low density (European) Housing. 
Besides residential schemes, an Industrial area was designed along Pugu Road. It was 
serviced and allocated to Europeans and Asians. A new drive towards comprehensive town 
planing was embarked upon from the mid 1 940s culminating in the 1 949 P/an for Dat es 
Sa/aam; the introduction of a Town Planning Department in Government; and the enactment 
of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1956.   Despite that Africans were agitating 
for equality, and were poised to take over the reigns of power, access to land and land use 
in Dar es Salaam continued to be conceived in racial terms throughout the 1 950s. 
This was perhaps the colonial officials attempts to preserve their privileges in the face 
of the onslought against racism driven by the economic power of the Asian Community 
(which aimed at breaking raciallarriers between itself and the Europeans), and the African 
nationalism. It was also meant to create a physchological situation as to the status of the 
African vis a vis the European. CoIial officials may also have misjudged the speed of the 
decolonisation process. 
The Land Ordinance (Amendment) of 1947 was clearly meant to give officials easy 
access to urban and agricultural land. The Europeans forged close relationships and a working 
environment with Asians in view of the latter's economic importance. The African continued 
to be segregated. This situation was articulated at territorial level whereby the policy of 
I. 
"parity", which the colonial government attempted to install, and which meant that the 
different races were represented by an equal numbers of members in the Legislative Council, 
was clearly a means to preserve the privileges of the Europeans, and Asians against the 
Africans. This would appear to be another example of the colonial state propagating its own 
interests instead of the interests of capitalism. Propagating the interests of the latter would 
have meant, during this period, doing away with racial segregation, and encouraging social 
interaction and equal opportunities. 
Public authorities, particularly the central government, were a key player in determining 
Dar es Salaam's land use structure; selecting, acquiring, demarcating, servicing and allocating 
land for various uses. In many cases, Public Authorities also directed or influenced the actions 
of the private sector. The central government regularized the land use in private ownership 
in Upanga, for example, and smoothened the process of removing natives from there. It 
directed Africans to their own designated areas. It allocated Oysterbay and the Industrial area 
to Asians and Europeans, and it continued to oversee the development and servicing of the 
these areas. Spontaneous action outside government policy was limited. 
In the wider context of the capitalist penetration of Tanganyika, the bar es Salaam port 
was greatly improved, the airport relocated and several roads and other means of 
communications, linking Dar es Salaam to the rest of the country, greatly improved. Dar es 
Salaam became better connected to the country and to the world and could work much more 
efficiently as a port, and as a commercial and administrative centre. All these led to the fast 
growth of Dar es Salaam so that by 1957,   the Municipality was over three times as large in 
terms of population as the next'Thrgest town of Tanga. It seems fair to conclude that Dar es 
Salaam's land use structure during the 1 940s and 1950s   was almost entirely the result of 
government policy, which in turn ws a response to the dictates of the epoch which required 
the stablisation of labour and more effective urban management. However, the old order of 
racial segregation cntinued to be upheld. Colonial officials were perhaps under pressure to 
protect and possibly enhance their own privileged positions. 
On the eve of independence, the landuse structure of Dar es Salaam had grown further 
to add to the previous structure: an extended European (and Asian) area at Oysterbay, and 
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to a lesser extent at Kurasini; a regularised Upanga areas for Indians; new African residential 
areas at Ilala, Temeke, Kinondoni, Magomeni and Kurasini; and the Industrial area along Pugu 
Road. Several unplanned areas developed at Kheko, Chang'ombe, Kigogo, Msasani and 
Buguruni, and several others were in the making just outside the Municipal boundaries. This 
landuse structure was mainly a result of government policy whose motivation, however, was 
neither efficiency, nor equity. 
With the coming of Independence, racial segregation had to go but the already 
established land use patterns and relations could not be obliterated. The independence period 
ushered in a new era. New attempts were made at "development", but the government's 
ability to regulate urban land uses was to get constrained under the sheer weight of rapid 
urban growth, inadequate and in appropriate regulative and administrative frameworks, 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CAPITAL OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNTRY 
6.1 The Enhanced Importance of Dar es Salaam after Independence 
Tanganyika got Independence in December 1961. In 1964 Tanganyika united with 
Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania. As part of the Independence celebrations, 
Dar es Salaam was granted City status. The city was also retained as the country's capital. 
It thus became the focus of the nation's attention from all corners. It attracted new people 
and new socio-economic infrastructure. It attained immense political significance and was 
privileged to be the locus from whence national affairs were to be managed. All these had 
their impacts on the policies adopted for the city's development and affected the city's land 
use structure. 
The attainment of Independence brought a new status to Tanzania's capital city, Dar 
es Salaam, and initiated a new phase of the city's development. The affairs of the country 
started to be managed wholly from the capital while the greater civil functions and 
commitments of a sovereign state meant more people, more buildings, and therefore, more 
growth. In 1955 for example, there were only 9 Ministries running the country. In 1963 the 
number had risen to 15, all with headquarters in Dar es Salaam. In 1960 there were only 9 
consulates in Tanganyika. In 1966, this had risen to 44 countries represented. 1 The new 
independence government championed the liberation of the oppressed peoples in Southern 
Africa and elsewhere. This not only brought liberation movement to Dar es Salaam, but the 
importance of the Dar es Salaam harbour to a number of landlocked countries which were 
dependent on South Africa for external trade was enhanced. The harbour had therefore to be 
expanded to meet, nQt just internal needs, but also to serve neighbouring countries, to which 
it was connected by road, rail, and, in the case of Zambia by an oil pipeline. The Zambian case 
deserves special attention since political happenings in the then Southern Rhodesia in 1965 
A.C. Mascarenhas, 'The impact of Nationhood on Dar as Salaam," East African Geographical Review, 5, 
1967, PP.  39-46. 
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necessitated Zambia's reliance on Dar es Salaam harbour. The Dar es Salaam-Zambia Road 
had to be improved; and a 1 680km, 8" diameter oil pipeline was constructed in 1968 linking 
Zambia to Dar es Salaam. Most significantly, a 1 860km railway line was constructed with 
Chinese help between Dar es Salaam and Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia between 1970 and 1976.   
These developments necessitated the expansion of the harbour. 2 The Tanzania-Zambia 
Railway had the local effects of opening up Dar es Salaam's south and south-western areas 
to development. 
Ecologically, the city changed after Independence. The previous land use pattern had 
been based on racial segregation. With internal self government, the first Africans moved into 
Oysterbay (a then predominantly European residential area) in 1959,   as Ministers or Senior 
administrators. Later on, many of these were allocated plots for private construction (see next 
section) in this, and the predominantly Indian area of Upanga. Racial barriers were broken but 
differentiation between senior African administrators and politicians and the more ordinary 
Africans was taking place. 
As the nation's capital and primate city, Dar es Salaam had a lot of political strategic 
importance, so that early policies which were considered to be of political significance, like 
the ameliorating of Africans' urban living conditions including slum clearance and public 
investment in housing and infrastructure, were concentrated in Dar es Salaam. Other socio-
economic infrastructure like major hospitals or insittutions of higher education were also 
concentrated in Dar es Salaam. These in turn attracted more people as well as investment to 
the city. Dar es Salaam's attraction was not substantially affected by government policies 
aimed at diverting activities from the city, or indeed by the stated policy (since 1 973) of 
shifting the country's capital to Dodoma. 
The need to spearhead economic development meant the adoption of various Five 
Year Development F1ans which earmarked considerable investment in urban areas in the form 
of, for example, physical and social infrastructure, as well as considerable investment in 
industry either through the Public Sector (particularly the National Development Corporation) 
2 	M.B. Gleave, "The Oar es Salaam Transport Corridor: An appraisal ", African Affairs, 91, 1992,   pp. 249-267. 
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or by attracting the private sector. This necessitated for example, the expansion of the 
industrial area along the Pugu Road, and the creation of new industrial estates at Ubungo and 
at Mikocheni in the late 1 960s/early 1 970s. An oil refinery was established within the harbour 
area in the 1 960s, while a cement factory was, out of necessity, sited some twenty miles 
from the city centre at Wazo. In the social development field, the need for skilled manpower 
was realised early enough and soon after independence, a school of Business Management 
was established at Dar es Salaam and the Dar es Salaam Technical College, opened in the late 
1 950s, was greatly improved. Most significant however, was the establishment of the 
University College, Dar es Salaam occupying an 800 acre site at the Observation Hill. 
Tanzania's adoption of the policy of socialism (through the Arusha Declaration of 1 967) 
also affected Dar es Salaam's land use. In the first instance, legal changes aimed at removing 
exploitative tendencies in land tenure and land holding, as well as the benevolent attitudes 
towards the mass of the people, encouraged the haphazard occupation and development of 
land, while decentralisation policies adversely affected the land development control and 
management mechanism, leading to further uncontrolled development. A major political 
initiative was taken in 1971 with the nationalisation of all privately rented housing valued at 
more than Tshs 100,000/=. This particularly, affected the Indian landlords in the urban 
centres, and in particular the city of Dar es Salaam. Some 2000 properties were taken over 
and administered by the a body known as the Registrar of Buildings. This, to some extent 
allowed the entry of the Africans in the city centre as tenants, but it also froze private 
investment in high cost buildings till well into the 1 980s. Most tenants of these nationalised 
buildings turned out to be people well placed in government and politics. 
6.2. Land Policy Impacts 
6.2.1 Major Policy Tools 
During the decade after Independence, the government adopted policies which had a 
direct or indirect irrl'pact in the land use structure of Dar es Salaam. While the major basis of 
land tenure remained the Land Ordinance of 1923,   there were a number of enactments aimed 
at extinguishing freehold titles and at removing exploitative and feudal tendencies in land 
tenure. The Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1956,   as amended in 1961 remained 
the major instrument governing urban planning under which planning schemes (including 
314 
masterplans) for Dar es Salaam were prepared. The other major policy initiative affecting Dar 
es Salaam's land use structure was direct government intervention particularly through the 
National Housing Corporation and the Sites and Services Directorate. On the other hand, the 
general laissez-faire government policy toward unplanned development encouraged the 
unplanned occupation of land to an excessive degree. While urban land policy during the 
colonial area was motivated by clear issues like racial segregation, public health and 
employment, these were no longer important in the post-colonial era. Instead, political 
expediency as well as the consolidation of the African in the urban areas appeared to be the 
new key considerations. Both the central government and the Dar es Salaam City Council 
were key players in determining and implementing land policy. 
6.2.2 The Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Leases Act of 1963, and other 
Legislation 
We have seen in Chapter Four how the British Colonial government supported the 
concept of customary tenure among Africans, with a clear aim of preventing the 
proletarianization of the African. It was however, apparent that customary tenure conflicted 
with the need for rural transformation aimed at high productivity and involving the use of 
capital. The EastAfrican Royal Commission appointed in the 1 950s to, inter alia, look into the 
issue of land tenure, recommended the replacement of customary or tribal tenure by freehold 
tenure among the Africans. Similar recommendations had been made to, and adopted by a 
number of African countries. The East African Royal Commission's Report was adopted by 
all the East African Governments. In 1958,   the Government of Tanganyika outlined its 
proposals for extending the freehold system to Africans on the lines already adopted in Kenya 
since the early 1 950s that is,y giving individual title to land held under customary law by 
the process of adjudication, consolidation and registration. 3 These proposals were opposed 
by the nationalists, and in partic1ar the TANU leader, Julius Nyerere. His main line of 
objection was that freehold tenure did not allow the government to control land uses so that 
the owner of the la'Y,d was free to use or abuse it the way he liked. Secondly, Nyerere pointed 
out that freehold tenure would allow non Africans or a few "clever" Africans to buy the land 
belonging to the bulk of Africans so that "within a short period, there would only be a few 
Tanganyika, Review of Land Tenure Policy, Government Printer, Oar es SaIaai-n, 1958.   
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Africans possessing land in Tanganyika, and all others would be tenants." 4 
The colonial government was aware of the shortcoming of the freehold system and 
two principal dangers were recognised. 5 One, that some Africans may be tempted by what 
might appear to be large sums of money to part with their land without any plans for the 
productive use of this money, and two, that some Africans might borrow on the security of 
their land, again, without putting the money to productive use. The result would be the 
appearance of a class of landless persons and the reduction of the peasantry to a state of 
indebtness. The safeguards suggested by the colonial government were: one, the maintenance 
of the law requiring the consent of the Governor in cases of land disposition between Africans 
and non-Africans, and, two, the expansion of credit facilities available to Africans for land 
development. 
British colonial practice had long resisted the recognition or extension of freehold 
tenure to Africans for reasons more or less similar to those advanced by Nyerere, although 
colonial officials were more worried about the landless African getting detribalised and 
becoming not just unproductive, but also a burden to the colonial government. Stren notes 
with respect to colonial policy in Mombasa, Kenya, that, although many Africans wished to 
have individual title to their land, officials argued for the retention of communal tenure: 
If they (Africans) were given freehold title, their improvidence and desire for 
cash could soon result in the alienation of large tracts of land to non-Africans. 
Then, having lost their security in land and cut off from the tribal communities, 
Africans who sold their land would become "detribalised" and subject to the 
influence of urban life. 6 
Again, in the case of the Wadigo tribesmen on the Kenyan coast in the mid 1 930s, it was 
ION 
pointed out that if they were to be pmitted to dispose of their land in the open market, many 
J.K. Nyerere, Mali ya Taifa (National Property) in Uhuruna Umoja: selected Writings, Oxford University Press, 
Dares Salaam, 1967, p.  53. 
Tanganyika, Review of Land Tenure, p. 3-4. 
6 	R.E. Stren, Housing the Urban Poor in Africa, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 
Berkeley, 1979, P.  112. 
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of them would quickly become landless and consequently cease to be selfsupporting, and the 
prospects of their ever becoming an economic asset to the colony would disappear. 7 In these 
respects, both Nyerere and the British colonial government agreed. The major difference of 
opinion between Nyerere and the colonial government with regard to the dangers of freeholds 
tenure was that the government would lose control over freehold land. 
Soon after independence proposals were put forward to abolish freeholds altogether from 
Tanganyika. In 1963,   the Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Leases Act, converted 
the existing freeholds into 99 year leases. Later on, in order to smoothen land administration, 
these leases were converted into Rights of Occupancy by way of the Government Leaseholds 
(Conversion to Rights of Occupancy) Act of 1969. This streamlined the system of land tenure, 
recognising only Rights of Occupancy either directly granted, or, in the case of customary 
tenure, deemed granted. 8 Thus the Independence government completed the earlier colonial 
drive to put the complete control of land in the hands of the government. The colonial policy 
of the 1 950s, of rehabilitating the freehold land tenure system which it had opposed since the 
1 920s, was seen by the nationalists as a trick to perpetrate the exploitative racial privileges, 
and to weaken the new post-colonial state. The latter required to consolidate its position, and 
thus required that land be vested in the government. 
The significance of the 1963 Act as the instrument that nationalised land in Tanganyika 
is certainly an exaggeration. The Land Ordinance of 1923 had virtually nationalised all land, 
recognising only those freeholds that existed then, and this latter policy was necessitated by 
the need to favour the existing settlers, and to muster their support and cooperation in the 
post World War I reconstructid. The colonial government did not then favour the freehold 
system, and no new freehold titles were given out under the Land Ordinance. The 1963 Act 
affected a very restricted portion of jnd (although some considerable urban freehold land was 
involved) in Tanganyika but political capital was subsequently made out of this Act by the 
independence govrnment. The significance of the 1963 Act however, was in the 
Mombasa Land Office file M/1 383/B, quoted in, ibid, p. 112. 
8 	
R.W. James, LandLawandLandPo//cyin Tanzania, Nairobi and Dares Salaam, East Africa Literature Bureau, 
1971. 
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strengthening of the government hold over land, including the enabling of the government to 
take land cheaply from or to replace existing landowners and poor peasants at the urban 
fringes and choice rural areas through planning and other schemes, and to allocate this land 
to the people of the government's choice, whenever it deemed it fit. The existing land users' 
room for manoeuvre (e.g. in terms of claiming compensation) was thus highly restricted, since 
land did not legally belong to them but was "public property", with no value to individuals 
except in terms of unexhausted improvements. Customary land tenure (with its indefinite and 
unconditional tenure characteristics akin to freehold) was somewhat left on a cliffhanger by 
the abolition of freehold. 9 
The other area of concern soon after Independence, was the prevalence of feudal 
tendencies in rural land holdings, as well as the sceptre of absentee landlordism in both rural 
and urban areas. These had behoved the colonial government. The Nyarubanja Tenure 
(Enfranchisement) Act of 1965 enfranchised the Nyarubanja tenants in the parts of 
Tanganyika where the system existed 10 . The following year, the Rural Farmlands (Acquisition 
and Regrant) Act of 1966 granted leases to tenants of land belonging to absentee lease 
owners, and in 1968,   the Urban Leaseholds (Acquisition and Regrant) Act of 1968 did the 
same for tenants of urban land. 
The effect of all these policies was to legalize and popularize the policy of "land to 
the tiller", which was to find further support in later socialist policies. The 1963 Act however, 
converted tenants on former freeholds land into squatters, and an example of such conversion 
concerned the tenants of the Hanna Nassif Estate in the Kinondoni area of Dar es Salaam. 
This was freehold estate land vth tenants paying rent to the landlord. After the abolition of 
freehold tenure, these tenants became "illegal" occupiers of government land. The 
government however, did not take any steps to impose its ownership. Subsequently the 
ON 
Ever sice Independence, the Government has been grappling with the question of the inadequacies of 
customary land tenure in Tanzania. During the 1960 and 1 970s it sought the answer in villagisation. 
Recently (December, 1992) a new Act virtually extinguishing customary tenure in some villages was passed 
by Parliament. See R.Tenga "Monstrous' Land Bill to make most Tanzanians Lahdless ". Article appearing 
in, The Express (Tanzania), December, 1992, pp. 12-13. In November 1993, the Act was challenged in 
court and was declared unconstitutional. 
10 	The Nyarubanja system was a feudal kind of land holding whereby one person or institution owned a large 
tract of land (called the Nyarubanja) on which were tenants or fiefs. 
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estate developed into a sizeable squatter settlement. However, since government policy with 
regard to squatters was not hostile, occupiers of former freehold lands did not in practice 
suffer. Indeed, it could be argued that they gained by enjoying the general security extended 
to all squatters by government policy. Thus the extensive growth of squatting on other former 
freehold land. 
6.2.3 Africanisation and Dar es Salaam's Land Use Structure 
After gaining independence, Africans_replaced non-Africans in rnanagng the nation. 
Gradually, the civil service and other employment was Africanised. In tandem with this, 
African presence increased in the high class areas of Upanga, Oysterbay, Kurasini and 
Chang'ombe in Dar es Salaam. These area were mainly the recluse of Indians and Europeans 
during the colonial era. In the situation prevailing before Independence the colonial 
government set aside Block W Magomeni for the use of the emergent African elite. The area 
was planned at lower densities and higher standards of buildings were expected. Owners of 
plots in Block W also benefited from the African Urban Housing Loan Scheme. 
A study of the applications for building permits made to, and approved by, the Dar es 
Salaam City Council in 1965,   together with other land office documents, gives, us the names 
of some of the important personalities who then held plots in Block W Magomeni. These are 
given in Table 6.1. It is also known that the Tanzania President, Mwalimu Nyerere was one 
of the plot owners in Block W. 11 The names listed in Table 6.1 include those of the then 
Ministers, City Councillors, and high ranking civil servants and politicians. 
Africans however could n,t just be contented with this colonial arrangement which was 
aimed at perpetrating racial discrimination, discrimination which was breaking down anyway, 
since Africans, as a result of their new responsibilities, were taking up residence in the former 
European and Indian areas. The early breed of top officials and politicians aimed also at 
owning (rather then mere living in) property in these areas. Government policy made plots 
available in Oysterbay, Upanga, Kurasini and Kinondoni (Ada Estate), by way of subdividing 
The Town Planning committee which met on 12 July, 1963, agreed to a proposal that Block W Magomeni 
be called ' Butiama" area, in reference to President Nyerere's home village. See Dar es Salaam cit y Council, 
Minutes, 1963, p.  508. 
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the larger plots, or by creating new ones on existing open spaces, or extending layout to 
formerly unsubdivided land in these high class areas. In 1963,   only 6 Africans (or people 
whose names are considered 
Table 6.1: Successful applicants for Building Permits, in relation to Block W. Magomeni. in 
1965, and other important landowners in the Block 
Name Plot No. Name Plot No. 
Hon. Chief A.S. Fundikira 67, 68, 69 Hon. Lucy Lameck 109 
A.W. Sykes 172 L.K. Bakuname 169 
R.J. Abdallah 102 R.C. Simkoko 188 
R.K. Mwanjisi 111 Ali K. Sykes 167 
Saada Salum Omar 39 H.O. Bwata 106 
O.L. Millinga 181 J. Keto 84 
K.H.M.S. Kungulilo 108 S.A. Kandoro 183 
Selemani Mkwawa 21 Kitwana Kondo 79 
A. Lubulwa 168 F.K. Burengelo 179 
R. Makange 20 G.Y. Mpupuya 78 
P. Aoko 180 S.R.M. Makutika 80 
Sheikh Yahya 19 Lotti Y. Zacharia 59 
M.N.E. Shaidi 34, 35 E.E. Akena 192 
S. Mlatie 193 J.B. Mwenda 203 
E.C. Mzena 175 Hon. R.M. Kawawa 10,11 
Andrew Abdallah 205 Mrs Grace Nderimo 42 
M. Litunu 11 Dr S.A. Mwankemwa 100 
J.G. Mutayoba 197 B.I. Suwedi 1 
E.J. Samuel 206 J.K.L. Mutaboyerwa 195 
B.J. Sichiambo 199 Lila Mwinyikondo 110 
R. Mgana 99 Donald Roman 97 
M.M. Songambele 49A+13 H.M.S. Ibrahim 190 
H. Mlezi 10 M.A. Max 177 
Saidi Juma Mzee 15 R.M. Nanyomwa 178 
Athumani Mtipuka 41 S. Machangu 8 
S. Mkwa W.F.I. Maro 23 
M. Mfaume 107 W. P. Mpira 76 
Mbiyu Koinange (Kenyan) 116 M.T. Ntare 112 
Sheikh Amri Abeid 26,27,2 8 P. Mwishihage (SWAPO) 17 
J.M. Haiwenge (Mrs) 63, 64 S. Kibwana 98 
O.S. Kambona 29,30,31 
Source: 	Dar es Salaam City Council, Minutes of the Meetings of the Town Planning 
Committee, 1 965; and some Land Office Files 
to be African) were given permits to put up buildings in these areas: Four were in Upanga (i.e. 
R.K. Juma (Plot 205), I.F. Lambert (Mrs) (Plot 2 Seaview), E.Ebrahim (Plot 672 Upanga) and 
S.L. Juma (Plot 165 Upanga). Two were in Oysterbay i.e. J.A. Namatta, (Plot 349 Msasani), 
and L.K. Bakuname (Plot 380 Msasani). In 1965 this number had jumped to 86 as follows: 
Upanga (38 permits), Oysterbay/Msasani (41 permits), Kurasini (1 3 permits) and Kinondoni 
Ada Estate, (4 permits). The list of the successful applicants for permits to build in these areas 
of Dar es Salaam in 1965 and their plot numbers is given in Table 6.2. It is almost wholly 
made up of Ministers, Members of Parliament, top civil servants and judges, army officials, 
chiefs, councillors, and key politicians. This is the group that is usually referred to as the 
ruling elite. 
Besides Upanga and Oysterbay, the new elite aimed at acquiring land further north by 
the Ocean. In May 1965 the Director of Town Planning presented for approval of the Dar es 
Salaam City Council, a layout (Town Planning Drawing No. 1/408/385) of ten new large plots 
approximately six acres each, created at Msasani Village along the Ocean to the north of 
Msasani Peninsula (see Chapter Six). The layout was initially rejected by the Council which 
particularly objected to the creation of such large plots, and instead suggested plots of a 
maximum size of 1 1/2  acres each. In June 1965,   a new layout with 1 ½ acre plots was 
presented to the Council, and this time the Commissioner for Lands was applying for the 
layout's approval so as to enable him to offer Rights of Occupancy. The Council approved this 
layout and the area was allocated to several Ministers of the early national government of 
Tanganyika. 12  Up to today this area remains exclusice with properties owned by important 
personalities in Tanzania's politics. Just like the colonial officials had used their political 
power to get access to land, so the new independence government used its newly found 
power to do just the same.By the late 1 960s key politicians and civil servants owned plots 
in several key areas of Dar es Salaam particularly Magomeni, Upanga, Oysterbay, Msasani, 
Kinondoni and Kurasini 13 
12 	
Dar es Salaam City Council, Minutes, 1965 p. 728. 
13 	
The Arusho Declaration of 1967 was in part aimed at curbing the tendency of the new leaders to amass 
wealth. 
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Table 6.2: African grantees of building permits in the Upanga Oysterbay, Kurasini and 
Kinondoni (Ada Estate) Areas of Dar es Salaam, 1965 
UPANGA  
Name Plot No. Name Plot No. 
J. Malekia 372 J.L. Okiji 115 
Hon. J.B. Mwakangale 79 H.S. Gondwe 148 
A.C. Tandau 80 S.K. Gabba 147 
Hon. Theresa Ntare 315 G.A. Mhina 376 
A.W. Mwakangale 272 Hon.J.M. Lusinde 288 
R.M. Lyabai 122 Hon. E.A. Mang'enya 287 
S.R.M. Makutika 991,989 W.R. Mwakitwange 519 
J.L. Kimwaga 986 F. Burengelo 932 
T.P. Mwanjisi 383 J.P. Singano 1003 
Chief Humbi Ziota 74 B.J. Maggid 373 
Lt. B. Lukwembe 146 M. Kamuntu 925 
Col. Tarimo 139 A.J. Adela 929 
R.H. Saidi 395 R. Makange 612,613 
H.I. Taratibu 983 P.S. Kalanga 371 
L.S. Saguti 375 H.I. Taratibu 365 
B.M. Juma 595 A.A. Aziz 135 
E.D.A. Mwinchumi 143 S.B. Matovu 368 
V 
S. Pashuwa 369 V.S. Makame 141 




Name Plot No. Name Plot No. 
Dr. Nhonoli 268,269 B. Munanka 404 
V.M. Eyakuze 890 Hon. Joseph Nyerere 402 
Hon. S.N. Eliufoo 379 R.W.G. Rugarabamu 294 
Otinni Kambona 396 Ally K. Sykes 394 
Hon. J.S. Kasambala 361 Hon. L.P. Dantes-Ngua 421 
G.W. Kiletta 397 J.S. Masayanyika 197 
E.I.M. Mtei 332A Hon. E.A. Kisenge 415 
A.J. Nsekela 365 Z. Mtemvu 107 
J.A. Nzunda 420 H.K. Katua 389 
H. Aziz 418 Hon. T.S. Tewa 370 
A.C. Mwingira 195 Hon. Abdul Faraji 386 
R.O. Kirundu 422 Hon. E.B.M. Barongo 388 
C.P. Ngaiza 419 S. Chale 332 
Just. M.P.K. Kimicha 424 F.V. Mponzi 374 
D.A. Nkembo 110 M.M. Songambele 416 
C.A. Kalaghe 408 A. Saidi 112 
Hon. Bibi T. Mohamed 450 Hon. Lucy Lameck 364 
S. Kitundu 390 Brig. M.S.H. Sarakikya 40 
A. Mbuga 109 Chief Marealle 192 
Hon. R.M. Kawawa 426 K.R. Baghdellah 423 




Name Plot No. Name Plot No. 
Magambo 47 G.V.S. Chaussa 38 
Mwajasho 14 G.P. Shirima 27 
Z.A.H. Kyassi 23 A.R. Shungu 18 
F.K. Lwegalulila 28 D.S. Nkulila 32 
B. Makatte 41 G.M. Rutabanzibwa 5 
C.F. Ijumba 33 S.H. Pundugu 11 
H.Z. Talawa 13  
KINONDONI (ADA ESTATE)  
Jacob 8/23 Chief J. Maruma 14 
L.M. Gama 102 J.G. Kileo 14 
Source:Dar es Salaam City Council, Minutes of the various Town Planning Committees, 1965.   
It is not only that top government officials and politicians got themselves allocated plots 
in choice residential areas of Dar es Salaam. Facilities were created to give them access to 
development finance. The African Urban Housing Loan Scheme of the 1950s had been 
discontinued in 1960.   It was succeeded by the Urban Roof Loan Scheme, but this was 
unsuited to the requirements o?hese officials and politicians, most of whom, in line with both 
the planning conditions required of the areas they were aiming at, as well as in line with the 
standards previously set, had appliV for permits to put up two storey buildings. A Revolving 
Loan Fund for senior government employees was thus established in 1963.   By August 1968,   
it had disbursed Sh. 16.3 million to 230 borrowers 14 . 
14 	J. Campbell, "The State, Urban Development, and Housing", in, Norman O'Neil and Kemal Mustafa, (Eds), 
Capitalism, Socialism, and the Development Crisis in Tanzania, Gbwer Publishing Company, Aldershot (UK), 
and Brookfield (USA),1990, pp  152-176. 
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The government, moreover, eased conditions by which civil servant might acquire land. 
In a letter to the Dar es Salaam City Council in 1964,   the Minister for Lands asked the Council 
to permit government servants who were granted loans for building houses in the Upanga 
Area to pay road fronta9e premiums in instalments, pointing out that the Government was 
making that facility available to its servants where a road frontage premium was charged for 
making up of the roads. 15 
It will therefore be seen that the government did adopt a deliberate policy of allowing 
top officials and politicians access to land in choice residential areas of Dar es Salaam, during 
this first decade of Independence. This was the phase of consolidation and access to land by 
Africans was seen as an important tool in achieving this goal. As a result, the racial 
composition of Oar es Salaam's land use structure changed considerably, but the struggle for 
Oar es Salaam's coastline was perpetrated. 
6.2.4 The National Housing Corporation (NHC) and Dar es Salaam's Land Use Structure 
BackQround to and the Establishment of the NHC 
Independence brought a new situation as far as the housing of Africans was 
concerned. Looking back to the colonial era, it was stark clear that Africans had been given 
low quality houses, or had been confined to houses constructed in traditional materials in 
poorly serviced planned areas or in emerging unplanned areas. The problem was three 
pronged: housing shortage, poor quality structures, and poor residential environment. During 
the immediate post colonial period, this situation was seen as unacceptable, particularly in the 
capital city of Dar es Salaam, which for many politicians was the window portraying the 
image of the rest of the count'r. Addressing the Oar es Salaam City Council in January 1963,   
the Minister for Local Government, Job Marecera Lusinde, made this point: 
We must never forget thatbar es Salaam is not merely a large town, but it is 
also the capital city and the commercial centre of Tanganyika. To many of our 
visitors, Er es Salaam is Tanganyika and we are responsible for seeing to it 
15 	Dar as Salaam City Council, Minutes, January, 1964. 
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that the picture presented to them is a favourable one (Emphasis in the 
original) 16 
This "favourable" picture was not being presented by the bulk of African houses 
constructed in traditional materials in unserviced areas. Besides, there was the need to break 
away from the colonial past by providing Africans with public houses of good quality. 
Commenting on the National Housing Corporation Bill, presented in Parliament in June 1962,   
one Member of Parliament enjoined the government to ensure that "the houses which the 
Corporation is going to devise suits the type of a progressive African of an independent 
Tanganyika, not an African under a colonial government" 17 . To the politicians and the Ruling 
Party, TANU, the solution to the African housing problem lay in the creation of a National 
Housing Authority (an idea which had been mooted by the colonial government when they 
proposed to create an African Housing Company in the 1 950s). They could cite support from 
the Report of the Commission appointed in March 1961 to look into salaries and conditions 
of service appropriate to the local civil service (the Adu Report) which noted the "continuing 
shortage of houses which appear to be general in Tanganyika"; and strongly recommended 
that early action should be taken to encourage housing schemes; and that the "impetus to 
build must come from the central government" 18 . 
Expatriate officials who continued to occupy senior civil service positions after 
Independence however, opposed the direct government intervention in housing provision in 
general, and the formation of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) in particular. Permanent 
Assistant Secretary responsible for Housing in the Ministry for Local Government, Mr. K.G. 
7-4 
Mather was the chief propont of the expatriate anti-NHC stand 19 . Mather, inter alla, 
16 	
Address by the Minister for Vtical Government, Hon. J.M. Lusinde, to the Dat es Salaam City Council on 
16/1/1 963, in, Dar es Salaam City Council, Minutes of the Proceedings of the Meetings of the Council and 
of the Committees thereof for the Year 1963, Oar es Salaam, 1964.   
17 	Tanganyika, Proceedings of Par/iament,(Hansard), 1962, Oar es Salaam, 1963.   
18 	Tanganyika, Report of the Tanganyika Salaries Commission (Adu Report), Government Printer, Oar es Salaam, 
1961, P.  128. 
19 	
Information on the views expressed by Mr. Mather is contained in various memoranda to higher ranked 
officials in the Ministry of Local Government, and is cited in, R.S. Mukandala, The Political Economy of 
Parastatal Enterprise in Tanzania and Botswana, Ph.D Thesis, university of California, Berkeley, 1988. 
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disputed the generalised existence of a housing shortage, arguing that where this appeared 
to exist, it was localised and a result of subsidised rents in government housing. He doubted 
whether government constructed housing could find takers at economic rents. He therefore 
saw there being pressure for subsiding such government housing, which though politically 
popular, was unaffordable in the long term by a poor country like Tanganyika. 
TANU and the politicians, on the other hand, thought poor quality structures, put up 
by the bulk of Africans were unbecoming. The Minister for Local Government called for "more 
houses of better quality and good facilities like roads and streetlights", and also pointed out 
that in some places , houses were built so close to each other such that they constituted a 
major fire hazard and posed the danger of the development of slums which were injurious to 
health. Moreover, many urban houses did not give a proper picture of Independent 
Tanganyika 20 . To the TANU politicians, expenditure on housing was not to be seen as an 
economic burden but as an "adjunct to production". More and better houses "produced a 
better and brighter towns people who can make great contributions to the country's 
development". More and better housing expanded the building trade, increased the demand 
for further houses and encouraged people to work harder to attain such good houses. Further, 
housing paid for itself in the long run. TANU therefore preferred a welfare state solution to 
housing which, the government would be prepared to subsidise in anticipation of the indirect 
advantages cited above. As the Minister for Local Government said somewhat later, 
"Sometimes it may be necessary for the government to subsidise housing schemes and in 
such cases, the Corporation (the NHC) may lend people money and forget about the 
interest" 21  TANU stood for active central government role in solving the housing problem by, 
for example, making finance available and setting up a public corporation which would, inter 
alla, construct houses for the low income people. TANU moreover, wanted to mobilise people 
for self-help, but Mather opposed tIs as well, arguing that saving in self-help undertakings, 
was illusory, and that the traditional Swahili house represented a sound investment with 
returns of up to 25/o on invested capital. The quality of the houses, he argued, should be 
improved slowly over time, rather than have the houses demolished and rebuilt, since during 
20 	
ibid., p. 195. 
21 	
ibid., p. 196. 
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the rebuilding period, the owner lost income; and after he was given back his house, he was 
saddled with a loan which would take some twenty years to repay. "To rush, for political 
reasons, into such an ill advised self-help scheme as this appears to be, would, with due 
respect, be most unwise'. 22 
There was however something deeper engaging the minds of the politicians than the 
mere question of the economics of housing. The new government was going through a phase 
of consolidation. Participation in public housing was one way of mobilizing people, 
consolidating national political power and forging national identity. This was in fact noted by 
Mather: "There is something deeper underlying this clash of conceptions of housing policy 
than is superficially apparent". This deeper something was spelt out by the Minister for Local 
Government who said that the issue of improving housing conditions for Africans was not 
only in order to "improve the lot of the towns people", but also to ensure "the promotion of 
unity and loyalty to the Government" 23 . 
In order to come to a compromise, a two man team of advisors from Israel was 
appointed in 1962 to: (a) advise on the suitability of the continuation of housing policies then 
pursued by the government, and, (b) to investigate the suitability of establishing a central 
housing agency, a corporation, or a board, to finance and promote housing construction. The 
team recommended more or less what the Tanganyika politicians wanted to hear, that is: 
o The subsidisation of housing for low cost housing projects for people in the middle and 
low income brackets; 
o 	The expansion of tenant purchase schemes for government officials, local government 
employees, foremen, overseers, and "responsible labourers"; 
o 	A Five Year Plan to construct 10,000 houses, implemented in two or three stages; 
o 	The establishment of a construction corporation to carry out housing schemes; and, 
22 	




o 	The organization of a National Housing Authority. 24 
Not surprisingly, Mather thought nothing of the advisors' report. He found it abominable, 
unprofessionally prepared and presented, and an affront to the Government of Tanganyika. 
Politicians, however, found it quite satisfactory. Realising that they were convinced on the 
need to create a National Housing Corporation, Mather conceded defeat in February 1962.   In 
June the same year, the National Housing Corporation Act was passed, and the Corporation 
became operative in August 1962.   
The functions of the NHC were spelt out as being: 
o 	to lend, guarantee or provide finance to local authorities and individuals, for the 
construction or improvement of buildings and approved housing schemes; 
o 	to undertake direct construction; 
o 	to eliminate shortages of residential houses and to meet the needs of a rapidly growing 
• 	population; and, 
o 	to clear slums and other unsuitable housing and to replace these with modern 
residential housing, and to administer all houses built in urban areas by the colonial 
government and all house4 constructed under the defunct African Urban Housing Loan 
Scheme. 
The National_HousingCorpo ion_wasiiioreoverpolitical1y_symbotic,_beingthe first - 
parastatalorganisat4cn to be set up after Independence. Mukandala 25 provides a thesis 
whereby the creation of parastatal organizations in emerging African nations was an important 
tool of realising socio-economic changes, and of ensuring the political consolidation of the 
24 	
M. Bar-Uan and K. Porath, Report on Housing in Tanganyika. Department of International Cooperation, 
Jerusalem, 1962. 
25 
Mukandala, The Pohtcal Economy. 
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new nationalist rulers. In the case of Tanzania, he identified three periods: that of power 
consolation (1961-67), that of hegemony (from just after the Arusha Declaration in 1967 to 
1969) and that of rationalization (1969-1985). A period of the demise of parastatal 
organizations could be added, from the late 1 980s. The NHC fits into this periodisation very 
well. It was an important parastatal with a cognitive role during the power consolidation 
phase. When this role was over, the importance of the NHC waned, and from the mid-i 970s 
the Corporation began drifting without clear support and policy guidelines from the 
Government. 
The impact of the NHC on Dar es Salaam's land use structure can be divided into two 
phases. The first ten years (1 962-7 2), and the post 1972 period. During the first phase, the 
NHC enjoyed considerable government support by way of capital grants with which the 
Corporation was enabled to carry out a substantial slum clearance programme, as well as to 
construct hundreds of houses for tenant purchase and for rental. During the second phase, 
slum clearance and tenant purchase schemes were discontinued, and from 1973, the 
government stopped giving the NHC development grants so that its construction output 
dwindled. Moreover, its estate management role was hampered by low rents, and huge rent 
arrears, problems which the Government did little to help the NHC solve. The major impact 
of the NHC on the land use structure of Dar es Salaam was therefore during its firt decade 
of existence, and this study concentrates on that period. 
The NHC's First Decade 
During the Three Year Development P/an for Tanganyika, (1961-64), £300,000 had 
been earmarked for housing anit was intended to establish a National Housing Corporation 
during the second and third year of the plan. Mather's objections to the formation of the NHC 
(above), was so much anti-currentince the World Bank prepared Three Year Development 
P/an approved by TANU, had already earmarked the formation of the NHC. Besides, £30,000 
had been set aside"for launching a pilot tenant purchase scheme, and another £30,000 had 
been set aside for launching an Urban Roof Loan Scheme. It is thus clear that the views of 
the World Bank Mission, and those of the TANU politicians, as far as the necessity for setting 
up a NHC was concerned, were coincident. 
330 
Table 6.3 Summary of NHC's attempts to raise funds outside the Government, 1964-1967 
Year of Negotiations Party Negotiated with Scheme/Funds Outcome 
1 964/65 Seaboard Construction Kariakoo Redevelopment Fell through 
Scheme 
1964/65 Sir Isaac Wolfson Old Airfield Housing Fell through 
Scheme 
1964/65 Standard Bank Musoma Housing Scheme Loan agreement concluded, 
25/8/1 966. NHC started 
construction in anticipation of 
refunds from the Bank, in phases 
starting 24/2/1 967. The Bank 
withdrew from the agreement 
before paying te first instalment 
when Banks were nationalised in 
the wake of the Arusha 
Declaration of February 5, 1967. 
Consequently, the Musoma 
Housing Scheme was 
abandoned. Only 100 of the 
earmarked 400 houses were 
constructed. 
1965/66 Norwegian Government Credit of lOm/= Negotiations fell through as 
agreement could not be reached 
upon over the interest rate to be 
charged. 
1965/66 Messsrs Massarda Loan of £2m for Old Fell through but engineering 
Airfield Housing Scheme works on the scheme 
undertaken by the NHC. 
1966/67 2,000,000 buy-a-brick and Sales disappointing. Only 
build the Nation stamps 185,653/60 raised by 1968/69. 
printed cost free by the W. Not reported in later NHC 
German State of Hessen. reports. 
Offered to the public at 
11= each to raise funds 
with effect from 3.3.67. 
1966/67 Continental Houses Tshs 35.6m/= for Old Fell through 
Airfield Housing Scheme 
During the First Five YearDevelofrnent Plan (1 964-69), the NHC was earmarked to spend 
£20m, out of which the government was set to provide £5m, and the balance was to be 
sought by the NHC from other local and external sources. The government's contribution was 
to be used for: house construction (C3.5), site development (flm.), reconstruction and 
improvement of houses (0.25m.) and the Urban Roof Loan Scheme (f0.25). In effect 
therefore the NHC was allocated only 25% of what it was supposed to spend between 1964 
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and 1969.   Because of this, various fund raising trips to countries like West Germany, the 
USA, United Kingdom and Holland were undertaken by NHC authorities and the Minister for 
Housing. Only West Germany provided first, a loan of Tshs 19.4m/=, and then a grant of 
some capital equipment, as well as a loan of Tshs 3m1= for slum clearance in Arusha, and 
another for clearing the Buguruni squatter settlement and redeveloping the site. Attempts 
were made locally to raise funds for various of the NHC's schemes mainly in Oar es Salaam 
as itemised in Table 6.3. 
It will be noted that the NHC's efforts to raise funds proved unsuccessful. It does appear 
that there was something discouraging investors to risk their money with the NHC. It is 
surmised that the reason for this was that there was fear that the NHC was more of a 
political, rather than an economic institution. So the Corporation relied almost entirely on 
government grants and rental income for its developmnet activities. The government however 
did not fulfil its pledge of giving the NHC the Tshs lOOm/= during the First Five Year 
Development Plan. Only Tshs. 69.4m1= was given out. Thus, the ideals of improving housing 
conditions through the NHC were not matched by resources from the government. This 
sugests that the NHC was not seen as the key solution to the housing problem as is usually 
portrayed, but as a political rook, which it has continued to be. During its first decade of 
existence, the NHC undertook various slum clearance, tenant purchase, and self help schemes; 
as well as constructed thousands of housing units for rental. The bulk of these schemes were 
in Dar es Salaam and affected the city's land use structure. 
(a) The Slum Clearance Scheme 
The word "slum" was useduring the 1 960s, to refer to an area with houses constructed 
by Africans in traditional materials of pole and mud walls and thatched roofs. In Dar es Salaam 
such buildings were constructed ithe 1950s in the areas of Kinondoni, Magomeni, and 
Temeke. Older "slum" areas going back to the mid 1 930s and earlier, were at Kariakoo and 
Ilala, and newer ons of the late 1 950s and 1 960s, included Mwananyamala. It is noteworthy 
that some for the so called slum houses that were demolished by the NHC were new having 
been constructed in the 1 960s, some, on the eve of, and during the progress of, the slum 
clearance exercise. Buildings constructed of modern materials in the slum cleared areas were 
not demolished. The issue was mainly to get rid of building constructed of traditional 
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materials. 
Slum clearance started in earnest in the Magomeni Area of Dar es Salaam in 1964.   The 
exercise was then extended to llala, Temeke, Keko and Mwananyamala. The procedure was 
usually that temporary structures would be put up to accommodate the owners of the houses 
to be demolished, until the new buildings were ready. The owners could, if they wished, 
contribute their labour as part of the cost. What was demolished in most cases was the six 
roomed Swahili houses in traditional materials. This was replaced by a similar Swahili house 
in modern materials. In most cases each house was provided with a pit latrine, a stand water 
pipe, and electricity. Roads in the slum cleared areas were tarmaced, and surface water 
drainage provided. 
Significantly, slum clearance per se does not appear to be prominent in the programmes 
outlined in the First Three Year Development Plan, or in the First Five Year Development Plan. 
The prominence given to slum clearance appears to have been the brainchild of the politicians 
who indeed capitalised on the scheme. The foundation stone for the first slum clearance 
house was laid by Emperor Haile Sellasie of Ethiopia. 26 In 1963,   President Nyerere, several 
cabinet Ministers, senior government officials, Members of Parliament, and other prominent 
personalities in the country, took part in a self-help scheme to build houses in the Magomeni 
area of Dar es Salaam which were (to be) used as transit houses for people whose houses 
were (to be) demolished for rebuilding. 27  This supports the view that the slum clearance 
undertaking had as much the drive to improve the quality of houses, as to gain political 
popularity. For, it can be pointed out that, even as the slum clearance was in full swing, the 
Dares Salaam City Council wissuing new building permits to people to build in traditional 
materials. In one year alone, 1965,   349 permits were given for the construction of such 
buildings in areas such as: Temeke1 42 permits), Mwananyamala (1 55 permits), Kigamboni 
08 permits), Kinondoni (30 permits), and Ilala and Magomeni (2 permits in each area). 28 
26 	
National Housing Corporation, Annual Report 1964165, Dar es Salaam, 1965. 
27 
J.D. Kikenya, N.H.C.: Progress in Housing the Masses , Tanzan,a Notes and Records, 76, 1975, pp. 185-
191. 
28 	
Dar as Salaam City Council, Minutes, 1965. 
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The contention that political popularity may have been a more important consideration than 
the quality of houses is supported by this continuation of the issuing of building permits for 
temporary houses while similar ones were being demolished. It is hereby advanced that there 
were possibly two cauquses within the government ranks in relation to public housing. The 
first, which included Local Government Minister Job Lusinde, upheld the colonial idea of the 
danger to public health, of slums, and also held the neocolonial concept of housing that 
presented a proper image of the country. The other included President Nyerere, and saw in 
land policy, an opportunity for political consolidation. This latter group had the upper hand and 
was able to demolish and rebuild slums to gain political popularity, but at the same time allow 
the continuation of the putting up of housing in traditional materials, as well as of squatting 
since preventing these would have been politically unpopular. Popularity was doubled, when 
a few months later, the government would move into a "slum" area and convert the newly 
built traditional houses into ones of permanent materials. Thus, the slum clearance exercise 
was generally aimed at improving the political position of the government. 
The Magomeni area in Dar es Salaam was pivotal in the whole slum clearance exercise. 
It was singled out by the politicians as an area in which they would physically participate. 
This was due to the fact that many of the leaders had plots in Magomeni and the general 
environmental status of the area affected their interests directly. It was moreover necessary 
to remove the obvious contrast between the properties belonging to the leaders and those 
belonging to the masses in the same locality. 
By 1969,   when the slum clearance exercise was stopped only, 3667 houses (out of a 
targeted 50,000) had been deolished and rebuilt. Of these, 70% were in Dar es Salaam, in 
areas of Magomeni, Kinondoni, Mwananyamala, Ilala, Temeke, and Keko. The rest were in 
the towns of Morogoro, Dodoma, Ddtwara and Songea. 29 
It is intriguingWthat  Kariakoo, the oldest African area in Dar es Salaam, was not slum 
cleared during this period. It is hereby suggested that Kariakoo people must have protested 
against the slum clearance exercise as they were unsure of its effects. For, as the NHC 
29 	Tanzania, Second Five Year Plan for Soc/al and Economic Development, 1st July, 1969 to 30th June, 1974, 
Volumes land/I, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1969, p. 189. 
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admits in the case of Magomeni, there was a feeling of anti-pathy when the exercise started. 
It appears that the NHC had grander designs for redeveloping Kariakoo and replacing the 
existing occupants. This is suggested by the search for funds from private sources (see Table 
6.3) for Kariakoo's redevelopment. This search did not materialise living Karikaoo maroned.3° 
The slum clearance exercise had to be abandoned because it no longer made sense. It 
was realised that little was being added to the housing stock, while new buildings in 
traditional materials were being put up everywhere. There were also signs that the 
beneficiaries were not repaying their loans, some people arguing that President Nyerere had 
given them free houses as the product of Independence. Most significant however, was the 
fact that the late 1 960s presented a different political situation where symbolic undertakings 
like slum clearance were no longer necessary. 
Self Help Schemes 
Together with the slum clearance exercise, an attempt was made to organize people to 
carry out selfhelp schemes in terms of housing development i.e. to provide their labour and 
build their houses with the advice from, and materials provided by, the NHC, although 
self-help per se predated the creation of Corporation. Self help was also mobilised for the 
construction of roads, dispensaries, community halls, Party Offices etc. As far as self help 
housing was concerned, the results were disappointing, with a very slow rate of construction, 
and the lack of a true spirit of selfhelp. As the NHC noted, "the only selfhelper was the paid 
labourer, while the Corporation paid the skilled man". 31 Later on, loan collection, proved 
difficult and selfhelp was abandoned in 1968,   with only 540 houses put up mainly in the 
Magomeni area of Dar es Salaam. 32 
The Tenant Purchase Scheme 
This scheme started in 1963.   Houses were built on new plots acquired by the NHC and 
V 
complete buildings in various designs were put up and sold outright or on long term repayment 
30 	National Housing corporation, Annual Report 1964165. 
31 	Mukandala, The Political Economy. 
32 	Tanzania, Second Five Year Plan. 
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terms extending to between 15 - 25 years at a 5% rate of interest. The majority of the 
tenants were civil servants in middle positions, and the scheme was aimed at allowing them 
access to quality urban property, like had been African Urban Housing Loan Scheme. Like 
slum clearance, the tenant purchase scheme was given priority in the early days of the NHC. 
In 1 964/65, of the 1,11 5 houses constructed by the NHC, 80% were for tenant purchase. 
By the time the scheme was abandoned in 1969,   some 2,130 houses had been constructed 
mainly in Dar es Salaam's areas of Mwananyamala, Kinondoni, Magomeni, Keko, Kigogo and 
Temeke. The scheme had to be abandoned, however, mainly because it was an expensive 
undertaking, and loan repayment was proving to be a problem. Besides the political demise 
of such schemes in the later 1 960s, it was being conceived that the provision of plots and 
finance for people to build for themselves, would pay higher dividends both in terms of 
quantity and quality of houses put up. 
(d) The New Rentals Scheme 
In September 1964, the NHC gained control of some 4359 urban African quarters 
constructed during the colonial period. 33 Only the quarters earmarked for Africans, as 
opposed to all government quarters, were given to the NHC. Previously these African quarters 
were under the urban authorities. The government retained the senior and middle cadre 
houses put up by the colonial government which continued to be estate managed by the 
Ministry of Public Works. This fact, together with the observation that the NHC did not build 
substantially in the high class areas such as Oysterbay, suggests that the NHC was conceived 
to provide and manage housing in the middle to low cadre ranges, in the spirit of the colonial 
African urban quarters. 
Besides the above quarters, the NHC put up several of its own buildings for rental. 
Between 1 962/63-1 972/73, the NFJQ constructed 12,966 housing units utilising government 
grants totalling some Tshs 1 22.3m, plus a Tshs 1 9.4m loan from West Germany, plus the 
Corporation's own lncome e.g. from rents of the rental housing units. Of the total housing 
units, 63% (or 8209 units) were in Dar es Salaam. Table 6.4 shows the NHC's output in Dar 
es Salaam during its first ten years of existence. 
33 	National Housing Corporation, Annual Report, 1971172. 
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Table 6.4: NHC housing units constructed in Dares Salaam 1962/63-1972/73 










Magomeni 1523 - - - 1523 
Kinondoni 1387 - - - 1387 
Ubungo 624 - 432 - 1056 
lIala 688 168 96 72 1024 
Keko 504 5 192 273 974 
Temeke 416 - - - 416 
Morogoro Road - - - 72 72 
Kariakoo 12 - - - 12 
Upanga - - - 32 32 
Drive In Cinema - 80 - - 80 
Hanah Nassif 199 - - - 199 
Kijitonyama I 123 - - - 123t' 
Kijitonyama II 7 9 5 * - - 795 
Makurumla 310 - - - 310 
Kigogo 142 - - - 142 
Tandika 64 - - - 62 
Total 6787 253 720 499 8209 
Source: N .A. Pillai, A Study of the National Housing Corporation with special Emphasis on 
Financial performance, and a brief survey on the National Housing Sector in Tanzania, 
Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, 1976,   p. 40. 
*Core  slabs. 
(e) The National Housing Corporation, and the Government Strategy of Sites and Services 
With the abandonment oflum clearance and other schemes towards the end of the 
1 960s, government housing policy was slowly moving back to giving prominence to the sites 
and services schemes, preferably to be undertaken on a cooperative basis to reflect the 
government's socialist orientation. It. was stated in the Second Five Year Development Plan 
0 969-74) that selfelp and cooperative efforts in housing were to be encouraged. The NHC, 
besides its traditional role of providing houses, was to provide building plots as well. With 
respect to the latter, a total of Tshs 68m/= was planned to be spent by the NHC to provide 
sites and services plots, beginning with the expenditure of Tshs 1 .25m in 1 969/7 0.34  In 
34 	Tanzania, Second Five Year P/an, p. 25. 
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pursuit of the above, the NHC was in 1970/71, given Tshs lm/= by the Ministry of Lands, 
for sites and services projects. The money was used to construct foundations, foundations 
with core houses, and 2 model houses in the Kijitonyama/Mwenge area. The NHC spent a 
total of Tshs. 1.572m/= and 795 plots were serviced. The NHC expected to make some 
profit out of the sale of these plots only be told by the Ministry of Lands that 365 of the 
above plots had been allocated by the Ministry, to the Mwenge Cooperative Society, and that 
no profit was to be made out of the project. The NHC had thus to write off Tshs. 895,771 /= 
from its capital fund, and was, according to its 1973/74 Annual Report, struggling to recover 
the Tshs 51 2,171/= overexpenditure on the sites and service project from the Ministry of 
Lands. 35 Thus the NHC made a loss on this scheme. The Mwenge scheme was initially 
portrayed as a model low income households cooperative housing scheme. However as can 
be implied from the above, the scheme was highly subsidised and was once again, one of 
those symbolic projects in which, moreover, the NHC was used with disastrous results. It was 
not replicated. Later sites and services undertakings were simpler, and did not involve the 
NHC. 
The Decline of the National Housinci Corporation 
With effect from the 1st January 1973,   the government stopped giving capital grants to 
the NHC, which was directed to get its development resources from the newly created 
Tanzania Housing Bank. This marked the beginning of the demise of the NHC, as the Bank 
loans were given out at commercial interest rates. Earlier, through its operations the NHC had 
witnessed its other sources of income getting precarious. The collection of the Urban Roof 
Loans which had been inherited from the local authorities, as well as the collection of 
repayments in respect of the ?Um clearance and the tenant purchase schemes had become 
difficult. Worse still, even the collection of rents from its own estate managed houses had 
become a major problem. In 1 968/69 the NHC started complaining of large rent arrears. 36 
In 1970,   the government responded to this by exempting the NHC from sections 19 and 20 
of the Rent Restrittion Act of 1962,   so that the NHC was enabled to sue defaulters. This, 
however, covered only direct tenants not slum clearance or tenant purchase beneficiaries. 
35 	National Housing Corporation, Annual Report, 1973174, p. 12. 
36 	National Housing corporation, Annual Report, 1968169. 
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Arrears on the slum clearance scheme alone stood at Tshs. 2.1 5m/ = as of 30/6/1 970, the 
NHC pointing out that that had become: 
"a baffling problem for us to collect these arrears. As the matter involves some 
socio-political problems, we have brought the problem to the notice of higher 
authorities and sought their help in its solution" 37 
Other arrears persisted as well. In 1970, total arrears stood at Tshs. 5.86m./=. Despite the 
NHC's issuing prompt demand notes and opening their offices late at month ends, rent arrears 
continued to grow. 
The NHC tried to work through the ruling party (TANU)'s branches to explain the 
importance of rent payments but, "it is unfortunate that these discussions were endless and 
did not bear any fruits". 38  In 1971/72, arrears stood at Tshs. 7.26m/=. The NHC was 
complaining of political interference and was appealing to top National leaders and Members 
of Parliament to find a solution. 39  Partly in response to this, the government, in 1973,   
decided on a new system of rent collection from public employees residing in public (including 
NHC) housing, whereby house rent would be a percentage of the employees salary i.e. 7 Y %, 
10%, and 12½%, depending on the salary scale, deducted directly from this salary by the 
employers, who would then remit it to the NHC, topping up, or keeping, the difference 
between the property's passing rent and the proportion of the employees' salary deducted as 
rent. Employers were expected to effect some cross subsidy since highly paid employees 
would subsidise poorer ones. The scheme appears to have only served to exacerbate the 
NHC's problems. The Corporation lost direct control over its tenants, and many employers 
reneged on submitting rents even when they had deducted their employees' salaries. Major 
defaulters included Government Ministries, Parastatal Organisations and the Ruling Party, 
making NHC's financial position most precarious. As of December 1977,   public bodies owed 
the NHC, 90% of rent arrears40 . 
AN 
37 National Housing Corporation, Annual Report, 1969170, P. 5. 
38 	National Housing Corporation, Annual Reports, 1971172. 
39 ibid. 
40 Daily News (Tanzania), 27112/1971. 
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The other major problem facing the NHC was the low rents charged for its houses. Until 
1984,   rent determination was controlled by the Rent Restriction Act, 1962,   which applied to 
the NHC, and which limited rents to a maximum of 14% of the historical cost of construction. 
Thus, as years went by,the value of the NHC rent income went down. The Rent Restriction 
Act did not provide for rent reviews. A new 1984 Rent Restriction Act allowed the 
determination of rents on the basis of 14% or 1 8% of the value of residential and commercial 
property respectively, but the NHC was, from 1985,   engaged in a struggle between itself and 
its tenants over the new rents which it wanted to introduce 41 . The NHC did subsequently 
manage to put up rents over a number of its properties but such rents have been described 
42 as being "too little" and coming tttoo late". In 1992, the NHC was exempted from the 
provisions of the Rent Restriction Act 1984,   but its efforts to get higher rents from its 
business properties, have been hampered by continued court and political action spearheaded 
by the business (mainly Asian community). Government support for the NHC has been hostile, 
ambivalent, lukewarm, and capricious. 
In response to the government policy requiring it to raise its own capital development 
funds, the NHC negotiated with the Permanent Housing Finance Corporation of Tanzania for 
a loan of Tshs lOm/= during 1968/69 In the following consecutive years, loans of Tshs 
5m/= and Tshs. 5.4m/= were respectively raised. In 1971/72 another loan of Tshs 
13.17m/= was raised from the newly created Tanzania Housing Bank. Besides, the NHC 
began to get engaged in contracting work for government departments and for parastatals to 
boost its income. 
The loans raised were to be repaid at commercial interest rates, and with low and poorly 
paid rents, and rising overheads, the NHC found that it could not repay its loans promptly. In 
1972/73 only Tshs. 0.835m/= oof the Tshs 2.048/=m interest due, could be repaid to 
the Tanzania Housing Bank. The NHC also started defaulting on the West German loan, and 
was by 30/6/1 97, Tshs. 2,09m/= in arrears. While total repayment default stood at Tshs 
41  J.M.L. Kironde, ,, Rent Control Legislation and the National Housing Corporation in Tanzania, 1985-1990 
canadianJourna/ofAfrican Studies, Volume 26, No.2, August 1992, pp.  306-327. 
42 	ibid. 
340 
4.14m/= as of 30/6/1 973, revenue arrears stood at Tshs. 8.402m/= suggesting that there 
was scope for meeting loan repayment obligations if revenue arrears could be paid. 43 
However, there was no positive government policy to help the NHC solve its problem of low 
revenue, much of which. was in arrears. By December, 1990,   the NHC had an outstanding 
loan with the Tanzania Housing Bank of Tshs 327m/=. As there was little hope of it ever 
being repaid, the government, rather than allow economic rents, decided to write it off. The 
decline of the NHC can be gauged from the fall in its construction output as shown in Table 
6.5. Thus in the eight years to 1990,   the NHC's output was less than 30 units per annum. 
NHC financial reports show consistent losses from the mid - 1 970s particularly on the rental 
activity. This has forced the NHC not just to seek contractor work, but also to construct for 
sale (rather than estate management), a task which is hampered by limited capital, and lack 
of well located plots. It has had also to sell some of its capital assets to raise income. In fact 
the NHC was again able to convince the government to give it a subsidy which has been Tshs 
44 60m/= p.a. since 1985. 
Table 6.5 Units completed by NHC, 1962/63 - 1989/90 
Units % Units Amount Amount 
Year Completed Completed invested invested per 
(Millions, Tshs) unit (Tshs) 
1962/63-1971/72 11,632 72.9 198.0 17,000 
1972/73-1981/82 4,098 25.7 144.7 35,300 
1982/83-1989/90 234 1.5 184.4 788,000 
1962/63-1989/90 15,E4 100 527.1 33,000 
%J%JUII,V- F'jau.jujuai nuuiiiy 	UIUdLIUI1 recoros 
Besides, the condition of the NHC's housing stock has deteriorated seriously due to lack 
of maintenance, leading to a vicious circle where tenants refuse to pay high rents because the 
houses are not maintained, while the NHC says it cannot maintain the houses because of low 
43 	
PiIIai, A Study of the National Housing Corporation. 
44 	
Matrix Development Consultants, Strategy for the 1990s and Beyond, Report prepared for the National 
Housing Corporation, 1992. 
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Table 6.6: NHC's Profit and Loss Appropriation Account, 1986- 1990, (Million Tshs.) 
Type Of Activity 	- 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Profit (Loss) on Rental 
Activity (30.6) (20.6) (27.9) (16.9) 28.4 
Profit (Loss) on 
Construction Activity - 26.5 - 19.0 58.1 
Profit (Loss) on contract 
work - - 3.6 (3.9) 20.3 
Profit (Loss) on 
Factor i es * (0:5) (0.6) (0.4) (2.0) 0.5 
Net Profit (Loss) (31.1) 5.3 (24.7) (3.7) 107.4 
Accumulated Profit 
(Loss) brought forward (119.5) (150.6) (145.2) (169.9) (182.1)** 
Accumulated Profit 
(Loss) carried forward (150.6) (145.2) (169.9) (173.6) (74.6) 
* The NHC owns a number of factories manufacturing building materials. 
** Figures adjusted by the Auditors to add an extra Tshs. 8.5m/= 
Source: 	NHC Audited Accounts, relevant years. The improvement shown in 1990 was 
a result of the merger of the old NHC with the Registrar of Buildings, the latter 
created in 1971 to manage high cost nationalised buildings. The Registrar of 
Buildings was ming a comfortable profit from its rental activity. 
rents. A summary of NHC's audited accounts for the five years to 1990 shows a gloomy 
picture (Table 6.6) 
The Corporation has been drifting since around 1973 without a clear government 
supported role 45 . Today, there are claims of high circle involvement in the sale or lease of 
45 	Mukandala, The Political Economy.... 
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NHC houses to private individuals at give away prices. The Asian community, who were the 
most adversely affected by the nationalisation of buildings in 1971 are also claiming their 
properties back, and are challenging the legality of the NHC charging them any, let alone high, 
rents. While such wrangling is going on, there is no hint as to what government policy in 
respect of the future of the NHC is although it has directed the Corporation to sell most of its 
rental property. A recent consultants Report recommended that the NHC abandon its estate 
management and construction activities, and instead, concentrate on providing serviced 
land •46 
This may not be possible because of the importance attached to the public ownership 
of some buildings by the government and by the political system. Nevertheless service land 
provision would be a role worthy serious consideration. The NHC needs a new dynamic and 
profitable role away from its current problematic estate managing of an ageing property 
portifolio, if it is not to die out altogether. 
The imDact of the NHC's activities on Dar es Salaam's land use structure 
The slum clearance exercise of the 1 960s introduced new housing and environmental 
standards in the affected areas, by transforming the Swahili house from its hitherto 
construction in traditional materials, to modern materials. Each house was, moreover, 
connected to piped water and was provided with a hygienic pit latrine. Roads in these areas 
were all macadamized. So, compared to the African residential areas of the colonial era, the 
slum cleared areas represented a major transformation, and this squared well with the 
conception of the housing probl?m soon after independence. Slum cleared areas could always 
be pointed to as a clear symbol of the government's concern for peoples housing. Up to the 
late 1 970s, the Swahili house in thelum cleared areas dominated the housing rental market 
both conceptually and practically in the city of Dar es Salaam. Later, private house 
construction, takin cue from the cleared areas, tended to be in modern materials. 
46 	
Matrix Development Consultants, Strategy for the 1 990s and Beyond. 
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The actual addition to the housing stock by the NHC was however limited averaging no 
more than 400 units p.a. during the 1 964-69 first Five Year Development Plan. These new 
housing units were usually allocated by powerful national or local bodies, usually to 
government or other public sector employees; or allocated in "block" to institutions. 
Institutions renting substantial NHC units include the Army, the Treasury and "Housing 
Allocation Committee 'A", the latter being the one dealing with housing for important 
government officials. Most NHC tenants are therefore those who could be called "the elite". 
However, since the NHC's output has been low, its impact on the general housing stock has 
been highly restricted. 
In putting up tenant purchase as well as rental houses, the NHC developed sizeable areas 
of Dar es Salaam. However, in cases like those of Keko, and Buguruni, this involved the 
demolition of existing unplanned areas whose occupiers were usually replaced. Nevertheless, 
unplanned areas removal was not a generalised policy in Dar es Salaam. In the cases, like 
those of Mbulahati, and the Kijitonyama/Mwenge sites and services scheme, the NHC was 
a pioneer, opening up then undeveloped areas, and attracting building activities there. 
The NHC, particularly after its merger with the Registrar of Buildings, is the owner of 
extensive urban property including valuable city centre plots. The NHC's limited maintenance 
and redevelopment capacity (largely due to low rents) means that such property is 
deteriorating fast, and the land occupied by such buildings is in many cases being 
underutilised. 
It is however submitted that the NHC has throughout its life, been used as a political 
expediency, with negative effects on the national economy (in terms of grants and loans 
which are not recovered), but with pesitive advantages to households occupying NHC houses 
who pay comparatively low rents, and enjoy tight security to tenure. While it is admitted that 
V 
some landlords and tenants in the slum clearance areas were among the poor who benefitted 
from better quality housing, this does not mean that slum clearance was undertaken merely 
to alleviate poverty, or to simply improve housing conditions but to achieve political ends. The 
NHC later concentrated on medium to high income housing hardly doing anything about the 
traditional poor man's areas. Thus unplanned areas grew chaotically, devoid of most service 
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infrastructure, without the NHC playing any role to ameliorate this situation. Since the NHC's 
unit output has remained miniscule vis a vis private construction, its housing has ended up 
in the hands of a few, who continue to be subsidised by the rest of society. Low rents have 
in turn led to poor maintenance so that some for the NHC estates, particularly, the old ones, 
are in pathetic conditions. To claim, as the then NHC general manager does, that the NHC did 
anything to house the masses 47 is simply expeditious. 
6.2.5 Land Policy impacts on the land use structure od Dar es Salaam during the 1960s: 
An overview 
The 1960s   can be seen as a period when national consolidation was necessary. Policies 
undertaken by the government included the Africanisation, not just of the Civil Service, but 
also of former European and Indian residential areas, as well as the encouraging of sections 
of the African population to put up permanent houses in Dar es Salaam. This policy involved 
mainly senior civil servants and politicians. The NHC carried out limited slum clearance, tenant 
purchase, and rental housing schemes which were mainly politically symbolic, and benefited 
a limited number of urban residents. For the rest and majority of the Africans, continued self- 
construction in traditional materials was allowed, and squatting (discussed in the following 
Chapter) was tolerated. 
6.3 Economic Responses 
6.3.1. The Unfolding post-colonial set up 
After Independence, racial stratification as practiced during the colonial era was no longer 
tenable. The Africans exeed their supremacy which had been suppressed throughout the 
colonial period. Europeans, declined both in numbers, and in social power. While the 
continuation of identifying the jctors on the Dar es Salaam land use scene on a racial basis 
would still be plausible, increasingly the Africans were getting dominant in all areas of policy 
making, and were getting stratified within themselves. We will now examine the economic 
reaction to the unfolding post-colonial set up in relation to Dar es Salaam's land use structure. 
47 	Kikenya, "National Housing Corporation". 
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6.3.2 Africanisation 
Throughout the 1 960s to 1967 Senior Civil Servants and politician utilised the 
opportunity to acquire land in Dar es Salaam, as has been discussed earlier on, in the area of 
Magomeni, Upanga, Oysterbay, Kurasini, and Kinondoni. By far the majority invested in single 
or double storeyed structures in permanent materials, and no doubt utilised the existing 
financial facilities i.e. The Revolving Loan Fund for government Senior Officials and the 
Permanent Housing Finance Company of Tanganyika (which was later on taken over by the 
Tanzania Housing Bank). By the time of the Arusha Declaration in 1967,   several of the top 
leaders owned more than one house in Dar es Salaam. The dangers which such tendencies 
to amass wealth posed to President Nyerere's goal of creating a socialist and egalitarian 
society, led to the adoption, in the Arusha Declaration, of a tough code against the ownership 
of rented property by public officials and their families. A number of these were compelled to 
sell their properties mainly to the expanding parastatal sector. This was however, only a 
temporary set back, for, as Yaeger notes, the Leadership Code was being violated so that in 
1973,   an Enforcement Committee had to be formed. "The problem of how to eradicate the 
avaricious and authoritarian inclination in Tanzania's political class" remained. 48 Politicians 
and government officials continued to acquire and develop land furtively under various guises. 
The bulk of the African population who were allocated plots in the Dar es Salaam's City 
Council's plot allocation schemes continued to build in traditional materials almost throughout 
the 1960s so that by 1968, only 35% of Dar es Salaam's dwellings were in permanent 
materials. 49 
6.3.3. Slum Clearance 
The government's endeavour to clear slums produced mixed reaction. At first the move 
was unpopular, perhaps because thandowners were not too sure whether the government 
would deliver. The NHC's report for 1964/65 notes that there was a feeling of antipathy when 
the slum clearanceoperation began in Magomeni. This then disappeared. "We now find 
48 	R. Yaager, Tanzania: An African Experiment, Westview Press, Boulder (Colorado) and Gower Hamshire 
(England), 1982, p.  61. 
49 	
J. Leaning, Housing and Urban Land distribution in Urban Tanzania, Economic Research Bureau,University 
of Dar es Salaam, 1972, p.  9. 
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ourselves unable to cope with the demands for house demolition". 50 This was mainly due 
to the fact that the whole scheme was highly beneficial to the landowners who got new 
houses in a well serviced environment, for their old ones in a poor environment. It is true that 
these landowners had to . pay back the loan but this was spread over a long period at a fixed 
low interest rate of 5%. Most landlords were required to let out several of the six rooms in 
their new houses and retain one or two for their own use. The typical rent for such rooms 
was Ths 30/= per month. If five rooms were let, this yielded Tshs 150/= while repayment 
to the NHC was usually in the region of Tshs 80/= per month. This was therefore affordable. 
Nevertheless it is noted that many landlords soon fell into arrears presumably because they 
consumed all the money. Realising this, the government increased the rents for Swahili house 
rooms in 1977, from Tshs 30/= to Tshs 50/= per month, so as to encourage repayment. 
This did not improve matters and up to today (1 993) many beneficiaries of the slum clearance 
scheme still owe the NHC, although all should have cleared their loans during the 1 980s. 
According to NHC officials, however, such arrears are so low in value that they are not 
worthy following up. Thus these landowners got themselves a bargain and the contention that 
the slum clearance exercise was detrimental to the landowners' interests is probably 
misplaced. 
6.4 Overall Deductions on the Evolution of Dar es salaam's Land Use Structure During the 
1960s 
The period under review witnessed the rapid development of Dar es Salaam both in 
terms of area, and population. The ushering in of the post colonial era and the need to 
consolidate this phase dictated Revernment policy. The hand of the government in controlling 
land was strengthened by the enactment of the Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government 
Leases Act of 1963.   The effects of this law was to be felt heavily in the 1 970s and 1 980s 
during the implementation of planniAb schemes. "Symbolic" and politically popular schemes 
like slum clearance, or housing construction by the NHC were undertaken. These schemes 
transformed the environmental quality of the areas involved. The slum clearance and other 
NHC schemes allowed the beneficiaries to acquire or occupy housing at very favourable 
terms. The NHC in particular had some considerable impact on Dar es Salaam's land use 
50 	National Housing Corporation, Annual Report, 1 964/65, p.  7. 
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structure, although its role declined fast during the 1 970s. At the same time, and for the 
same reasons, squatter development, as well as continued house construction in traditional 
materials were tolerated. The racial composition of the former non-African residential areas 
changed drastically as the government encouraged Africanisation, and as the new leaders 
utilised their positions to acquire land in former European and Indian areas, and created 
conditions enabling them to develop it, and as they extended their grip on new choice areas. 
The struggle to occupy land along the coastline by the powerful was clearly manifest. 
Thus Dar es Salaam's land use structure continued to be shaped by government land 
policy. What is significant is that this policy was motivated by neither efficiency nor equity, 
but rather, by personal interests and political expediency. However, despite the government's 
planning schemes, the phenomenon of squatting (discussed in the following Chapter) was 
taking place in Oar es Salaam at an alarming rate, and the government seemed both powerless 




A CITY OF SQUATTERS 1 AND PLANNING SCHEMES 
7.1. Dar es Salaam: The Second Decade of Independence 
Major historical happenings during the second decade of Independence which had impacts 
on Dar es Salaam's land use structure included: the adoption of Socialism in 1 967; the 
accelerated villagisation during the second half of the 1 970s; the abolition of local 
governments between 1972 and 1 974; and the economic crisis that grippled the country from 
about 1974.   The abolition of local governments, had detrimental effects on urban 
management in the country and is discussed in Chapter Eight. The rest of these happenings 
are broached in this section. 
In 1967,   Tanzania had opted for Ujamaa socialism. This policy barred senior public 
officials and politicians from investing in landed property and from accummulating wealth. The 
policy too required the peasantry to live in communal Ujamaa villages. Movement to these 
villages was originally meant to be voluntary, but by 1973 it was realised that this movement 
was slow. In 1974 there was a major countrywide "operation" to move millions of peasants 
into these villages. It is likely that accelerated villagisation also encouraged rural-urban 
migration. The population of Dar es salaam more that trebled between 1967 and 1987.   From 
1974,   Tanzania was thrown into a deep economic crisis. 
All the above disastrous consequences for Dar es Salaam. While the City grew at a very 
high rate, urban management was disrupted at the same time as the nation was suffering 
from an economic crisis. 
There were various efforts to guide urban development through various planning schemes. 
Key ones were the Dar es Salaam masterplans of 1968 and 1979; and the World Bank 
1 	The term "squatting" is used strictly to denote a situation where people acquire and develop land outside the 
government system. It is not meant to imply any attitude towards the legal status of tenure over the land occupied. 
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supported sites and service schemes of the 1 970s. The masterplans do not appear to have 
been implemented. The sites and service project yielded results contrary to those originally 
aimed at; and in 1984 the World Bank pulled out of the project. Nevertheless, planning 
schemes have continued to be hatched for various parts of Dar es Salaam, and in this process, 
the struggle by the authorities to control land through planning schemes has become manifest. 
However, unplanned development, popularly known as squatting, was growing fast, so that, 
by 1979,   over 60% of Dar es Salaam's population was living in such areas. Therefore, the 
Dar es Salaam of the 1 970s onwards can rightly be called a city.of squatters and planning 
schemes. 
7.2 Land Policy Impacts 
7.2.1 Major Policy Tools 
No major legislation related to land was passed during the period under review, but several 
policy undertakings, and attitudes affected Dar es Salaam's land use structure. We consider, 
in sequence, the attempts at the overal planning of Dar es Salaam, including masterplanning; 
squatting and government attitudes towards this phenomenon; the World Bank supported 
sites and service schemes; planning schemes outside the sites and sevrices schemes; and 
the attempts to perpetrate the sites and services schemes without the World Bank. 
7.2.2. Policy towards the general planning of Dar es Salaam 
Backciround 
By the time of Independence, a Town Planning Department was well established in the 
country within the Ministry for Local Government and the Town and Country Planning 
Ordinance 1956, was in operatih. However, throughout the 1 950s, the Chief Town Planning 
Officer, L. Sylvester White, was wont of complaining that Town Planning was not properly 
understood in the country, and thate was starved of resources (particularly manpower). A 
town planning scheme for Dar es Salaam prepared by White had been placed before the then 
Dar es Salaam Munlcipal Council in 1954 but had not been fully adopted by it, (the Council). 
Therefore Dar es Salaam grew in accordance with ad hoc planning schemes prepared for 
various areas, despite the 1949 Plan. White would appear to have had anything but cordial 
relationship with other planning authorities in the country in general, and with the Dar es 
Salaam Municipal Council in particular, so that changes were deemed necessary. The Town 
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and Country Planning Board which he headed, was disbanded in 1961 and its powers 
transferred to the Minister responsible for Town Planning. White himself was replaced in 1961 
while on leave. His assistant, R.L. Sharp, was promoted to the post of Chief Town Planning 
Officer, which was made a Commission. The declaration of Dar es Salaam as a planning area 
was renewed in 1960,   although no progress in the preparation of a General Planning Scheme 
for Dar es Salaam was reported in 1 961 •2  Addressing the Dar es Salaam Municipal Council 
in February 1961, The Minister for Local Government and Housing, Hon. R.M. Kawawa, 
complained that although the Council had been made a preparatory (planning) authority and 
was as such expected to prepare a planning scheme for Dar es Salaam, it was neither doing 
that, nor accepting plans, services, or advice from the government Town Planning 
Department: 
the present position is that, here in Dar es Salaam there is less active and 
creative Town Planning than in many of the small upcountry towns. No one 
really knows what the plan is, or what the intentions are; many investors and 
developers are puzzled, and there is no yardstick to use in the control of 
development. 3 
Kawawa alluded to the "long and sad history of dissension" between the Council and the 
Town and Country Planning Control Board, but hoped that that then belonged to the past, and 
that the Council would "get down to planning and to the smooth control of development". 4 
Relations between the Town Planning Department and the City Council improved 
considerably in 1961 after White's departure, and arrangements were made for informal 
discussions between the Commissioner for Town Planning and the City Engineer concerning 
applications submitted for planning consent. On its part, the Council appointed one Mr. K.M. 
Ghandhi as a Town Planning b1nd Architectural Assistant in the City Engineer's department, 
to advise it on planning issues. 5 
2 Tanganyika, Annual Report of the Town Planning Department, 1961, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1962,   p. 
2. 
Dar as Salaam Municipal Council, Minutes, 1961, p.  65. 
ibid. 
Tanganyika, Annual Report of the Town and Country Planning Department, 1961, p. 31. 
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All the same there was little progress in the preparation of a general planning scheme 
for Dar es Salaam. Addressing the City Council on 16/1/1963 the Minister for Local 
Government, Job Lusinde, hoped that the Council would then "come to grips with the problem 
of drawing up a general planning scheme for the city which has been so long delayed, 
although it is the first duty of your Council as a preparatory authority". 6 
In October 1963,   Tanganyikan President, Julius Nyerere, criticised town planning 
within the City of Dar es Salaam and wanted to know what was being done to improve 
matters. As a result, the Council was required by the Minister for Local Government to submit 
a general planning scheme for Dar es Salaam within one year with effect from 22/11/1 963 
otherwise the Minister threatened to cancel the declaration of Dar es Salaam as a planning 
area. 7 The Council was able to convince the government that it had no resources to fulfil 
such a feat, and that help be sought from outside consultants. In 1964,   efforts were made 
to obtain overseas financial and technical aid to prepare a revised master plan for Dar es 
Salaam, and in 1965,   Canada tentatively agreed to support this with a longterm loan. At the 
same time, Macrosurveys of Nairobi were engaged to carry out a comprehensive social survey 
of Dar es Salaam including land uses, building types, travel habits and family composition, to 
form the basis of a revised Dar es Salaam Masterplan. 8 In February 1967,   Project Planning 
Associates, a Canadian firm of planning consultants, started preparing the Dar es Salaam 
Masterplan. The project was, except for local costs, financed by Canada, with a Tshs. 
2.8m/= interest free loan, repayable in 50 years. The Masterplan (herein referred to as the 
1968 Oar Masterplan) was ready around April, 1968.   
Instead of the Dar es SaTam and Central government authorities sitting together and 
working out a development policy for the city in consultation with the city residents, they 
preferred to seek foreign assist,nce. This fitted in well with the concept of the 
internationalisation of national management which had started in 1959 with the World Bank 
6 Dar as Salaam City Council, Minutes, 1963,   p. 8. 
ibid. 
8 Tanzania, Report of the Town Planning Department, 1964. p. 6. 
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Mission to Tanganyika. The internationalisation of town planning appeared beneficial since the 
consultants were to be paid by a long term loan provided by external support. The loan would 
not be repayable for decades. More importantly, both the Council and the central government 
were, at least in the short term, relieved of the burden of policy making, and of the pressure 
to effectively control the development of Dar es Salaam (like dealing with squatting, for 
example). In the longterm, a masterplan was a useful tool of reference which could guide land 
uses but which could also enable authorities to illegalise existing land uses and therefore 
effect the displacement of existing occupiers. 
The Dar es Salaam Masterølan of 1968 
The proposed land use scheme proposed in the 1968 Dar Masterplan in shown in Figure 
7.1. It was the product of an ambitious post-war second generation which emphasized 
scientific rigour and methodological complexity as the panacea for urban problems in contrast 
to the descriptive and impressionistic approach based on notions of architectural design which 
characterised the previous generation of the 1949 P/an for Dar es Sa/aam. 9 It stressed the 
importance, not just of the city, but also of the region. In terms of time scale, it incorporated, 
not just the customary twenty years, but also a long range perspective of how Dar es Salaam 
should be developing by the year 2,000. It utilised the then popular 'systems" view so that 
the envisaged eightford expansion of the city's growth was to be accommodated according 
to a planned modular growth. Expansion was to grow westwards until the western scarp was 
reached, then north and south, parallel to the coast. To prevent sprawl there would be a green 
belt guiding the city, beyond which satellite sub-cities would be developed as far as Wazo Hill 
to the north, and Mzinga Creek to the South (Figure 7.1). Within this framework, new 
residential areas were to be formed into neighbourhood units, i.e. partly self contained units 
providing district level services to their planned 40,000 inhabitants, and themselves 
comprising four district village unitTo reflect some aspect of Tanzania's socio-political 
preferences, the 1968 Dar Masterplan proposed to breakdown racial segregation, and to 
create a variety of prot sizes in each area. Densities too were to be reduced in high density 
areas, and increased in low density ones. Housing clusters were to be based on the ten cell 
A.M. Armstrong, "Master Planning for Dar as Salaam, Tanzania", Habitat International, Volume 11, No. 2, 1987, pp. 
133-145. 
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unit, and building standards were to be relaxed and the use of traditional materials 
encouraged) ° 
However, contrary to the then grain of political thinking, in Tanzania, prestige and 
aesthetics received considerable stress, with a planned new impressive government complex 
as a phallic showpiece at the Western edge of the city, linked to the Central Business District 
by a wide parkway set in an open corridor. The concept of the breeze lanes in the 1949 P/an, 
was, like that of neighbourhood units, reintroduced in the 1968 Masterplan in the form of 
landscape corridors and open space fingers. A tough policy was proposed against unplanned 
development, and the draconian measurers proposed included the employment of a staff of 
enforcement officers, the outright removal of emergent squatter areas and all those 
developments inconsistent with the Masterplan, and the non payment of compensation for 
disturbance and non-resettlement of squatters thus cleared. 11 
This antisquatters attitude may have been the influence of the Commissioner for Town 
Planning, R.L. Sharp, who throughout the 1 960s had been hammering at authorities, both 
central and local, to do something about squatting but getting little action out of them 
(below). 
The 1968 Dar Masterp/an was hardly implemented despite its impressive proposals. The 
main problem would appear to be that it proposed a level of government investment and land 
use direction completely inconsistent with existing realities in terms of financial resources, 
political willingness and manpower availability. 12 The Masterplan did not make clear what 
was wrong with the then city's organic and piecemeal development necessitating such 
proposed drastic action. Besid&, it was clearly overambitious. The government therefore 
ignored it (despite that its cost had to be repaid and despite the massive expenditure through 
the Town Planning Department proposed in the Second Five YearDeve/opment P/an) and went 
10 ibid. p.  141. 
ibid; 0. Sandberg, Attitudes Towards Squatting: A Review, BRALUP Research Report, University of Dar es Salaam, 
1974. 
12 A.M. Hayuma, Economic and Financial Constraints in the Implementation of the 1968 Dar es Salaam Masterplan, 
Occasional Paper No. 3., Department of urban and Rural Planning, Ardhi Institute, Dar es Salaam, 1984. 
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ahead and proposed its own programme of urban development. This included the 
decentralisation of economic activity from Dar es Salaam to other urban areas, and the 
shifting of the country's capital to Dodoma. 13 These policies, to some extent, diverted 
government attention from Dar es Salaam and its Masterplan. 
Dar es Salaam continued to develop on two bases: piecemeal planning schemes 
(including sites and services) which never took a holistic view of the whole city or region; and 
squatting, which the government continued to tolerate and to legalise. It would moreover 
appear that the 1968 Oar Masterplan did not influence the government's decisions with 
respect to planning schemes like the sites and services schemes of 1 970s. Within some ten 
years after the 1968 Oar Masterplan was completed, the government had engaged a new firm 
of consultants to prepare a new one. 
The 1979 Oar es Sa/aam MasterIan 
The inadequacies of the 1968 Oar Masterplan, and the felt need of a comprehensive 
approach to Dar es Salaam's development led to the commissioning of another Canadian firm, 
Marshall Macklin Monoghan, to prepare a new Dar es Salaam masterplan. Funded by a 
Swedish grant-in-aid, the 1979 Oar Masterplan is considered to be still current. Its proposals 
were more flexible, pragmatic and down to earth than those of its predecessor, 14 
concentrating more on the pressing and detailed concern of urban management. This was in 
line with a new generation of planners who shunned the rigid, overdetailed long range 
scenarios, in favour of less exhaustive preplan survey and analysis, and attempts to lay down 
practical programmes in the light of the prevailing realities; and emphasizing control and 
implementation rather than desii. No rigid schedule of population forecast was stipulated. 
It merely identified three broad development stages by way of the level of population to be 
attained, and for each stage, areaof the city to be developed, and the capital works 
programmes to be implemented. The population levels to be accommodated were 1 .2m, 1 .5m 
V 
13 It is nevertheless baffling that this same firm of Planning Consultants was engaged to prepare the Masterplan for the 
new capital city at Dodoma. 
14 Armstrong, "Masterplans for Dares Salaam", p.  142. 
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Figure 7.2 The 1979 Dar Masterplan: Proposed landuse scheme 
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and 2.4m inhabitants, the latter figure earmarked for the year 2000. The Masterplan also 
incorporated greater "participation", a then fashionable trend in the planning world, but not 
of the general public and urban land users, but of the politicians, administrators, and national 
and city agencies. This was aimed at overcoming the problem of poor coordination, and also 
of forestalling criticism. 15 The Masterplan was pragmatic against separating land uses, 
suggesting that industry be encouraged to locate throughout the urban area to achieve 
balance between job opportunities, residences, and distances. Squatters were also to be 
accommodated, as was housing constructed in local materials. As a result, all areas then 
squatted upon, were zoned residential. 
The landuse she me proposed for Oar es Salaam by the 1979 Dar Masterplan is shown 
in Figure 7.2 While the Masterplan tried to avoid the criticisms levelled against the earlier 
plans, it nevertheless proposed a level of expenditure that exceeded that spent by the Dar es 
Salaam City Council on all development projects within the previous five years, at a period of 
gathering economic hardships and stringency. According to Campbell, the 1979 Dar 
Masterplan was impossible to implement as it "bore no visible relation to developments 
actually taking place." 16  With rapid population growth, limited development expenditure, and 
the continuing inadequacy of the city planning machinery, the pattern of development on the 
ground in Dar es Salaam increasingly diverges from that shown in the 1979 Masterp/an 17 , 
and even where actual land uses agree with the proposed landuse schemes, this is more 
fortuitous than by design. For example, as will be shown below, land earmarked as open 
space, or for industrial or public utility use had mostly been squatted upon; and much of the 
proposed investment in infrastructure has never been realised. 
15 ibid, p.  143. 
16 J. Campbell, "The State, Urban Development and Housing", in, Norman O'Neil and Kemal Mustafa, (Eds), Capitallsm, 
Socialism and the Development Crisis in Tanzania, Gower Publishing Company, Aldershot, UK, and Brookfield, USA, 
1990, pp. 152-176. 
17 
Armstrong, "Masterplans for Dar as Salaam", p. 144. 
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Criticisms of Masterplannina in the Dar es Salaam Context 
Masterplanning is still regarded as an important tool of urban planning in Tanzania despite 
its abandonment in the West where it originated, and despite the general concurrence that 
masterplans are expensive to prepare, are quickly outdated by the pace of development and 
most of their proposals are usually hinged on factors outside the realm of planning, and are 
therefore difficult to implement. Such factors include economic resources, as well as the 
political and administrative set up. It would appear that masterplanning is the planner's version 
of the governments' "Commission of Inquiry" whenever faced with a problem. While the 
Inquiry is going on, the problem would be put in abbeyance. After the Inquiry, its report would 
be being studied and that could be the end of the story. Alternatively by the time when a 
decision must be made, the Inquiry's Report would be out of date, requiring revision. 
We have seen above how colonial authorities felt the need of an overall plan for Dar es 
Salaam in the 1 930s and 1 940s. When this was prepared in 1949,   it was not implemented. 
By 1 954 another Draft Scheme was prepared and revised in 1958 but this too was not 
adopted by the Dar es Salaam Municipal Council. We have also seen how during the 1 960s, 
the government pressed for a General Plan for Dar es Salaam which it saw as a revision of 
the 1949 one, but only to shelve it when it was prepared in 1968.   Again, the 1979 Plan was 
seen as a revision of the 1968 one, but was hardly implemented, i.e. no deliberate efforts 
were taken to realise the goals of the Masterplan in terms of controlling land uses or 
instituting infrastructure for example. 
A masterplanning section exists in the Department of Urban Development in the Ministry 
of Lands, and is currently engaged in formulating or revising masterplans for various urban 
areas in Tanzania, including Dar es S,jaam. Yet these plans are hardly, if ever, implemented. 
Masterplanning does appear to be aimed at demonstrating that action is being done about the 
development of urbn areas, while in fact planners have little control over this development. 
It appears to be a substitution for desirable or appropriate action dictated by the 
circumstances, and it seems to be a mode of preserving bureaucratic power in the wake of 
accelerated spontaneous urban development. It is also a means by which government 
expenditure can be realised. The following points summarise the major criticisms of 
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masterplanning: 
o 	Masterplans assume slow growth and Iongterm stability, assumptions which are most 
unrealistic in Thkd World cities, which are characterised by rapid growth and 
uncertainty; 
o 	Masterplans assume a level of land use control and investment capacity which 
governments do not possess in terms of economic resources, political muscle, and 
legal and administrative set ups; 
a 	Masterplans tend to have an implicit assumption of right and wrong, the right being 
development according to the plans' stipulations. Yet what might be wrong with the 
existing urban growth is never made clear. The climb down by the 1979 Dar 
Masterplan to accept most of the spontaneous land uses in Dar es Salaam, e.g. 
squatter settlements, or undifferentiated land uses, is testmony that the de facto 
situation has a lot of merit to it; 
a 	It is doubtful whether masterplans take in wider national circumstances, particularly 
the country's economy; 
o 	Masterplan are expensive undertakings and the money utilised to produce them could 
perhaps be best utilised to cooperate with, and strengthen, or direct spontaneous 
action. 
Within the context of international relations, masterplanning has been a way of 
strengthening relationships betwdn poor and rich countries not only through the capital 
expended (whethr it be paid back or not), but also through the indirect input of imported 
concepts and expertise in planning. It is notable that the three plans for Dares Salaam (1949, 
1968,   and 1 979) have all been externally financed. Clinging to masterplanning in a country 
like Tanzania, when the concept has largely been abandoned can be explained by examining 
the alternative to masterplanning. In the latest generation of fashions this is seen as structural 
planning and action planning. 18 The structure plan is the planning framework for an area and 
includes such matters as the distribution of population, the activities and relationships 
between them, the patterns of land use and the development the activities give rise to, 
together with the netwprk of communications and the systems of utility services. The 
structural plan should indicate action areas and the nature of their treatment. These would 
be the priority areas for intensive action. This requires that planners leave their ivory tower 
offices and directly work with the masses of urban developers. This, unfortunately, entails the 
loss of bureaucratic powers and privileges, a phenomena which must be undesirable on the 
part of the planners and other land policy makers. The upholding of the old order (i.e. 
masterplanning) has denied a city like Dar es Salaam the effective government intervention 
necessary for proper land development. In other words, masterplanning in a situation of rapid 
growth and limited resources, is irrelevant. It is not undertaken to make inroads into the 
City's problems, but to strengthen the hand of the la°nd administrators, particularly planners. 
As a result of clinging to this unsuitable tool of urban planning,, the city of Dar es Salaam has 
grown its way, while plans have pointed their ways. A major impact of this has been in the 
negative, i.e. in the encouraging of uncontrolled urban development popularly known as 
squatting. 
7.2.3. Squatting, and government Policy towards squatting in Dar es Salaam 
Definition of, and Introduction to Squatting in Dar es Salaam 
The term "squatting" is normally used in Tanzania to mean the occupation and 
development, at fairly high densities (which would normally disqualify an area from being 
called agricultural), of urban land, obtained otherwise than by way of allocation by public 
authorities. Such land is also deloped in an irregular manner. This concept transcends that 
of squatting in the legal sense of occupying land without the express permission on the 
owner, and its use in this study shod not be construed to mean that the land in question is 
illegally occupied. 
The legal status of many squatters in urban Tanzania is vague. One opinion holds that 
since many squatters hold land by way of acquisition from, or with the express consent of, 
18 ibid. p. 145. 
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the recognised private landowners, then they hold it under customary tenure in which case 
they hold a deemed right of occupancy, and are therefore legally, not squatters. This 
argument is emphasized when urban boundaries are shifted to encompass existing rural 
settlements. The other-opinion is that once an area is declared to be a planning area, 
customary tenure ceases to exist. This was certainly the view of colonial officials in the 
1950s,   a view that ended up in a proposal to extinguish customary or tribal land tenure in 
urban areas. The proposal was however not converted into legislation. 19 The issue however, 
is whether non government-allocated land in, and around, urban areas like Dar es Salaam, can 
be called customary. Colonial land policy understood customary land tenure to mean native 
communal, or tribal, or family ownership of land, and a complete negation of individual 
freehold tenure. Thus, where communal ownership of land was considered to have had broken 
dOwn, like in the case of the coastal strip, freehold, not customary, tenure was recognised 
among the natives. However, any claim to freehold tenure had to be proved within 5 years 
of the Land Ordinance, i.e. by 1928.   Any land that was not proved to be in private ownership 
became expressly public land vested in the governor unless it was held on customary tenure, 
in which case it was only indirectly public land since occupiers were assumed to own deemed 
rights of occupancy from the Governor. 
In many parts within, and about urban areas, (and indeed in many rural areas), new 
people have moved in, acquiring land from locals through purchase, or have occupied 
unclaimed land which they have subsequently subdivided and sold to others, who, in turn, 
have done the same. Much as these transactions involve Africans, it is difficult to see such 
kinds of land dealings as being compatible with the concept of customary tenure under the 
Land Ordinance. But, at the same time, it is difficult to agree that as customary (i.e. 
communal) tenure breaks down because of changed circumstances (particularly since the 
colonial concept of customary landtenure was devoid of any dynamism (see Chapter Six)), 
then occupiers of such land become squatters on public land. The Tanzanian court's ruling, 
in the case of Nyawasa v. Nyirabu 2° in 1985,   established that a person's rights in land are 
19 
G.M.M. Fimbo, Law and Urban Housing: A Study of State Intervention in Urban Housing in Tanzania, PhD Thesis, 
University of Dar es Salaam, 1988. 
20 G.M.Fimbo, Essays in Land Law/n Tanzania, University of Oar as Salaam, 1992. 
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not extinguished by the mere declaration of an area to be a planning area, but left the question 
f tenure vague. Reputable commentators 21 have noted that Tanzanian courts have so far, 
not cleared this murky aspect of land tenure particularly with regard to urban areas. Dar es 
Salaam presents even a-more complicated legal case. The City is located in the coastal strip 
which falls within the ambit of the area where colonial policy assumed customary land tenure 
to have had largely broken down. If this view is taken, then a lot of people who acquire land 
privately in the area are squatters in the legal sense unless the earlier occupiers of the land 
had proved their having freehold interests in the land to the British Colonial authorities by 
1928.   In practice though, many people who acquire land from recognised owners, consider 
themselves, and are considered by the rest of society, to be doing so under customary 
tenure, and this acquisition appear to have the support of some state organs like the ruling 
Party. 
Unplanned settlements 22 were a feature of the colonial era, either as existing villages 
that became engulfed by, or as new settlements that grew up in, urban areas. The colonial 
government however was able to keep the growth of such areas in check, by outright removal 
(like in the case of Gerezani Village), or regularisation (like in the case of Upanga), or by the 
underbounding of the urban areas. A few areas (like Kheko) were tolerated. After 
independence, squatting began to assume alarming proportions and was reported in 1962 as 
being extensive within, or just outside the boundaries of Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Tanga, 
lringa, and Mbeya urban areas. In Dar es Salaam, the Town Planning Department in the 
Ministry of Lands noted that illegal building was increasing but that there was no noticeable 
signs that the City Council had taken any steps to control it. Discussion in this respect had 
taken place with the Governrnt in relation to Tariga and Dar es Salaam but no useful 
progress had been achieved. 23 A survey of squatting carried Out in Dar es Salaarn and other 
towns in 1963 established that t.re were 12,000 squatter families within, or at the 
21 
e.g. Fimbo, ibid. 
22 
This phrase is used interchangeably with the term "squatter settlements". 
23 Tanganyika, Annual Report of Town Planning Department, 1962,   Government Printer, 196. 
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immediate periphery of towns and these were increasing. 24 After some considerable 
discussion, the Ministry of Development Planning agreed to include in the First Five Year 
Development Plan, an item of £140,000 for resettlement of some 1,390 squatters mainly in 
Dar es Salaam, from land earmarked for industrial development. To resettle all known 
squatters some £1,140,000 was required. 25 An item of £1,139,368 was therefore included 
in the First Five Year Development P/an (1 964-69) for squatter removal and resettlement. 
Meanwhile the City Council prepared a redevelopment scheme for Keko Juu, near the 
Industrial area, "where the traditional village had expanded to several times its original 
capacity by squatting". 26 It was hoped to resettle these on proper layouts on nearby 
government land. 
The Dar es Salaam City Council Housing Officer, C.H.F. Mchaina, in his report to the 
Markets, Housing and Fire Committee of the Council in October 1962,   reported illegal 
buildings, particularly in Magomeni, Buguruni and Temeke; and called for stern action. He 
pointed out that the old methods of deterring squatting/illegal building had failed because of 
squatting took place en masse and therefore the issue became political. Many owners of such 
illegal buildings refused to give their names, or to allow details of their buildings to be taken, 
threatening to beat up the building inspectors. So, many such illegal buildings could not be 
dealt with. 27 The Council however seemed to be on the squatters side. The following year, 
His Worship the Mayor, Mohamed Mfaume, castigated building inspectors for being harsh with 
"the people". 28 
Furthermore, Housing Officer Mchaina noted that the Urban House Tax Ordinance of 
1962,   empowered the Dar es salaam City Council to collect house taxes from buildings in 
unplanned areas. This required that houses be numbered. Such numbering encouraged 
24 




Oar as Salaam City Council, Reports to Committees, 1962. 
28  Oar es Salaam City Council, Minutes, 1963. 
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squatting as it appeared to legalise the otherwise illegal structures: "I fear if matters came to 
the worst, these squatters might claim ownership of land after paying the House Tax". 29 By 
charging house taxes, the Council was indirectly recognising the squatters and thus 
compromising its position of attempting to remove them. 
Relations between the Department of Town Planning and the Land Division on the issue 
of squatting were, by 1964,   getting sour, with the former accusing the latter of not 
appreciating Town Planning and of tolerating squatters; thus forcing the Town Planning 
Department to plan areas far from town to avoid the cost of removing squatters. 3° 
Meanwhile, squatting was increasing fast. In 1965,   there were some 20,000 illegal buildings 
within and just outside the town boundaries of Dar es Salaam, having between 80,000 - 
100,000 people. 31 It was decried that, at any time, dozens of huts could be seen under 
construction. Old huts could be seen being improved, and virtually being converted into 
permanent materials, and inhabitants were demanding piped water supply. The Ministry of 
Lands was being pressed to take action if only to stop squatting: "political issues however, 
are involved and it seems unlikely that any action will be taken without a Cabinet decision. 
Meanwhile the problem assumes alarming proportions". 32 
The Town Planning Department advocated the determination to deal with the problem 
in the form of strict enforcementof Township Ru/es, and provision of funds to prepare layouts 
for resettlement areas. It was noted that there was little inclination on the part of the local 
and other authorities to prevent squatting, and already in Dar es Salaam, a large layout 
designed for 630 high density plots was held up since the land was occupied by squatters. 
Indeed, it was noted, even if sqiatter areas were to be zoned residential, they were being 
used to such high densities in irregular patterns, that it was not possible to improve matters 
29 Dar es Salaam City Council, Report to Committees, 1962. 
30 Tanzania, Annual Report of the Town Planning Department, 1964.   
31 Tanzania, Annual Report of the Town Planning Department, 1965, p.  2. 
32 ibid, p.  2. 
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without resort to clearance and displacement of some persons. 33 Attempts at partial 
redevelopment planning were frustrated by further building after surveys (usually, by air) were 
done. Nevertheless, there was the realisation that squatter housing could be put to good use, 
but there was need to put up a large number of serviced plots for self help housing in 
traditional materials, diverting squatters to these. This required resources, particularly finance 
and staff. 34 
Squatter removal was thus hampered by lack of resources as well as political will. While 
the Town Planning Department urged stern action against squatting, the Land Department, 
..Jhe_Pares Salaam City Council and the Cabinet preffered to take_no acon. This was 
possibly because, while the Town Planning Department remained in the hands of expatriates, 
the last fully-fledged expatriate commissioner for Lands had left in July, 1964.   After a nearly 
a year of instability which saw four acting Commissioners for Land (three Africans and one 
European), the first African Comissioner for Lands, Mr F. Rutakyamirwa had been appointed 
with effect from 6th July 1965.   The Dares Salaam CityCounciLwasalsoAfrican dominated. 
There were also signs of feet dragging and sabotage. A squatter area at Makaburini, 
along Pugu Road (Figure 7.3) identified for removal in 1965 to give room for industrial 
development, was still unremoved in 1966,   due to delays in the surveying and servicing of 
new plots, and the allocation of those available to applicants who were not the earmarked 
Makaburini squatters. This fact is remarkable. The new plots that were being provided were 
going to the non-squatting population (i.e. the elite). This made fighting squatting difficult. 
Squatting was therefore releasing planned plots to those who were socially powerful. The 
Department of Town Planning'?eport for 1965 lamented that "the squatter situation has 
deteriorated. Though there was greater realisation of the need for action, nothing had been 
done and nothing was likely to be done until this was decided at high political level, and funds 
and implementation resources were made available". 35 
33 




Some decision was made in 1967 when the first comprehensive squatter removal 
exercise in Dar es Salaam took place. Around 320 houses were demolished at Makaburini, 
along the Pugu Road to give way to land required for industrial use. Compensation was paid 
and the evacuees settled at Kigogo Road, where construction in traditional materials was 
allowed. Another extensive squatter clearance undertaking was carried out by the NHC in the 
same year and involved the removal of part of a large squatter area at Keko Juu. In its place, 
new houses for rental and tenant purchase were put up. A smaller squatter removal exercise 
took place at Temeke South, undertaken by the NHC for the purpose of constructing tenant 
purchase houses. 36 Much later, in 1975,   part of another extensive squatter settlement at 
Buguruni was demolished by the NHC. Some 550 people were displaced, and the area put to 
multistorey residential buildings. Again, in the same year, an old squatter area at the edge of 
the city centre known as Kisutu, and famous for its immoral notoriety, was razed. Some 93 
huts were demolished and the area put to commercial uses. 37 
Outside the above areas, there was no major squatter area demolition in Dar es Salaam 
during the 1 960s and 1 970s. In the first seven years of independence, the government was 
unwilling to remove any squatter areas, no doubt because of the unpopularity of such a move, 
particularly in the light of the non existence of viable alternatives, but also because squatting 
served a useful purpose. Squatter removal was therefore, never a generalised policy. The 
squatters at Makaburini had to go because they were occupying some 240 acres of land 
which, as the Director for Town Planning remarked, has immediate economic benefit i.e. 
zoned industrial, during an era when industrialisation was seen as being a national priority. 38 
Kisutu, being in the City Centre, did not conform to the principle of depicting a good picture 
of the country,both physically and morally, so it had to go. The rest of the affected squatter 
areas (Keko, Temeke and Buruni) were cleared in relation to the NHC's construction 
activity, and it can be noted that, particularly in the case of Bug uruni, this involved foreign aid. 
Given the extent of squatting, the aeas removed were only a tip of the iceberg. In any case 
further squatting continued unimpeded. 
36 Tanzania, Annual Report of the Department of Town Planning 1966 and 1967, p. 3. 
37 J.L.P. Lugalla, Socialist construction and the Urbanisation Process: An analysis of Urban Poverty and Politics in 
Tanzania, PhD Thesis, University of Bremen, 1990,   p. 282. 
38 Tanganyika, Annual Report of the Department of Town Planning 1963, p.  3. 
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Figure 7.3 Dar es Salaam: Major Land Uses in 1968. 
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Note the extent of Squatting. 
Studies for the 1968 Dar es Salaam Masterplan found that there were 97,500 people 
(out of Dares Salaam's 272,515 people in 1967) living as squatters in the Dares Salaam's 
city area, and more in the statutory Planning Area (see Figure 7.3). Squatting had by 1967,   
increased by 70% since 1 963. In 1969,   a systematic count based on aerial photographs 
showed a total of 14,720 houses in 14 main squatter areas of Dar es Salaam. A similar count 
carried out in 1972 and based on the same methods, showed that the number of squatter 
houses had nearly doubled to 27,981, an average compound yearly rate of increase of 
24%. 0  In 1972,   Stren estimatedthe squatter population in Dar es Salaam to have had gone 
up to 224,000 people, or some 44% of the total city's population. 41 Figure 7.3 shows the 
main squatter areas in the Dares Salaam statutory area in 1967 while Table 7.1 and Figure 
7.4 show these areas in Dar es Salaam's city boundaries in 1979.   In view of the fact that 
60% of Dar es Salaam's population was by 1979 living in squatter areas 42 , a major 
phenomenon of Dar es Salaam's growth since Independence has been squatting. 
Factors encouraclinci squatting in Dar es Salaam 
Peil, in a comparative study of squatting in urban Africa suggests that government 
flexibility and low standards of buildings are a precondition for the containment of large scale 
squatting. 43  The colonial government in Dar es Salaam followed this policy, but as Stren 44 
points out, squatting began to take on alarming proportions after Independence despite the 
continuation of this policy by the Independence government of Tanzania. Why then has 
squatting been so prevalent in Dar es Salaam, despite the known advantages of planned land? 
Several reasons can be cited: 
39 
Project Planning Associates, National Capital Master P/an, Oar es Sa/aam. Toronto, 1968.   
40 
R.E. Stren, "Underdevelopment, Urban Squatting and State Bureaucracy: A Case Study of Tanzania", Canadian Journal 
of African Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1982, PP.  67-91. 
41 
R.E. Stren, Urban Inequality-and Housing Policy-in Tanzania, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 
1975, p.  62. 
42 
Tanzania, Oar es Salaam Master Plan, Marshall Macklin Monoghan Ltd, Toronto, 1979.   
43 
M. Peil, "African Squatter Settlements: A Comparative Study", Urban Studies, 13, 1976,   pp. 1 55-1 66. 
44 
Stren, "Underdevelopment ....., p.  73. 
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Figure 7.4 Dar es Salaam: Major Squatter Areas, 1979 
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Table 7 1 PnnhltRtion livina in Unotanned Residential Areas in Dar as Salaam 1979 
UNITS AREA IN AVERAGE ESTATIMA 
No. NAME OF THE HECTARES DENSITY TED POPU- 
UNPLANNED AREA 1969 1972 1975 1979 ppgh LATION 
1. Keko/Gerezani 1,450 2,240 1,183 1,491 60 273 16,401 
2. Chang'ombe 651 1,345 332 481 14 328 4,589 
3. Kurasini - 363 960 1,210 52 256 13,310 
4. Mtoni 1,650 3,855 774 975 63 170 10,725 
5. Tandika 1,300 2,426 3,885 4,895 264 204 53,845 
6. Temeke 1,025 214 2,760 3,476 152 252 38,236 
7. Ilala - 570 451 568 24 260 6,248 
8. Buguruni 1,000 3,020 1,495 1,884 119 174 20,724 
9. Vingunguti - 130 2,363 2,977 147 223 32,747 
10. Kiwalani - - 942 1,187 110 119 13,057 
11. Kipawa 690 1,242 1,099 1,385 53 287 15,235 
12. Gongolamboto - - - 1,764 98 198 19,404 
13. Kigogo 630 1,643 1,312 1,653 60 303 18,183 
14. Magomeni 1 188 488 615 25 271 6,765 
15. Manzese 4,650 6,869 7,500 9,444 680 152 103,884 
16. Mabibo - 420 529 25 233 5,819 
17. Ubungo 380 675 579 730 47 171 8,030 
18. Kimara - 175 121 152 18 93 1,672 
19. Hanna Nassif - - 954 1,202 37 357 13,222 
20. Mwananyamala} it& 2,051 2,584 129 220 28,424 
500 1,572 
21. Kinondoni 	} 1,197 1,508 41 405 16,588 
22. Mikoroshoni . . 950 1,197 46 286 13,167 
23. Mikocheni - 
k. 
- 344 433 17 280 4,763 
24. Mwenge . 226 285 21 149 3,135 
25. Kawe 530 714 744 937 47 219 10,307 
TOTAL - - 34,770 43,501 2,349 204 478,489 
Source: Marshal Macklin Monoghan, Dar es Sa/aam Master Plan, Toronto 1979. Table 13, page 58. 
o Large variation in unit counts are a result of using different boundaries, and of redevelopment. 
o ppgh = Person per gross hectare. 
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o 	One, while the Government prepared plots for allocation, these were usually available 
sporadically and in small quantities, unable to meet the demand in a situation of rapid 
urban growth. Besides, getting government land involved considerable bureaucracy 
e.g. form filling, fees, interviews, etc., and one had to wait for long before learning of 
the allocating authority's decision. The official system land allocation system was not 
open, and, to the novice, it was formidable. All these factors worked against the weak 
in society. This did not apply to unplanned areas where one could get a plot 
immediately one made a decision, either through occupying vacant land or through 
acquisition from recognised owners. 
o 	Two, while the authorities in Dar es Salaam were flexible and allowed construction in 
traditional materials, they allowed this in some areas but not in others. Even then, 
construction had to conform to the City Council's house designs. As was the case way 
back in the late 1 920s with the Gerezani evacuees (Chapter Four), some people could 
not afford to put up such houses, and therefore resorted to squatting. City Council 
standards required of African urban developers may have been low but they were then 
still too high for some sections of Dar es Salaam's population. 
o 	Three, even when one got allocated a government plot, one could not build on it 
without a building permit and this depended on the would-be builder submitting plans 
of his proposed building to the authorities, who need not give a decision immediately. 
As early as the late 1 950s, the District Commissioner for Dar es Salaam, J.H. Adams, 
was complaining of delays in issuing building permits to would be African builders in 
Magomeni by the Dar es Salaam Municipal Council. In a squatter area, one could 
simply start building, to any standards as soon as one made a decision and was able 
to. 
o 	Four, there was the question of location. It was pointed out in Chapter Four that some 
of the Gereani evacuees in the late 1920s   did not take up plots allocated to them by 
the government because of the distance of these plots from the beneficiaries' work 
places. Availability of government land was not usually coincident with the locational 
preferences of some land seekers. It was noted by PADCO in 1969,   that with centrally 
administered land, development planning, and implementation, there was apt to be a 
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more accurate reflection of bureaucratic preferences and needs than those of the 
people: 
"An area may be chosen for development simply because the 
land can be obtained and prepared with little difficulty. There are 
surveyed plots available in Dar es Salaam, but there is a 
tremendous backlog of demand for plots in locations people 
considers desirable" 45 
The desire for some locations will led to squatting and to the densification of 
structures in these desirable locations. 
o 	Five, there are sociological factors related to squatting. In a squatter area, new 
developers are usually first accommodated within the area itself. A typical squatter 
area starts off as a small village which grows from within, occupying neighbouring 
lands. The new builder in a squatter area is not usually a stranger, but would have 
colleagues therein, who can be handy both during the quest for land, and during 
construction. In a government allocated area, everybody is a stranger, and the land 
allocated is many times distantly located and devoid of developments; thus 
discouraging some households, particularly those in low income brackets from taking 
up such plots. This would appear to be one reason that discouraged low income 
households from taking up sites and service plots in Dar es Salaam in the 1 970s. 
o Six, the availability of land to squat upon is another positive factor encouraging 
squatting. Despite the law to the contrary, a lot of land within and around Dar es 
Salaam was, and still is, in private hands, or is unclaimed, or has nobody to look after 
it. There are also many traditional villages that get engulfed by urban development. It 
is not the abolition of freehold titles that of necessity encouraged squatting as Stren 
argues. 46 Early squatting in Dar es Salaam, e.g. at Gerezani and Keko was on freehold 
land, as was later squatting on Suleiman Daya's land at Ilala/Bungoni, or on Hanna 
Nassif's land at Kinondoni. There has been a flourishing market for land in various parts 
of Dar es salaam, but particularly at the city's periphery. Traditional rights in land are 
recognized (by the populace, and indirectly by state organs e.g. the ruling Party), 
45 Tanzania, Ministry of Lands, A Proposal for an Urban Development Corporation in Tanzania, PADCO, Washington DC, 
1969, p.  20. 
46 Stren, "Underdeveiopment 
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irrespective of what the law on land tenure says. In any case, even if it could be 
argued that the land belonged to the public, the government has never taken effective 
steps to assert its ownership. Recognised land transactions usually involve land 
(supposedly) on customary tenure; abandoned private land (e.g. in the case of the 
sisal estates around Dar es Salaam in the 1 950s); undeveloped and uncared for 
government land (e.g. in Mbulahati and part of Manzese areas); or marginal land (which 
would, theoretically, be government land). 
o 	Seven, if by squatting it is meant, as is usually the case, unplanned and irregular 
development, the government has never worked out a scheme whereby it would 
cooperate with these developers. Powers for land pooling and adjustment, for example, 
are given in the Town and Country Ordinance, 1956,   but these have only been used 
to an appreciable degree with respect to the mainly Indian Upanga area (Chapter Five). 
The received concept of dealing with squatters has been their removal and 
resettlement on planned land but not cooperating with them. The squatter areas 
upgrading policies of the 1 970s was externally advocated and supported, and was not 
generalised. As removal and resettlement proved impracticable, chaotic development 
prevailed in the absence of the government's guiding hand. 
o 	Finally, the government itself has been unable to politically and practically justify 
extensive squatter removal in the light of: its failure to provide alterative land and to 
pay adequate compensation to squatters; the fact that some squatter areas are 
encompassed by urban growth and the government has usually no viable policy to deal 
with them; and in the ftght of the politics of anti colonialism and socialism which 
rejected coercive action against the African poor. In fact, from about 1970,   squatting 
was given de facto recogn, ion and squatters could count on the support of the 
politicians against their removal. During the 1 970s, the policy turned into possible 
upgrading (t least theoretically). 
Squatting is therefore a result of government land policy, which, on the one hand decided to 
tolerate the phenomenon for political expediency, but on the other, failed to evolve appropriate 
policies to cooperate with the occupiers of unplanned land, cooperation which could have 
dealt with the common manifestations of squatting, e.g. irregular development, lack of 
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services, lack of title to land etc. The failure to cooperate with the squatters is rooted in the 
drive to conserve bureaucratic power over land control. Any policy aimed at close cooperation 
and working with squatters entails the loss of bureaucratic power, thus the resort to just 
ignoring these areas, with an ulterior belief in their eventual removal or regularisation on terms 
dictated by the authorities. 
The imDact of squatting on Dar es Salaam's Land Use Structure 
Irregular land development and lack of land for public infrastructure and public uses 
(e.g roads and open spaces) are two of the manifestations of the failure of the operation of 
the market in land, characterising squatter areas. Government intervention would be beneficial 
to iron out these and other imperfections. In Dar es Salaam, government policy has largely 
been that of doing nothing. Squatter areas have not been removed, but they have not been 
helped either to overcome their problems. In 1979,   some 2349 hectares (or nearly 40% of 
the city's residential land) was occupied by some 25 squatter settlements. In 1990,   I 
calculated that there were some 40 squatter settlements in Dar es Salaam occupying some 
5000 hectares (Chapter 2). Major squatter areas in Dar es Salaam in the late 1 980s are 
shown in Figure 7.5. Squatting therefore has a major impact on the city's land use structure 
as large expanses of land get developed irregularly, at extremely high densities but with little 
or no land for vehicular access, drains or public open spaces. Usually, too, the number of the 
people living in such areas, and the number of structures therein is unknown, and this has 
negative connotations for urban management. 
In some cases, land squatted upon has been earmarked for other uses. This has been the 
case with industrial land in Dar es Salaam and thus has, in a number of cases, frustrated or 
delayed earmarked land use development (Chapter Eight). Successful squatting encourages 
further squatting as the fear of eventual removal diminishes. Moreover, squatting frustrates 
efforts to produce planned land v4ich in turn encourages squatting as planned land gets 
scarce. The government has recently admitted that the non-availabity of unoccupied land 
within urban areas"has emerged as a major constraint for planned urban development: "In 
many of the urban centres, most of the unplanned areas have been squatted upon and the 
compensation is beyond the means of the government47 . 
47 Tanzania, Economic Survey for the Year 1991, National Planning Commission, Dares Salaam, 1992, p. 157 
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Figure 7.5 Major Squatter areas in Dar es Salaarn 
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Source: Maps of the Survey and Mapping Department, as well as Field Surveys. 
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As can be observed in today's Dar es Salaam, squatting is no longer the realm of the 
poor as the rich and socially influential also end up occupying land in such areas, partly as a 
result of lack of planned land and partly as result of wanting to acquire large pieces of 
land. 48  The movement of the latter households into squatter areas makes their removal even 
more difficult (although it may in future facilitate such policies as land pooling). Indeed, this 
appears to be a phenomenon taking place elsewhere in Africa. Mabogunje notes that at the 
periphery of many subsaharan African urban areas, 
land is not developed by the squatters but by the middle class individual 
developers who have bought land from locals and have been accorded enough 
legitimate rights of ownership that they can develop their plots in peace and 
without hindrance49 
Viewed that way, squatting is beneficial to the middle and upper classes in society as a mode 
of land grabbing, on the one hand, and as a way through which the bulk of the population can 
provide their own accommodation (thus leaving planned land for the few), on the other. 
Finally, squatting has encouraged planned land use sprawl as the government, in order 
to avoid conflicts with squatters (including the thorny question of compensation), chooses to 
locate planned schemes on distantly, but usually thinly populated land. This is a phenomenon 
currently taking place in Dar es Salaam. 
7.2.4. The World Bank supported Sites and Services Schemes 
Background 
As we have indicated above, the provision of sites where urbanites could build for 
themselves has a long ancestr'in Dar es Salaam, going back to the German era. During the 
1960s it was the City Council's policy to allocate planned land to would be developers for 
-construction in modern or traditionrnaterials in certain areas. However the sites and services 
scheme of the 1 970s bore some deflections from the hitherto administered land allocation 
48 	Lugalla, Socialist Construction. 
' 	A.L. Mabogunje, Perspective on Urban Landand Urban Management Policies in SubsaharnA fr/ca, World Bank Technical 
Paper No. 196, World Bank, Washington, n.d. (ca 1992), p.  7. 
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schemes ° 
o 	The aim of sites and service schemes was to provide serviced plots before 
development. In the past, only land demarcation was usually undertaken, while land 
servicing followed development. 
o 	Construction on sites and services schemes was expected to bemostly in modern 
materials. So, long term Rights of Occupancy were usually offered; and facilities for 
long term finance were created in the form of the Tanzania Housing Bank. Previous 
policies mainly envisaged construction in traditional materials, and short term rights of 
occupancy were usually offered. Only in exceptional cases (like that of Block W 
Magomeni), was financing considered. 
o 	Foreign international capital and expertise in the form of IDA loans and World Bank 
experts were involved. The form that the sites and services scheme took, owed a great 
deal to World Bank proposals in use elsewhere in Africa and were strongly marked by 
a high degree of centralised "expert" planning. 51 From the beginning, the project was 
in the hands of expatriate staff/ consultants who formulated policy and evaluated 
project implementation. Mgullu 52 sees the World Bank's entry into the housing sector 
(in the form of sites and service schemes) as a ploy to avoid social and political unrest 
and revolutions on the one hand, but to further capitalists interests on the other, since 
the bulk (80%) of IDA's finance went towards the purchase of goods and services 
from capitalist suppliers. While the project purported to aim at housing the "masses 
of the underprivileged aTh ill housed people", loan repayment was IDA's major worry, 
so that the beneficiaries were those who could pay "the instalments without 
difficulty." 
V 
50 The term sites and services will be hereafter used to mean those World Bank supported sites and services projects of 
the 1 970s11 980s. 
51 campbell, "The State, Urban Development and Housing". 
52 Mgullu, Housing. 
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Internal pressure to seek a solution to increased squatting, the possibility of getting new 
land, external influence in respect of experience elsewhere, and the possibility of external 
finance, all encouraged the adoption of sites and services schemes in Tanzania in the early 
1970s. 
Sites and Services Schemes in Dar es Salaam and the social struggle to get access to planned 
land 
In terms of social class formation in Tanzania and within Dar es Salaam, the sites and 
services schemes represented what Mgullu has described as the maturity of the petty 
bourgeoisie who found it necessary to construct self contained houses or flats for rent and 
to get loan advances for owner occupied housing. 53 Mgullu's contention is supported by the 
contradictions that were apparent between the stated aims of sites and services schemes, and 
the stipulations incorporated in the carrying out of these projects: 
o 	One, while purportedly triggered off by an alarming rate of squatter development, sites 
and services schemes in Dar es Salaam were related to the upgrading of only parts of 
just two, out of some twenty major squatter settlements. The bulk of the project 
resources went to the provision of new sites, not to squatter area upgrading. 
o 	Two, the cumbersome procedures to get sites and servise project land as well as 
development finance cannot have been meant for the poor. 
o 	Three, the locating of the sites and services schemes in Dar es Salaam, on distantly 
located, virgin land'in Kijitonyama, Sinza and Mikocheni (Figure 7.3), where 
employment opportunities were highly restricted, and the existing social ties would 
have to be cut by the schrnes' beneficiaries, could not have been conceived in favour 
of the poor. A squatter areas occupants/low income households "friendly" scheme 
would hie consisted of simple layouts abutting the existing squatter or other low 
income households areas, and as near as possible to major employment centres like 
the Pugu Road industrial area. Most money too would have gone the upgrading of 
53 MguIIu, Housing... p.  76. 
squatter areas. Yet, it must be significant that the first of the sites and services 
schemes, at Kijitonyama, abutted Bagamoyo Road, a road considered to be a symbol 
of status in Dar es Salaam. 54 This view is shared by Halfani who questions the 
concentration of the sites and service schemes initially in one district - Kinondoni, 
although the selected areas had a much higher cost per plot than the alternatives like 
Tabata West in Ilala District that were rejected. He notes that Kinondoni District has 
the largest areas of "bureaucratic residences" since the colonial era; and that the 
selected areas for sites and services schemes were contiguous to these areas of 
prestigious residences. Mikocheni was contiguous to Msasani, Kijitonyama to Regent 
Estate, and Sinza to the University Hill, although the latter is also contiguous to the 
largest squatter area in Dar es Salaam - Manzese. He concludes, and we concur, that 
the concentration of the project in the Kinondoni District was a plan by the decision 
makers to expand the area where government officials, politicians and those in middle 
and higher income brackets could invest in property. 55 It could be added that the 
Mikocheni area, near the Ocean, was planned with a relatively higher proportion of 
medium sized plots. A random investigation of plot owners in Mikocheni medium 
density area revealed several names of personalities in higher echelons of the public 
service. These included Ministers like L.N. Sijaona (Plot 45); judges like R. Korosso 
(plot 308), and N. Mzavas (plot 554); workers of the Ministry of Lands like one time 
Director of Lands, Judge H. Mkatte (plot 555), land officers like M.H. Sanze (plot 39), 
and land surveyors like A. Nyangali (plot 617) and expatriate advisors like R. Martin 
(plot 395); principal secretaries like B. Mwapachu (plot 284); ambassadors like J.W. 
Opanga (plot 560); and prominent businessmen like M. H. Bachool (plot 285) and R.S. 
Patel (plot 286). 
o 	The point system used to allocate the plots was skewed in favour of the middle 
income salaried people (see below). 
It is thus submitted that the sites and services project (and the other planning 
54 
Most high income residences in Oar as Salaam are located North or East of Bagamoyo Road or just to its South or West 
side. 
55 M.S. Halfani, Urban Management and the Implementation of an Externally Financed Project in Dar es Salaam, Ph.D 
Thesis, University of Toronto, 1986, p. 148. 
schemes discussed below) represented a second phase of self consolidation of the "elites" 
in Dar es Salaam (the first one being the Africanisation of Upanga, Oysterbay, and Msasani, 
discussed above) 56 . The elites had all the reasons to want to invest in the city in which they 
were then getting well established. Senior officials and politicians had, as we have seen, got 
themselves allocated land in the choicest areas of Dar es Salaam in the 1 960s, but there was 
no large scale system to deal with new land needs from both the old and the upcoming elite 
strata. The National Housing Corporation was on the decline. Its tenant purchase scheme had 
been discontinued, and, in any case, it offered very little in terms of choice of types of 
houses. The existing land allocation system administered by the City Council was not only 
grossly inadequate, but it tended as well to favour locals, as opposed to government and 
other public employees. Yet this upcoming strata was desirous of investing in property in Dar 
es Salaam for at least two reasons. One, for owner occupation, in order to get away from 
renting (particularly in the prevalent multi-occupied Swahili houses), with its attendant social 
problems. In this respect it is significant that the well known low income household six 
roomed Swahili House hardly featured in Dar es Salaam's sites and services schemes. Two, 
was to secure themselves some kind of permanent investment either for renting out, 
especially to the growing parastatal sector (and despite the Leadership Code of the Arusha 
Declaration), or as an insurance for the future. 
It is inconceivable that government officials would have hatched a scheme which 
would consume vast sums of local and external funds to provide thousands of building plots 
in which they would just be spectators or, at most, implementors; and out of which they were 
not to benefit, when it is plausible to argue that they too required land on which to build. The 
government and other elite strYa must have known that they would somehow get into this 
scheme as land owners/developers. Thus, the conception of the sites and services schemes 
in reflection of their own requirements (e.g. in terms of location, land servicing, and 
development finance). Thus, the institution of bureaucratic procedures completely unrelated 
to the needs of the lbw income households residing in squatter areas or elsewhere. This would 
also perhaps account for the creation of a separate Sites and Services Directorate in the 
56 
The Third Phase could be seen as the acquisition of large tracts of unplanned land as well as the acquisition of 
agricultural land in the periurban areas of Dar es Salaam that has been going on in the 1 980s. 
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Ministry of Lands (as opposed to letting the Dar es Salaam City Council), to manage these 
schemes. 
Why then call the project "low income"? Two reasons can be advanced. One, 
government and other public employees have never regarded themselves as being anything 
but low income households and this is plausible when only salaries of most civil servants are 
taken into account. Non salary income, both as a result of an employee's position, or as a 
result of side businesses can however, sometimes be substantial. It is thus interesting to note 
that the sites and service schemes in Tanzania were skewed in favour of salaried persons; but 
against those earning less than 300/= a month (i.e. the really low income households) on the 
grounds that the latter were to poor to afford the sites (see point system, below). The 
interests of the unemployed, those on intermittent incomes, poor tenants, and the like, are 
not reflected in the sites and service schemes. The salary range most favoured i.e. between 
Tshs 300/= and 750/=, (later (1975) raised to 10001=) per month, covered 60% of all 
household income groups in Dar es Salaam. 57 This meant that only the very poor and the 
very rich were disfavoured. 
The second reason why the sites and services scheme was paraded as a low income 
housing project was because the concept was appealing. It was (and still is) characteristic of 
the bureaucracy in Tanzania and in other countries, to use appealing slogans like "low income 
households", "the poor", etc. to seek external assistance, or to popularise programmes both 
internally and externally. Indeed the ideology propagated by influential bodies like the World 
Bank had already turned to purporting to support low income households. Once the project 
took off, its terms of referenccan always be changed during implementation. Indeed this 
is what took place in Tanzania's sites and services scheme. 
Our argument is that sites and services schemes in Dar es Salaam and elsewhere in 
Tanzania were aimd at low income households only in theory. In practice, they were aimed 
at the middle and upper strata, particularly among public employees. The later preoccupation 
57 B.B.K. Majani, "The concept of the National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Projects in Tanzania", in, P. 
Crooke, (Ed), Management of Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Housing Areas, Occasional Paper, centre for 
Housing Studies, Ardhi Institute, Oar as Salaam, 1985,   pp. 19-30. 
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with the "mystery" of high income households take over of the sites and services areas 
should perhaps be reexamined in the light of the above argument. 
General Drovisions of sites and services schemes 
The Second Five Year Development Plan (1969-1 974) indicated a change of emphasis of 
government policy from slum clearance and complete housing provision, to the provision of 
serviced plots. During the implementation of the Plan, the Land Division was expected to 
spend Tshs 7m/= to provide some 25,000 residential plots in the Dar es Salaam's areas of 
Kijitonyama, Tabata, Sinza, and the Old Airfield; as well as to provide industrial plots at 
Ubungo. Some Tshs 31.1 m/= was to be spent on the expansion of the general site clearance 
and servicing scheme for residential and industrial plots. The Town Planning Division was to 
spend Tshs 70m/= to provide economic infrastructure in Dar es Salaam in pursuance of the 
provisions of the 1968DaresSa/aammasterplan. Main residential areas to be developed were 
along Morogoro Road, Kijitonyama, and East and West Tabata. An industrial area was to be 
developed at Vingunguti, along Pugu Road, while the one at Kurasini was to be extended. 
Three new deep water berths were to be provided to the Dar es Salaam port. The National 
Housing Corporation was also earmarked to spend some Tshs 68m/= on sites and services 
schemes. We have seen above how some Tshs 1.5m/= out of this money was spent on the 
provision of 795 serviced plots, with core houses at Kijitonyama/Mwenge in 1969.   This 
scheme proved expensive and was not replicated, but was symbolic of the government's 
future policy. 
The change of policy emanated from the realisation that the National Housing Corporation 
was hardly contributing to housing stock. This was not all. The era when there was 
political compulsion for symbolic schemes in visible structures had come to an end. The new 
era required the consolidation of turbanites in urban areas like Dar es Salaam. This could 
not be done through the National Housing Corporation. Squatters were doing that, thus their 
striking of a sympthetic chord in government policy. Provision of serviced plots for self 
construction (with financial provisions for those who may need such help) was seen as the 
answer. Besides, there was worldwide evidence that major international financing institutions 
were then tuned to supporting low income self built housing or squatter area upgrading. 
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Between 1969 and 1973,   deliberations went on within the Ministry of Lands, and 
between that Ministry and the President's Office on what to do about the proliferation of 
squatting. 58 In October 1973,   the Ministry of Lands prepared a document known as the 
National Sites and Services Programme which was later on adopted by the Cabinet. The 
document included proposals to establish a Tanzania Housing Bank and the establishment of 
a Sites and Services Directorate in the Ministry of Lands. Following detailed project application 
and an appraisal report by a World Bank Mission, two agreement were signed in 1974 
between the IDA and Tanzania, by which credit of Tshs 103.2m/= was provided for serviced 
plots, squatter improvement, and housing loans for an initial four years project. A portion of 
this principal sum was to be given to the Tanzania Housing Bank, which would give housing 
loans to the beneficiaries of the plot development and upgrading projects. This Phase I of the 
project was designed to benefit some 160,000 low income people through the provision of 
10,600 new serviced building plots in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, and Mbeya. In Dar es Salaam, 
7450 new plots were to be provided in the areas of Kijitonyama, Mikocheni and Sinza, while 
530 hectares of Manzese "A" and "B" squatter area were to be "upgraded", positively 
affecting 7600 houses (Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2: Phase One of the Sites and Services Project in Tanzania 
Area (Ha) No. of Plots 
Dar es Salaam: New serviced sites 
Sinza 234 3800 
Kijitonyama 160 1672 
Mikocheni 35 710 
Dar es Salaam: UDciraded Houses 
Manzese 530 7600 
Mwanza: New sites 
Nyakato 170 1900 
Mbeya: Uøciraded Houses 
Mwanjelwa 	V 140 2050 
Source: World Bank, Tanzania National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Project 
Appraisal Report Phase I, Washington, 1974,   cited in Mgullu, Housing, p. 79. 
58 
Zubeida H. Remtulla, The National Sites and Services Project in Tanzania: A case study, MSc. Thesis, niversity of 
British Columbia, 1976, p.  30. 
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The second phase, estimated to cost Tshs 243.0m/ =, was to provide 14,150 serviced plots 
in the Dar es Salaam's area of Mbagala and to upgrade 9,138 houses in the Mtoni/Tandika 
squatter area. Other towns to benefit were earmarked to be Iringa, Morogoro, Tabora and 
Tanga. Due to cost overruns however, the project was later on drastically scaled down. 59 
lmDlementation of the Sites and Services Schemes in Dar es Salaam 
From 1974 contractors were engaged to institute the necessary infrastructure whose 
general standard was kept low (compared say to standards adopted elsewhere in Africa, e.g. 
in the Umoja Scheme in Nairobi). Only a limited number of roads were macadamised. The rest 
were gravel-rolled, or earth compacted. Drainage was by unlined ditches, except on steeply 
rolling areas, with culverts at crossings. Foul water drainage was planned to be by improved 
pit latrines. Water supply was to be by public standpipes with four stand pipes for 50 plots. 
Plots were allocated bare, and the types of buildings expected, simple. Building in cheap 
materials like soil cement blocks was expected and was encouraged. Most of the plots were 
the high density type (288m2). 6° 
It may be wondered why low standards of land servicing were adopted. Six reasons are 
put forward: 
o 	One, Oar es Salaam had a long tradition of poor land servicing, even in such high 
income areas as the Oysterbay; 
o 	Two, there was a drive to keep the cost of the plots down. This would, for example 
enable the not so rich rich civil servants to get access to land without keen 
competition from the richer groups like the businessmen, who would be attracted by 
the superior services ( a similar policy had been adopted by the colonial government 
59 Campbell, "The State, Urban Development and Housing", p.  165. 
60 J. Mghweno, "Tanzania's Surveyed Plot Programe", in, G. Payne, (Ed), Low Income Housing in the Developing World, 
John Wiley, Chichester, 1984, pp.  109-1 23. 
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in respect of the Oysterbay); 
o 	Three, poor servicing allowed plots to be developed slowly, a policy suited to the 
financial position of government officials; 
o 	Four, there was a need to maximise the extent of land to be included in the scheme. 
The issue at stake was access to land, not its servicing which could always come later 
once land was controlled; 
o 	Five, poor land servicing allowed easy manipulation of land administration (e.g. the 
creating of new plots on open spaces, or the clandestine reallocation of plots); 
o 
	
	Six, poor land servicing was a built-in factor discouraging the administration of cost 
recovery (so that in effect, plots could be obtained very cheaply). 
The majority of the plots were first allocated between 1 975-1 979 (Table 7.4). Original 
allocation was based on a point system as shown in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: The Point System originally used in the allocation of Sites and Service Plots 
Category of consideration 	 Points earned 
For every child or dependant 	 1 
Permanent employment 	 2 
Income per month 
0-300/= 	 3 
301-750/= 6 
751-1000/= 	 3 
Over 1000/= 0 
Every Year on the waiting lists 	 2 
Wiilingness to join a cooperative 1 
Payment of Land Rent: 
Through Salary Check off 	 5 
Through the Tanzania Housingank 	 5 
Directly to the Land Office 	 0 
Source: Ministry Lands. 
Our discussion with key site and services project implementators suggest that the point 
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system was originally strictly followed. However, it will be seen that the point system was 
highly skewed in favour of people in middle incomes and in permanent employment. It is, for 
example, low income non salaried persons who would pay their land rent through the District 
Land Office (in which case they would score nothing). It is mainly the middle to high income 
households who would register hemselves on the waiting list (in which case they would score 
highly as the years went by).lt is also implied that a non salaried person would score no point 
under the "permanent employment" category. Moreover, while it would be common for low 
income households to be willing to join a cooperative and to have large families, these two 
items were given relatively low scores. It is thus not surprising that the only major group of 
non employed persons who benefitted from the sites and services schemes were those who 
were displaced from Manzese to give way to part of the area's upgrading. Many were 
allocated plots in Block "C" of the Sinza area. 
As if the above was not enough, soon after the debut of the sites and service scheme, 
conditions of eligibility were changed to suit further, people in middle income brackets as well 
as government officials. In 1975,   the upper income limit for qualifying for sites and service 
plots was raised from the original Tshs 750/= to Tshs 1000/= per month. 61 A year later, 
in 1976,   the Ministry of Lands obtained agreement from the World Bank that 25% of the 
project plots be issued to individuals irrespective of their income. It was argued that this was 
in order to prevent the growth of low income segregated areas in a socialist country. 62 It is 
suggested that this witnessed the end of the point system. Most likely, as a result of these 
changes the pace of allocations picked up. Most plots were allocated between 1 975-1 979 
when conditions had already been altered in favour of the middle income groups (Table 7.4). 
V 
61 Mgullu, Housing 
62 ibid p. 120. 
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Table 7.4: Percentages plots allocated, compared to percentages plots changing owners, 
Kijitonyama, Sinza and Mikocheni, 1970-1988. 
Years % Plots Allocated 
- 
% Plots changing 
hands 
1970-74 5.5 - 
1975-79 54.6 18.4 
1980-84 21.3 55.2 
1985-88 6.2 15.4 
Not determined 12.4 10.8 
Total 100 99.8 
Source: J.M.L. Kironde, "Land Scarcity Amidst Land Abundance: The Paradoxes of 
Tanzania's Urban Land Policy", in, Open House International, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1992,   P. 6. 
In the first half of the 1 980s, there was a major plot reallocation exercise of sites and 
service plots (Table 7.4). This was a result of: many offers for plots remaining "unaccepted" 
i.e. the original fees plus one year's land rent not being paid; and/or, of plots remaining 
undeveloped. This would tend to support Mgullu's contention that many low income 
households were discouraged from taking up the plots because of the suffocating 
bureaucracy. Getting the Land Office to show one one's plot was in itself a prime nightmare, 
as was the labyrinth of fees and levies amounting to an initial Iumpsum figure of Tshs. 
2590/=. In the mid-i 970, this figure was too high for low income households to give out 
at one go. 63 One key official dtfling the implementation of the sites and services schemes 
in the 1 970s intimated to me that many self employed plot awardees may not even have 
known that they had been allocated a plot. Many "offers" for plots were addressed to the 
beneficiaries through indefinite addresses like care of TANU Offices. Such plots were among 
those that were reallocated in the 1 980s. Besides, such "beneficiaries" need not exist. Low 
income households would be put off as well by the original "wilderness" nature and distant 
locations of the sites and services areas. Both Mgullu and Blunt point out that many of the 
83  Mgufl ,,u, Housing , p. 80. 
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600 people displaced in Manzese and allocated plots in the sites and services schemes simply 
decided to take up land within the same area, leading to further overcrowding rather than take 
up distantly located and expensive sites and service plots. 64 
The development of the sites and service areas took off at a very slow pace. Schmetzer 
notes that when in 1977 contractors had finished servicing the sites and services areas, and 
were leaving, no development was to be seen on the allocated plots. 65 Mghweno too notes 
a contradiction that while insufficient plots were surveyed to meet the demand, it took too 
long for the allocated plots to be developed. 66 World Bank figures for completion, five years 
after the project completion date, indicate that of the 8,848 sites that were officially reported 
as complete in the sites and services schemes in Tanzania, only 48.3% were finished with 
occupants in the houses, 22% were developed but not yet occupied, and 26.6% showed no 
development. 67 A study carried out over the sites and services areas in 1988 showed that 
15.4% of all plots in Sinza, Kijitonyama and Mikocheni were completely undeveloped, 
although most had been allocated ten or more years earlier. Another 20.3% though partly 
developed, had not yet been roofed. 68 
However, in the case of the plots that were being developed, houses that were being put 
up appeared to be beyond the means of low income households. Even where a Housing Bank 
loan was obtained, houses constructed cost several times over what such loans could finance. 
This was despite the goverment's policy of encouraging low cost houses on sites and services 
kcl 
64 Mgullu, Housing; A. Blunt, Problems that arose during the Implementation of Phase I of the Sites and Services 
Schemes in Tanzania, Final Report of tI'Consultant in charge of monitoring and Evaluation, Ministry of Lands, 1977. 
65 H. Schmetzer, "Slum Upgrading and Sites and Services Schemes under different political circumstance: Experience 
from East Africa' , African Urban Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp.  276-286. 
66 Mghweno, "Tanzania's Surveyed Plot Programme." 
67 Campbell, "The 5tate, Urban Development and Housing" p. 167. 
68 J.M.L. Kironde, "Sites and Services in Tanzania: The Case of Sinza, Kijitonyama and Mikocheni Areas in Oar es 
Salaam", Habitat International, Vol. 15, No. 1/2, 1991,   pp. 27-38. 
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plots and despite the the general paucity of institutional land development credit69 
At the same time, the demand for plots in the sites and services areas was actually 
getting keen leading to the accusation by World Bank Officials, that land officials in Dar es 
Salaam had a different land allocation system, and were corrupt. Partly in response to this 
pressure, and since the sites and services schemes superseded all other plot allocation 
programes in Dar es Salaam 70, land officials (particularly planners) went back to the sites and 
services areas and "created" plots out of land earlier left unsubdivided for private use because 
it had been considered to be unsuitable for building, or was earmarked for public purposes like 
public open spaces, local car parks, schools, community centres, etc. Official records showed 
that is 1988, already 17.4% of the 4,540 plots in Sinza were "creations". The extent of these 
"creations" can be gauged by looking at the various open spaces or public land that has been 
converted to land for private use (Figure 7.6) 
Plot beneficiaries were expected to pay back to the government, the cost of the 
infrastructures but this has been fraught with problems. Most likely as a result of poor records 
and poor follow up, households have been lax in paying back their dues. Government figures 
quoted by Kulaba for 1983 showed that 75.2%, 63.6%, 60.5%, and, 54.3% of the project 
beneficiaries in Manzese, Kijitonyama, Sinza and Mikocheni were in default 71 . The high 
default rate in Manzese (considered to be a low income households area), and the relatively 
low default rate in Mikocheni (considered to be a high income area) should be noted. The high 
default rate, and such adverse factors as a high rate of inflation and funds mismanagement, 
have all made the question or sites and services replicability very difficult. In view of the fact 
that the plot beneficiaries werêhe ones entrusted with cost recovery, it is hereby argued that 
effective cost recovery was delibeately sabotaged in the general philosophy and onslaught 
to get land cheaply. 
ON 
69 S.M. Kulaba, "Managing Rapid Urban Growth through Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading in Tanzania: Lessons 
of Experience", in, P. Crooke, Management of Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Housing areas, pp.  31-42. 
70 
The non sites and services Mbezi Planning Scheme was ready for allocation from 1979. Initially, its distant location 
and paucity of service infrastructure did not relieve pressure on the Sites and Services areas. 
71 Kulaba, "Managing Rapid Urban Growth.." 
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There has always been an argument that the sites and services areas were originally 
allocated to low income households, but that the latter were bought out by middle to high 
income households. In order to get some insights into this apparent take over phenomenon, 
a study was carried out in 1988 in Sinza, Mikocheni and Kijitonyama, whereby details of plot 
allocation and transfer of every 1 0th plot were collected from the Land Office, and the plots 
visited physically to note the development on the sites. The findings indicated that the 
majority (57.9%) of the original plot awardees were still the owners. Where the plots had 
changed hands (i.e. in 42.1 of the cases) this had been mainly (63%) due to plot reallocation 
as a result of plot non take up (i.e. not payment of the initial fees and other dues), or plot non 
development, or revocation. Only in about 3.5% of the case were plots sold. In 1 .4% of the 
cases plots were transferred for "love and affection", or were surrendered (in which case, a 
possibility existed that these plots might have been sold). 72 There were thus no large scale 
plot sales by the original awardees. These findings would tend to support the argument that 
low income households (the majority of whom were perhaps among those whose plots were 
reallocated) were edged out of the scheme ab in/tb, by the unfavourable conditions attached 
to the sites and services scheme. The propagated view that low income households areas 
were taken over, is perhaps the "elites" mode of shedding crocodile tears. 
Verdict on the Sites and Services Scheme in Dar es Salaam 
Implementation of the sites and services scheme in Dar es Salaam revealed that a 
policy-making caucus is capable of instituting conditions suited to its own needs and 
requirements while at the same time claiming to want to serve another group. The sites and 
services schemes were hardly conceived with the needs of low income households in mind. 
The latter were right from thstart disadvantaged so that plots ended up in the hands of 
government and parastatal officials, and later on, important businessmen. Not that these did 
not qualify. The system had been signed in such a way as to incorporate the majority of 
them. During the negotiation stage, and the early days of implementation, concern was 
expressed for low 1fcome households, though these were poorly defined. From about 1975,   
the concept of low income households was dampened, and was thrown out altogether during 
the 1 980s. This is not to say that the original poor man's plots were subsequently taken over, 
72 




but that the poor were outsmarted right from the start. Slow plot development was not only 
a reflection of lack of readily available development finance, but also of the fact that it was 
access to planned land (rather than its development) that was considered important.The  
Effects of the Sites and Service Schemes on Dar es Salaam's Land use Structure 
The sites and service project was a major plot provision undertaking paralled only 
during the 1 950s. Areas that were considered to be yet wild were opened up and developed 
albeit slowly. The three areas of Sinza, Kijitonyama, and Mikocheni have sorted themselves 
out with Mikocheni coming out as a high class residential areas with expensive houses some 
fo which are let to expatriates. This is partly because of Mikocheni's location by the Ocean 
and partly a result of deliberate policy that subdivided the area into a comparatively high 
proportion of medium sized plots. 
Sites and services schemes created a psychological conviction that no area in Dar es 
Salaam was too remote so that subsequently, households were no longer afraid of seeking 
and developing distantly located, unserviced areas. This is currently leading to Dar es 
Salaam's sprawl. More importantly, the sites and service schemes demonstrated the power 
that planning schemes could endow to land administrators in terms of controlling and getting 
access to land. As a result, the Ministry of Lands then launched a major non sites and 
services planning scheme in Mbezi, while the sites and services directorate itself made an 
abhortive bid for survival, by launching new schemes in Tegeta and Tabata areas. These 
manoeuvres are described in the following paragraphs. 
7.2.5. The Non Sites and Services Planning Scheme at Mbezi 73 
Background to the Mbezi Planng Scheme 
During the early days of implementing the sites and services project, it became obvious 
that the sites and services directote had become powerful. Other powerful social groups 
could not easily control the administration of land in the sites and services project. Moreover, 
plots in the sites d'nd services project were not adequate to meet the needs of other social 
groups in terms of quantity, and size and location of plots. It was therefore decided to launch 
73 
Where the name Mbezi is used, it refers to the Mbezi Planning Scheme area, along Bagamoyo Road, not Mbezi along 
Morogoro Road. 
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a major planning scheme in the Mbezi area of Dar es Salaam. 
The Mbezi Planning Scheme Area is located between 10-1 5 kilometers from the Dar 
es Salaam City Centre 'and is bounded to the South by the Mbezi River, to the East by the 
Ocean, to the North by the Tegeta River and to the West, by a hilly area linked to Goba and 
Kimara. The topography is flat to undulating. Low lying and marshy ground along the Ocean 
is suited to mangrove tree growth and provides expansion areas for the Ocean. This led to 
the establishment of salt works in the area. Sand quarrying was, until recently, carried on in 
the Mbezi River area, while stone quarrying was carried out in the Kunduchi and neighouring 
areas. 
The area that is known as the Mbezi Planning Scheme covers some 5,500 hectares, of 
which 3,184 were earmarked for residential uses, 558 for industrial uses, 145 for institutional 
uses, 55 for District Centres and 1,558 for agricultural uses and open spaces. The 1968 Dat 
es Sa/aam Masterplan had zoned the Mbezi area, for industrial and residential uses. This was 
upheld in the 1979 Masterplan. The development of the area was expected to follow a 
planning scheme TP/DSM/MISC/1 5/478 prepared by expatriate consultants A. Janson and E. 
Jensen in 1978,   and approved by the Dar es Salaam Urban Planning Committee during the 
same year. 
Part of the Mbezi along the Ocean had already been occupied by (mainly) European 
settlers. During the 1 950s, Mbezi was considered to be agricultural land. In the mid-i 955, 
Mbezi was well outside the bodaries of Dar es Salaam, in Kisarawe District and was put to 
general farming establishments. Early 0 955) attempts by the farm owners and settlers in the 
area, spearheaded by one Captain D.F. Heath of Heathley Farm, Box 1336, Dar es Salaam to 
Organise the raising of funds for rotJ servicing (called the Beach Plots Road Fund) met with 
problems as a number of land owners especially the Indians, did not pay the 200/= 
V 
contribution. 74 
In 1974,   most of the Mbezi area was put to sisal growing with two estates: Mbezi Sisal 
74 See Tanzania Archives File No. 11/100 Volume II, Beach Plots, General Correspondence. 
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Estate, belonging to a Greek, D. Mathekiaris and the Kunduchi Sisal Estate. Posssibly because 
sisal business was depressed, the estates were not well looked after, and were, as a result, 
nationalised by the government and given over to small scale farmers for agricultural purposes 
(see Chapter Eight). Part of Mbezi, not put to sisal growing, belonged to "wenyeji" (native 
population). In 1976, Mbezi was declared a planning area, and a planning scheme was 
prepared and the area surveyed. Plots began to be allocated in 1978.   The area was 
earmarked to be surveyed into 3,445, 2,246, and 225, high, medium and low density plots 
respectively, as well a as large number of industrial plots in the earmarked Mbezi Industrial 
Area. The actual number of residential plots in Mbezi is about 7,000, as a result of the 
parcellation of many open spaces and land originally meant for public and institutional uses. 
It is important to point out that the Mbezi Planning Scheme was not related to the sites and 
services schemes going on at the same time. The Mbezi Scheme was nevertheless one of the 
largest plot provision undertakings, outside the sites and services schemes, ever to be 
undertaken in Dar es Salaam. The area's servicing was to be funded wholly by the Tanzania 
government. 
Part of Mbezi, adjacent to the River Mbezi was earmarked to be a greenbelt in the 1979 
Dar es Sa/aam Masterp/an. No administrative measurers were taken to define or protect this 
greenbelt, so that it was slowly occupied spontaneously. A high income squatter settlement 
with high and low density plots has therefore developed in the earmarked greenbelt. 
The Mbezi Planning Scheme as an arena of the Social Strucicile to get access to land 
Within the struggle to have control over the land delivery process discussed in Chapter 
One, the Mbezi Planning Scheme must be seen as being aimed at countering the 
prepondarance of, and providing an alternative to, the sites and services schemes. 75 The 
Mbezi Planning Scheme was thus uider the Directorate of Urban Planning in the Ministry of 
Lands, as well as the Dar es Salaam City Council, and not under the Sites and Service 
Directorate which ty then was very powerful as far as the allocation and administration of 
75 
A hypothesis where Parastatal Organisations enhance their powers by hatching subsidiaries has been presented in, 
R.S. Mukandala, The Political Economy of Parastatal Enterprise in Tanzania and Botswana, PhD Thesis, University of 
California, Berkeley, 1988. An analogy with respect to land policy is hereby drawn whereby officials enhance their 
powers over the land delivery process by hatching (new) planning schemes which they can control. 
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new development land in Dar es Salaam was concerned. 
As the first major non sites and services plot allocation scheme in Dar es Salaam, it is 
significant that the MbeziPlanning Scheme perpetrated the earlier trend of abutting the Ocean 
and Bagamoyo Road, both symbols of status. Like the first phase of the sites and services 
schemes, the Mbezi Planning Scheme was, too, an extension of the area for property 
investment by the elite. In any case no pretense was this time ever made that the scheme 
was earmarked for low income households. It is significant too to note the proportion of low 
and medium sized plots (42%), compared to high density plots. Except for Mikocheni (again 
by the Ocean), there were hardly any low or medium sized plot in the earlier sites and services 
schemes. The Mbezi Planning Scheme was another example of the struggle by the policy 
makers to control the coastline, started during the colonial era (Seaview and Oysterbay) and 
perpetrated during the early days of independence (Msasani Beach); and during the early sites 
and service schemes (Mikocheni) and was later to be extended to Tegeta. This has led to the 
sprawling of Dar es Salaam northwards while nearer areas to the west, south west and south 
have remained, until recently, relatively undeveloped. 
Thus, during the 1970 and 1 986s there were two major (land) planning schemes in Dar 
es Salaam: The sites and service schemes under the sites and services Directorate, and the 
Mbezi Planning scheme, under the Town Planning Department in the Ministry of Lands and 
the Urban Planning Department under the Dar es Salaam City Council. This did not augur well 
for land servicing and land administration. The meagre resources available could only be 
spread thinly over a wide area, during a period of the economic crisis in the country. Besides, 
there were at least three major land administrating authorities in Dar es Salaam, i.e the Town 
Planning Department and the Sites and Services Directorate, both in the Ministry of Lands, 
and the Dar es Salaam City CouncL. 
In order to imjLment the Mbezi Planning Scheme, the area had to be acquired from the 
existing farmers. This was relatively easy. The area was simply surveyed over their heads. 
They were however promised compensation for their "unexhausted improvements". For many 
this amounted to nothing since they grew annual crops and had no structures in the area. 
Others were promised plots within their land. In both cases, the government hardly kept its 
im 
promises, so that to date many people are yet to be compensated, more than a decade after 
the land was acquired, and many never got allocated any plots (see Chapter Eight). 
Problems of develoDinci Mbezi: Land non-servicing and øoor land administration 
As alluded to earlier, the Mbezi Planning Scheme came at the wrong time as far as its 
servicing was concerned. Without any external help, money for servicing had to come from 
the coffers of the Tanzania government. Yet by 1979, the economic crisis described in 
Chapter Seven was biting. With the government unwilling to increase the cost of land, there 
were no resources to institute the necessary infrastructure. But land servicing was not as 
crucial as the getting hold of land by the authorities on which to wreak their will and expend 
their powers through its planning and allocation. Plots were therefore demarcated, surveyed, 
and allocated in the Mbezi uBushu (either as planned before surveying i.e. from Town Planning 
Drawings, or, as later on surveyed. The land surveyors added a lot of plots to the original 
Mbezi planning scheme, which they allocated themselves). Many small scale farmers 
continued to till the land, many times destroying survey beacons and pins. There were no 
services whatsoever instituted in the area. Not even rough roads were carted into the bush 
that was being allocated. It was thus an uphill task to identify ones plot, let alone develop 
it. 
Originally, Mbezi was not popular since it was regarded to be too far and its unserviced 
nature discouraged some would be plot takers. Besides, plots were still available in the sites 
and services scheme areas with relative ease. Nevertheless some of the beneficiaries 
particularly those near the Ocean, took up the plots and started developing them slowly. Some 
parts of the Beach were already allocated or developed mainly by Europeans. By the mid-
1 980s, with the sites and serviceschemes almost wholly allocated, the Mbezi Planning 
Scheme became popular and plots began to be keenly sought after in the area. This demand 
came at a time of cnfused urban land administration practice in the country so that various 
officials involved themselves in shoddy deals some of which have resulted into disputes (see 
Chapter Eight). 
Developing Mbezi was originally a nightmare. Roads were spontaneously instituted 
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particularly by lorries carting through the bush to deliver building materials. Many times, such 
"roads" cut through other peoples' plots, and therefore kept changing courses whenever the 
owners of the plots surfaced. Water had many times to be fetched from distantly located 
sources. Some developers who decided to lay their own individual pipes found the cost 
prohibitive particularly because of the distances involved. Lack of co-ordination among 
developers led to repetitive action i.e. each individual laying their own pipes sometimes in the 
ditches dug earlier by another developer, where co-ordination would have led to lower costs. 
Lack of security in the area led to some of these water pipes being unearthed and stolen. 
Building materials too were usually stolen from sites. 
By 1988,   over 4000 plots lay undeveloped in Mbezi, though most were allocated in 1983 
or earlier. Currently (1993), however Mbezi is taking off. Although plenty of land is yet to 
be developed, it is allocated, and the owners are there, somewhere. A plot in the area in now 
a goldmine and is difficult to come by even to those prepared to pay. Most developers appear 
to aim at grandiose, multistorey houses, with flat concrete slab roofs or tiled roofs. Some of 
the earlier developers who put up simple buildings are finding themselves out of place. 
Perhaps because of its location, Mbezi is coming up as a visually high income residential area. 
The paradox that exists in Mbezi however, is that the value of the properties being put up, is 
not matched by any service infrastructure. The few improvised roads that exist are not 
passable during the rainy season. There are no sewers, or storm water drains, or street 
lighting. There are no schools, health centres, markets or police posts in the area. These will 
no doubt be instituted one day, but it means that much of the property that is complete in 
Mbezi cannot yield returns. It cannot be occupied by the owners or rented out, not only 
because of poor infrastructure, ' ut also because of poor security. Many of these grandiose 
houses are occupied by paid up guardsmen, particularly the Makonde tribesmen, who 
specialise in that kind of service. 
The Mbezi PlanninciScheme: Some Conclusions 
The Mbezi Planning Scheme has been presented as an example of the struggle to control 
land, particularly valuable land by the Ocean, by land administrators in Dar es Salaam. Other 
aspects of Mbezi's development, particularly land maladministration, and the inefficiency and 
inequity of land policy are discussed further in Chapters Eight and Nine. In terms of planned 
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plots Mbezi nearly equals the sites and services project. Although devoid of services, Mbezi 
is developing to high standards. The Mbezi planning Scheme demonstrated that access to land 
was more basic that the provision of services. As a result, the key issue in Dar es Salaam has 
now become access to, plots, but not the integrated conception of planned development of 
neighbourhoods. 
7.2.6. Attempts to perpetrate the Sites and Services Project without the World Bank 
The exit of the World Bank from the Sites and Services Project in Dar es Salaam 
As it was becoming apparent, during the 1980s   that the World Bank was not too happy 
with the sites and services schemes in Tanzania, the sites and services Directorate was faced 
with the sceptre of being redundant should the Bank withdraw. The Bank did withdraw in 
1984.   According to the then Director of the sites and services Directorate in the Ministry of 
Lands, Mr. B.B.K. Majani, the Bank withdrew because it differed with Tanzania over the 
continued centralization of sites and services powers in Oar es Salaam.The bank wanted these 
powers centrifuged to the other towns where schemes were to be carried out, that is, the 
Bank was proposing to break up the powers of the sites and services Directorate. This was 
unacceptable to the Directorate, who were the negotiators on behalf of Tanzania, and, as no 
agreement could be concluded, the Bank withdrew its support. 
Tegeta and Tabata Sites and Services Schemes 
In order to justify its continued existence, the sites and services Directorate hatched a 
Third Phase of the Sites and Services Scheme which leapfrogged Mbezi, by then hardly 
developed, to Tegeta, where apanning scheme was prepared. Initially 929 low density plots 
were planned. Later, another 2840 high density plots were demarcated. The low density plots 
in Tegeta were allocated to fairly pgwerful people in the country. Apparently this was aimed 
at palmgreasing the powers that be to support the proposals for the government to fund the 
Third Phase of the sites and Services Scheme. And apparently,the proposals were approved. 
Initial funding was secured to service Tegeta. Like was the case with the first Phase of the 
sites and service schemes, it was necessary to show that the interests of low income 
households, particularly those living in unplanned areas, were the motivating force behind the 
scheme. Thus the Third Phase earmarked to upgrade the unplanned areas of Hanna Nassif 
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(which had been earmarked for removal since 1965), Mwananyamala Kisiwani and Kinondoni 
Shamba. The 2840 high density plots demarcated in Tegeta and another 1434 plots 
demarcated in Tabata, were earmarked to take the population that would be displaced from 
those three unplanned areas. Some 630 houses were earmarked for demolition in those 
areas, and by 1987,   the properties to be demolished had been surveyed and valued, and 
compensation amounting to Tshs 11 8m/= paid. 76 
The Third Sites and Services Prolect as a demonstration of the social strugcile to control land: 
The disbandment of the Sites an Servics Directorate 
It is baffling that land administrators in Dar es Salaam could have convinced themselves 
that the poor and the not so poor residents of the areas of Hanna Nassif, Mwananyamala 
Kisiwani and Kinondoni Shamba would have been willing to move from their locations which 
were within 5 kilometres of the city centre, to unserviced locations like Tegeta, some 20 
kilometres away. In fact these people have not moved despite the payment of compensation. 
It is hereby submitted that the whole concept of the Third sites and services scheme in Dar 
es Salaam was aimed at enhancing the interests of (sections of) the bureaucrats in getting 
access to new land in general, and to prime land along the Ocean in particular, using the 
mirage of squatter area upgrading to justify their motives and to get hold of funding. This is 
further supported by the lack of correspondence between the number of houses earmarked 
for demolition in the areas to be upgraded (i.e. around 630 houses) and the number of planned 
new plots which was 5203. Indeed the government was castigated in the Bunge (Parliament) 
that the new plots in Tegeta and Tabata were not just allocated to the replacees, but also to 
civil servants and Party leaders. 77 Within the bureaucracy itself, the struggle over land 
administration was between the sites and services Directorate, and the rest of the land 
administration set up, and the hatching of the Tegeta Scheme by the former was to 
match/counter the Mbezi PIanningcheme, earlier hatched by the latter to counter the 
powers of the former. In this struggle something went wrong for the sites and services 
Directorate. It mayave been personality clashes. In any case, the World Bank's withdrawal 




had removed the carpet from under the feet of the sites and services Directocate. Despite 
its strategy to remain powerful by hatching the Third Sites and Services Project, it was 
disbanded in the late 1 980s and its duties transferred to a section under a Department in the 
Ministry of Lands. Its Director was able to reverse an order to transfer him out of Dar es 
Salaam, but he was nevertheless transferred out of Ministry of Lands. That spelt the end of 
sites and services schemes as conceived in the 1970s   in Tanzania. 
The develoøment of Tecieta and Tabata: Some Conclusions 
Although the sites and servises directorate was disbaded, a sites and services section 
was retained within the Ministry of Lands. It is this section (and not the Dar es Salaam City 
Council) which is handling Tegeta and Tabata, since these areas, being categorised as sites 
and services schemes, fall under the Ministry of Lands for allocation and management. Like 
was the case with Mbezi, the allocation of land in Tegeta and Tabata is haphazard. In most 
cases, the rights of existing land occupiers are not extinguished before allocation, causing 
major problems for the existing and would-be new occupiers. Because of lack of service 
infrastructure, the areas are difficult to develop, although, like the case of Mbezi, the 
developers are aiming at very high, building standards. Land policy created these areas but 
has again failed to ensure both efficiency and equity in their development. 
7.2.7. Land Policy Impacts on the land use structure of Oar es Salaam during the 1970s and 
1980s 
The late 1 960s and 1 970s saw concerted efforts to prepare general. and longterm land 
use plans for Dar es Salaam. The impact of these on the ground was limited. Policy emphasis 
was at the time put on the prov1ion of sites and services and other planning schemes. The 
effect of these was to extend Dar es Salaam's planned area, but the beneficiaries were mainly 
people in middle to high income brackets. Both the non sites and services planning scheme 
at Mbezi and the sites and services ones at Tegeta and Tabata served to increase Dar es 
Salaam's sprawl, but at the same time underscored the importance of planning schemes in 
the overall struggle to acquire and control planned land, particularly by the Ocean. There were 
thus no planning schemes which in practice were aimed at benefitting low income households. 
For the masses of Dar es Salaam, squatting became the major form of access to land 
401 
Though policies of squatter removal were advocated, the government was generally unwilling 
to comfront such squatters. Leaning observes that while there were moves and even orders 
for demolitions to remove squatters, politically and unofficially, "quite a lot is done to permit 
or even to encourage Jt (squatting)" 78 . During the 1960s, squatting was seen as 
undesirable, but removing squatter areas was inexpedient. During the 1 970s, squatting was 
seen as being inevitable. Thus the policy of squatter areas upgrading undertaken in parts of 
Manzese and Mtoni/Tandika. For the rest of the squatter areas however, nothing was done 
to ameliorate their conditions so that these areas continued to develop haphazardly. 
7.3. Economic Responses 
The sites and services plots were, as we have seen, not implemented in the favour of 
low income households. The low cost small houses, constructed in low cost building 
materials like soil cement were not adopted to any substantial degree. In a number of cases, 
grandiose structures have been put up without substantial development financial credit. This 
is despite the very poor infrastructure, or its lack altogether in the sites and services area. The 
six roomed Swahili house, typical of the slum clearance areas, and well suited for low income 
household subletting was not widely adopted either. Instead, most houses were constructed 
with complete house occupation (by owner or tenant) in mind. The government's attempts 
to portray the site and service areas as low income areas by propagating small, cheap houses 
was thwarted when households put up expensive structures, thus manifesting their true 
economic and social status. 
A study carried out in 1988 concluded that 36% of all houses in the sites and services 
areas were occupied by tenars, while a more recent study found the percentage of 
houses occupied by tenants in the Sinza area to be 44%. In 63.3% of the rented houses in 
the Sinza area, the employer (usuajy a parastatal) paid the rent. 8° Areas like Mikocheni, 
V 
78 J. Leaning, Housing and Urban Land Administration in Urban Tanzania, Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar 
es Salaam, 1972, P.  12. 
79 
Kironde, "Sites and Services in Tanzania", p.  37. Table 5. 
80 A.A. Mosha, The Study of Planning Practices, Residents' awareness and attitudes,, and their environmental 
onsequences on women and children in the High Density Area of Sinza in Dar es Salaam, Women Research 
Documentation Project, University of Dar es Salaam, 1992, p.  32, Table 6. 
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have attracted very high cost buildings, several of which are let at very lucrative rents to 
expatriates. During the 1 970s however, sites and services areas were developed slowly and 
even today, there are still many vacant or partially developed plots. An interesting observation 
in the complete transformation of houses abutting major roads like Shekilango Road (Chapter 
Eight) into commercial users, shops, groceries, restaurants, bars and workshops, in complete 
contradistinction from what was planned for. In other planning schemes particularly those 
in Mbezi, Tegeta and Tabata, land development is slow. Despite the lack of service 
infrastructure, the buildings that are being put up are quite expensive. 
As has been pointed out above, the major phenomenon of Dar es Salaam's land use 
structure in terms of the population accommodated, has been squatting. Many areas seem to 
have grown in relation to places of employment opportunities particularly industry, the port, 
and high income areas, or along major roads, and surrounding planned areas. Old squatter 
areas are developed to high densities. In other settlements, particularly those at the periphery 
and those colonised by high income households, densities are low and land is, in some cases, 
put to agricultural use. The type of buildings differ from the simple to multi storeyed ones. 
All indicators show that these squatters are confident with their areas and are not 
worried about removal, lack of amenities, or lack of security of tenure authenticised by legal 
document. 81 Thus investment of all standards is going on, making, it all the more difficult 
for squatter areas to be removed or even to be "upgraded" by demolition. 
7.4. Overall Deductions on the evolution of Oar es Salaam's Land use Structure during the 
1970s and 1980s 
The land use structure of Dar es Salaam continued to be shaped by land policy, positively 
through various planning schemes 4ncluding the sites and services projects); and negatively 
by failing to address the question of squatting. It has been argued that the planning schemes 
ignored the intereis of low income households and were conceived and implemented with 
the middle to higher income/social status in mind. Throught the 1 980s, land policy dragged 
81  S. Kaitilla, "The Upgrading of Squatter Settlements in Tanzania. The role of security of land tenure and the provision 
of amenities in housing improvement", Journal of Asian andA fr/can Studies, Volume 26, No. 3/4, 1991, pp.  220-236. 
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Oar es Salaam northwards along the Ocean, in conformity with the interests of of high income 
households and policy makers, but issues of equity or economic efficiency in land uses 
received little consideration. The fastest growing aspect of land uses in Dar es Salaam 
particularly in terms of population was squatting, and we have argued that this too was a 
result of land policy which chose to ignore this phenomenon, rather than work with the 
various communities in the existing or potential squatter areas, to regularise them. It has been 
argued as well that, squatting took care of the interests of the poor and thus left planned land 
to the elites. In recent years, even the middle to higher income households have resorted to 
squatting. Thus the indirect encouragement of this phenomenon by the government. In the 
following Chapter, we show how land administration, in both the planning schemes and the 
squatter areas was in a crisis, thus leading to gross inequity and inefficiency. The crisis, 
however, was beneficial to, and was thus perpetrated by, the land administrators. 
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Milli— CHAPTER EIGHT I I 
A CITY IN CRISIS, THE 1980S AND AFTER 
8.1. The Economic and Political Changes of the 1980s   
8.1.1 The Economic and Political Framework 
The 1 980s witnessed two fundamental phenomena in Tanzania's history. One was the 
economic crisis that the country faced and still faces and which led to Structural Adjustment 
Programmes. Two, was the departure of Mwalimu Nyerere, the longstanding national leader 
and shaper of most of the country's socio-economic policies for over three decades, from the 
country's leadership in 1985.   His departure was followed by the ready acceptance, by the 
new government, of Structural Adjustment Programmes as dictated by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which Tanzania had earlier strongly resisted. In the wake of structural 
adjustment pressure, came pressure for political reform, which resulted in Tanzania's 
abandonment, in 1992,   of single party, for multiparty, democracy. 
On top of the national economic crisis, Dar es Salaam had been facing a management 
crisis since the 1 970s, particularly since the abolition of local government in Tanzania in 
1972.   The national economic crisis limited the scope of operation of the central government, 
while the importance that investment in land acquired, both as a hedge against adverse 
economic circumstances, and in the light of the demise of the Arusha Declaration, created a 
situation where all powers tha!tbe found it opportune and necessary to gain control over the 
land delivery system. Under such circumstances, the poor and the weak suffered, while the 
advancement of individual interests took precedence over social interests. Land policy failed 
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to unfold itself to embrace the intests of the poor, since, traditionally, this had never been 
its role, and morea'er, since within a confused status of land policy, lay the power of those 
who controlled the directions of land policy. 
The situation facing Dar es Salaam in the 1 980s was that of a crisis. The economic 
problem which the country was going through had its toll on Dar es Salaam, which therefore 
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faced an economic crisis. On the other hand, Dar es Salaam being the capital, was attracting 
the interests of all social groups in the country, particularly the powerful politically and 
economically. While this meant that Dar es Salaam was able to attract comparatively more 
resources to itself compared to other urban areas in the country, it also meant that managing 
Dar es Salaam's land became a scene of contention between the Dar es Salaam City Council, 
and the Central government, and, within the Council itself, between councillors and functional 
officers. Dar es Salaam was therefore facing a managerial crisis. The evolution of Dar es 
Salaam's land use structure in the 1980s   must therefore be seen within this framework of 
adverse national economic conditions, changing political circumstances and a crisis in urban 
management. 
8.1.2. The National Economic Crisis 
Aspects of the national crisis 
During the first decade of Independence, Tanzania was fairly successful in terms of 
meeting basic human needs and performed well in terms of achieving economic growth. The 
situation changed in the mid-i 970s. In 1974,   the country suffered a major balance of 
payments deficit as a result of falling primary agricultural commodity prices, the first of the 
oil price rise shocks, drought, and accelerated villagisation. Fifty percent of the export 
earnings in that year (1 974) was used to import food. The situation was rectified by an IMF 
extended facility to which Tanzania, as IMF's ordinary member was entitled. A subsequent 
boom in coffee prices, between 1 975-i 978, saw Tanzania accumulating surplus reserves, 
allowing a belief that the economic problem was ephemeral. With the costly War with Uganda 
(1 978-79), the fall in coffee pces, new oil price rise shocks, the collapse of the East African 
Community, and recession in the advanced countries, the economic crisis cropped up once 
again. 1 Some indicators of the ecomic crisis were: 
o 	The decling in GDP growth from an average of 5.1 % p.a. between 1970 and 1976 to 
G. Rutihinda, "Structural Adjustment, External Debt and Growth in Africa: the Tanzania Experience", in, Bank 
of Tanzania, Economic and Operations Report for the Year ended 30th June, 1981, pp.  57-64; W. Biermann 
and J. Campbell, "The Chronology of Crisis in Tanzania", in, B. Onimode, (Ed.), The /MF, the World Bank, 
and the African Debt, Vol. 1: The Economic Impact, Institute of African Alternatives, Zed Books, London and 
New Jersey, 1989, pp.  69-89. 
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less than 2% between 1976 and 1 986; 
o 	The soaring in the annual rate of inflation, from an average of less than 5% over the 
1 966-70 period, to 30% after 1 979; 
o 	The adverse external balance of payments, from a surplus of US $ 1 37m in 1977,   to 
an annual deficit ranging between US $ 50m and 395m between '1 978 and 1 990; 
o 	The runaway overall public finance deficit which grew six and half times between 
1 978/79 and 1 984/85, reaching 20% of the GDP in 1 980; 
o 	The change in the price index for goods and services consumed by urban dwellers, 
from 100 in 1977, to 1991 in 1990; and, 
o 	The falling value of the Tanzania shilling against the US dollar from Tshs 7.5 between 
1969-1 977, to Tshs. 1981= in 1990. 
In the first half of 1979, foreign exchange reserves fell to less than what was 
required to procure basic necessities for two weeks. Tanzania went back to the IMF and 
although the first tranche of $ 40m was released, negotiations stalled and were abandoned 
as the conditions demanded of Tanzania were unacceptable to the Tanzanian government. 
These revolved around a massive devaluation of the Tanzania shilling, a steep increase in 
producer prices, the lifting of price controls, the freezing of wages, import liberalisation, the 
balancing of budget deficits, privatisation of the economy, the increase in bank interest rates 
and internal trade liberalisation. 2 Tanzania resorted to increasing the supply of money. New 
negotiations with the IMF made some headway but were abandoned and inflationary measures 
were resorted to once again. In 1981, a homegrown National Economic Survival Programme 
which included several deflationary measures like cuts in salaries and social services, increase 
in taxation, export promotion, ad increases in rural prices, was adopted. The Programme was 
soon abandoned for lack of support from the IMF because it did not include stabilisation 
policies. 3 In 1982/83, under pressur and direction from the IMF, Tanzania produced a three 
year Structural Adjustment Programme which included stabilisation policies, particularly 
2 	W. Biermann and J. Wagao, "The IMF and Tanzania: a solution to Crisis", in, P. Lawrence, (ed.), World 
Recession and the Food Crisis in Africa, Review of African Political Economy and James Currey, London, 
1986, pp.  140-147; K.A. Malima, "The IMF and World Bank conditionality: The Tanzania Case", in, 
Lawrence, World Recession, pp. 129-139. 
Rutihinda, "Structural Adjustment ...". 
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stricter fiscal and monetary policies, liberalisation of domestic trade, liberalisation of crop 
marketing, removal of food subsidies and reduction in the government work force. A major 
disagreement remained that of devaluation. While the Tshs had been gradually devalued (by 
10% in January 1 979; 19% in March 1 982; 20% in June 1 983; and 26% in June 1984), and 
while the government favoured this gradual devaluation, the IMF wanted a "shock" 300% 
devaluation to stimulate exports, so, negotiations failed again. In August 1982,   the World 
Bank withheld transfers, as Tanzania had fallen behind in its repayment of the principal and 
interest on World Bank loans. However, several structural adjustment measures, including the 
removal of food subsidies, had been implemented in 1983 and in 1984,   and as these did not 
produce the typical "breadt' or "IMF" riots, further adjustment measures were implemented. 
It was obvious that the IMF's and Tanzania's positions were converging. The economic crisis 
however, deepened. In 1985, foreign exchange earnings financed only 46.6% of imports. 
Debt repayment obligations as a percentage of the value of exports rose from 12.5% in 1980 
to 80.1% in 1985. In the same latter year, Tanzania got a new leader. In 1986/87 after 
extensive consultations with the IMF and the World Bank, Tanzania produced the first 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) conforming to the IMF requirements and was known 
as the First Economic Recovery Programme (ERP I). The conditionalities of ERP I were that 
there should be 
o 	A liberal policy in the form of exchange rate depreciation. The Tshs was devalued by 
135% and currently (March, 1993) stands atTshs 350 to 1 US$; 
o 	The upward adjustment of bank interest rates which were increased by over 50% and 
now stand between 24-3 1 %; 
o 	Retail trade Iiberalisatior The function of state monopolies was curtailed, and food 
subsidies removed; 
o 	Increase in producer prices. ie official prices (per kg) of maize, paddy, wheat, and 
beans were respectively increased from Ths 1, 1.75, 1.65 and 3, in 1980/81, to 13, 
26, 32 and 35 in 1990/91, a rise of between 1000 and 1900%. Several products 
were decontrolled and the private sector allowed a greater role in their marketing; 
o 
	
	Liberalisation of external trade and payments. This culminated into the introduction of 
private Bureaux de Change. By June, 1992, 26 bureaux had been licensed, and 14 
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were operating. 4 
o 	Restrained fiscal and credit policies. This entailed massive public expenditure cuts. In 
1 977/78 the overall deficit was 4% of the GDP. In 1 978/79, it shot up to 1 9%. After 
the launching of the Economic Recovery Programme it dropped to 11 %, but was 
expected to go up to 22.4% in 1 992/93. 
According to some criteria, the Tanzanian economy improved. Between 1986 and 
1989,   (with 1 980-85 figures shown in brackets) the GDP grew at 3.9% (1 %), agriculture at 
4.8% (3.2%) and manufacturing at 2.7% (-5%). The rate of inflation felI to 19% in 1990, 
(from 30% between 1980-85). There has also been some increase in foreign exchange 
earnings as well as in the export of non traditional materials. But there has not been a major 
improvement in export drives. The rate of capital formation has in fact fallen to 0.3% 
compared to an increase of 4% between 1 980-85. That means that there has been a 
disinvestment process. There has also been a disindustrialisation process in favour of trade 
and commerce. Capital flight has increased. At the same time, there has been a serious 
deterioration of social overhead capital, particularly in the education, health, and water supply 
sectors. Between 1970 and 1983,   the proportion of the Budget spent annually on education, 
ranged between 10-15%, and that on health, between 5-8%. Since 1983/84 these 
proportions have fallen to between 5-7% for health, and 4-6% for education. Many 
commentators and researchers6 have pointed out that the redirection of government priorities 
coupled with other adjustment measures (i.e. higher prices, unemployment, etc.) during the 
first Economic Recovery Programme have increased the hardship experienced by the 
vulnerable groups in the economy: the poor, children and women. The Government admits 
this, so that in launching the séond Economic Recovery Programme (ERP 2) in 1 989/90, it 
launched as well, a Priority Social Action Programme (PSAP) aimed at promoting growth "with 
a human face", by taking account of,the social dimension of the adjustment measures, and 
Daily iiws (Tanzania), 12.8.1992. 
M.S.D. Bagachwa, "A comment on the 1992/93 Government Budget", in, Tanzania Economic Trends, 
Volume 5, Nos 1 and 2, 1992, pp. 49 - 61. 
6 	e.g. Rutihinda, "Structural Adjustment ."; A. Tibaijuka, The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes 
on Women: the Case of Tanzania, Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar as Salaam, 1 988; C.S.L. 
Chachage, Forms of Accummulation Agriculture and Structural Adjustment in Tanzania, University of Dar as 
Salaam, Mimeo, 1992, p.  12. 
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to particularly increase expenditure on education, health and rural water supply. However, 
such increase as there has been in the budgetary allocations to these three sectors does not 
appear to have yielded any tangible results so far. 
As a result of these Structural Adjustment Programmes, aid to Tanzania increased 
from US $ 287m in 1985 to $850m in 1989. Of this money, 47% was spent on import 
support. Dependence on external assistance has increased. In 1991, 95% and 45% of 
development and recurrent expenditure respectively depended on foreign assistance. 7 While 
there are few signs of productive reinvestment of capital, glaring signs of inequality e.g. 
grandiose houses, luxury trucks and conspicuous consumption, are prevalent. 8 The rich have 
been grabbing land in Dar es Salaam, including open spaces and hazard lands, in shoddy deals, 
in order to invest in property. What is emerging out of structural adjustment in Tanzania is 
that it has introduced new forms of accumulation based on the plundering of non renewable 
material resources including timber, birds, marine resources (line prawns), minerals, live 
animals, animal products, illegal exports/imports, tax evasions and massive corruption. Those 
who were poor before structural adjustment are poorer and those who were relatively better 
off have become poor. 9 
The Effects of the Economic Crisis on Dar es Salaam's Land Use Structure 
The economic crisis meant that relatively little could be spent by the government on 
land development and management. This was so under a situation of rapid urban growth and 
a poor urban management set up. The result was a general accelerated breakdown of public 
infrastructure like roads, water supply networks, and drains, and of services like solid and 
waste water disposal. ,AJthougDares Salaam has a long history of poor endowment with 
infrastructure, the economic crisis made matters worse. Moreover Dar es Salaam had no_prior 
experience with infrastructure mainnance since most of the city's infrastructure had been 
instituted only in the 1 950s had 1 960s. This infrastructure had survived the 1 970s reasonably 
'I 
chachage, Forms of Accumulation, p. 6. 
Rutihinda, 'Structural Adjustment ."; Chachage, Forms of Accumulation. 
Chachage, Forms of Accumulation, p. 12; A. Tibaijuka, "Issues arising from the non traditional export drive 
policy of Economic Adjustment: The case of Wood and Wood Products", Tanzania Economic Trends, Volume 
4, No. 1, 1991. 
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well, but needed rehabilitation and extension in the 1 980s. With limited economic resources 
available to the government to expend, direct investment in infrastructure and services in 
existing and new planning schemes became highly constrained. The results were: The 
breakdown of existing infrastructure; the failure by government to service new areas required 
for the city's development; and the incapacitation of the government's ability to effect new 
planning schemes (from the failure to acquire land, for example); and the continued 
spontaneous development of Dar es Salaam as more and more households of all income levels 
and status, (partly compelled by the economic crisis to get hold of land for economic 
activities) resorted to the unplanned sector for their land requirements. 
8.1.3. Political Changes 
The 1 980s were also years of political changes. President Nyerere relinquished power 
in 1985. His departure, together with the economic realities of the time, brought into 
question, the continued adherence to the Arusha Declaration and the policy of socialism and 
self reliance. The ready acceptance of IMF conditionalities, as much a result of compelling 
circumstances, as of President Nyerere's retirement from the government, undermined the 
basis of socialism as privatisation was encouraged, and government expenditure and control 
over various sectors of the economy, trimmed down. In 1991 the country's leadership under 
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, reviewed the Arusha Declaration and replaced it with the 
Zanzibar Declaration which allowed leaders to own houses for renting and to participate in 
private business ventures. While the Nyerere era had not eliminated the quest for wealth by 
top leaders, it had kept this quest under check. The new era introduced a near laissez faire 
situation, a situation encouraged by the anti-public sector and pro-privatisation and economic 
liberalisation policies of the rMF. The 1 980s witnessed the open private accummulation of 
wealth and witnessed various incidences where the economically or socially powerful 
members of society have participated keenly in land acquisition and development, either by 
buying out poor households in areas like Kariakoo and at the City's periphery, or by using their 
muscle to acquird'some of the most sought after land in Dar es Salaam, either from the limited 
planning schemes that there has been, or by forcing "creations" on, or invading open spaces 
and beaches. Besides, many leaders have had their houses which had been either nationalised, 
or sold under the political compulsion of the Arusha Declaration, returned to them. 
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The impact of the multiparty system of governance adopted in Tanzania during 1992 
has yet to be felt as far as land uses are concerned. Despite the unearthing, in recent times 
of various national scandals (a number of which have involved urban land in Dar es Salaam) 
by the proliferate private press, there are signs that top leaders are becoming "criticism 
resistant". However, one suspects asenseof urgency among the powerful classes in Tanzania 
to utilise their positions to acquire and develop as much land as possible while the going is 
still good, and to do as much as possible not to rock the boat by introducing new reforms. 
Many people in authority are under pressure from the wealthy to shortcut land allocation 
procedures and to allocate valuable land in questionable deals. 
8.2. Land Policy Impacts 
8.2.1. Introduction 
While previous eras had major policy themes guiding land use development, there is 
a lack of such themes in the 1 980s and after. Slum clearance and tenant purchase had been 
discontinued. Direct house construction by the NHC was miniscule. Sites and service projects 
were in shambles and the World Bank had pulled out in 1984.   Squatter areas upgrading was 
being hailed by the authorities but little or nothing was being done realise this goal. The new 
1979 Dar es Sa/aam Iviasterplan had just been completed, but there were no resources to 
implement its provisions. What however transpires, is a situation of confusion and power 
struggles in the whole process of land delivery and administration; and a direct move to get 
access to land by those in authority. We discuss policy impacts under four headings: Policy 
in relation to City Centre land; the policy in relation to squatter areas; policy related to new 
planned areas; and policy in relation to open spaces and hazard lands. Before discussing these, 
it appears pertinent to presenti'irst, the issue of the struggles over land delivery problems 
between the central and local government. 
8.2.2. The Managerial Crisis in Dar es Salaam 
( 	 It is possible that even without the abolition of local governments between 1 972- 
1974,   the Dar es Salaam City Council would have faced a managerial crisis but their abolition 
created a hiatus during which Dar es Salaam was managed directly by the central government 
through the Regional Authorities. When the urban councils were reestablished from 1978,   
local management had been disturbed and could not be recast to preform satisfactorily in the 
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new circumstances. 
This managerial crisis has manifested itself in Dar es Salaam in the high turnover of 
City Directors. With the exception of Mr. B. Kasege, who was Director for 3 '/2 years from 
1978 to 1981, subsequent Directors who have held office to 1992 have had an average 
tenure of less than two years each. Many commentators discussed with, blamed this situation 
on the current (since 1 980) Dar es Salaam Mayor, his Worship, Councillor Kitwana Selemani 
Kondo, who, it is argued, derives his power from his close and long association with President 
Ali Hassan Mwinyi. (City Directors are appointed by the President). The Mayor however denies 
this, pointing out that he has all along been a democratically elected leader. Nevertheless 
many officers with the Dar es Salaam City Council expressed a reservation that the Mayor 
was standing in the way of most of their progressive policy proposals, accusing him of 
insisting on having his way almost on everything, and throwing his weight about; of violating 
existing land use regulations; of misusing the Councils resources; and'of ensuring a high 
turnover of top Council Officers. One also suspects a confrontation between the "local" 
Mayors and councillors, and the "upcountry" directors and other high ranking officers. What 
this demonstrates isa situation of instability within local government, within the triangular 
relationship between council technocrats, the Councillors, and the central government. The 
high turnover of its top executive officials has denied the Dar es Salaam city council, the 
longterm leadership stability necessary for effective management. 
As a support for this observation key national leaders have had to intervene directly to 
solve some of Dat es Salaam's problems (like city cleanliness or the protecting of the City's 
open spaces and hazard landsrwhich fall squarely on the city authorities' shoulders. The 
managerial crisis has also been used to distort land administration for the benefit of select 
classes. Major areas of conflict hav been with regard to local revenue collection, and with 
regard to land administration. 
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Table 8.1 	Dar es Salaam City Directors, 1978-1 992 
Name Period in Office 
Benedict Kasege 1978- 1981 
David Mgwasa 1981 - 1983 
Edward Oluoch 1 983 - 1985 
Abbas Farahani 1 985 - 1987 
Felix Ndaba 3 months in 1987 
George Chale 1 987 - 1989 
Sigiti Mayeye 1989- 1991 
Evarist Kweba 1991 - 1992 
Omar Mkhandi 1992 
Source: 	Dar es Salaam City Council 
8.2.3. Revenue Collection 
Although Dar es Salaam is by far the richest of all urban areas in Tanzania, its record 
of self-sufficiency in revenue collection is possibly the worst. In July 1991,   at the height of 
the breakdown of Dar es Salaam's infrastructure and services, the DarIaarnjy1ayor_ 
caused quite— a stir in Parliament when he accused the centraLgovernmentof..giying the City 
Council very little funds in conarison to its needs. According to the Mayor, the Government 
was responsUe for 
the Council very restricted funds for these purposes. Furthermore, the Council had proposed 
a petrol tax of 11= per litre of ftJ1 for its own revenue, but the central government had 
declined to give its sanction. In reply, the Minister for Local Government, J. Warioba, (who 
was once the Dar es Salaam City Council Solicitor), castigated the Oar es Salaam City Council 
for not utilising the human, material and technical resources at its disposal to augument, or 
reduce reliance on, government grants. He pointed Out that in 1990/91 the Dares Salaam 
City Council received 64% (i.e. Tshs 517.2m/= out of Tshs 806.5m/=) of the development 
subsidy earmarked for all the 119 urban councils in the country. In 1991/92, 60% (i.e. Tshs. 
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750m/= out of Tshs. 1 .25bn/=) of the Ministry of Local Government's development budget 
was allocated to Dar es Salaam. Besides, the per capita government expenditure on the 
delivery of social services in Dar es Salaam was, at Tshs. 1 ,2461 =, the highest in the country 
• For Mwanza, Moshi, Tanga and Arusha, the figures were Tshs. 800/=, 6721=, 6571= and 
5181= respectively. The Minister stressed that the City Council should involve the city's 
residents in its management, and enhance its revenue collection, pointing out that Dar es 
Salaam's record was very poor compared to other urban and district councils) ° The result 
of this confrontation, however, was the sacking, a few days later, of the City's Director, S. 
Mayeye, who was known to sympathise with the Minister's views expressed above. Prior to 
Mayeye's sacking, but in clear reference to him, the Mayor had warned the central 
government that his Council would not be the dumping grounds for incompetent civil servants. 
In reference to such views as expressed by the Oar es Salaam City Council Mayor, a seminar 
on strengthening Local Government held in April 1991,   had urged the politicians not to treat 
local government technocrats as casual labourers by firing them from service over the radio 
or through the Press without following the proper procedures. 11 This however did not 
prevent the unceremonious sacking of City Director Mayeye, and of his successor, E. Kweba, 
less than a year and half later. 
While instruments exist to allow the City Council to collect adequate revenue, these 
are not used to the maximum. In particular, 
Urban Authorities ('Rating) Act of 1983,   the Dar es Sal 	cjy_çqnciljas_not_taken 
significant steps to effect property_taxation. 12 
In relation to city manement and to revenue collection, it is observable that most 
of Dar es Salaam streets, outside the areas developed before 1970,   have no names, and most 
buildings are not numbered (see aIsahapter Nine). The Council has no record of properties 
in its jurisdiction which would form the backbone of the Council's revenue collection 
10 	Daily News, (Tanzania) 2.7.1991. 
11 	Daily News, (Tanzania) 19.4.1991. 
12 	
There is, at the time of writing (1993), a World Bank supported scheme to survey the properties of Dar es 
Salaam for rating purposes, but it is not all that clear whether there is the political will to support property 
taxation. 
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over the issue. Prior to the demise of the local authorities in 1972,   land allocation was done 
by the Council except in limited cases. During the period when local authorities were in limbo, 
powers for land allocation reverted to the central government. With the restoration of local 
government in 1978,   there followed "a tussle between different authorities particularly local 
governments and the Ministry of Lands as to their respective powers with regard to the 
allocation of Land". 13 This situation, as well as the general confusion and breakdown in land 
administration, is blamed on the Decentralization period: 
In this major process of reorganising the government's executive machinery, 
land administration suffered severe disruption and possibly a loss of sense of 
policy direction. The result was the proliferation of land allocating authorities, 
loss and breakdown of keeping of routine records, frequent transfers and 
devolution of responsibility on relatively unsuitable staff resulting in loss of 
valuable experience, and multiplication of opportunities for unethical behaviour 
on the part of key allocating officers at different levels. 14 
A study an behalf of The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters 15 found 
"irrefutable" evidence demonstrating the resultant confusion, and a virtual collapse of land 
administration. 16 Nevertheless, since the decentralisation period lasted only six years, the 
tussle over land administration is perhaps and indication of a more fundamental problem 
revolving around the whole question of the struggle by the powers that be to control the land 
delivery process. Once powers of land administration were concentrated at Ministerial level 
during the Decentralization period, (and this included the creation of the Sites and Services 
Directorate in the Ministry of Lands), central government authorities found it difficult to 
devolve these powers again, especially since a period when every power that be, wanted to 
control the land delivery procss, had been ushered in. But at the same time, the local 
authorities, realising the powers and privileges attached to land allocation, also wanted these 
powers for themselves. The decentjlization period may have brought about confusion in land 
13 	
Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters, Volume I, 1992,   p. 27. 
14 	mid, p. 23. 
15 	ibid. 
16 	
F.P. Mgullu, The Problem of Multiple Allocation of plots and enclosure of Beaches in Dar es Salaam, Mimeo, 
1992. 
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endeavour. The other major source of revenue i.e. development levy (poll tax) which every 
able bodied urban resident is obliged to pay, is effectively collected only from those who are 
employed, i.e. the levy is deducted from their salaries by the employers. The rest of the 
residents are hardly taxed unless there is some loophole where they can be netted, e.g. when 
they are seeking a business license. Central government policy, particularly with respect to 
the collection of development levy, has been ambivalent as well. Whenever local authorities 
have resorted to draconian measures like the rounding up and jailing of tax defaulters to 
enforce levy payment, the central government has always intervened, castigating these 
authorities for "harassing" wananchi (the people). The local authorities on their part, have 
not investigated other ways of effectively collecting development levy (e.g. by cooperating 
with the local neighbourhood leaders). With the shrinking formal employment sector, revenue 
from development levy has also suffered. 
( 	The reason why the Dar es Salaam City Council is shying away from effective local 
taxation is suspected to be the fear of accountability to Dar es Salaam's residents. Thus the 
preference of the direct subventions from government. Funds from the government, however, 
have been limited as a result of the government's hamstrung budget, particularly during the 
Cstructural adjustment era. Thus in the nine years between 1981/82 and 1989/90 the Dar es alaam City Council got from the central government only Tshs 554.2/ (i.e. 9%) of the Tshs 1 ,350m/= it had requested. Dar es Salaam has therefore lacked the economic base required 
to have a dymanic land delivery programme. It must be stressed however, that the potential 
for raising local revenue in Dar es Salaam is enormous, but the concerned authorities will not 
exploit the various sources largely for fear of accountability to the public; 
8.2.4. Crisis in Land Administration 
Of direct relevance to this study, has been the crisis in land administration. Ever since 
its re-establishment the Oar es Salaam City Council has faced the problem of who should be 
responsible for land allocation within the city boundaries. Legally, this is the duty of the 
Minister for Lands, unless he delegates his powers. The Council however feels that land 
allocation should be its duty, as was the case before Decentralization (1972). There has 
therefore been a tussle between the Ministry of Lands and the Oar es Salaam City Council 
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administration but the struggle to control land administering powers between local and central 
government authorities is common in many African cities. 
According to the Dar es Salaam Mayor, the President of Tanzania had in 1978,   
directed that all plots in urban areas be allocated by local authorities. 17 This was reaffirmed 
in Parliament by the Minister for Lands in 198018  who said that her Ministry would not 
involve itself in plot allocation, and that this should be done through the urban councils' plot 
allocation committees. Yet even in that Parliamentary session, the Minister was reminded (by 
the Dar es Salaam Mayor) that her Ministry was involved in plot allocation in Dar es Salaam. 
The issue of plot allocation continued to dominate both the Council's and the Ministry of 
Lands' policy discussions. As matters were getting out of hand, the Prime Minister of the day 
had to intervene, and as a result, the Ministry of Lands issued a directive in 1989 (the lnnga 
Dfrective) spelling out three levels of plot allocation: 
The Ministerial Level where land for large users e.g. heavy industry, hotels, foreign missions, 
farms exceeding 500 acres, and land for villages was to be allocated. Within Dar es Salaam, 
the Ministry of Lands reserved to itself , powers to allocated City Centre land; land in sites 
and services projects (irrespective of densities); medium and low density plots and beach plots 
in non sites and services land delivery schemes; as well as the plots earmarked for the 
government and the parastatal sector. The Dar es Salaam City Council was left with powers 
to allocate only high density plots in non sites and services schemes; 
The Regiona/Level, where land in the following categories was to be allocated: industrial land 
(except heavy industry); land fo?overnment, parastatals, and religious bodies; residential and 
commercial plots in urban centres; farms of between 100 and 500 acres; and, beach plots. 
These powers did not extend to Rar es Salaam, in which city, regional land allocation 
functions were to be performed by the Ministry of Lands; 
The District Level where land for commercial, residential and service plots and farms not 
17 	
Property Digest, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 10. 
18 	Tanzania, ParilamentaryDebates (Hansard), 24th-26th June 1980, Government Printer, Dares Salaam, 1980.   
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exceeding 100 acres; and land for small scale industry, was to be allocated. For Dar es 
Salaam, district allocation committees had powers to allocate only high density plots and 
farms of less than three acres. 
In all cases, available plots were to be advertised, and applicants were to fill in forms. Every 
local authority was to make monthly returns of plot availability and allocation to the Ministry 
of Lands.' 9 
This directive meant that powers to allocate land were concentrated in the central 
government, and this caused an immediate outcry from the local authorities in general, and 
from the Dar es Salaam City Council in particular. In October 1989,   the Dar es Salaam City 
Council Mayor threatened that his Council would not issue building permits to those allocated 
land by the Ministry of Lands, while the latter threatened to withhold certificates of Title for 
those allocated land by the Dar es Salaam City Council contrary to the above directive. 20 
Furthermore, City Council's letter Ref. DCC/C.LD/DMM/4 Vol. lV/46 instructed Councillors and 
Dar es Salaam District Land Officers not to attend plot allocation committee meetings 
convened by the Ministry of Lands. So far, however, there is no evidence that the committees 
are operative. Land in Dar es Salaam is allocated on an adhoc basis, without following the laid 
down procedures by both the Ministry of Lands and the Dar es Salaam City Council. 
The situation is one of utter confusion. Plots to be allocated are never made public 
as required by the 1989 Iringa Directive. Both the Ministry of Lands and the Dar es Salaam 
City Council allocate land in camera. Thus, the Ministry does not abide by its own directive. 
The criteria happens to be that The land seeker has some political, social or economic muscle, 
and/or has personal contacts. Within any of the authorities, various officials i.e. land officers, 
land surveyors, town planners, dectors or higher ranking officials, and councillors, do 
allocate, or immensely influence the availability and allocation of plots. In some cases, officials 
keep in personal cdtody, details of planning schemes and are the only ones knowledgeable 
19 	
Tanzania, Directive on the Preparation of Layouts, Surveying and Allocation of plots in Tanzania, Ministry 
of Lands, Dar as Salaam, 1989. 
20 	Property Digest, Vol. 2, No. 2, p.  10. 
419 
about the status of the areas concerned. KuIaba 21 reports on councillors allocating or 
pressuring the allocation of plots, and on the Ministry of Lands subdividing areas and creating 
plots without involving the councils. This is possibly illegal, and in contravention of the Town 
and Country Planning Ordinance. According to Kulaba: 
dishonest Council Officials tend to take advantage of a such fluid and confusing 
state of affairs where the major actors do not respect the limits of their 
authorities by engaging in various malpractices. These include the conversion 
of open spaces into residential plots, or plots for vehicle repair garages and 
workshops, and the allocation of those plots to individuals contrary to 
procedures or existing masterplans. 22 
The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters found overwhelming evidence that 
different political leaders and government officers at various levels of administration were 
directly or indirectly involved in the allocation of land, particularly prime urban land, open 
spaces, beaches, and large tracts of farm land in rural areas. The Commission was shown 
written evidence from some top politicians and officers giving instructions as to who should 
be allocated what land. 23 
The result has been a state of confusion throughout the land development regime 
characterised by the conversion of public open spaces, catchment areas, conservation lands, 
beaches, sacred plots (including cemeteries), and government and institutional plots, to private 
uses. Other results have been the allocation of one plot to more than one person (known as 
double allocation, although in some cases treble allocations have taken place); the failure to 
follow any laid down procedures in the whole process of land demarcation and allocation; the 
allocation of land by various authorities without coordination; the failure to enforce any 
development controls; and, above all, the failure to have an integrated conception of how Dar 
es Salaam's land use structure should be. By way of an example, of all the 13,059 plots 
allocated in Dar es Salaam between 1983 and 1989,   11 % were double allocated. In 68% of 
IV 
21 	
S.M.Kulaba, Urban Management and the Delivery of Urban Services in Tanzania, Research Report, Centre 




Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Commission on Land, Volume I, p.  29. 
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the cases of double allocation, recourse had to be made to the Courts, and of the cases filed 
in the courts, only 38.4% were settled within three years. The rest took longer, causing 
untold misery and inconvenience to the concerned. 24 
Causes of double allocations were identified by the Presidential Commission of/n quiry 
into Land Matters as: malpractice in Land Offices, defective plot allocation systems, issuance 
of plots from Town Planning Drawings before the land was surveyed, overlapping plot issuing 
authorities, prolonged non development of allocated plots, revocation of previously allocated 
plots without following laid down procedures and absolute shortage/non availability of 
plots 25 . 
The allocation of recreation grounds has led to the diminution of public open spaces, 
while the allocation of hazard land has led to pollution, erosion, and dangers of flooding. The 
allocation of conservation beach plots which has blocked the flow of Ocean water onto the 
lowlying lands and Creeks (e.g. at Msasani kwa Mamwinyi, and at Mikocheni) has contributed 
to much of the observed Beach erosion in the areas of the Africana, Kunduchi, Rungwe 
Oceanic, Bahari Beach and Silversands Hotels. When the Ministry of Lands officials decided 
to survey and allocate the beachside open spaces at Msasani, all allottees were top 
government and Party officials. 26 
Besides carving plot out of open spaces and hazard land, power struggles over the 
control of land has been demonstrated through officials hatching planning scheme for various 
parts of Dar es Salaam, as has been discussed in the Chapter Seven. 
Land policy has therefore been conceived and implemented within a framework of 
confusion, power struggle and the cnsolidation of private interests over public interests. This 
situation has been perpetrated because various officials and and politicians benefit from this 
24 	
A. Semtenda, Litigation Delays as an obstacle to urban Land Development in Dares Salaam, Diploma Project, 
Ardhi Institute, Dares Salaam, 1991, p.  17. 
25 	Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Commission into Land, p.  30. 
26 	
MguIIu, The Problem of Multiple Allocation of Plots, p. 73. 
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confusion. 
8.2.5. Policy impacts in relation to Dar es Salaam's Central Areas 
(a) The Central Business District 
Plans existed as far back as the late 1 940s/early 1 950s for the redevelopment of Dar 
es Salaam's central area, 27 but little could be done because of lack of resources. Any 
projections to effect city centre redevelopment through the private sector suffered a major 
setback after the nationalisation of buildings in 1971. During the 1 980s, there was renewed 
interest in city centre redevelopment. In 1982,   the Oar es Salaam City Centre was declared 
a redevelopment area. 28 It does not appear however that this declaration was followed up 
by any action. The need for action on the city centre is generally acknowledged but no 
comprehensive policy yet has been implemented. There is, however, peacemeal 
redevelopment taking place with existing open spaces or public land being passed on virtually 
free to private developers. 
(b) Kariakoo 
Kariakoo has attracted redevelopment schemes since the 1 930s. This is discussed 
in Chapter Nine. In the 1 980s, it was the Dar es Salaam City Council's policy that building 
permits for Kariakoo area would be issued only for multistoreyed buildings. In 1989,   Kariakoo 
(together with a number of squatter areas in Dar es Salaam), was declared to be a 
redevelopment area under s.27 of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance, where land 
redistribution was to be undertaken. 29 This is strange since Kariakoo is a planned area and 
s.27 would hardly apply to it. Section 27, which was infact replaced by section 12 of the 
Town and Country Planning (AThendment) Ordinance of 1961,   applies to areas whose plot 
shapes and sizes are so irregular that land pooling and redistribution is the only feasible option 
(see Chapter Five). The declaring ofdKariakoo  to be a redevelopment area under s. 27 of the AN 
Town and Country Planning Ordinance demonstrates the kind of confusion that general land 
V 
27 	Colonial Office, Tanganyika Report for years 1948 and 1950, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1949, 
1951. 
28 	
General Notice 98 of 30/7/1 982. 
29 	
Town and Country Planning (Dar as Sa/aam Land Redistribution) Order, 1989, published as General Notice 
No. 374 of 21/11/1 989. 
422 
administration is suffering from. The official redevelopment schemes for Kariakoo, have hardly 
had any effects. Kariakoo is being redeveloped slowly but haphazardly by the private sector 
(Chapter Nine). The government has its own schemes for Kariakoo, but these remain 
unimplemented. 
Redevelopment plans for both the CBD and Kariakoo have been prepared by the Ministry 
of Lands, and not by the City Council, and the collision of interests between these two 
authorities has contributed to frustrating any comprehensive scheme implementation. 
8.2.6. Policy impacts in relation to squatting 
Continued unolanned DeveloDment in Dar es Salaam 
Although during the 1 970s the policy of squatter area upgrading was propagated, we 
have seen in Chapter Seven that little was done to realise this goal. As a result squatting 
continued so that in 1988,   over 70% of the City's population lived in squatter areas. As the 
official land allocation system failed to deliver, the unplanned sector continued to grow, taking 
in all kinds of households; some squatting because of lack of planned land in absolute or in 
the desired neighbourhoods; others squatting because they preferred larger plots which the 
official system could not deliver, etc. However, the policy of turning a blind eye to squatting 
was sooner or later bound to cause conflict with other land uses especially where squatting 
took place on high value residential or industrial land. The following examples which hit the 
media headlines in the 1 980s illustrate the problems and constraints of government policy 
with regard to squatting. 
The Case of Ubungo Kisiwani 
This squatter area (Figure 7.4) on elevated ground overlooking the Morogoro Road/Port 
Access Road junction, was sparselyccupied during the mid 19709. Its population however, 
began to increase particularly since employment and other income earning activities were 
getting established' at the University of Dar es Salaam and in nearby government and 
parastatal offices, as well as in the Ubungo industrial area. In the 1979 Dar Masterplan, 
Ubungo Kisiwani was zoned for light industries. With the completion of the Port Access Road 
in 1980,   the Dar es Salaam City Council was keen to see the light industries area established. 
In 1979,   there were 48 houses in the area with 240 people. By 1986 the houses had grown 
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to 306, and the people, to 1 530. ° Residents of the area included University dons, various 
high ranking government officials and businessmen, as well as the more Ordinary citizens. In 
1980,   the City Council issued a stop order against further development in the area, pending 
the assessment of compensation and demolition, so that the area could be put to the planned 
use. The residents rose in arms, appealing to the Ruling Political Party and the Central 
government who in turn intervened on the side of the squatters. The stop order was quashed. 
In May 1986,   the City Council made another attempt to remove the squatters of Ubungo 
Kisiwani. This time, the residents had even stronger arguments against removal. They cited, 
inter alla, the earlier attempt to remove them, after the failure of which, they had been given 
a go ahead to continue developing their land. They also cited the Tanzania Housing Bank loans 
which had been issued to some of them, and which had been sanctioned by Ward, District, 
and city authorities, thus condoning residential development in the area. Besides, they cited 
the two primary schools in the area which had been constructed by the City Council itself. 
Finally, they argued that the proposed industrial establishments would pollute nearby 
residences; and that some of their houses were new, and very expensive, compared to the 
earmarked compensation. The second attempt to remove the Ubungo Kisiwani people was 
again stopped by the government. It is unlikely to be tried again. The case demonstrates the 
problem of policy conflicts within the City Council itself, and between it and the central 
government, the Party, and other land development institutions. Today several of the area's 
resident have had their plots surveyed and have been issued with title to land. 
The Port Access Road 
The area 0.7 km on both sides of the Port Access Road (which was completed in 1 980) 
had been zoned industrial in Me 1979 Dar Masterplan. Although the Dar es Salaam City 
Council demarcated and allocated these industrial plots, it did not deal adequately with the 
question of the existing occupiers. I1 979, there were 461 houses in the earmarked industrial 
area, with 2305 residents. In 1986,   the houses had grown to 1 520 with 7600 residents. 
Between 1 979-1 9'7 only 13 of the Industrial plots were developed. The Dar es Salaam City 
Council tried to remove the squatters but failed. Instead the Council turned to supporting the 
plot allottees to negotiate with the residents and pay then compensation. Some industrialists 
30 	P.G. Mtae, Some crucial issues in the implementation of planning proposals in declared areas, Diploma 
Project, Ardhi Institute Oar es Salaam, 1988. 
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have done this. Others have failed so that the area is developing in a mixed fashion of 
planned industrial/warehousing plots, unplanned residences, and unplanned industrial and 
commercial establishments. 31 
The Case of Ukonpa Maiumba Sita 
This is an area between Pugu Road and the Central railway line, opposite the Airport 
(Figure 7.4). The area had been zoned industrial in the 1968 Dar Masterplan. It remained 
undeveloped, but had on it, several users on customary tenure. With the modernisation of 
Pugu Road in 1977,   the area became more accessible and ripe for industrial development. In 
1979,   a local entrepreneur, one Mr. Rajani, was allocated 12 plots in the area for industrial 
development. He intended to put up an oil mill as well as a textile mill. As he did not 
immediately develop the land, new people settled the area, and unofficial subdivisions of land 
continued. Later in the year, in the light of the existing residential squatters, the 1979 Dar 
Masterp/an (which aimed at preserving existing residential areas) zoned the area Residential, 
including the part that had already been allocated to Rajani. In the light of this 1979 Dar 
Masterplan zoning, the Dar es Salaam City Council allocated a number of plots in the area for 
residential development on 99-year leases. 
During 1980,   Rajani tried to enforce his rights. In this, he had the support of the 
Mayor, the city planner and, initially, the Director of Town Planning in the Ministry of Lands. 
The former two argued that the 1968 Dar Masterplan had never been revoked. It, therefore 
had not been replaced by the 1979 DarMasterplan! This was a most curious translation of 
events to be taken by Senior Government and Council functionaries in support of a rich 
industrialist. The Director of wn Planning, in his letter of 2/11/1 981, informed the Dar es 
Salaam City Council that the 1979 Dar Masterplan had been wrong in zoning the area 
residential. The area should be indstrial. He did not give any reasons for this reasoning. 
The area residents took the issue to the High Court, where it was argued between 
1979 and 1985.   Meanwhile the number of houses in the area grew from 1 576 in 1982 to 
2805 in 1987. The population rose from 8184 to 14,025 during the same period. The Mayor 
31 	ibid. p. 13 
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and the Council officials were insistent that these people should move 32 but perhaps in the 
light of the political implications that the dispute was taking on, the Director of Town Planning 
changed his mind and in 1985,   he declared the area to be residential. Unconvinced by such 
vicissitudes in the attitude of a senior government official, the residents insisted on a Court 
ruling, which, when it came, declared the 1979 Dar Masterplan to have had replaced the 
1968 one. The area was therefore residential, and only the Minister for Lands had the 
authority to change a masterplan. 
The Ukonga Majumba Sita case again illustrated the state of confusion within land 
development, with the backing of an important industrialist by officials and councillors 
bringing into question, the validity of a masterplan, and threatening the livelihood of thousands 
of people. 
Msasani kwa Makanciira 
This is an area which was originally a small fishing village, but which grew up near 
the beach in response to job opportunities in the then sisal estate at Msasani, as well as in 
the high income residential areas nearby (Figure 7.4). The name of the village is reputed to 
be the corruption of Musa Hassani a reputable area's resident of the past. The area had, by 
1980,   already been leapfrogged by the high class residences along the beach at Mikocheni 
and further northwards, and there was pressure for Msasani to be redeveloped. In March 
1987,   the Dar es Salaam Mayor was reported as saying that Msasani squatters were to be 
removed and the area put to low density residential development. He claimed that he was 
acting on government instructions issued since 1982,   when the Principal Secretary, Ministry 
of Lands, was said to have had instructed the City Council to allocate the disputed area for 
low density residential development. 33  However, the Msasani Residents' Committee, led by 
one Mr. J. Mkondwa, had copy of latter with reference number DSMNaI./41 663Nol.3/96, 
addressed to the Kinondoni District Area Commissioner (in whose district Msasani was) 
implying that the oder to remove Msasani residents had originated from the State House, 
32 	
Daily News (Tanzania), 29/5/1 985. 
33 	
Daily News (Tanzania), 14/3/1987. 
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three years earlier. 34 In view of this revelation, the government backed down and the 
squatters were not removed, but this is an issue likely to crop up again sooner or later 
because of the valuable location of this squatter area, and as the existing open spaces in the 
Msasani Peninsula and Oysterbay areas get exhausted. 
Kinondoni Shamba 
In October 1987,   there were reports that the Dar es Salaam City Council was planning 
to demolish 60 houses at Kinondoni Shamba (Figure 7.4) and that the affected persons were 
to be given alternative plots in Tegeta and Tabata. This was in relation to the Third Phase of 
the sites and services project (Chapter Seven). The Acting City Council Director, Mr. G. Chale 
admitted that the plan had existed sometime in the past, but that his Council did not have the 
Tshs. 50m/= necessary for paying compensation. The plan therefore could not be carried 
out. 35 
Kurasini Shimo Ia Udoncio 
This squatter area had developed on what was, until 1963,   freehold land belonging 
to the Roman Catholic Mission at Kurasini. The area was well located with respect to 
employment opportunities in the Harbour (Figure 7.4). Sometime in 1988,   Shimo Ia Udongo 
residents were informed that their houses would be demolished to give way to the 
construction of godowns related to the storage of Malawi cargo. Between 66 and 76 houses 
were involved. The residents, naturally, protested. The bone of contention between them and 
the government was compesation, and the provision of alternative land. They disputed the 
compensation of between Tshs 8000/= and 200,000/= per house that was awarded to 
them. Some were not given lalernative land. But, according to the Council valuers, the 
residents had been paid three times by the incoming company, lnterfreight, either through the 
City Council, or directly, much as ty still claimed that compensation was inadequate. 36 The 
Company also offered facilities to transport the affected residents and their salvaged building 
34 	Sunday News (Tanzania), 15/3/1987. 
35 	Daily News (Tanzania), 21/10/1987. 
36 	
In most cases of squatter removal in Dar es Salaam, residents would accept the inadequate compensation 
while putting up a case for more. 
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materials to Yombo Vituka where new plots had been made available. Some residents moved. 
Others didn't and took the case to court seeking an injunction against demolition, pending the 
review of compensation and other issues. On Saturday 11 /3/1 989, Inter freight bulldozed the 
settlement, and this resulted into an uproar which attained national political proportions as 
some 600 people spent a night in the open air. 37 All the government and Party sympathy 
was with the squatters and the two Council valuers who had accompanied the bulldozers, one 
Mtweve and one Malogo, plus the city solicitor were suspended indefinitely from their 
employment. Two days later, the residents of Shimo Ia Udongo announced plans to sue 
lnterfreight but it would appear that the issue was subsequently settled quietly, but the Shimo 
Ia Udingo residents were moved. 
Some observations on the oolicy with regard to squatting 
The above are some examples of confrontation between squatters and policy 
dictates. They show that the policy towards squatter areas has been ambivalent and adhoc; 
and many times characterised by confusion. While, in principle, the government attitude was 
anti-squatting and pro-expropriation and redevelopment, authorities have generallyshyed away 
from demolition. Even where it was deemed necessary to remove the squatters, (as in the 
case of Shimo Ia Udongo), the government was lax in creating the conditions for the 
successful implementation of this policy i.e. adequate and prompt compensation and the 
allocation of appropriately located alternative plots. Whenever it came to the crunch, 
authorities in higher echelons almost always preferred to leave the squatters alone (usually 
to make political capital out of the situation) against earlier decisions or instructions. In cases 
like Shimo Ia Udongo it is junior officials who sometimes bore the brunt of the saga. 38 The 
result has been what we cou'd call "squatting without fear", and this to some extent, 
accounts for Dar es Salaam's high incidence of squatting in land uses. This however is not 
necessarily a desirable phenomenoj, nor can it be argued that the government options are 
limited to either demolition or the turning of a blind eye to squatting. 
37 	The Sunday News (Tanzania), of 12/3/1 989, carried a headline banner "Kurasini Residents get shock of the 
Year as bulldozers raze down houses. 
38 	
Both Mtweve and Malogo, of the 1989 Shimo Ia (Jdongo squatter area removal fame had, by 1993 been 
cleared of all misdeeds in the incident by the State House. 
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Attempted alternative policy towards squatter areas 
Perhaps in view of the failure of the concept of squatter removal and in view of the 
need to address the question of the squatter areas, the government has from 1989,   thought 
of adopting a new approach i.e. that of land pooling and redevelopment as provided under 
s.27 of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance (as replaced by s.12 of the Town and 
Country Planning (Amendment) Ordinance of 1961). General Notice 374 of 21/11/1989 
published the Town and Country Planning (Dar es Salaam Land Redistribution) Order, 1989, 
which declared the following areas in Dar es Salaam to be redevelopment areas in which land 
redistribution was to operate: 
Kariakoo, Keko, Yombo, Temeke, Mlalakuwa, Msasani Village, Ubungo, Kimara, 
Buguruni, Vingunguti, Majumba Sita, Gongo Ia Mboto, Mbagala, Mikocheni, 
Kawe, Mwananyamala Kisiwani, Tandale, Hanna Nassif, Kinondoni Shamba, 
Mtoni, Tandika and Manzese. 
As pointed Out above, Kariakoo is odd in this list since the area has, by and large, a regular 
land use pattern and does not need land pooling. According to the above Order: 
all that land specified in the Order shall vest in the President on the coming into 
effect of the Order. The President shall thereafter, allocate the land so vested 
in him for the purposes specified in the detailed scheme. 
This latter statement would appear to be ultra vires, since s.27 (or, for that matter, the whole 
of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance) does not give the President, powers of 
divesting the owners of their land interests. Besides, popular consultation powers and other 
procedures provided for in the Town and Country Planning Ordinance for land pooling 
schemes were not followed. Fi1lly the definition of the areas affected needed to be much 
more definite than their mere naming. Nevertheless, in view of the above order, the Ministry 
of Lands has been preparing redevtopment  schemes for such areas and anybody with a 
property in the area can have it surveyed according to the provisions of the scheme. No 
remedies are speciTied for the owners whose land would be adversely affected by the 
schemes and no formula is provided on how much of the land is to go to public uses like 
roads. Not only is the legality of such schemes highly questionable, but also they are highly 
impractical. A study of one such a scheme for part of Buguruni squatter settlement 
demonstrated the weaknesses of the Ministry of Lands' approach. The Ministry's 
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redevelopment scheme bore little semblance to the situation as then existing in Buguruni. On 
inquiry it was found that the redevelopment scheme was based on 1982.   aerial photographs. 
Yet between 1982 and 1991,   558 structures had been added in the affected area. No survey 
of the existing situation was made. No inventory was taken of existing land owners, and 
neither were the area residents consulted in the preparation of the scheme. It is highly unlikely 
that such a scheme can be implemented, and any attempts to do so in likely to lead to serious 
disputes. The success of such top down engineered land pooling and redevelopment schemes 
is therefore likely to be highly limited principally because those planned for are not consulted 
or involved in the proposing of a new land use layouts. As the Presidential Commission of 
Inquiry into Land Matters observes, such schemes illustrate the expropriation tendency 
embedded in the administrative practice of land administration, where even the liberal 
provisions of s.27 and the Third Schedule of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance are 
distorted. The inequitable and impractical compulsory acquisition is readily resorted to, rather 
than the preservation of existing rights and their redistribution to effect planning. 39 
Interviews with the City Surveying Office confirmed that they had failed to most survey the 
squatter areas in in Dar es Salaam in accordance with the Town Planning Schemes, as 
prepared by the Ministry of Lands. 
8.2.7. Policy in relation to new land for planned development 
Weaknesses in Policy ADproaches 
The traditional approach to the provision of new land for development has been by 
way of the government declaring an earmarked area to be a planning area under the Town and 
Country Planning Ordinance. After such a declaration, no further development is allowed in 
the declared area without planni,g consent. The government then prepares a planning scheme 
for the area, acquires existing interests, surveys the land and allocates it to new developers. 
This process is continuously gettingighly constrained, and the authorities have been unable 
to cope with the demand for plots. Between 1 978/79 and 1 989/90, the Dar es Salaam City 
Council received 21 ,002 applications for plots, but allocated 22,746 i.e. only 8.1 % of the 
applicants got plots. In 1990,   only 1 830 plot surveys were approved for Dar es Salaam. In 
39 	
Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Land, p.  76. 
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1991, this had fallen by almost 50% to 934,40  This situation has many times been blamed 
on lack of resources, particularly manpower and equipment. But there are more reasons. Poor 
land pricing, which see the government not recovering its input in surveyed plots certainly 
starves it of resources. Outdated, inefficient, and bureaucratic approaches towards land 
acquisition and land surveying exacerbate the problem. The struggle by the authorities to 
control planning schemes also contribute to the problem. Of late, the government has 
admitted the problem of lack of land to plan and survey, as most that is available, is built upon 
haphazardly, and the government cannot afford compensation. 41 The general policy geared 
towards replacing existing land users is getting highly constrained. Policy approaches towards 
the provision and administration of new planned areas are discussed below to highlight the 
problems and constraints in policy implementation. Two examples are presented: one from 
Segerea, and the other from Mbezi. The Mbezi Planning Scheme is delved into in considerable 
details as it has been the hallmark of the crisis in land administration in Dar es Salaam in 
recent years. 
SeQerea 
Segerea is an area which, until the mid 1 980s was considered distant from Dar es 
Salaam because of poor accessibility, but which has in recent years seen the city coming too 
near, too fast. It is located beyond Tabata, between Pugu Road and Morogoro Road. In 1987,   
the people of Segerea saw surveyors in their area, without any prior warning. They were told 
that these had been sent by the government. 42 From there on, plots were surveyed and 
allocated, and new people have been taking these up and developing them. Only a handful of 
the existing residents were allocated plots or compensated. Where paid, compensation was 
paltry. A number were give orers for plots which did not exist. Some have therefore 
continued to occupy their plots, at the risk of quarelling with the incoming owners, although 
40 	TanzaniaHaIiya Uchumiwa Taifa 1991, (Economic Survey for 1991), Government Printer, Dares Salaam, 
1992, p.  200. 
41 	ibid,p. 199. 
42 	
It is now well known that the appearance of surveyors (and valuers) is the first sign that a land expropriation 
scheme is being hatched by the government. In some cases, like that of Mabibo (Chapter Nine) these 
government Officials have been prevented, through threats of, or actual violence, from executing their 
mission by angry residents. 
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they realise that their legal rights have been taken away. 43 It is alsopossible that since 
Segerea was allocated without extinguishing the rights of the existing occupiers, such 
allocation was illegal. 
The case of Segerea is particularly interesting since the area appears to have been 
declared to be a planning area only in 1990. 44 If, therefore the planning scheme which was 
used to survey the area in 1987,   was implemented without the area being declared to be a 
planning area, the scheme may have been illegal. 
The Mbezi Planning Scheme 
Details of the Mbezi Planning Scheme have been given in Chapter Seven. This section 
concentrates only on the problems of land administration that manifested themselves in Mbezi 
during the 1 980s. 
We have argued in Chapter Seven that the Mbezi Planning Scheme reflected the struggle 
by the powerful social groups (particularly government officials) to get hold of valuable 
planned land. The official land administration of the Mbezi Planning Scheme demonstrated a 
high level of mismanagement and violation of legal, technical, and administrative procedures 
in urban land delivery. In order to get into the picture of the kinds of problems that cropped 
up in Mbezi, it was decided to study one hundred, randomly selected, files from the Kinondoni 
Land Office. These were selected from ten of Mbezi's fourteen blocks, again selected 
randomly. In each of these blocks, ten plots were selected on the basis that the selected 
plot's number ended in "0". Oy in 36% of these studied plots was there no record of some 
dispute (e.g. double allocation); or, of the non compliance with terms of allocation; or, of 
suspicious behaviour. Evidence colcted by the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land 
Matters was also referred to. The following were major highlights of the process of land 
maladministration In Mbezi: 
43 	Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land. 
44 	
General Notice No. 70, published on 16/3/1990. 
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o 	Violation of the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance. The 
declaration and preparation of the Mbezi Planning Scheme was done without 
consulting the public in general, and the existing residents of the area in particular. 
Land was also allocated without extinguishing the interests of most of the existing land 
occupiers. There were 1200 residents /small scale farmers in Mbezi, who, in 1978,   
were promised compensation. By 1989 (i.e. eleven years later), only 175 had been 
paid. 45 This has not only led to frustration and discontent among the earlier Mbezi 
residents; it has also created a situation of confrontation between the new and the 
old owners of the area. By and large, however, the poorer people have been 
overwhelmed and replaced by the incoming allottees who are developing Mbezi as a 
high class residential area. The fate of the poorer old Mbezi residents is discussed 
further in Chapter Nine. 
o 	Multiple allocation of plots. Several plots in Mbezi were allocated to more than one 
person. Examples include Plot 344 Block E which was allocated to M. Kakiziba of P.O. 
Box 9084, Dar es Salaam in 1 984; to M. Rashid, in 1 988; and to F. Ramadhani in 
1991. Plot 261 Block J was allocated to Zainab Ali of P.O. Box 20624 Dar es Salaam 
in 1981 and to W. Mtengule, in 1984.   Plot 460 Block F was allocated to H.M. 
Tegisa of P.O. Box 2834 Dar es Salaam in 1982 and to Baya Salemu in 1983.   Plot 
110 Block D was allocated to H.C. Nindi of Box 2930 Dar es Salaam in 1986,   but it 
was later found that to plot had already been allocated to a private company called 
Louvent. 
o 	Allocating non-existing pl&s: According to the District Land Officer, Kinondoni, there 
were in 1991,   at least 500 people who had been allocated Viwanja Hewa (i.e. ghost 
plots) in the Mbezi area. 
o 	Arbitrary cha1hges in plot numbers. In a number of cases, plot numbers in the area 
were changed (usually by land surveyors) when the plots had already been allocated 
45 	Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land, p.  76. 
46 	. ibid. 
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from Town Planning Drawings. Land would then be reallocated to new people on the 
basis of the new numbers, leaving the earlier allottees stranded, particualrly where land 
was yet to be developed. For example, Plot No 11 Block D was allocated to E.J. 
Shayo in 1986. The area was resurveyed and his plot renumbered 235 in 1992, 
complete with a new owner leaving Shayo with no plot. In an opposite example, two 
plots were assigned the same number (490 Block K). 
o 	Allocating land without following the laid down procedures: Evidence in the files 
suggested that the allocation of land in Mbezi was not done through Plot Allocation 
Committees, but though a syndicate, involving land surveyors (who were the ones 
who increasingly knew where the plots where, and who assigned numbers to plots), 
and land officers, (who wrote the offers for plots). Pieces of papers were galore in the 
files instructing land officers to allocate specified plots to specified persons. 4' 
Sometimes the pressure to allocate land came from as high an authority as the 
Principal Secretary, Ministry of Lands. In one case, on 26 October 1985,   the City 
Planner instructed the Kinondoni District Land Officer to allocate eight plots "that very 
same day" to eight people proposed by the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Lands, 
"kabla hajatuhamisha" (i.e." before he -the Principal Secretary- transfers us"). These 
people were immediately allocated plots 50 - 57 Block G. In another example 
involving Plot 80 Block G, the Land Officer was instructed to allocate land but to leave 
blank, details of the meeting of the Plots Allocation Committee. 
o 	Creating olots on public or institutional land, open spaces and hazard land: As Mbezi 
got developed, there vs increasing evidence that land earmarked earlier for public or 
institutional uses; as well as open spaces and hazard land was getting converted to 
private uses. This was made easy by the disjointed manner in which the area was 
developing; by the lack of the usual land serice infrastructure (like roads); and by the 
non availability to the public, of the area's planning scheme. In June 1992, the 
Minister for Home Affairs ordered the arrest of three Dar es Salaam City Council land 
officers for alleged malpractices in land administration, including the allocating of land 
47 	
These pieces of paper were retained in the files by the Land Officers apparently to cover themselves in the 
case of queries. 
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earmarked for a police station. Plots 664 - 670 Block H were "created" by a land 
surveyor - one I. Setumbi - on hazard land which was a deeply dissected water 
course (Korongo) and completely unfit for building. These plots were then allocated 
to people who found it impossible to develop them. 
o 	Poor follow up after the allocation of plots. In all cases, it appeared that the concern 
of the land administrators was with land allocation not its development. This has been 
referred to in Chapter Seven with respect to sites and service plots that remained 
undeveloped for long. No follow up was made after allocation. In 69% of the case 
where land remained undeveloped and had to be reallocated, action was taken after 
six or more years had elapsed since allocation. Yet the terms of allocation were that 
construction should be complete within three years. It was moreover noted that follow 
up was undertaken only when interested parties identified the idle land and were 
seeking its reallocation to themselves. 
o 	Officials selling planned land. While concrete evidence is difficult to come by, it is 
known that several officials have engaged themselves into accepting huge sums of 
money in order to allocate or transfer plots. In one example that became public, a land 
surveyor, one Michael Wejuli admitted before the Minister for Home Affairs, to taking 
Tshs 2.05m/= from three persons to allocate them plots in the .Jangwani Beach area 
of Mbezi, plots which were already allocated (see Appendix Ti). There were in the 
files, requests for the transfer of land "for love and affection" in circumstances which 
suggested the sale of land, and this was usually accomplished with the help of land 
officials. 
o 	Creating plots in the field, contrary to Town Planning Drawings: The land surveyors 
in charge of demarcating Mbezi became extremely powerful by creating and assigning 
numbers to plots without consulting the Town Planning Department. An example is 
plot 360 Block F which was allocated to Mathias Dominic in December 1986.   He was 
shown the plot by a land surveyor, one I. Setumbi. He had, by January 1990,   not been 
issued with a site plan by the land surveying office. On making a follow up on this 
issue, he was told that the Town Planning Department did not have plots 344 
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upwards on their Town Planning Drawings! 
o 	Improper revocation /reallocation procedures. In several cases land was reallocated 
after backdating the notices of revocation, or, without revoking the earlier allocations. 
The messing up of Mbezi was a result of many factors, chief among these being the 
outright malpractices emanating from land administration. In a drive to satisfy personal gains, 
the whole land administration control setup disintegrated leaving individual officials to do what 
they wanted. According to the Director of Urban Development in the Ministry of Lands, the 
major culprits in this respect were the then City Planner and the City Surveyor. Sources within 
the City Council also identified the City Draughtsman as another major culprit. Yet much of 
the malpractice could not be implemented without the collaboration of the officials in the 
Ministry of Lands who, for example, approve changes in Town Planning Drawings; issue 
survey instructions to allow the demarcation of changes; and who approve the land surveys. 
As a result of this confusion some areas in Mbezi are still being u adj ustedu ten years since 
they were allocated. In the case of some blocks, it has been difficult to approve the surveys. 
In the opinion of the Director of Urban Developmet in the Ministry of Lands, the confusion in 
Mbezi can only be solved by an ad hoc Commission of Inquiry to regularize matters. However, 
the government is not in favour of such a Commission since it would lead to the unearthing 
of many scandals with regard to Mbezi and possibly elsewhere. 
General Observations on the Qovernment policy in relation to new land for planned 
development 
The general town planing practice, which however has no legal basis is that once 
an area is declared a planning area, then customary rights in land cease. This is what the 
colonial Government Circular No. 4, of 1953 stated. It was however, not converted into law, 
but it became accepted practice. Fimbo points out that such colonial intentions were adopted 
hook, line and swker by the Independence government. In 1968,   Minister for Lands, 
Settlements and Water, Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, is reported to have said that native 
laws and customs was inapplicable in townships and other urban centres, and only applied 
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to tribal areas.48 Thus, the practice has been to assume the non existence of customary land 
rights in urban areas. However, since the practice is oppressive, it has not been smoothly 
carried out particularly since it has generated a lot of opposition. Some commentators have 
argued that since the Town and Country Planning Ordinance under which planning areas are 
declared is only regulatory in nature, it could not extinguish tenurial rights. In a recent case 
of Nyagwasa v. Nyirabu (Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1985,   unreported), the Court of Appeal in 
Tanzania held that customary rights in land persist after the declaration of an area to be a 
planning area, until these rights are properly extinguished in law. This stand has been most 
recently reaffirmed in the case of Kakubukubu v. Kasubi where it was held that: 
In any event, a Right of Occupancy under customary law does not become void 
merely upon an area being declared a planning area ... other statutory 
provisions must be operated to occasion such eventuality. 49 
The effect of the above rulings is yet to be felt but administrative practice, drawing from the 
colonial days, assumes that the only entitlement of customary title landholders is 
compensation for unexhausted improvements i.e. the existing developments, not the value 
of the land itself. Once cleared by compensation, it is assumed that the customary holder no 
longer holds the title. As pointed out above this is not all. In many cases moreover, planning 
schemes have been prepared, approved, and the land allocated in complete violation of the 
provisions of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance e.g. without making the schemes 
public, and without consulting existing residents, or giving them a chance to give out their 
objections; and allocating land without extinguishing the existing occupiers' rights. Besides, 
compensation is usually poorly assessed so that it is never related to the cost of replacing the 
improvements being acquired (i.e. the principle of equivalence); it is never paid in one month 
as required by the law, and where it is not paid on time, it is never paid with interest, again 
as required by the law. In many cases, compensation is not paid at all, especially where the 
existing land occupiers are poor,r otherwise socially weak. 
In practice, therefore the administration of land, and the powers of town planning have 
48 	G.M.M. Fimbo, Essays in Land Law in Tanzania, Faculty of Law, University of Dares 5alaam, 1992, p. 69. 
49 	
quoted in, Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land. p.  74. 
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been the process of expropriation of land right of the large majority of town dwellers who own 
or possess customary tenure and short term rights of occupancy. Town planning to a larger 
majority has been the expropriation of land rights. That is why planning schemes have been 
opposed, leading to the prevalence of squatting. Rather than incorporate pen-urban residents 
into urban life, land policy has been antagonistic against them. 
A clear example of such antagonistic land policy is the declaration, in March 1990,   of 
various pen-urban areas around Dar es Salaam to be planning areas, by way of the Town and 
Country Planning (Areas Ripe for Development) Order, published as General Notice No. 70 of 
1 6/3/1 990. The areas, declared under s. 13 of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance, 
were: Mbezi Juu, Kunduchi/Mtongani, Radio Tanzania, Kunduchi, Tegeta, Ununio, Boko Maji, 
Basi-Haya, Wazo Hill, Mabibo, Segerea, Tabata/Kimanga, Kitunda, Yombo Vituka, Mtoni 
Kijichi, Kidete, Kigamboni and Kibonde-Maji Mbagala. 
Some of these areas, e.g. Segerea, Tegeta and Tabata, appear to have been declared 
retrospectively since land in these areas had been surveyed and allocated from about the early 
1 980s. The Order above, goes on to state that all the land specified shall vest in the President 
on the coming into effect of the Order, and that the President shall thereafter allocate the land 
so vested in him for the propose specified in the detailed scheme. 
As pointed out above in the case of redevelopment areas, the question of divesting 
owners of their land rights is ultra vires. It is not provided for in s. 13 of the Town and Country 
Planning Ordinance, which only prohibits further development in declared areas without 
planning consent. In fact, s. 4t allows the government powers to acquire land in a declared 
area should this be necessary, and the land owners can insist that their land be acquired if 
they are adversely affected by the Wkpnning schemes. There is therefore no question of vesting 
land rights in the President. Besides, the provisions in the Ordinance, of consultations with 
the public, particurarly the directly affected public, are never followed. This was confirmed in 
an interview with the Director of Urban Development in the Ministry of Lands. According to 
the evidence presented to the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters, many 
people felt they were not represented in the planning process (although legal provisions exist. 
See also Chapter Nine). Land Officials too admitted before the Commission that the system 
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of depositing plans for public inspection had largely broken down. 5° Thus the question of 
getting new land for planned urban development around Dar es Salaam has largely been a 
matter of confrontation between land officials and residents of these areas. A notice in the 
local newspaper, Uhuru of 1 0/8/1 992 announced the declaration of most of Dar es Salaam's 
pen-urban areas to be planning areas, and this has already created a situation of confrontation 
between the areas' residents and the government. 
It may be asked as to why land planning and administration practice should be so 
biased towards expropriation, and against public participation and incorporation. As far as we 
could deduce from observations and discussions with several officials, the question is about 
power consolidation by the bureaucracy. Current land administration policies endow power 
to various officials. They also make it relatively easy for those who are socially powerful, and 
this includes government officials, to acquire land from, and to replace, the weak cheaply. The 
failure to involve the masses in planning schemes, or to adopt pro-masses planning 
approaches like land pooling and redistribution provided in the Town and Country Planning 
Ordinance, is really aimed at making the weak easy prey to the powerful while at the same 
time enhancing the powers of land planning and administering officials. The Presidential 
Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters too formed an opinion that the whole process of land 
delivery was aimed at the displacement of the weak by the powerful. 51 
The argument can be extended further to say that the phenomenon of poor land 
taxation to pay for government input in planned land preparation, and to pay for infrastructure 
in Dan es Salaam's new areas, as well as the weak follow up on whether land is developed 
after allocation or not, are all mhifestation of the same process i.e. to allow the powerful to 
get land cheaply (the services would usually be put in sooner or later, at government 
expense), and to develop it withoutjjndue duress (which therefore allows some speculation 
e.g. the owning, by one households, of several plots while there is no ability at the present 
to develop them allY. 
50 	
Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land, p.  74. 
51 	ibid. p. 67. 
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Parallels can be drawn with colonial practice in Tanganyika. Whenever it wanted to 
have new people in the area (e.g. in the case of Magomeni in the 1 950s) powers of 
expropriation were usually resorted to. When it did not want to put new people in an area, like 
in the case of Upanga, then land pooling and redistribution was used (see Chapter Five). Land 
administration practice in Dar es Salaam has since Independence, aimed at putting new people 
in planned areas, and at consolidating the officials' powers, thus the resort to powers of 
expropriation. 
The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters expressed surprise that the 
relatively liberal and attractive land pooling and redistribution approach was hardly used in the 
land delivery process in urban Tanzania. 52 The answer would apaper to be that land pooling 
and redistribution diminishes the officials' leverage as far as land administration is concerned, 
and limits the possibility of introducing new people sponsored by the bureaucracy in the new 
areas. It is to avoid these, and to achieve the opposite that land pooling is eschewed, and 
expropriation, espoused. 
Together with the general hostile attitude towards existing land users in the conceiving 
of planning schemes, we have also shown how the administration and management of land 
in these schemes has been characterized by inefficiency, confusion, corruption and gross 
malpractices. These have not augured well for the efficient and equitable evolution of Dar es 
Salaam land use structure. 
8.2.8. Policy in Relation to Open Spaces and Hazard Lands. 
Dar es Salaam's DisarrnearinQ b.,en Soaces 
By mid - 1984 it was increasingly becoming clear that many hazard land, open spaces, 
and undeveloped institutional plotsvyere being converted into building plots. 53 These kinds 
of new, private plots, added to the original Town Planning Schemes, are known locally as 
"creations". They 'pare not a systematic official policy of densification, but have tended to 
52 	ibid. p. 72. 
53 	
C.C. Mosha, The Encroachment of Open Spaces in Urban Tanzania, Diploma Project, Ardhi Institute, Dar es 
Salaam, 1984.   
440 
be on random areas scattered throughout neighborhoods, and have been implemented on an 
ad hoc basis. There was a public outcry against the invasion of open spaces in Dar es Salaam 
in the late 1 980s, but the process went on unhampered, and increasingly, some of the 
principal open spaces and hazard lands were invaded by private developers with the 
collaboration and approval of top national and Dar es Salaam City Council politicians and 
officials. 54 Two examples are detailed below to highlight the kind of crises that Dar es 
Salaam has been facing in managing its open spaces and hazard lands, against the onslaught 
of a drive for profiteering and personal benefits by officials and politicians. 
The Case of Beachlands alonci the Indian Ocean 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Dar es Salaam has a long coastline with several beautiful 
beaches. 
By the mid 1 980s there were two opposing camps with regard to Dar es Salaam's 
Beaches. One, from the environmentalists urging for the Beach lands to be kept free of 
buildings; and the other, from private developers who wanted to build upon such lands. It 
looked like the environmentalists had won when, in 1989,   the Ministry of Lands issued the 
Town and Country Planning (Pub/ic Beaches Planning Areas) Order, 1989, which stated that 
"no development shall take place within two hundred metres of the shore". Unfortunately a 
number of developments were already taking place within this area. Prominent among these 
was the White Sands Hotel, reputed to be owned by key national politicians. Apparently, in 
order to defend such interests, the Ministry of Lands interpreted "development" to mean only 
residential development. This interpretation was strongly challenged by sections within the 
Dar es Salaam City Council; àd by the National Environment Management Council, the 
Attorney General, the Ministry of Tourism and Natural Resouces, and the Permanent 
Commission of Inquiry. On the lar's recommendations, the titles already allocated for 
beach plots within the 200 metre zone were revoked, but, apparently to hoodwink the public. 
Pressure from the Sate House was brought to bear on the Ministry of Lands that 200 metres 
clear of the shore was too big. In any case, construction of the White Sands Hotel and other 
54 	
Headlines from the local media tell the story: "Do not build on open spaces, says Premier", Daily News, 4 
September 1988; "Sinza Sports Plot invaded", DailyNews, 20 August 1988; "More open spaces invaded", 
Sunday News, December 1988; "Msimbazi Creek invaded by builders", Daily News, January 1989. 
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developments continued unabated. The Dares Salaam City Council had been "forced" to issue 
a building permit for the White Sands Hotel, despite its earlier reluctance. In 1991,   in order 
to legalise developments on beachiands the 1989 Order was revised and replaced by the new 
Town and Country Planning (Public Beaches Planning Areas), Order, 1991. This reduced the 
200 metres to just 60: "a strip of not less than 60 meters from the high water mark shall be 
reserved exclusively for conservation and for strictly water-related human activities." "Water-
related human activities" were defined to include: "tourism, aqua recreation, luxury beach 
hotels, fishing, boat and ship building, harbours, mining, defence and security, and structures 
of supreme national importance." The objectives of the amended order were: "to protect 
marine and coastal environments against pollution and degradation. .... and to avoid the 
privatization of the beaches and allow access and enjoyment of the beaches by the general 
public as their common heritage." 
The Order was signed by the Minister for Lands in April 1992,   gazetted on 22 May 1992 
(General Notice No 76), but was to be effective retrospectively from 24 November 1989.   
This covered White Sands Hotel, where construction had nevertheless gone on illegally for 
the previous two and half years. In anticipation of this new Order the State House ordered the 
Ministry of Lands to give the title deeds back to the White Sands Hotel developers, East 
African Holidays Limited, since Hotel development on the beaches would then be legal. White 
Sands Hotel went on to enclose the affected beaches exclusively for their own use. 
Thus contrary to all expert opinion and recommendations, with regard to preventing 
beach erosion and pollution, and preserving the beaches for public use, Dar es Salaam's 
beaches are beeing privatised. The end result is likely to be further beach erosion and 
pollution, and the denial of the public to enjoy this common heritage. The failure to prevent 
the privatization of the beaches is because the most powerful social groups in the country are 
out to drive for private benefit from this public but choice land, which incidentally they get 
V 
almost free of charge. 
The Case of Mnazi Mmoia Grounds 
The story of Mnazi Mmoja Open Space has been narrated in the foregoing Chapters. 
Currently, Mnazi Mmoja is regarded as one of the most important open spaces in Dar es 
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Salaam's City Centre, where, moreover, key national functions are performed. A historic 
monument to commemorate Independence, the Uhuru Monument, is also located in Mnazi 
Mmoja . In May 1993,   it began to be rumoured that Mnazi mmoja had been I!soldu  to a rich 
Arab, for the construction of rows of shops. This came in the wake of the parcellation of 
another historic open space, the Gymkhana Grounds, to put up a major hotel (Sheraton). 
During the first week of November 1993,   fencing activity started along the edges of 
Mnazi Mmoja grounds. An alarm was raised by the media, and on learning of this, the newly 
appointed Minister for Lands, Edward Lowassa, who had just promised to iron out corruption 
and irregularities in land administration, cancelled the allocation of Mnazi Mmoja, which had 
been done surreptitiously by the Dar es Salaam City Council, without the knowledge of the 
Ministry of Lands. He ordered the Dar es Salaam City Council to demolish the incipient 
construction work within 24 hours. This was not done, and there were rumours that the 
Council, under its Mayor Kitwana Kondo, was unwilling to fulfil the Minister's Order. Whereby 
on 1 9th November 1993,   a mob of angry Dar es Salaam residents descended on the 
construction (a fence) and demolished it. 
The Dar es Salaam City Council issued a statement admitting that it had allocated part of 
Mnazi Mmoja grounds to one Mohamed Akber Baghdad to build a series of shops. This 
allocation was illegal since the change of use has not been sanctioned by the Ministry of 
Lands. The allocation was also a violation of various laws protecting public open spaces. This 
allocation sent shock waves through Dar es Salaam residents and there were claims that the 
Mayor and the whole council had received hefty sum of money (40m/=) from Mr. Baghdad. 
A few days later residents, in Mangombe area thwarted yet another attempt to build on an 
Open Space in the area, by one Ali Akbar Saleh who had also been allocated the area by the 
Council. 55 
Mr Baghdad, Vvho had been allocated parts of Mnazi Mmoja, claimed that he had the 
support of the State House. A statement issued by the President's Office admitted that 
Baghdad has indeed routed his application through the State House, but that the State House 
55 	Daily News, 30.11.1993. 
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had directed him to the City Council for their consideration of his application, but had not 
issued instructions for the law to be violated. Nevertheless there is evidence of a deeper 
State House-Baghdad connexion. Before the Mnazi Mmoja saga, the new Minister for Lands 
had revoked titles over a number of public (government) plots allocated to this same man in 
the Oysterbay area. The plots had been allocated with the assistance of the State House. 
It was later on rumoured that despite the public announcement of revocation by the Minister 
for Lands, the State House had directed that this revocation be put in abbeyance. Newspaper 
reports claimed that the President would soon transfer this Minister from Lands, since he was 
probing into various land allocation scandals, many of which involved government officials and 
high-ranking politicians. 
Meanwhile, the Mayor for Dar es Salaam defended the Council's action in allocating 
Mnazi Mmoja, and blamed the law which allowed the "inteference" by the Ministry of Lands 
into the Council's affairs. He was advocating that powers for Land allocation and management 
should be vested entirely in his Council as was the case before the decentralisation period 56 . 
He also wondered why the Council was blamed for allocating Mnazi Mmoja to Mr Baghdad 
while no blame was raised when Open Spaces near the International School in Oysterbay were 
parcelled and allocated to "big shots". 57 
The Mnazi Mmoja case is still simmering and despite the popular protest, the buitding on 
these grounds can as yet not be ruled out entirely given the current leadership in theDar es 
Salaam City Council, and the State House connexion. Rather than defend its open spaces, it 
is the Council itself (with the Mayor at the forefront), which is decimating Dar es Salaam's 
open spaces, and beachlands, and, in most cases for private gain. The Ministry of Lands has 
also got a large part of the blame in this process, since it too has parcelled several open 
spaces in the City, although the cuøent Minister (November 1 993) may succeed in putting 
a stop to some of the worst excesses. The Mnazi Mmoja example shows the impunity with 
which those in authority are bent on benefitting from Dar es Salaam's valuable land, public 
56 	
The unearthing of various land allocation scandals involving the City Council, however, undermines the 
advocacy for the devolution of land administration powers to the local authorities. 
57 	




Almost all of Dar esSalaam's open spaces and hazard lands are "endangered species". 
The recent public outcry against the parcelling of Mnazi Mmoja and Chang'ombe open spaces 
may retard the rate at which open spaces are currently being decimated by the authorities but 
the pressure for this decimation is there, and is likely to surface from time to time. In order 
to avoid scrutiny from the public, planning authorities may decide to keep land use schemes 
in new areas secret. There unfortunately does not appear to be any central authority inclined 
to protect Dar es Salaam's public lands from grabbing by those in power. 
8.2.9. Policy Impacts on the Land Use Structure of Dar es Salaam during the 1980s 
The 1 980s can be seen as a period when there was no major policy theme behind 
which land policy could be rallied. With the withdrawal of the World Bank from supporting 
sites and service schemes in 1984,   the sites and services ideology could no longer be upheld, 
although drawing on past experience, the government undertook major plot provision schemes 
in Mbezi, Tegeta, Tabata, Segerea, Yombo Vituka and Kigamboni. Nearly 23,000 plots were 
earmarked for plot surveying in Kigamboni, Yombo Vituka, Mtoni Kijichi and Mbagala areas 
in 1990,   but due to lack of funds for compensation, only 3000 plots were surveyed. 58 In 
Mbezi, Tabata, Tegeta and Segerea areas, some 15,000 plots were earmarked for survey and 
allocation during the 1 980s. These schemes have been hit by the problems confronting the 
whole issue of the land administration process, i.e. the confused implementation of the Town 
and Country Planning Ordinance, lack of appropriate compensation and alternative land for 
those affected, lack of basic infrastructure, inappropriate and tardy land surveying methods, 
confused land allocation procedures, unreliable land records, etc. Some of these problems are 
discussed further with reference totbe Mbezi and Mabibo area (Chapter Nine). 
Unplanned areas and pen-urban semi-rural areas have continued to grow. The whole 
land policy is in a state of confusion, conceptually, legally and practically, characterised by 
illegal promulgation and undertakings by Government and by the City Council; institutional 
58 	
Dar es Salaam Cit y Council, Report of the Urban Planning Committee for 1991.   
445 
power overlaps; lack of co-ordination; and conflicts between the functionaries charged with 
land administration. The result is the state of chaotic and unco-ordinated development 
observable throughout Dar es Salaam. The breakdown of the administrative structures during 
the Decentralization and villagisation period of the 1 970s, has something to do with this 
situation. The economic crisis of the 1 980s made a bad situation worse. The 1 980s could be 
seen as a period of maturity, as land administration faced new challenges emanating from the 
keen search for land as permanent investment and residence in urban areas became the norm. 
It is however felt that, so far, the impact of land policy in general has, on balance, been 
negative, not leading to an equitable and efficient land use structure for Dar es Salaam. 
8.3. Economic Responses 
8.3.1 Framework for Analysing Economic Responses 
While in the foregoing chapters, economic responses to land policy have been analysed 
on a racial basis, such an approach is hardly applicable to the 1 980s. The main actors on the 
scene were racially heterogenous although the Africans were by far the majority; and the 
Europeans, almost non-existent. Ever since the 1 950s, Africans had slowly became 
differentiated into socially powerful people who included top politicians, government and other 
public officials and top businessmen . There were also the more ordinary citizens. These had 
varying reactions to land policy although the powerful usually got their way. Economic 
responses of the 1 980s are discussed, not in terms of races, but in relation to various integral 
parts of Dar es Salaam's functional areas, i.e. the City Centre; the old native (African) areas, 
like Kariakoo; the old unplanned areas like Mabibo; and the new planned areas like Mbezi. It 
is noted as well, that there is a lot of spontaneity in The City. There is also evidence of 
increased farming activities in r es Salaam, and the uptake of periurban land for settlement 
and cultivation. In view of the lack of policy theme, lack of wherewithal, and inappropriate 
policy tools, economic responses hive been spontaneous. 
Within Kar?koo, and to a lesser extent, within the former African areas of Magomeni 
and llala, the major phenomenon taking place since the 1 980s has been the replacement of 
the older Swahiihouses, owned by the poorer African households, with multistorey buildings. 
This, together with other tenets of Kariakoo, is discussed in Chapter Nine. Increased 
densification, and change of use from residences to shops and offices along major 
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thoroughfares, is observable in the old squatter areas like Manzese and is discussed in Chapter 
Nine. Some of what is taking place in the sites and services areas has been discussed in 
Chapter Seven. Further elucidation is presented in Chapter Nine. The new unplanned areas are 
experiencing increased penetration by household of various socio-economic status. The 
example of Mabibo is discussed in Chapter Nine. Land uptake and development in the new 
planned areas like Mbezi is slow, although in most instances, the structures that are put up 
are quite expensive. These areas are characterised by isolated developments and lack of 
infrastructure. Mbezi in discussed further in Chapter Nine. 
In the rest of this Chapter, we look at a number of economic incidents related to Dar 
es Salaam's City Centre land uses. We also describe some spontaneous changes in land uses, 
usually involving commercial uses, observable in various parts of Dar es Salaam. Finally, we 
highlight on some farming activities within the main urban areas and the pen-urban areas of 
Dar es Salaam. 
8.3.2. Dares Salaam's City Centre in the 1980s 
The development of Dar es Salaam's City Centre got adversely affected by the 
nationalisation of buildings in 1971. Problems of low rents, and the managing a large estate 
by the public sector, created a situation where the nationalised buildings, most of which were 
in the City Centre, remained poorly maintained. With the demise of the nationalisation of 
buildings, development in the city centre is picking up again. Many of the older buildings are 
now being redeveloped. 
71 
Demand for city certre land is great from investors. Several of the government 
properties in the former Residential Area (Chapter Four), originally the recluse of Europeans, 
have been sold by the Governmept on long term leases, to embassies and to other foreign 
missions. The older building have been knocked down and replaced by modern ones. Others 
have been aIIocaed clandestinely, and there are current moves to revoke these allocations. 
City centre open space is under pressure. In March 1993,   part of the Gymkhana 
grounds was carved off and allocated to a private firm for the construction of a Sheraton 
Hotel. There were various protests against the scheme from sports lovers, environmentalists 
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and several of the city residents who respect open spaces but to no avail. Indeed, the Minister 
for Lands had assured the public, sometimes in 1991,   that there were no plans to build on the 
Gymkhana grounds. Yet on 24th April 1993,   the foundation stone for the Dar es Salaam 
Sheraton was laid on these grounds by the Tanzanian Prime Minister, Hon. John Malecela. 
It appears plausible, in the light of the above, and in the light of inquiries in the Ministry of 
Lands, to conclude that the decision to truncate the Gymkhana Open Space was made at a 
level higher than the Ministry of Lands. 
Another observable, but unquantified phenomenon is the replacement of the Africans 
from the City Centre flats which had been allocated to them since the 1971 nationalisations 
of buildings. The process, though unresearched, entails the offering of very lucrative terms 
(monetary and materials, e.g. building materials, or a house) to the Africans, by members of 
the Asian community, to get the Africans to vacate. This process is taking place in the nearby 
area of Upanga as well. Segregation in terms of race seems to be creeping back. 
In short, the Dar es Salaam City Centre of the 1 990s is growing upwards, is 
consuming its open spaces and is getting de-Africanised. The consumption of Open Spaces 
appears to have top government support, and the beneficiaries have tended to be non-Africans 
or Africans closely related to top politicians and government officials. 
8.3.3. Spontaneity in Dar es Salaam's Land Uses 
A major observable land use phenomenon in Dar es Salaam is what we have called 
spontaneity, whereby residential uses and open spaces are converted into commercial uses, 
particularly along the major troughfares, bus termini and main road junctions, without 
government sanctioning. A spectacular example, is the area at the junction of Bagamoyo 
Road, and the road to the Drive in nema, known today as Namanga shopping centre. The 
origin of the name, is the post on the border between Kenya and Tanzania called Namanga. 
At the apogee of th economic crisis in Tanzania, when most consumer goods were in short 
supply, traders usually travelled to Namanga "where you could get everything". The Dar es 
Salaam Namanga area developed in the mid-i 980s and since its shops were full, when shops 
elsewhere were empty, it earned itself the name. The shopping centre serves mainly the needs 
of the high income households including the expatriate communities in Kinondoni, Oysterbay 
448 
and Msasani. Namanga developed on road reserve and hazard land without any official 
prompting or permission. 
Other large scale changes from residential to commercial land uses can be observed 
along Morocco Road, at the Mwenge bus Terminal, and along Shekilango Road, and in many 
other places. The string, (or strip), of the unplanned for shops, groceries, restaurants, and bars 
land along Shekilango Road earned itself an imported name of Gaza (strip). The ruling Party 
(CCM) has in the past been given custody of many public open spaces where it would usually 
erect a small offices, and use the space at night as a vehicle custody area. Several of these 
open spaces are now being enclosed by rows of shops built by the Party for renting. Along 
several major roads, e.g. the Port Access Road, one notes several "squatter shops" on road 
reserves and on industrial land. In most cases, these conversions or constructions have 
neither planning consent, nor building permits, although the business carried thereon will 
usually have a trading license. Neither the central government, nor the Dar es Salaam City 
Council have deemed it necessary to take any action. 
8.3.4. Urban Farming 
During the 1970s and 1980s there was an increase in the phenomenon of urban 
farming in Dar es Salaam. 59 This involved both agriculture and livestock keeping. There is 
little doubt that this increase was caused by the economic difficulties facing various 
households. Within urban Dar es Salaam many people keep chicken, dairy cattle and pigs at 
their backyards for income generation. Several others undertake cultivation of crops like 
spinach, maize, tomatoes, cassava, sweet potatoes, etc., either on their plots or on hazard 
or other public or private undeveloped land. Those who are able, own large pieces of land at 
the periphery in areas like Bunju, Goba, Kimara, Kwembe, Mbagala and Mjimwema and have 
established therein, "weekend" far.s, or, is some cases, residences. The most common crops 
grown are orange, banana, and coconut trees; maize; cassava; and pineapples. Livestock is 
V 
also kept. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 give a picture of the extent of urban farming in Dar es Salaam 
during the latter half of the 1980s. All kinds of households engage in urban farming. High 
income/status households are prominent in farming activities which require substantial start 
59 	C.J.Sawio, Feeding the Urban Masses?: Towards an Understanding of the dynamics of Urban Agriculture 
and Land Use change in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, PhD Thesis, Clark University, 1993.   
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up capital like dairy cattle rearing. 60 It is significant that most livestock in Table 8.3 (over 
60%) was to be found in the Kinondoni District, a district in which most high income/status 
Dar es Salaam residents (e.g. top government officials) live. 
Table 8.2: Select Seedlings sold in Dar es Salaam, 1987-89 
Type of Seedling 
Quantity sold Percentage 
increase 
1987 1988 1989 (1987-98) 
Bananas 5,870 36,706 136,786 479 
Oranges 185,443 1,124,245 1,253,739 576 
Pineapple 30,000* n.a. 1,195,000 819 
*1985 
Source: Ubungo Coconut and Citrus Nursery Cooperative, Dar es Salaam. 
Table 8.3 	Agricultural animals kept in Dar es Salaam 1985/86-1987/88 
Type of animals 1 985/86 1 986/87 1 987/88 
Percentage increase: 
1 985/86- 1 987/88 
Dairy Cattle 1449 3788 5741 33 
Goats 2617 3820 5764 120 
Pigs 8601 10454 13383 56 
Poultry:Broiler 180500 194500 237000 31 
Poultry: Layers 292000 390000 445000 52 
Poultry: Free range 93389 98304 103341 11 
Ducks 4900 	1 6800 	1 8100 	1 65 
Total 586'k66 707666 	1 818329 	1 40 
Source: Dares Salaam City Council, Livestock Office. 
60 	
The Principal Secretary, Ministry of Lands, recently admitted in public that he was one of the farm animals 
keepers in the City. See Daily News 27 August 1991. 
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The City Council's policy has been generally to support agriculture by selling agricultural 
inputs, offering extension services, and zoning some of the land to be rural. However it has 
at times waged war against farming activities in the City. City bye laws, for example, allow 
only four farm animals per household to be kept within the plot, and not to be moved without 
the Council's authority. It is however common to see herds of animals browsing and feeding 
on open spaces in Dar es Salaam. Occasionally the Council attempts to enforce its bylaws. 
Towards the end of January, 1993,   the Council apprehended livestock found loitering on the 
streets and by Sunday 22/1/1 993, some 100 goats and 24 cows had been herded. Several 
of these were later on auctioned, but the whole cattle apprehension exercise was soon 
abandoned 61 , apparently as a result of pressure from above. The Ministry of Lands has also 
taken a public stand against uncontrolled urban farming although privately, many of its senior 
officials keep animals, or own shambas. The recently gazetted Town and Country Planning 
(Urban Farming Regulations) of 1992 prohibit the keeping animals in urban areas, unless this 
is done under zero grazing. They also limit urban land holdings to no more than three acres 
per individual unit. These rules, however, are likely to be difficult to enforce since urban 
farming is now a major activity in Dar es Salaam. The authorities have therefore failed to 
formulate a policy suited to the agricultural activities of Dar es Salaam. 
8.4. Conclusion 
The Dar es Salaam of the 1 980s has been a city without a central policy theme, but 
has experienced many spontaneuos and adhoc actions and undertakings emanating from the 
public authorities as well as from individuals, with little control or direction. There has also 
been a clear land delivery mismanagement, as well as land grabbing by those who are socially 
powerful. The resulting land us' structure particularly in newly colonised areas has therefore 
been heterogenous, unsystematic, uncoordinated, and uncontrolled. This is what has given 
Dar es Salaam the look of spontanty observable in its current development, both in terms 
of changes in land uses in old areas, and in terms of developments in new areas; and is 
reflective of the mnagement crisis which Dar es Salaam is going through. 
61 	DailyNews (Tanzania), 25/4/1 993. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
PRESENT-DAY DAR ES SALAAM, AN EVALUATION 
9.1 Research Methodology 
It was indicated in Chapter One that in order to put the current land policy practice in 
perspective, it was considered necessary to administer a questionnaire to a sample of 
population, selected from five areas of Dar es Salaam. The five areas were selected on the 
basis of their representativeness of other areas in Dar es Salaam. These areas were: 
o 	Kariakoo, representing the old colonial natives residential areas like Magomeni, 
Kinondoni, Ilala and Temeke; 
o 	Manzese, representing Dar es Salaam's squatter areas in general and the upgraded 
squatter areas in particular; 
o 	Kijitonyama, representing areas planned during the sites and services schemes of the 
1970s   like Sinza, Mikocheni and Mbagala; 
o 	Mabibo, representing the new unplanned areas like Kimara, Makongo, Ukonga, 
Mbagala and so on; and, 
o 	Mbezi, representing the new planned areas like Tabata, Mbagala, Yombo Vituka and 
Tegeta. 
The questionnaire was administered in Kiswahili. Most of the questions were structured and 
are reproduced in Tables 9.- 9.16 The fieldwork was done during the month of October, 
1992. 
In each area, the plan wato select one hundred houseowners for interviewing. First, 
a list of all the ten-cell leaders in each area was obtained, and ten of these leaders were 
selected randomly. Each of the selected ten-cell leader produced a comprehensive list of 
house/plot owners under their jurisdiction. These ran into several tens. From this list, 10 
house/plot owners were randomly selected and, (where found) interviewed. For reasons of 
non-availability of some houseowners, the figure of 100 was attained only in the case of 
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Kijitonyama. The situation was worse in the Mbezi area, which is only partly developed, and 
where most plot owners live elsewhere (even where plots are developed) and visit their plots 
only occasionally. As a result, only 56 households were interviewed in Mbezi, despite the 
tracking of some to their places of work or domicile. In Manzese, Mabibo and Kariakoo, 97, 
89 and 76 households were interviewed respectively. The total number of house/plot owners 
interviewed was therefore 418. The questionnaire was standard in all areas, but a few 
additional questions were asked in the case of Kariakoo. The results of this questionnaire are 
presented for the most part in percentage form. 
Prior to the presentation of the results of the questionnaire, a brief description of the 
areas in which the questionnaire was administered is given below. Land policy directions with 
regard to these areas are also discussed and highlighted. 
9.2. The Study Areas 
9.2.1. Kariakoo 
The story of Kariakoo as an area earmarked for native settlement during the colonial 
era has been told in the foregoing Chapters. By the 1 930s Kariakoo was already attracting 
redevelopment schemes from policy makers. We have seen in Chapter Four how, in 1943,   the 
Dar es Salaam Municipal Secretary E.H. Helps, proposed that Kariakoo be redeveloped 
piecemeal into a garden city. The 1949 Plan for Dar es Salaam proposed the. redevelopment 
of Kariakoo to increase open spaces and reduce densities (Chapter Five). Towards 
Independence, the Ministry of Lands prepared a Town Planning Scheme for Kariakoo 1 , with 
the support of the Dar es Salaam Municipal Council. The latter urged the government that 
"consideration be given in the 1 1 61/62 programme, to the constructing of the flatted 
development in Kariakoo, thereby also assisting in the clearace of the present unsuitable 
houses in that area". 2 It was felt, inje 1960s, that Kariakoo did not represent the true 
picture of Dar es Salaam. The National Housing Corporation planned to develop parts of 
Kariakoo, but this wâ not implemented. In 1965 a Kariakoo Development Order was 
1 	
See Minutes of the Town Planning Committee, 13.2.1 960, in, Dar es Salaam Municipal Council, Minutes, 
1961, p.  101. 
2 	
Minutes of the Markets, Housing and Fire Committee meting of 15.2.1961, in, Oar as Salaam Municipal 
Council, Minutes, 1961, p.101. 
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published. This required that only multistorey buildings be put up in the area, a policy that 
was confirmed in the 1968 and 1979 Dar es Salaam Masterplans. The 1965 Kariakoo 
Redevelopment Scheme had proposals to alter the street pattern of the area to make it 
suitable for modern traffic flows, while taking care of pedestrian interests. Community 
facilities and open spaces were to be increased. In 1969 another Redevelopment P/an was 
prepared. It envisaged the demolition of 500 houses along Lumumba, Mkunguni, Livingstone, 
and Uhuru Streets to give way to multistorey offices and quasi-government office blocks. The 
affected population was to be moved 7-8 miles away from Kariakoo to Dar es Salaam's 
periphery. This never materialised. The Scheme was greatly opposed by the Kariakoo 
residents, supported by local politicians, including the current Dar es Salaam Mayor, Councillor 
Kitwana Selemani Kondo, who was then Member of Parliament of the Ilala constituency in 
which Kariakoo was (and still is). A new scheme was prepared in 1975,   while the 1979 Dar 
es Salaam Masterplan had provisions for Kariakoo's redevelopment. In 1989,   Kariakoo was 
declared a redevelopment area in which land pooling was to take place, and, in the light of 
that declaration, a new redevelopment scheme is now under preparation. Previous 
redevelopment schemes have remained unexecuted, mainly because of popular resistance by 
the indigenous people of Kariakoo against their replacement and resettlement. Therefore 
Kariakoo has not had a major government redevelopment scheme implementated in the area, 
save for the paving of some roads, and the expansion of some sewers in the mid 1 970s. 
The area generally referred to as Kariakoo has, administratively, four wards i.e. Gerezani, 
Jangwani, Mchikichini and Kariakoo, all covering an area of 137 hectares. Kariakoo 
(hereinafter used to include the four wards), had a population of 47,187 people in 1978.   This 
had grown to a slightly higher'gure of 50,416 in 1988. It is considered that this slow 
growth, of less than 1 % p.a., is a reflection of the redevelopment that has been taking place 
in. Kariakoo, whereby residential builngs, mainly the multioccupied Swahill type, are being 
bought, demolished, and replaced by multistorey commercial buildings. 
Kariakoo is bounded by Morogoro Road, Lumumba Street, Nkrumah Street, Pugu 
Road, Shauri Moyo Street and the Msimbazi Valley. Between Karikaoo and the city centre 
proper is an open space, the Mnazi Mmoja grounds planned by the German Colonial 
government (Chapter Three). The area was planned in grid-iron blocks. Individual plots are 
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small, measuring 1 2m x 1 2m. Land uses in Kariakoo are mixed and include: residential, 
commercial/residential, institutional, service trade, and transportation. In the Gerezani area, 
are to be found numerous small scale industries, fabrication workshops, motor vehicle repair 
garages and woodworks, reflecting the characteristics of the "Zone of Transition". Most of 
the African-owned buildings in Kariakoo are constructed of mud and pole, except along the 
main streets of Uhuru and Msimbazi, and about the Kariakoo Market, where the colonial 
government had deliberately planted Indians and Arabs, and gave them long term rights of 
occupany. Buildings in these parts are mainly multistoreyed. Piecemeal unco-ordinated and 
haphazard redevelopment of Kariakoo into high rise blocks has been going on since the 1 950s, 
picking up pace since the 1 980s. 
Kariakoo in generally considered to be the second Central Business District of Oar es 
Salaam. It has a large food market supplying the entire city. The history of this market goes 
back to the German era, but a new ultramodern market, with refrigerated storage facilities 
was opened in 1974.   Today's market, occupies a 1.4 hectare site and is a focus of 
commercial activities in the area. Around the market, and along Msimbazi and Uhuru Streets 
are many shops dealing in wholesaling and retailing of clothing and shoes, general hardware, 
building materials, electric goods, spare parts, and so on. Street trading is also keen in 
Kariakoo, reaching near choking point along Congo Street 3 . Kariakoo is also a terminus of 
many local and upcountry buses, while the open space at Kidongo Chekundu has been turned 
into a lorry park. 
Government policy towards Kariakoo has been ambivalent. While on the one hand it 
has favoured the redevelopr?tënt of the area, it has shyed away from demolition and 
rebuilding, partly because of financial constraints, but more significantly, because 
redevelopment has always been politically too unpopular to to be undertaken. The Government 
however has never come out clearly in support of the African "landowners" of Kariakoo. Until 
relatively recentlyit upheld the colonial policy of refusing to give longterm titles to owners 
of houses constructed in traditional materials, the most prevalent of whom were the Africans. 
It even upheld the colonial policy of denying the owners of traditional houses, permission to 
An attempt by the public authorities to remove street traders from Congo Street, in September, 1993, 
sparked off widespread riots in Dar es Salaam. 
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repair, extend, or improve their houses unless these houses were to be rebuilt into multistorey 
buildings. Therefore many traditional houses fell into very bad repair.4 The people of Kariakoo 
have therefore remained in the area on account of their political muscle. But the land which 
they have held mostly on short term rights of occupancy, reverts, legally, to the government 
annually unless the rights are renewed. There was thus, always the danger that one day, the 
government might feel strong and remove these people. With the government doing nothing 
to help the people of Kariakoo remain in the area e.g. by providing them with development 
finance, it can be concluded that, like was the case with the natives of Upanga in the 1 940s 
and 1 950s the government is adopting deliberate policies that deliver these people to the 
forces of the market whereby they are bought out and replaced by the moneyed people. It 
does not want them in the area. The government's guillotine has always been hoisted over 
the necks of the people of Kariakoo. Some have therefore sold because of the fear of losing 
their land. Even the recent policy of granting longterm rights of occupancy can hardly help the 
people of Kariakoo since it commits them to expensive building conditionswhich they cannot 
meet (without substantial development credit, for example), and this failure can offer the 
authorities an excuse to repossess and reallocate the land. This policy therefore, can only 
serve to accelerate the process of disposing of the land by these people. 
The combined effects of lack of security of tenure in the past, expensive development 
conditions, and lack of government positive support, has exposed the people of Kariakoo to 
wealthy land seekers who are usually "foreigners". According to the Ilala District Land Officer, 
a third of Kariakoo residents had, by 1987 transferred their plots to other persons. 5 Prices 
offered for the aged Kariakoo structures ranged between Tshs 0.5m/= to Tshs 1 .Om in 
1984/85, but had gone up to'etween Tshs 2.5m/ - 4.0I=m in 1988/89. Inquiries made 
in 1992 revealed prices of Tshs 7.0mI= for plots away from commercial centres, and Tshs. 
10.0m/= for plots with immediae commercial potential. Some well-located plots have 
fetched as much as Tshs. 40.0m/=. It is hereby argued however, that the relationship 
between the indignous people of Kariakoo and the "foreign" buyers is not that of willing 
See Speech in Parliament by Hon. Kitwana Kondo, in, Tanzania, ParliamentaryDebatas (Hansard), 30th June 
- 4th July, 1980,   Government Printer, Dar as Salaam, 1980. 
Sunday News, (Tanzania) 8/2/1 987. 
seller, willing buyer. With only short term titles in the past, Kariakoo people were always 
under the threat of losing their land. This was even more so in the light of the various 
proposed redevelopment schemes which entailed their replacement. The current willingness 
by the government to give longterm rights of occupancy to Kariakoo residents to has come 
at a time when these people have no ability to meet the new development covenants. In either 
cases, and in order to salvage something for themselves, they have no choice but to sell. 
Without such "threats", it is highly unlikely that it is in the interests of the poor people of 
Kariakoo, or of their progeny, to lose such centrally located land and move (usually) to the 
periphery, despite the apparently lucrative monetary offers. This is reflected in the answers 
to our questionnaire, where 83% of the interviewed Kariakoo houseowners said they were 
completely unwilling to sell their landholdings in Kariakoo. 
Official attitude towards the indigenes of Kariakoo is perhaps best reflected in the 
proposals contained in the new Kariakoo Redevelopment Scheme which recommend that the 
government should intervene in the ongoing land transactions in Kariakoo by fixing the amount 
which the incoming developer has to pay as compensation to the outgoing owner, and by 
ensuring that the incoming developer pays for the cost of the public expenditure on 
infrastructure. The amount recommended to be paid to the outgoing owner: 
Should be sufficient to enable the outgoing occupier to construct another house 
of Swahiitype elsewhere in the city. Having done so, the government should 
revoke the short term titles at the end of their duration and allocate plots 
potential developers." 6 [Emphasis added] 
It might be wondered as to why government policy should be against the indigenous 
people of Kariakoo in favour of'"foreigners", although the area was deliberately set aside for 
natives since colonial times. It is hereby argued that colonial policy was characterised by 
removing natives from areas of higlor potentially high, land values, like the seafront, or the 
commercial area. The post colonial government is perpetrating this practice with respect to 
Kariakoo, since indenous people there are occupying highly valuable land with immediate 
commercial potential. To the policy makers, the resolution towards the realisation of such high 
land values has always been the removal of the poor indigenous population, together with 
6 	Tanzania, Kariakoo Redevelopment Scheme, (Final Draft), Department of Urban Development, Ministry of 





The danger of this kind of population displacement is realised. The new Kariakoo 
Redevelopment Scheme,in contradiction to its recommendation outlined above, puts in a note 
of caution: 
The ongoing gentrification whereby local residents are systematically being 
displaced by developers who are often economically powerful non-natives, is 
a potential social and political problem which should be pre-emptied through 
government intervention in the land market in Kariakoo. Urgent administrative 
measures should be taken to ensure that the entire population now living in 
Kariakoo is not displaced. 7 
Unfortunately, proposals in the Scheme do not offer any recommendations that might help 
in the realisation of the goal of preventing the displacement of the indigenous people of 
Kariakoo. On the contrary, the Scheme's proposals, are meant to ensure this displacement at 
an even faster rate. 
Kariakoo is being rebuilt. A survey carried out in April 1991,   found that there were 
23 newly completed commercial/ residential buildings, 20 of which were multistoreyed. 
Another 56 were under construction, 49 of which were multistoreyed. This redevelopment 
has led to the overworking of the existing infrastructure. The water supply network was laid 
in the late 1 920s and is worn out, pipes are too small (80 - 1 00mm in diameter), and the 
pressure is insufficient to ensure water flow to the multistoreyed buildings. The sewerage 
system is equally old and overworked despite the fact that most buildings use on site systems 
i.e. septic tanks and pit latrineStorm water drainage is inadequate and blocked. Roads are 
badly damaged. Traffic is highly congested. There is a dearth of parking space; and there are 
hardly any open spaces in Kariako 1 The old planned Kariakoo has now overspilled into the 
flood-prone land in the Msimbazi River Valley, where dozens of unplanned buildings have been 
put up in recent yers, thus swallowing up a natural open space that was readily available to 
some residents of Kariakoo. 
ibid. p. 28. 
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At the moment, government policy appears to be the ready issuance of longterm 
certificates of occupancy to Kariakoo residents who may apply for them. These certificates 
have new, stringent redevelopment conditions which cannot be met by the low income 
residents of the area. The result is the systematic replacement of the pepple of Kariakoo by 
the new corners. While these incoming owners of Kariakoo are showing a financial ability to 
redevelop the area, the price at which they buy land is never disclosed. Thus the government 
loses revenue on capital gains tax. The activities of these redevelopers are uncoordinated, and 
are completely unrelated to the existing level of services. The result is congestion and the 
overworking and deterioration of the existing infrastructure, as well as the mixed development 
of Kariakoo with isolated multistorey blocks towering over the ramshackled Swahili houses. 
The new developers will no doubt be looking to the government to improve the infrastructure 
for whose deterioration they can be said to have contributed immensely, without they 
themselves being taxed. 
9.2.2. Manzese 
Manzese is reputed to be the largest squatter area in Dar es Salaam in terms of both 
area and population. It is located between 6-8 kilometers from the City Centre, and straddles 
Morogoro Road. It is bounded to the West, by the Ubungo Industrial Area and the Ubungo 
Friendship Textile Mill Flats; to the South by Mbulahati Road; to the East by the valley of River 
Luhanga and Kagera Road; and, to the North, by River Sinza. A bridge over the River Sinza 
to the West of Manzese, leads to the Sinza sites and services area, which was in part 
earmarked to take up the replaced population, as Manzese was being upgraded in the 1 970s. 
Manzese "A" is to the South of Morogoro Road, and Manzese "B", also known as Tandale, 
is to the North, both cove'ng an area of 530 hectares. In 1974,   Manzese had a population 
of 93,000 people, housed in 7,600 dwelling units. This population exceeded that of 
Tanzania's then second largesown, Tanga, (whose population then was 91 ,670). Manzese 
has an irregular, undulating terrain; and has several river and shallow lakes valleys. These 
include those 
V 
 of the Sinza and Luhanga Rivers, and those of Lakes Minyonyoni, Makurumla, 
Magomeni and Tandale (Chapter Two). 
During the 1940s, Manzese was a rural settlement outside Oar es Salaam's 
boundaries. By 1957,   part of Manzese had already been included within Oar es Salaam City 
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boundaries. As was narrated in Chapter Five, part of the Manzese area, towards Magomeni 
and Mbulahati (together with Magomeni itself) had been acquired by the government for public 
purposes. While Magomeni was developed into a planned African residential settlement, the 
Manzese part of the acquired land remained as a coconut plantation for the letting of which, 
the government invited tenders during the late 1 950s. After Independence in 1 961, this land 
had nobody to look after it, and it would appear that it "reverted" to a de facto customary 
tenure, despite its being government land. The rest of Manzese, like other peripheral areas 
of Dares Salaam was owned and occupied by "Wenyeji" i.e. natives. Although still sparsely 
populated in the mid-i 960s, Manzese became fully integrated in the city when the city 
boundary was moved out around 1968.   With the planning of an Industrial area at Ubungo, 
Manzese started developing very fast, land being subdivided and occupied totally outside 
government control. At first, houses were built on good lands. When these were filled up, 
even bad land was tackled. The built up area grew from 45% of the available land in 1967,   
to 96% in 1980.   The average housing density in the built up land increased from 22 houses 
per hectare in 1967,   to 32.5 in 1 980.8 The growth of Manzese was mainly through infilling 
rather than areal extension. This is reflected in changes in room density, from 40 rooms per 
hectare in 1967 to 165 in 1987.   There are hardly any open spaces in Manzese since even 
marginal and hazard land has been built up at an even faster annual growth rate of 5% 
between 1982 and 1987,   in comparison to the rate of only 2% for the good lands. 9 
During the late 1 960s and early 1 970s, Manzese was notorious for its lawlessness 
and thus earned itself the name of "Soweto", reflecting the image of the South African black 
township, where violence was rife. 10 It was partly for this reason that Manzese was 
selected for upgrading. A study of the upgrading process covering Manzese "B", (200 
hectares in area; 16,686 people in 1740 dwellings in 1973) (Figure .9.1), highlighted that, 
prior to upgrading starting in 1 97%Manzese "B" had no roads, no drainage facilities, no 
8 	C.A. de Bruijn, "Monitoring a large squatter area in Dar es Salaam with sequential aerial photographs", ITC 
Journal, 1987-3, 1987, PP. 233-238. 
R.V. Sliuzas, Problems in Monitoring the Growth of a Squatter Settlement: The Housing Process in Manzese, 
MSc. Thesis, ITC, Enschede, Netherlands, 1988. 
10 	During the 1 970s and early 1980s,   the University of Dar as Salaam was also nicknamed Manzese, because 
its general learning and living conditions were constrained. 
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Figure 9.1 Manzese B 
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electricity, no educational or health institutions, and no market. There was just one water tap 
in the area. The majority of the households used pit latrines for excreta disposal. Solid waste 
was disposed of by way of dumping or burning. Most of the houses were the 4-6 roomed 
Swahili type, constructed in traditional materials. 11 
The proposals to upgrade Manzese in the 1 970s included a plan to construct grade A, 
B, and C roads; the carrying out of block land surveying to facilitate road alignment; the 
improvement of water supply by instituting 82 water points; the institution of drainage 
facilities; the construction of an electricity network to ease house to house connexions; the 
construction of three primary schools to which would be affiliated public playfields and open 
spaces; the reservation of two plots for the future expansion of educational institutions and 
the construction of a health centre and of a market. 
During implementation, grade "A" (i.e. macadamized) roads were not provided. Only 
grade B and C, i.e. murram and compacted earth roads, were constructed. Main service 
water pipes were provided along the roads, and 35 public water kiosks (instead of the planned 
82) were provided. Unlined ditches were dug for storm water drainage. An overhead 
electricity network was provided along the roads, but street lighting was not. Pit latrines were 
to be the major mode of excreta disposal. A health centre, three primary schools, and a 
community centre were constructed. Playgrounds for the public were reserved and planned 
with the Primary Schools. Two plots were reserved and planned for the future expansion of 
educational facilities, and a market was constructed. In order to facilitate the process of 
issuing loans for house improvement, the Tanzania Housing Bank opened offices in Manzese. 
Between 1974 and 1 98, the population of Manzese "B" increased from 16,686 to 
91,000. During the same period, the number of persons per hectare increased from 83 to 
459; the number of persons per delling rose from 9.6 to 1 3; and the number of houses 
increased from 1 740 to 7315. Houses increased mainly through subdivisions and through 
encroachment on existing open spaces (which had been left unallocated during the upgrading 
process). Figure 9.2 illustrates the house densification process in part of Manzese "B", in the 
Lake Magomeni area between 1967 - 1987.   
Hawa S. Msham, An Evaluation of the 1974-77 Manzese Squatter Area Upgrading Programmes, Dar es 
Salaarn City, Diploma Project, Department of Urban and Rural Planning, Ardhi Institute, Dares Salaam, 1988. 
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The upgrading scheme had some positive effects on the area. Circulation was greatly 
improved, as was law and order. 12 Answers to our questionnaire show that security was 
one of the areas in which the people of Manzese showed considerable satisfaction. The 
general condition of public services was greatly improved. Msham found that, of the houses 
she surveyed in Manzese "B" in 1988,   42% had private water connexions; 40% had 
electricity; and 34% used flush toilets, (though 60% still relied on Pit Latrines, and 6% used 
neighbours' toilets). Only a few houses could be described as "temporary". In 75% of the 
cases, roofs were constructed of corrugated iron sheets; 23%, of old tins; and only 2%, of 
palm leaves or thatch. In 53% of the cases, house walls were constructed of cement blocks; 
27%, of plastered mud and pole; and 20% of unplastered mud and pole. Of the floors, 64% 
were in cement and sand screed, and 36%, in compacted earth. In 68.7% of the cases, house 
construction and improvement depended on personal savings and not institutional credit. Only 
in 8.4% of the cases was reliance made on loans. 13 
The current situation in Manzese "B" is that roads and storm water drainage facilities 
have greatly deteriorated due to lack of maintenance. Only 8 water kiosks (out for the 35 
installed) were working in 1988 mainly as a result of personal initiative of the users. Both the 
health and educational facilities are overworked. School land, together with the earmarked 
playfields, was not surveyed or otherwise properly demarcated, so it has been encroached 
upon by private builders. There has been some considerable change of land use from 
residential to commercial or commercial/residential uses along the main roads. Most (82%) 
commercial establishments started business in 1 984-86 after the government had liberalized 
trade. The market at Tandale,as earned itself national fame as the main centre for the 
distribution of food produce (particularly maize, rice, oranges, beans and pineapples) within 
Dar es Salaam. A spontaneous market known as "gengeni" sprang up to relieve congestion 
at the main World Bank provided mket site, but both the old and the new markets are now 
overcrowded and business overflows to the nearby primary school and health centre land. 
During upgrading, house owners were not given certificates of title to land since only 
12 	See article entitled Manzese, the silent revolution" by Subira Kumbuka in the Daily News, 8/11/1 978. 
13 	
Msham, An Evaluation of the Manzese Squatter Upgrading Programme. 
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block, and not individual, plots surveying was carried Out. Thus, most people have no proof 
of official security of tenure. House registration however, was carried out 14, but as this was 
not an ongoing exercise, many of the houses constructed later are not registered. That is why 
most of the houses (56%, see Table 9.3) in our survey had no identification numbers. 
While the World Bank envisaged the recovery of the costs through the increase in 
land rent in Manzese by 15%, i.e. each owner would pay Tshs 1 15/= p.a., partly through the 
Internal Revenue Office, and partly through the City Council, this has proved difficult. As was 
the case elsewhere with sites and service schemes, defaulting on land rent is widespread and 
increases as time goes by (Table 9.1). 
Table 9.1: Land Rent Defaulters, Manzese B, 1979-1 982 






1979 16,447 4,227 26 
1980 16,447 6,579 40 
1981 16,447 9,211 56 
1982 16,447 9,835 60 
	
Source: 	Hawa S. Msham, An Evaluation of the 1 974-77 Manzese Squatter Area 
Upgrading Programmes, Dar es Salaam City, Diploma Project, Department of 
Urban and Rural Planning, Ardhi Institute, Dar es Salaam, 1988,   p. 42. 
It may be noted from Table 9.1 that the number of eligible recorded land rent payers has 
remained static over the years desite the increase in buildings and houseowners. 
A major v'eakness in this upgrading process of the 1 970s was that it was seen in 
static terms, as if once the upgrading proposals were implemented, that would be the end of 
the problems in Manzese. No provisions were made for maintenance. Given that the 
14 	
B. Sichone, House Registration in Manzese, Diploma Project. Department of LandManagement and Valuation, 
Ardhi Institute, Dares Salaam, 1989. 
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standards of the services provided had been kept low, and that the population has increased 
tremendously, most services have deteriorated, since there was no policy to address such 
happenings. Besides, the people of the area were not involved in the planning or the 
implementation of the upgrading scheme, which was seen as belonging to the government; 
and with which the people had little or nothing to do. No provision/allovvnce was taken of 
future changes e.g. in terms of population, buildings, or uses. The question of land tenure and 
land use regulation was left vague so that subdivisions, densification and encroachment of 
open spaces continued without any government direction. It appears plausible to see the 
upgrading of Manzese as a political showpiece which moreover was used to justify the 
expenditure on the provision of new plots in Sinza, Kijitonyama and Mikocheni, but not as a 
viable longterm land policy to solve Manzese's problems. In view of the notoriety of Manzese, 
the government was interested to know what was going on in the area. This dictated the 
institution of some roads and house registration. In this respect, it will be noted that the 
registered houses in Manzese were required to bear clear house numbers for easy 
identification, while houses in the sites and services areas were under no obligation to display 
house/plot numbers. It may also be pointed out that the other (and only) squatter area that 
was upgraded after Manzese, was a large, equally notorious, area known as Mtoni-Tandika. 
Currently 0 993), the Ministry of Lands is preparing planning schemes for Manzese 
which can be used by those who wish, to have their land surveyed. Thence, they can be 
issued with a Certificate of Title. The house owners of Manzese are not involved in the 
preparation of these schemes (see Table 9.11), which, as suggested in Chapter Eight, are 
possibly illegal and are likely to lead to serious disputes if followed up. However, according 
to the Director of Urban Development in the Ministry of Lands 15 , no serious complaints had 
reached his office thus far from any unplanned area for which his Department has unilaterally 
prepared planning schemes, althougnany people had used these schemes to have their land 
surveyed. Nevertheless, it is becoming clear that the majority of the residents of Manzese who 
are having their landsurveyed are the economically and socially better off who are able to hire 
private land surveyors and who are anxious to use Certificates of Title to get credit from 
financial institutions. There is thus a likelihood that the poorer houseowners of Manzese are 
15 	
Interviewed on 3rd May, 1993. 
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adversely affected by these planning schemes which may see them getting displaced by the 
rich in due course. This is most likely to be the case, since the planning schemes are based 
on outdated 0 982) aerial photographs which do not show the buildings constructed since 
then, and since the schemes purport to leave aside land for roads, etc., land which may be 
built upon already. Although the Director of Urban Development pointed out that the land 
surveyors had some leeway to vary the planning schemes to incorporate the existing houses, 
should the schemes vary with what is on the ground, this raises the question of why prepare 
the schemes, unilaterally in the first instance, and why not demarcate land parcels according 
to the boundaries known by the residents themselves, instead of the new boundaries 
arbitrarily determined by the planners. These planning schemes are therefore likely to give 
powers to the rich to terrorise the poor out of Manzese. 
9.2.3. Kijitonyama 
Kijitonyama area is the "oldest" of the three Phase I sites and services areas in Dar 
es Salaam. The name derives from river Kijitonyama which transgresses the area and which 
for a long time formed part of Dar es Salaam's boundary line. Geographically, the area is 
bounded by Bagamoyo Road to the North, Shekilango Road to the West (although the area 
west of Shekilango Road, known as Mwenge, is considered by some to be part of 
Kijitonyama); Sinza area to the South, and Mwananyamala to the East. Kijitonyama has an 
area of 160 hectares. The area was declared a planning area under the 1968 Dar es Salaam 
Masterplan. During the early 1970s, part of Kijitonyama was developed by the National 
Housing Corporation into detached tenant purchase houses. The rest was planned in 1 972-75 
into a residential neighbourhood with a majority of high density (400m 2 ) plots. Part of the area 
was provided with a sewer network (see Figure 2.8) The neighbourhood was subdivided into 
some 1,672 residential plots; and into land for schools, a market, a health centre, religious 
and other institutional uses and openpaces. Plot allocation and development started in 1972,   
and as was the case with the other two sites and services areas (Sinza and Mikocheni), water 
and electricity netorks, as well as a low quality network of roads, were instituted in the 
area. Plot development was slow. By 1988,   some 523 plots, or 23.8% of all the plots in the 
area, were still completely undeveloped though most had been allocated over ten years earlier. 
But, like was the case with Sinza, several of the originally planned open spaces were 
converted into plots for private use, so that the total number of residential plots increased 
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from the original 1672 to 2,197 in 1988 . 16 
Like elsewhere in Dar es Salaam, Kijitonyama is suffering from very poor 
infrastructure. Most roads are poor and become impassable during the rainy seasons, because 
they are flooded or are badly eroded by surface water which has no drains. The water table 
in most of Kijitonyama is high so that waste water drainage is a major problem. Pit latrines 
have to be built well over the ground level to be usable. Septic tanks are always filled up so 
that their emptying is impossible even if roads were to be easily passable (which they are not 
so that many areas are inaccessible to emptiers). Many septic tanks are therefore left to 
overflow onto public lands (e.g. roads) and into natural drainage channels. The conversion 
of land uses abutting Shekilango Road into commercial uses described Chapter Eight is also 
taking place in Kijitonyama, but here, some of the land so converted is a road reserve cum 
hazard land. Some developers have built on the top of the Kijitonyama river apparently with 
official sanctioning, and although drains have been provided, these are likely to get blocked 
in due course leading to the river flooding the road as well as neighbouring properties. A 
clearer evaluation of the effects and efficacy of land policy in the Kijitonyama area will emerge 
during the discussion of the results of the questionnaire, later on in this Chapter. 
9.2.4. Mabibo 
The area known as Mabibo straddles the Port Access Road, and is in the region of 
8 to 10 kilometers from the City Centre. The population of Mabibo ward grew from 28,187 
people in 1978, to 45,963 in 1988, a 5% annual population growth rate. A study carried out 
in 1991 over a 24.8 hectare part of Mabibo (known as Mabibo Maziwa) gives some insights 
into the characteristics of M a bi'I o . 17 
In the 1 940s, Mabibo wassed for agricultural purposes including the growing of 
sisal. Part of the land was owned by one Mwinyigogo Mwinyikambi who allowed people to 
settle the area, bt prohibited the growing to permanent crops (like coconuts). At 
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J.M.L. Kironde, Some insights into issues related to Urban Land Development in the sites and services areas 
of Sinza, Kijitonyama and Mikocheni, all in the City of Dares Salaam, Research Report, Ardhi Institute, 1990. 
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Centre for Housing Studies, A survey of Mabibo unofficial Settlement, 4th March - 4th June, Mimeo, Ardhi 
Institute, Oar es Salaam, 1991. 
Independence, Mabibo was outside the City boundaries, and was only incorporated in the late 
1960s. By then the establishment of an industrial estate at nearby Ubungo, and of the 
government offices and institutions, including the University of Dar es Salaam and the Water 
and Electricity Supply Soles, attracted people to the area, leading to keen plot subdivisions. 
The opening of the Port Access Road in 1980 added impetus to this process. 
In 1991, the population in the 24.8 hectares area referred to above was 4,149 
people, living in 585 housing units, that is, seven people per unit. The majority (90.7%) of the 
housing units were constructed in permanent materials (i.e. concrete or sand cement block 
walls and corrugated iron sheet roofs). Only 9.3% were constructed in traditional materials. 
The gross density was found to be 189 people per hectare, and 24 houses per hectare. While 
there are major roads about Mabibo, internal circulation within the area was found to be very 
poor and dependent on nonstandardized and uncoordinated roads and, footpaths. Drainage 
facilities were completely lacking. The disposal of solid waste was by way of pit latrines 
though a few houses were connected to septic tanks which were however, rarely emptied. 
Although no systematic survey was made in the rest of Mabibo (which was 
nevertheless covered during our interview), casual observation showed that plot sizes varied 
from very small in some areas to very large in others. The appearance of land surveyors in 
Mabibo in the second half of the 1 980s, raised alarm among the area's residents who refused 
to sanction the surveying of the land. The surveyors were threatened away and did not 
survey the area. A planning scheme prepared by the Ministry of Lands exists for Mabibo. At 
the same time, the people of Mabibo came together in 1989,   to seek the surveying of the area 
according to the existing land holdings. While the various plots have been surveyed, it has 
become difficult for the surveyors to marry, what they have found on the ground with what 
the official planning scheme stipul4tes. 
Roads witin Mabibo are either non existent, or very poor. Water and electricity 
networks have been instituted through the efforts of individual households. There are no 
drains. Some of the houses that are coming up in Mabibo are quite substantial, but this is 
hardly surprising given that some of the residents are personalities well placed in business, 
and in government and parastatal service. 
469 
9.2.5. Mbezi 
Information on Mbezi and the Mbezi Planning Scheme has been presented in Chapters 
Seven and Eight. It has been argued that the Mbezi Planning Scheme was an example of the 
power struggle within public authorities to control land. We have also highlighted how the 
land delivery process in the area was mismanaged, and how Mbezi lacks the usual 
infrastructure, but how it is developing to vey high standards. Mbezi also demonstrated how 
planning schemes were used to replace the poor existing land occupiers. What remains to be 
highlighted further, is how planning schemes in this area, like in Kariakoo, have worked 
against the poor and the weak. 
We have pointed out above that the original Mbezi area occupiers were promised 
compensation. As the government did not keep its promise, existing occupiers increasingly 
began to resist being displaced by the new plot allottees. But even in this resistance, as the 
following examples show, the weak were easily defeated' 8 . 
One Jane Josephat was allocated plot 110 Block D Mbezi in 1980.   In January 1988 she 
requested the land office to transfer the plot (which was yet to be developed) to her brother 
Gilbert working with the Army, and who was economically able to develop it. This plot 110 
(together with plots 109, 111 and 1 20) fell in shamba land belonging to one Selemani Kondo, 
who was therefore entitled to compensation, altenative land, or "naturalisation" on his land. 
As government policy has always inclined to replacing existing users, valuers inspected 
Kondo's shamba in June 1988,   at the request of Gilbert. The "unexhausted improvements" 
found on Kondo's land were: one banana tree which was valued at Tshs 225/= and six 
cassava trees which were valued at Tshs 4.75 each. Thus the total compensation due to 
Kondo was assessed to be only Tshs 245.45. In February 1989 Kondo was made to take the 
compensation, paid by Gilbert, throqgh the City Council. Kondo was apparently illiterate since 
he could only thumb-sign the voluminous compensation documents. He continued tilling the 
land. In June 1 989'Gilbert obtained a building permit and was poised to develop the plot. 
Kondo must have found out that he has been dragged into a bad deal dispossessing him of 
his land for peanuts. Taking cue from other shamba owners in Mbezi, he complained to the 
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Information obtained from Kinondoni Land Office files for Plots 110 Block D, 610 Block C, and 493 Block 
L, Mbezi. 
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Land Office that the land allocated to Gilbert was his (Kondo's). The Land Office revoked 
Gilberts offer for a right of occupancy. But on getting evidence that Gilbert had paid 
compensation, the Land Office restored Gilbert's offer for a right of occupancy. Thus Kondo 
lost his land for just Tshs 245.45. 
Kondo's case should be contrasted with that of Brigadier H. Mziray whose shamba in 
Block C Mbezi, was similarly parcelled into several plots. One of these, plot 610 Block C, was 
allocated to one Helena in 1988.   The Brigadier would not let Helena gain entry to the plot. 
When she complained to the Land Office, in July 1990,   her offer for a right of occupancy was 
revoked. On the orders of the Commissioner for Lands, Brigadier Mziray was naturalised in his 
shamba by being allocated eleven plots (602-612 Block C) falling therein,"as a way of solving 
the problem of the shamba owners in Mbezi". 
Lest it be argued that Kondo (in the previous example) had not productively kept his 
shamba (thus the miniscule compensation), the case of plot 493 Block L is illustrative. 
Allocated to one Calister in April 1988,   the plot was also claimed by one Mkali as his shamba. 
The Mkali family is socially and politically powerful in Dar es Salaam. On being consulted, the 
officer who surveyed the area (one Shija) pointed out that he could not have imagined that 
the area in dispute could in anyway be regarded as a shamba, since it was sheer wild bush 
(vichaka tupu, he wrote to the Land Officer). All the same, Callister's allocation was cancelled 
and land allocated to Mkali. 
Therefore, together with the maladministration of land delivery in Mbezi described in 
Chapters Seven and Eight, land policy in Mbezi (as in other plannig schemes) operated 
oppressively against the poor and the socially weak. 
9.3. Evaluating Land Policy in the Study Areas 
9.3.1. Tools of Land 'olicy to be Evaluated 
As indicated in Chapter One, tools of land policy to be evaluated include: land tenure, 
registration and transfer; land taxation; and land use regulation (i.e. zoning, building 
regulations, regulations concerning land subdivision, urban planning, and the approval, by 
public authorities, of land development schemes). Other land policy tools emanate from direct 
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government intervention through: providing infrastructure, land acquisition, direct 
development, cooperation with the private sector, surgical action, and national and local 
investment decisions. The results (aims) of such land policy would be the provision of public 
goods; the prevention of externalities; the provision of reliable and cheap information on land 
attributes and its development; the reduction of monopolistic tendencies in land holdings and 
development; the taking care of future costs or benefits, as well as of communal risks; the 
provision of merit goods, and the redistribution of income. In the following discourse, use is 
made of the results of questionnaire, presented later on in this chapter. 
9.3.2. Evaluating Land Policy with regard to Kariakoo 
Land Tenure ReQistration and Transfer 
Government policy since the colonial times was to give the people of Kariakoo only 
short term rights of occupancy, renewable annually. This was purportedly to enable them to 
build in "temporary" materials, which they could afford. However since colonial policy did not 
want Africans in urban areas and it regarded their sojourn therein to be temporary, the policy 
of giving short term rights of occupancy to Africans was to allow the colonial government 
powers to remove them whenever it deemed it necessary. This is reflected also in the 
adoption of the term "temporary materials" instead of "traditional materials" for the houses 
that the Africans built. There is nothing temporary about a mud and pole house which in 
practice can last for a decade or longer if well looked after. Many traditional houses in 
Kariakoo have lasted for decades. Long term rights of occupancy were, during the colonial 
times, granted on a racial basis so that those considered worthy (i.e. Europeans and Indians), 
were given those rights and allowed some years in which to meet the deveJopment  covenants. 
Indeed in some cases, constrdtion in traditional materials was allowed, at least for some 
duration. With a longterm right of occupancy, development finance could be organized. This 
kind of opportunity was never availd to Africans who were viciously confined to short term 
titles only, till the 1 950s when colonial policy began to couch a strata of Africans (who later 
became the rulers'of the country), to build, or acquire houses built, in modern (called 
permanent) materials in Dar es Salaam. Together with granting long term titles to these 
Africans, financing facilities in the form of, for example, the African Urban Housing Loan 
Scheme, were also provided. No opportunities of that kind were made available to the 
Africans of Kariakoo. However, if any of the Kariakoo residents was able to transform their 
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buildings to be "permanent" they could be granted longterm rights of occupancy. Surely this 
was putting the cart before the horse, since a long term right of occupancy was a sine qua 
non of getting land development finance. As there was no question of the African-built 
traditional houses being temporary, the people of Kariakoo were, as much entitled to long 
term rights of occupancy, as were the Europeans and Indians, particularly, if it could be borne 
in mind that in some cases these long terms rights were given to the latter peoples, and, later, 
to the African elite, before their developing of the allocated land. It appears therefore that the 
confinement of the people of Kariakoo to short term titles was both racist and aimed at giving 
powers to the government to replace these people whenever it felt like. 
The hostile colonial policy against Kariakoo residents was perpetrated after 
Independence. Past government policy with regard to tenure, disenabled the people of 
Kariakoo from developing their properties to higher standards, both for lack of finance, and 
also for the fear that the government could always repossess the land. This forced some to 
sell their land. 19 Political muscle, however, has enabled the people of Kariakoo to survive in 
the area, despite various redevelopment schemes aimed at replacing them. This resistance is 
now being eroded by the onslaught of the new rich developers. 
Our inquiries at the Ilala District Land Office indicated that the government is now 
willing to give long term rights of occupancy to Kariakoo residents, who must however, apply 
for these rights. But the conditions attached require the construction of multistoreyed 
buildings. Most indigenous Kariakoo residents cannot fulfil this condition as there are no viable 
financing institutions that can advance them credit for such structures. Thus the issuing of 
these longterm rights of occuncy to the people of Kariakoo at this age and time is not 
necessarily in their favour. It exposes the grantees to the clutches of the state machinery 
demanding redevelopment, failure tfulfil which, could lead to the land getting repossessed. 
Thus the poor people of Kariakoo have little choice but to sell their property and, according 
to the Ilala District'Land Officer, this is exactly what they are doing. We have pointed out 
above that by 1987 a third of the old Kariakoo residents had transferred their plots. This 
information is to some extent collaborated by the responses to our questionnaire which show 
19 	
These views were given by Professor Issa G. Shivji, Chairman, Presidential Commission on Land Matters, 
interviewed in April, 1993. 
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that 24% of the plot owners acquired them in 1980 or later and that 29% acquired the plots 
through buying of a house or a foundation. Our data, however show that 83% of the Kariakoo 
houseowners do not wish to sell their property. In the balance of the cases where the sale of 
the plot cOuld be entertained, asking prices were given as being between Tshs lOm/= and 
Tshs 40m/=. Asked about how much their plots could fetch without buildings the majority 
expected this to be in millions of shillings as summarized in Table 9.2. These results tally with 
the prices at which properties change hands in Kariakoo. Thus Kariakoo residents are aware 
of the high prices which their land could fetch, yet the 
Table 9.2: Expected price ranges for undeveloped Plots in Kariakoo 
Expected Price Range Percentage of Respondents 
(N =53) 




Over Tshs 14m 11 
Source: Field survey, October, 1992 
majority (83%) were absolutely against selling their plots. What the effect of government 
tov 
policy has been to the people of Karioo is to deny them the opportunity to realise their wish 
of remaining in Karikoo, a wish which they have demonstrated time and again by opposing 
the various redevelopment schemes. 
While the government could congratulate itself that it was then granting long term 
rights of occupancy to Karikaoo residents, we have argued that this may lead to their fast 
replacement. All the same getting these titles has not been easy. While most of our 
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respondents had these titles, the system of getting them (titles) is still closed and oppressive 
so that in 68% of our respondents, acquiring a long term title was considered to be very 
difficult. 
Several of our respondents who did not want to move out of Kariakoo resented being 
replaced by " foreigners " . 20 Some described their threatened replacement as being "robbery". 
Many felt that the government should extend credit facilities to them to enable them meet the 
new planning requirements of putting up multistorey buildings. Others wanted partnership 
with the new developers e.g. a floor, or a flat in the new multistorey development. The 
majority (53%) felt that Kariakoo should be redeveloped by the government which would sell 
the new buildings to the existing owners on credit. The government could recover its money 
from the rents. They felt that they were under undue pressure from the wealthy, who are 
supported by the government, to move out of Kariakoo. At least 46% had been approached 
by people wanting to buy them out. The building of multistorey blocks towering over the old 
ramshackled single storey Kariakoo houses was seen by some as a psychological and practical 
pressure of terror to force them out of the area. 
The way matters stand is that land policy has failed to find a policy solution to the 
old occupiers of Kariakoo. A viable approach would appear to be the one based on a dialogue 
between the government and the old occupiers to come to an agreed solution, a solution that 
will ensure that the existing residents are not replaced, and do benefit from the existing 
redevelopment process. The solution is not for the government to let matters take their 
course, or to unilaterally prepare redevelopment schemes. Negotiations which may ensure 
the non-displacement of thendigenous people of Kariakoo are delicate and require active 
government backing. Since this backing is not forthcoming, one after the other of Kariakoo 
residents finally succumb to sellintheir property. The result is the poralisation of society, the 
unco-ordinated redevelopment of the area, and fear, and resentment among the existing old 
residents. 
20 	A good number of the new Kariakoo buyers are of Arabic/ Zanzibari, or Indian origin. 
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Land Taxation 
A major weakness with the current peacemeal and fragmented redevelopment of 
Kariakoo in a situation where land transactions are not open, is that the government does not 
get its fair share of capital gains tax when plots are transferred. In most cases, prices are 
understated. Secondly, the land rent charged in Kariakoo is generally low. The maximum land 
rent paid in Kariakoo according to our study is Tshs 5,000/= p.a. This is too low for many 
of the multistoreyed commercial/residential buildings in the area. Another form of taxation 
which would be appropriate in Kariakoo is Development Impact Exaction to take care of the 
stress on the environment and infrastructure that results from the new redevelopments. The 
system of poor land taxation means that no resources are tapped from the new developers 
to meet the cost of the necessary expansion of infrastructure. When this cost is taken from 
the general government budget, it can be argued that this is an inequitable subsidy to the new 
developers, who are apparently rich. The overburdening of the infrastructure and services by 
the new development, adversely affects the poor who are however not the beneficiaries of 
these developments. 
Land Use Regulation 
Several planning/redevelopment schemes have been prepared for Kariakoo. A new 
redevelopment scheme is currently (1 993) under preparation within the Ministry of Lands, but 
there are indications that in general, Kariakoo's development has not conformed to these 
planning schemes. However, the current conditions for getting a building permit in Kariakoo 
is that the new building must be four storey or higher, constructed of permanent materials and 
provided, inter a/ia, with car parking space. It must be a major sign of the inefficiency of 
planning that for nearly six dades, urban planning has failed to deal effectively with 
Kariakoo. The problems are both within and without the realms of urban planning. The 
planning schemes have been done aMinisteriaI level without interaction with the residents. 
Moreover, the redevelopment schemes have been conceived within the concept of clearing 
Kariakoo of the existing residents, and developing the area anew. This has, of necessity 
generated political opposition. However, there is little doubt that Kariakoo has for long been 
ripe for redevelopment. With the failure of planning to harness, guide, and work with this 
process in the interests of the majority, Kariakoo has been developing haphazardly despite 
impressive official planning proposals, and despite the amount of money the new developers 
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have shown to be willing to invest in the area. The result is overworked infrastructures, and 
isolated high rise buildings towering over the old dilapidated single storey buildings, mainly in 
traditional materials. A tripartite coming together of the government, the existing residents 
and the new developers, is perhaps a pre-requisite for Kariakoo to redevelop efficiently and 
equitably. 
Direct Government Intervention 
The intensification of land uses in Kariakoo through building upwards required that 
infrastructure i.e. sewers, storm water drains, water and electricity supply networks, roads, 
open spaces, car parks, etc, be extended. This has not been done despite several proposals. 
The problem has principally been lack of resources. The government does not get its fair share 
of income from the ongoing land transactions in Kariakoo and, as we have seen, it does not 
tap the potential of the private developers of the area in order to extend infrastructure. This 
could possibly be done through effective taxation. The alternative would be for the 
government to seek the cooperation of the developers by inserting covenants requiring these 
developers to extend or contribute to the extension of infrastructure. The issue of equity and 
the problem of the indigenous Kariakoo residents could be addressed by incorporating in the 
longterm titles, covenants stipulating shared ownership in a development, between the old 
residents and the incoming buyers. Currently, land policy can hardly be said to address these 
issues. 
Conclusion 
The impact of land policy on Kariakoo, as presented earlier, can be concluded to be 
the failure to achieve the hypotesised aims of land policy. It has failed to extend goods and 
services with public good characteristics (e.g. infrastructure) in line with the intensification 
of developments, or to minimise hW1ful  externalities (e.g. by harmonizing redevelopments, 
or preventing environmental degradation resulting e.g. from congestion and overworked 
infrastructure), or t encourage positive externalities. It has however succeeded, to a small 
extent, to ease the flow of information on Kariakoo land since the majority of Kariakoo plots 
have known numbers, and titles, and houses are well numbered. But the government is not 
all that conversant with who the redevelopers of Kariakoo are, or with the various land 
transactions going on in the area. Fragmented redevelopment may also have prevented the 
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growth of monopolistic land holdings. But haphazard redevelopment ignores the issue of social 
polarisation which land policy has not addressed. The policy can also be said to have failed 
in taking care of communal risks e.g. by looking into the appropriate service infrastructure 
required in the area. It has also failed in its role as provider of merit goods, since it has not 
helped the people of Kariakoo to extall the conditions of their properties, and since income 
inequalities are getting blatantly manifested in the form of highrise blocks towering over the 
humble structure belonging to the indigenes of Kariakoo. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that Kariakoo residents who have sold their property 
have obtained huge sums of money which they could not otherwise transfer from the new 
developers. In some cases some sellers have had alternative houses constructed for them in 
the outer the areas of the city. But, given the potential superiority of Kariakoo plots in terms 
of current and future value, this kind of income redistribution may be illusory. 
9.3.3. Evaluating Land Policy with regard to the Manzese Area 
Policy related to land tenure, transfer and registration 
Having grown up as an unplanned area, Manzese landowners are assumed to have 
deemed rights of occupancy. The upgrading of the 1 970s never tackled the question of land 
tenure, so, land owners in Manzese were left within the realm of the vague application of 
customary tenure, and so, spontaneous subdivisions of land have continued. In order to get 
granted Rights of Occupancy, individual plots had to be surveyed. This was never done. Only 
block surveying was done to ease the institution of roads. Thus, 92% of our respondents had 
not titles to land, mainly because the area is not surveyed (Table 9.5 and 9.6). House 
registration was carried out as p'at of the area's upgrading in the 1 970s, but buildings put up 
after the original exercise had been completed, are not registered. Without streamlining the 
question of tenure, the question of ,  nd transfer becomes murky, and information on land 
ownership, and the prevention of externalities become difficult. 
Policy on Land Taxation 
The efficacy of land taxation depends to some extent on the efficacy of land tenure 
and registration, and reliable information on properties and property ownership. Since the 
policy on tenure and registration has been weak, so too has land taxation. For example, 
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imposts to recover the costs of upgrading the area in the 1 970s have not been efficiently 
collected, and most eligible payers are in arrears (see Tables 9.1) A good number of Manzese 
residents 0 6% of our respondents) do not pay any land rent. While it could be argued that 
there is little justification for advocating the taxation of the people of Manzese, who could be 
said to be poor and not benefitting from public services, there are within Manzese, signs of 
rich people penetrating the area. These signs include the conversion of many residential 
buildings to commercial uses, and the construction of multistorey structures. 
Land Use Reciulation 
The development of an area into an irregular unplanned settlement implies that land 
use regulation had failed in the first place. The usual land use regulation measures i.e. zoning, 
control of land subdivision, building regulations, development schemes approval and urban 
planning have therefore not applied to Manzese even after upgrading. It is therefore not 
surprising that 85% of our respondents in Manzese have never sought a building permit from 
the authorities (Table 9.11). A major initiative undertaken by the Ministry of Lands since the 
late 1 980s is to prepare various planning schemes for Manzese and to have individual plots 
surveyed as far as possible in accordance with these schemes. This has important 
connotations for the land tenurial status of the area i.e. those whose land is surveyed can get 
titles. We have argued above that such schemes are difficult to implemented, and are likely 
to work against the poorer landowners of Manzese in favour of the rich ones. The planning 
schemes are being done without consulting the residents, so that 97% of our respondents 
said that they have never been consulted by the authorities in the preparation of the planning 
schemes for their area. According to the Director of Urban Development in the Ministry of 
Lands, such consultation would ie too involving to the extent of making the whole exercise 
aimed at surveying and titling the area impossible. We have argued however that, one reason 
why consultation is not done is becate it connotes the loss of bureaucratic power over land 
administration, which officials want to preserve within themselves. The result of this lack of 
popular participationnd consultation is that Manzese is growing with little control. 
Direct Government intervention 
As pointed out in Chapter Seven, direct government intervention in Manzese has 
been through surgical action, i.e. the area's upgrading in the 1970s, whereby some 
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infrastructure i.e. roads, water and electricity networks, schools and health centres, was 
provided. This, to some extent, changed the land use status of Manzese and one notable 
effect was further densification of the area (including the construction of multistorey 
buildings), and the change of the most accessible land from residential to commercial uses. 
These changes however, are taking place with little government control or regulation and this 
includes loss of valuable revenue (e.g. on transfer or land use changes, which should 
command higher land rent). However, the provision of infrastructure during the area's 
upgrading was conceived on a short term horizon so that no provision was made for its 
maintenance or extension, both important considerations since the standards of infrastructure 
adopted were low and since densification of use was expected. Besides, the population was 
not involved during the conception and implementation of the upgrading scheme which the 
people of Manzese saw as belonging entirely to the government. Most Manzese landowners 
interviewed expressed a view that infrastructure was instituted in their area as a result of the 
efforts their former Member of Parliament, who was also a senior cabinet Minister, the late 
Mr. Derek Bryceson. As a result of lack of maintenance, public infrastructure, particularly 
roads, drains and water kiosks, is badly damaged, uncared for by the both the City Council, 
and the local residents. 
Since the public participation option was not adopted, intervention by cooperating 
with the private sector could not be contemplated, yet approaches like land pooling and 
redistribution or land sharing could have been usefully applied during the upgrading process 
to regularize the area. Even today, people who are apparently wealthy and able to put up 
multistorey buildings in Manzese, are doing so without cooperating with the public sector 
whereby some of their resources could have been tapped to regularize and service Manzese. 
Moreover, the various developers, big and small, are not co-ordinated, so that their impact on 
existing infrastructure is not knowri Not known too, are future infrastructural requirement. 
Manzese, like many parts of Dar es Salaam, is developing with hardly any government control 
or direction. 'V 
Conclusion 
Land policy can be said to have played a major role in providing services with public 
good characteristics during the upgrading of Manzese. These included infrastructure like 
roads, water and electricity networks, drains, schools, markets, health centres and open 
spaces. This was aimed, as much at ameliorating conditions in Manzese as to helping the 
government in policing the area. Besides, the concept of upgrading was an important 
component in securing funds for preparing new plots for allocation. Thus the servicing of 
Manzese was not aimed at smoothening or overcoming the limitations of the operation of, 
land markets in the area. 
As a result of the limited goals of this upgrading, the role of land policy in preventing 
harmful externalities in Manzese has been highly restricted. Externalities emanate from 
incompatible users (all kinds of uses are mixed up in Manzese), pollution, especially from 
uncollected surface waste water, uncollected solid waste, smell and other nuisance (e.g.from 
pit latrines) particularly where houses are overcrowded without any general alignment, etc. 
Again land policy has succeeded only to a limited degree to provide cheap and reliable 
information on land holdings and development in Manzese. According to our research 
findings, in 45% of our respondents, plot numbers were not known. In 56% of the cases, 
the houses carried no clear plot/house numbers. This suggests that around half of the 
houses/plots of Manzese are not registered (presumably because they were constructed after 
the registration exercise was over). The majority of houseowners interviewed did not have 
certificates of title. The authorities too cannot claim to be well acquainted with the land 
transactions that are going on in Manzese, or with the land developments that are taking place 
in the area. Not when 85% of the developers never sought to get a building permit! 
The broad failure of lana policy to play an active role in the interest of the peoples of 
Manzese, means that other roles of land policy, i.e. reducing monopolistic tendencies, taking 
care of future costs or benefits, shoijdering communal risks, ensuring the provision of merit 
goods (e.g. tap water for all) and redistribution of income, are not being taken care of. 
9.3.4. Evaluation of Land Policy with relation to Kijitonyama 
Policy related to Land Tenure, ReQistration and Transfer 
As has been the case with other new planned areas, the original residents of 
Kijitonyama were more or less replaced. Some were promised plots in the area, and there is 
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some evidence suggesting that this promise was fulfilled. In parts of Kijitonyama, short term 
rights of occupancy were originally allocated to allow the construction of traditional buildings 
and a number of such houses exist in places todate. By and large however, Kijitonyama has 
developed as a middle to high income residential neighbourhood despite the stated aims of the 
planning scheme, earmarking the area for low income households. 
After its planning, Kijitonyama was allocated to new people and institutions. Judging 
by the proportion of people who have certificates of title, which according to our survey, was 
64%, and considering that 86% of those who have no title have official letters of offer 
(Tables 9.5 and 9.6), it could be argued that the official system of land tenure has worked 
fairly well in Kijitonyama. However, 71 % of our respondents did not obtain their plots 
through the normal system of allocation, but by way of buying plots, houses or foundations 
from the owners, or from officials (Table 9.4). This would seem to contradict the findings of 
a research carried out in 1 98821 which found that only a limited number of plots in the area 
were officially recorded as having been transferred through sale. The implication of this is 
that a lot of people do transfer/acquire plots and report e.g. to the courts, lawyers or ten cell 
leaders, but do not report the changes to the land offices, because the official process of land 
transfer is cumbersome and capital gains is payable. It is therefore possible that the records 
of landowners in Kijitonyama as officially held, do not reflect the actual situation. 
Policy with relation to Land Taxation 
Like other official land delivery schemes in Dar es Salaam, land in Kijitonyama is 
grossly undertaxed. By far the majority of the plot owners in the area pay an annual land rent 
of Tsh 5001= or less. Only 1 ii paid more than Tshs 500/=. Besides, as argued in Chapter 
Seven, many eligible payers are in arrears. This poor land taxation incapacitates government's 
ability to muster sufficient resours to invest in public infrastructure, for example. 
Policy with relatid'n to Land use Regulation 
By and large, Kijitonyama is a planned area with buildings regularly sited. But building 
control appear not to have been rigid. Plot ratios are violated and building heights are poorly 
21 	J.M.L. Kironde, 'Sites and Service in Tanzania: The case of Sinza, Kijitonyama, and Mikocheni", Habitat 
International, Vol. 15, No. 1/2, 1991, pp. 27-38. 
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regulated, so that it is common to see a high rise block towering over the adjacent single 
storey building. With an average area of 400 square metres, the high density plots of 
Kijitonyama are fairly generous. Generous too, were the original provision for open spaces. 
Most of these have been converted into private plots, and as pointed out earlier, hazard land 
along Shekilango Road has been converted into commercial uses. Kijitonyama is therefore 
getting congested. Nevertheless, although Kijitonyama has gone through nearly 20 years of 
development, there are still a number of undeveloped, or partially developed plots. This 
implies that development conditions are violated. Squatting has also taken place in areas left 
over as hazard land. 
Direct Government Intervention 
Kijitonyama benefited from direct government intervention by way of land acquisition 
for the implementation of the sites and services scheme, and by way of infrastructure 
instituted in the 1 970s. The standards of infrastructure aimed at, particularly with relation 
to roads and drains were low, so that with poor maintenance and overuse, infrastructure is 
in very poor condition. Many public water kiosks no longer work. In a number of cases, land 
earmarked for public water kiosks has been converted into plots for private use. Part of 
Kijitonyama was "directly developed" into houses, by the National Housing Corporation, and 
the Tanzania Housing Bank, for tenant purchase scheme. 
In view of the bad condition particularly of roads, a condition made worse by the lack 
of drains which force rain water to use roads as drains thereby badly eroding them, there has 
been instances where people in the area have come together in order to muster resources for 
"self help" road maintenanceCommendable as these efforts were22 , lack of trust among 
the population, and lack of the necessary knowhow did manifest themselves as major 
hindrances to the success of such , elf help" endeavors. For instance, some people refused 
to contribute to road maintenance, arguing that they owned no motor vehicles, or were mere 
tenants in the ares. Rather than contribute, others recommended that the bit of the road 
abutting their properties be left out during maintenance. It is possible that these self-helpers 
of Kijitonyama could have benefitted from government policy aimed at cooperating with them, 
22 	
In 1990-92 the author participated in a scheme to maintain a major neighbourhood distribution road 
(unfortunately unnamed) separating Kijitonyama, and Sinza. 
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and helping them to help themselves, but this has not been forthcoming so that the situation 
is pathetic as far as infrastructure is concerned. 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
Originally, it can be said that land policy was successful in its aims of taking care of 
public goods, and preventing harmful externatities in Kijitonyama. This success is now 
qualified by the poor status of infrastructure. Surface water pollution, from overflowing septic 
tanks is a major problem whose solution would appear to be the institution of a 
comprehensive sewer network to the area since the water table is very high and septic tanks 
cannot cope. Yet such a scheme is unlikely to be undertaken unless resources can be 
mustered. With a weak system of land taxation in Tanzania, resources are unlikely to be 
obtained from that source so that Kijitonyama is likely to suffer from poor infrastructure for 
the foreseable future. 
As for information provision, it is likely that official records are grossly inaccurate. It 
is also noticeable that while in the majority (96%) of our respondents, plot numbers were 
known, these were not displayed on the houses in 88% of the cases. With the exception of 
the two trunk roads bordering the area i.e. Bagamoyo Road and Shekilango Road, not a single 
road in Kijitonyama is named. Thus the status of information on land and land developments 
in Kijitonyama is poor. 
Perhaps the question of monopolistic tendencies does not arise in Kijitonyama since 
land was fragmented and allocated to many applicants, but land policy is possibly storing 
trouble for the future by allowing the near 100% conversion of open spaces to private uses, 
or the condoning of construction on hazard land. Already, the "besieged" Kijitonyama river is 
showing signs of flooding and erodig roads and properties near it. 
Land policy has1ot addressed itself to the question of communal risks, a key problem in 
Kijitonyama, by looking into appropriate and affordable modes of road construction and 
maintenance; drainage; and waste water removal. As for merit goods, it can be said that the 
standard of houses in Kijitonyama is satisfactory although there all many incomplete, but 
occupied properties. The water network infrastructure is fairly comprehensive so that most 
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households can get access to piped water (although it is likely that many do not pay for it). 
But the failure of recovering the cost of infrastructure from the beneficiaries of Kijitonyama 
means that considerable subsidy was bestowed to these people. 
9.3.5. Evaluating Land Policy with Respect to Mabibo 
Policy related to Land Tenure, Reqistration and Transfer 
Being an unplanned area which has not benefitted from upgrading, Mabibo cannot be 
said to have enjoyed a positive land policy impact with relation to land tenure. The tenurial 
status of Mabibo is within the realm of customary tenure. However, residents would like to 
have title to their land, despite their prohibiting the survey of the area by government 
instructed surveyors. This survey was meant to get Mabibo land into the hands of the 
government for its allocation. Drawing from past experience, the people of Mabibo would not 
let that happen. But sometime in 1989,   a group of landowners of Mabibo External came 
together to seek the survey of their land lots. They collected funds and got the services of 
land surveyors. To date 0 993), this survey has not gone beyond the surveyor's drawing table 
through the labyrinthine process of getting approved. The snag is that the actual pattern of 
land lots does not tally with the planning scheme prepared for the area by the Ministry of 
Lands. A solution to this problem is yet to be found, but in the meanwhile, land subdivision 
is going on and more buildings are coming up totally independent of the planning scheme. 
Thus the status of land tenure, "registration", and transfer is done entirely outside the official 
system. 23 
Policy related to Land Taxation 
Without streamlining tl question of land tenure, the question of land taxation cannot 
be easily tackled. Thus most Mabibo landowners do not pay land rent, and this has important 
connotations for land servicing. \hout income, say from land rent, the government is 
starved of resources to invest in services. 
Policy in relation toLand Use Regulations 
Mabibo is growing outside the realm of land use regulations, but as alluded to above, 
the government has a planning scheme for the area which remains unimplemented, and is 
23 	
The author collaborated with the residents to get the area surveyed. 
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probably unimplementable. Subdivision and land development is going on without the benefit 
of land use regulation, making the planning scheme even more outdated. 
Direct Government intervention 
The major form of government intervention had been earmarked to be land acquisition 
and relocation of the existing occupiers. This was resisted, and as a results the government 
"ignored" Mabibo. 
The infrastructure that exists has been instituted by the people themselves but has 
a lot of problems. Roads for example are very narrow, unmade and windery. In many cases, 
buildings are not sufficiently setbacked from the roads, and many buildings have no road 
frontage. Surface or other waste water drainage is non-existent. Electricity and water 
networks exist in parts of Mabibo, mainly as a result of individual efforts. 
Mabibo is unplanned, but most of it is yet to be highly densified. This is an area 
where the policy of cooperating with the land owners through such policy as land pooling and 
redistribution could work successfully. For reasons outlined earlier, this policy option, though 
provided for under the Town and Country Planning Ordinance, has not been contemplated for 
application to such an as yet lightly populated area as Mabibo. Land pooling does not accord 
with the inherited concept where land planning has been seen in terms of displacement, 
relocation and allocation. As the area is densifying rapidly with the authorities clinging to the 
old planning approach, it will not be surprising that there might be calls in future for the area's 
upgrading, an expensive option which could be avoided if the authorities cooperated with 
existing land owners to regula se the land uses before it was too late. 
Conclusion 
Land policy cannot be said to have played any positive role in Mabibo. But it has 
attempted the neative approach of trying to replace the existing residents by way of 
conniving a planing scheme for the area. This has proved difficult to implement, so that 
Mabibo is slowly developing into a typical high density unplanned area, despite the existence 
of apparently rich people with large land lots and imposing buildings in'the area. 
9.3.6. Evaluating Land Policy with respect to Mbezi 
Policy related to Land Tenure, Reciistration and Transfer 
The replacement of the landowners of Mbezi before the area was declared a planning 
area, a process which caused injustice to those people has been described above. The 
allocation of tenurial rights over Mbezi was done unsystematically and in an uncoordinated 
manner as a result of the multiplicity of allocating authorities and of malpractice. This resulted 
in problems like plot double allocation described above. The majority (80%) of our 
respondents in Mbezi had no Certificates of Title to land, a reflection of the inefficiency of 
land policy in allocating tenurial rights. 
A lot of land in Mbezi (45% of our respondents) was acquired by way of purchase. 
Since most of the land was allocated from 1980,   a lot of it was acquired and sold within a 
relatively short period. This implies acquisition of land for speculation. These transfers are 
usually done at the back of the government which therefore loses revenue. These too bring 
to question the continued adherence by the government to the policy of allocating land 
cheaply. Nevertheless, using the policy tool of granting tenurial rights, the government was 
able to reallocate most of the land in Mbezi to new owners, except in a few areas where 
powerful land occupiers resisted displacement. 
Policy with relation of Land Taxation 
Although Mbezi land is not provided with infrastructure, its acquisition, planning, 
surveying, and allocation cost money and enhanced the value of the land.' Neither is this cost 
being recovered nor is betterment value properly taxed. Thus while it cost some 10,0001= 
to survey a high density plot in1bezi, in the 1980s, the government charged only 251= as 
survey fee. As 3445 high density plots were earmarked for surveying in the area, some Tshs 
34,450,000/= can be assumed to hye been spent on land surveying these high density plots 
alone, yet, at 25/= a plot, only Tshs 86,1 25/= could have been recovered. The implication 
of this is that surv'ying of more land becomes difficult since new money must always be 
sought from the government and this is not usually forthcoming. The root cause of this 
problem is the policy that in practice aims at allowing the economically and socially powerful 
to acquire land cheaply. Those who get this land directly from the government do so cheaply, 
but those who have to buy it from the original allottees, or from land officials, pay dearly. 
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According to our study, plots in Mbezi that were acquired through purchase, were bought for 
between Tshs 3000/= and Tshs 1 .2m, depending on the size of the plot, its location and the 
year of purchase. In one ascertained case, plot 240 Block G Medium Density, was sold by 
one A. Yahya to one Dr Emmanuel Sifuel Munyo on 6/10/1 992 for Tshs 1.25m/=. Yahya 
had obtained the plot in December, 1985 for fees totalling less than Tshs 500/=, and an 
annual land rent of Tshs 650/= 24 
Asked to assess how much their plots could be sold for without buildings, respondents 
in Mbezi gave prices of between Tshs 0.1 m to Tshs 20m. Yet the land rent that was being 
charged in Mbezi ranged between Tshs 1751= and 1750/= p.a. This poor land taxation has 
partly been responsible for the government's failure to institute infrastructure in planned areas, 
and to have a dynamic land delivery system. Surveyed plots have as such been scarce, thus 
getting into the hands of those who are socially and politically powerful, leaving the poor to 
their wits. 
Policy in Relation to Land Use Regulations 
Mbezi is a planned area with about 7000 residential plots whose various planning schemes 
have been implemented in a situation of confusion in land administration. The various 
planning schemes for the area have been revised clandestinely so that a future developed 
Mbezi is likely to be starved of public open spaces or land for public uses. Disputes over plot 
ownership are also prevalent. Yet the area's developers are slowly but surely putting up very 
expensive properties in the area. A recent study found that most developers exceeded the 
allowed ceilings for site coverage and plot ratios. 25 This is not surprising since many builders 
did not hold building permits 'om the City Council, nor were they visited by building 
inspectors. Only 27% of our respondents found it easy to get a building permit. The rest 
either found getting it difficult (9%),ere still struggling to get one (1 6%), or had not sought 
to get one (48%). But even where permits were held, developers did not conform to what 
24 	
See File related to Plot 240 Block G, MD, Kinondoni District Land Office. 
25 	
P.K. Kazungu, A decade of Local Government (Urban authorities) in Tanzania, 1982-1992: Evaluation of 
Achievements and Bottlenecks in Property Development: Case of Dar es Salaam City Council, Diploma 
Project, Department of Land Management and Valuation, Ardhi Institute, Oar es Salaam, 1992, p. 44. 
the permits required 26 . Again, this is not surprising, since building inspectors never visited 
the sites during construction in the case of 75% of our respondents. This is because the land 
is in accessible, far from the planning offices, and lacks, inf rastructure and services. In most 
cases, it would be cumbersome for the officers even to be able to know the demarcation of 
the plots. In any case, facilities to allow building inspectors to visit the sites from their 
centralized offices are lacking, and while on site, inspectors can always be "persuaded" to 
turn a blind eye to the violation of regulations. Land use regulation as a tool of land policy 
has thus been inefficient in the Mbezi area. The root causes of this failure is the internal 
weaknesses in conceptualising and implementing these regulations, lack of resources, 
malpractices, etc. 
Direct Government Intervention 
We have pointed out how Mbezi was planned and is developing without the semblance 
of the infrastructure standard in developing planned areas. The reason given by the 
government is lack of wherewithal. Yet we have seen above how cheaply land is allocated. 
In political terms the government argues that this policy is aimed at ensuring that access to 
land is open to all, rich and poor. The government feels that pricing land highly is unethical 
since land is a gift of nature and "selling" it would exclude the poor from access too this it 
(land). Yet there are no pretenses whatsoever, that there are hardly any poor people in Mbezi 
planned Area. To some extent, it could be argued that the non servicing of Mbezi is equitable 
(if inefficient) since no public resources are expended to add further gain to the area's land 
owners. But already the people of Mbezi are clamouring for services and sooner or later, 
these are going to be instituted at public expense unless the government taps the plot 
allottees potential. It is unlike1 that the government will tap this potential, and two reasons 
are advanced to explain this reluctance: Like was the view of the colonial government in the 
1 950s (Chapter Five), incorporatinthe peoples efforts to institute infrastructure Connotes the 
admission that the government had failed in its role, and this, of necessity mean loss of 
bureaucratic pow. The solution is to wait, and institute infrastructure as and when the 
government is able to do so! itself. The second reason is the preservation of the colonial 
inheritance of getting access to land cheaply and preserving the bureaucracy's power to 
26 	Ibid. 
determine who gets access to what land. This would certainly be compromised if land was 
offered through an open land pricing system e.g. premium tendering. 
It has been questioned that if the argument is that the Mbezi plot owners are not poor 
people, how come plot development takes such a slow place? 27 The answer is suggested 
to be the lack of effective development financial institutions in Tanzania. The Tanzania 
Housing Bank is hamstrung for resources, and the maximum it can offer (currently Tshs 
2.0mI= for residential buildings), and even then, in paltry instalements, is in most cases only 
a (small) fraction of what is required to put up a normal house, let alone the types of 
grandiose houses coming up in Mbezi. Much as we consider the Mbezi plot owners to be 
relatively well off, we do not think they have millions of shillings readily available to develop 
their plots in a short period, but they are able to do so in the long run. There is also the 
observation that the process of plot acquisition and plot development are two independent 
variables. It certainly takes a lot of struggle and resources to acquire land whether this be 
done through allocation, or though purchase. Developing the plot is another protracted 
struggle. There is also the possibility that given the lack of infrastructure, some developers 
prefer to go slowly since no return are expected to be obtained in the short term from the 
completed buildings. No houseowners is debarred from putting up a small house which can 
be completed within the available resources. 
The potential for cooperation with the people of Mbezi is there. We have seen how they 
individually engage in repetitive and expensive investments to institute their own 
infrastructure, particularly roads, water and electricity. These efforts could be co-ordinated, 
advice given, and some powers of enforcement sought. The developers of Mbezi have no 
forum where they can meet and many do not know each other. Many too rarely visit their 
sites. 
Except for lanc.racquisition and planning, direct government intervention e.g. in terms of 
constructing infrastructure, direct development, offerring financing facilities or cooperating 
with the private sector has not been very active in Mbezi. 
27 	
Anonymous Referee for Land Use Policy on a paper by J.M.L. Kironde, "Land Policy of Options for Urban 
Tanzania", Mimeo, Ardhi Institute, Dar es Salaam. 
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Conclusion 
It can be concluded from the above discourse that land policy in Mbezi has failed to 
achieve many of its stated aims i.e. the provision of public goods; minimisation of harmful 
externalities and maximisation of positive ones; the provision of cheap and reliable 
information; the reduction of monopolistic tendencies in land uses; the taking care of future 
costs and benefits; the taking of communal risks; the provision of merit goods; and the 
redistribution of income. The result is the inefficient development of Mbezi which is devoid 
of infrastructure, but with expensive buildings, access to which is precarious and whose 
owners are finding it difficult to occupy or let. Investing in Mbezi is made unnecessarily 
expensive by this lack of infrastructure which forces individuals to undertake repetitive and 
expensive actions, where joint action would be cheaper. 
9.4. Inferences from answers to our questionnaire 
Further insights into the efficacy of land policy can be gauged by discussing the 
results to our questionnaire. The question that were posed are reproduced in each table 
together with the answers. Unless Otherwise shown, all answers are in percentages. 
9.4.1. Plot identification 
The first set of questions sought to find out certain characteristicsof the plots owned 
by the respondent households. The results are presented in Table 9.3. From the answers, 
it will be realised that in several cases, prevalent in the unplanned areas of Mabibo and 
Manzese, as well as in the unplanned parts of Kariakoo and Mbezi, landowners did not know 
the number of their plots, although in almost all cases, the plots were developed. In both 
Manzese and Mabibo areas, the majority of the plots were unsurveyed, and this was to be 
expected of unplanned areas. But what we find worth further stressing is the lack of clear 
house or plot numbers in the majorjty of cases in the areas surveyed with the exception of 
Kariakoo. Surprisingly, this is even more so in the planned areas of Kijitonyama and Mbezi. 
Manzese, though 
unplanned, has a considerable proportion (45%) of its houses clearly numbered. This is the 
consequence of house registration undertaken during the area's upgrading in the 1 970s. The 
prevalence of unnumbered houses in Manzese, despite house registration, is a reflection of 
the post-registration property development which was not catered for. This is a task which 
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the local leadership could have been entrusted to do as houses came up. Apparently this was 
not the case. Authorities too have not made a follow up on the new structures coming up. 
Table 9.3: Plot Identification 
Questions/Answer K/koo Mabibo Kfnyama Manzese Mbezi All 
options N=76 N 	89 N=100 N=97 N=56 Areas 
N =418 
Is the Plot number 
known? 
Yes 68 19 96 55 66 61 
No 32 81 4 45 34 39 
Is the Plot Surveyed? 
Yes 95 22 97 21 70 59 
No 5 78 3 79 30 41 
Is there a clear plot 
number on the 
house/plot 
Yes 67 19 12 44 0 29 
No L 33 81 88 56 100 71 
In Karikaoo, most houses have clear numbers, and it can be argued that this was 
inherited from the colonial era. The colonial government would have wanted to have houses 
numbered for administrative purposes. Modern Dar es Salaam administrators seem to prefer 
to govern in the dark. Lack of housnumbering as well as street naming is considered to be 
a major impediment to efficient land administration, though it is realised that keeping basic 
information on plts/houses, such as their numbers, secret, could be preferred if 
administrators have things to hide. It is however a glaring sign of inefficiency in urban 
management in general, and land administration in particular, particularly if it should be 
considered that no considerable resources need be expended to ensure this. A bylaw 
requiring every landowner to fix a number or street name on their houses/plots could go a long 
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way to achieve this basic requirement of urban management. 
9.4.2. Plot Acquisition 
Table 9.4 shows when the plots in the various areas were acquired, and the relatively 
"young" ages of Mbezi and Mabibo compared to Kariakoo Manzese, and Kijitonyama come 
out clearly. 
With the exception of Kariakoo, by far the largest group of landowners, got their plots 
through purchase, either of bare plots or of a house, or foundation. With the exception of 
Mbezi, only a minority obtained plots by direct allocation from the government. The high 
proportion of acquisition through land allocation in Mbezi is a reflection of the abundance of 
planned plots during the early 1 980s, and the then unpopularity of the area. 
The revelation that most people buy their plots, a finding highlighted by other studies as 
well 28, has important connotations for land policy, since the government's refusal to 
recognise urban land markets, and to help them to work openly and with certainty, is because 
it believes in land allocation. Yet, the majority of urban dwellers in Dar es Salaam, do not get 
their land by way of purchase. What this means is that in planned areas like Kijitonyama and 
Mbezi, original allottees (some of whom happen to be land officials) sell their plots to other 
people, and in the case of unplanned areas, the purchase of land from existing owners is 
prevalent. This is a strong case for policy makers to address the question of smoothening the 
working of the land market in land allocation; since as can be seen from Table 9.4 the process 
of plot acquisition was rated to be very difficult.. The continued belief in government land 
allocation is merely a political expediency, and, as we have argued above, would appear to 
be aimed, not at benefiting the majority, but the minority who are able to use political, 
bureaucratic or social muscle to geçheap government land. 
28 	
E.g. M. Hoek-Smit, The Urban Housing Sector in Tanzania, Report prepared for the World Bank and the 
Ministry of Regional Development and Local Government, 1990. 
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Table 9.4: Plot Acquisition 
Questions/Answer Options Kariakoo Mabibo K/nyama Manzes& Mbezi 
N=76 N89 NlO0 N97 N=56 
When was the Plot Acquired? 
Before 1941 22 .1 0 1 0 
1941-1960 16 2 2 8 4 
1961 -1980 25 39 72 59 11 
Since 1980 24 51 26 25 84 
NotGiven 13 7 - 7 2 
How was the plot acquired? 
Allocated by Govt./City 4 7 17 1 41 
Inherited 55 3 2 8 - 
Allocated by 10 cell leader - 2 - - - 
Allocated by owner 2 3 2 9 4 
Occupied without anybody's 
permission - 2 8 4 9 
Bought empty plot from owner 5 74 12 47 45 
Bought house/foundation 29 4 44 .26 - 
Was sold a govt. plot 5 1 15 2 2 
Other means - 2 - 2 - 
How did you find the Plot 
acquisition Process? 
Very difficult 86 87 96 88 88 
Not very difficult 8 4 2 5 5 
Easy 7 8 2 7 7 
Not given I 	 - 1 1 	 - - - 
9.4.3. Certificates of Title 
In both Kariakoo and Kijinyama, the majority of landowners had Certificates of Title over 
their land. This was not the case (and was not expected to be the case), in unplanned Manzese 
and Mabibo, but was surprisingly thcase in planned Mbezi (Table 9.5). As the majority of Dar es 
Salaam urbanites live in unplanned areas, it is safe to conclude that the majority hold no title to 
land. In all cases, illespondents rated the process of getting certificate of title to land to be very 
difficult. This was particularly so in the case of Mbezi where it can be assumed that the new 
landowners were anxious to get title to land. The failure of policy to deliver certificates of title to 
Mbezi is, to some extent, a reflection of the land administration confusion in the area. As pointed 
out above, the survey of several blocks in Mbezi cannot be approved because of malpractices in the 
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land administrationg of the Mbezi Planning Scheme. As a result, no titles can be issued to these 
unapproved surveys, yet this is no fault of the plot allottees. 
Table 95: Possession of Certificates of Title 










Do you have a Certificate of 
Title over your land? 
Yes 88 11 64 8 20 
No 12 89 36 92 80 
How do you rate the process 
of Acquiring the Title? 
Very difficult 
68 62 56 72 89 
Easy 
28 20 40 22 11 
Very easy 
3 3 - - - 
Not given 
1 15 4 6 - 
In the case of planned Mbezi and Kijitonyama, letters of offer are held by those without 
certificates of Title, and hopefully the titles can be granted one day. But in the cases of unplanned 
Mabibo and Manzese, it is sales agreements that are mainly held, and this highlights the importance 
of the local organisations in land markets (Table 9.6). The figures for Kariakoo have little 
significance. The major causqf having no title except for Mbezi is that the land is unsurveyed, 
or that the landowners have not bothered to seek them, presumably because the process is 
clogged, discouraging many even from bothering. 
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Table 9.6: Alternatives to Certificates of Title 










If you have no Certifi-cate of 
Title, what evidence do you 
have to authenticise your plot 
ownership? 
• Letter of Offer 22 19 86 2 62 
Sale agreement 44 70 6 75 29 
No evidence 33 11 8 16 9 
• Not given - - - 7 - 
What prevents you from 
getting the title? 
• Have not bothered 22 35 61 34 31 
• Tried and gave up 44 13 33 17 38 
• Plot not surveyed 33 12 6 49 2 
• Not given - - - - 29 
9.4.4. Plot Preferences 
In all the areas, the majority of the respondents claimed to have had alternatives to the plots 
that they finally acquired (Table 9.7). The high percentages showing for Kijitonyama and Mbezi do 
possibly reflect the newness of the areas in the early and later 1 970's respectively, when plot 
allottees were usually given various plots to select from. This practice disappeared in the mid - 
1980s.   The majority are happy with their plots. Small plots size is cited by majority who were 
dissatisfied with their plots. This reflects the general attitude which pebple in Tanzania hold over 
land, compared to other countriepossibly as a result of its being cheap. The plots that are 
considered small (with the possible exception of unplanned Manzese) range from 1 44m 2 in Kariakoo 
to 400m 2 in Kijitoyama, and would in, in countries like Egypt, India and Kenya be considered 
generous. In Kenya, for example, high density plots in sites and service scheme rarely exceed 
1 20m 2, although the superiority of infrastructure, especially sewers, eliminates the need to have 
land for septic tanks. 
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Table 9.7: Plot Preference 
Questions/Answer Options Kanakoo Mabibo K/n yama Manzese Mbez 
N=76 F"J=89 N=100 N=97 N=5 
Did you have alternatives to 
the plot that you finally 
acquired? 
Yes 51 54 83 58 73 
No 42 39 17 42 27 
Not given 7 7 - - 
Given an opportunity, would 
you prefer different plot from 
this? 
Yes 42 26 16 23 11 
No 58 73 84 73 89 
Not given - 1 - - - 
If you would prefer a different .. 
plot, whatiswrong with this N = 32 N 	23 N = 16 
. 	... 
N 	22 N 	16 
one? . . 	. 
• Plot too small 56 39 56 50 0 
• Plot badly located 41 39 44 23 33 
• Plot too far 3 22 - 23 17 
.Notgiven - - - 4 50 
9.4.5. Plot Transfer 
While the majority of our respondents said that they would inform the government or City 
Council, if they decided to sell or transfer their plots (although in practice, this is not done), it is 
significant that in the case of a dispute concerning their plots, the majority in each area would first 
go to the Ten-cell leader (Table 9.9). This reflects the confidence that people have in the local 
leadership, a factor that has not been effectively incorporated in the administration and delivery of 
urban land policy. 
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Table 9.9: Plot Transfer 










If you decided to sell or 
otherwise transfer this plots, 
would you inform the 
government, or City Council? 
Yes 99 76 90 95 68 
No 1 16 10 5 32 
Not given - 8 - -. - 
If there was a dispute 
concerning this plot where 
would you first go to seek a 
solution? 
To the Ministry of Lands! City 
Council 45 11 19 8 36 
To the 10 cell leaders 47 80 75 67 61 
To the Neighbours - - - - - 
To the courts 8 3 3 25 4 
Notgiven - 6 3 - - 
9.4.6. Land Rent 
Most land payers pay land rent to the Internal Revenue Office, but, as would be expected, 
a sizeable proportion of households living in unplanned areas like Mabibo, Manzese, and in the 
unplanned part of Mbezi do not pay 16nd rent (Table 9.10). The high proportion of rent payers in 
Manzese unplanned area is perhaps a result of the house registration exercise of the 1 970s, and 
also of turning into commercial uses of many houses, since, before granting a business licence, the 
authorities usually insist on the updating of land rent. 
Table 9.10: Payment of Land Rent 
Questions/Answer Options Kariakoo Mabibo K/riyama Manzese Mbez 
U=76 N89 N100 N97 N=56 
Where do you pay your Land 
Rent? 
Internal Revenue Office 93 25 86 39 64 
Party Offices - 1 - 2 2 
Ministry of Lands 3 2 9 11 - 
Do not pay Land Rent 4 48 3 16 30 
Not given - 24 2 34 4 
How much do you pay as 
Land Rent? (Tshs) 
100orless 2 1 2 8 - 
101 -500 17 31 84 34 7 
501 - 1000 29 1 10 1.1 18 
1001 -5000 26 3 1 3 39 
Over5000 - 2 - - - 
Do not Pay Land Rent 4 48 3 16 30 
Not given 18 12 - .27 6 
When was Land Rent Last 
Paid? 
Uptodate (1992) 51 22 39 20 39 
1991 8 10 16 22 20 
1990 or earlier 14 12 41 20 7 
Do not Pay Land lent 4 48 3 16 32 
Not given 22 7 7 23 2 
The land rent paid in all areas is generally low. In Kariakoo, Mabibo and Kijitonyama, the 
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majority of rent payers paid Tshs 10001= or less p.a. In both Kariakoo and Mbezi though, there 
isa substantial proportion of rent payers paying over Tshs 1,0001=. In Karikaoo, rents go up to 
Tshs 5,000/=, while in Mbezi, the highest land rent was given as Tshs 1,750/=. There is then 
the bulk of rent non-payers. The incidence of land rent arrears was also substantial especially in 
an area like Kijitonyama which, incidentally, has the lowest levels of land rents. A pattern whereby 
those who had the lowest land rents to pay were the most significant in arrears also depicted itself 
within the data for Manzese. Our interview with the Internal Revenue Officers, who are the 
collectors of land rent, indicated that the Internal Revenue Office did not bother following up on 
arrears where the rents were low, since the cost of doing so did not justify the expected income. 
The Internal Revenue Office's records were also in a mess and they did not have any information 
on the bulk of the plots in Dar es Salaam. 
Land rent was found to be low in the "older" residential areas like Kijitonyama compared 
to the newer ones like Mbezi. This suggests that land rents are hardly revised, once fixed. Low 
income from low land rents make land servicing difficult, while poor land servicing makes it difficult 
for the authorities to collect land rents or to raise them. An efficient and dynamic land policy 
requires realistic land rents, effectively collected. 
9.4.7. Land Use Regulation 
The majority of our respondents in the unplanned areas of Manzese and Mabibo did not know 
the government's intended uses for their area (Table 9.11). This is perhaps not surprising in the 
light of the prevalence of non-consultation in planning policy in urban Tanzania. With the exception 
of Kijitonyama, and to a lesser extent Mbezi, most of our respondents said it was not easy to 
consult the official land use scimes for their areas. This, for example, made it easy for officials 
to easily convert public open spaces to private use without inciting any reaction from the local 
populations. With regard to the CitvounciI's building conditions, the majority of the respondents 
in all the areas found them difficult or very difficult to abide with. Only in Kijitonyama did most 
respondents find itasy to get a building permit. In the rest of the areas, it was either difficult or 
the respondents had not sought one. This was particularly so in the unplanned areas of Mabibo and 
Manzese, but also in the planned areas of Mbezi. Given that the majority of Dar es Salaam's 
buildings are in unplanned areas, it is safe to conclude that the majority of the builders hold no 
building permits from the City Council. This is partly a result of the upholding of unrealistic 
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standards and bureaucratic procedures in issuing building permits and partly because unplanned 
areas are generally ignored by policy makers. Other studies have found that it can take up to four 
years to get a building permit. The number of permits issued by the Dar es Salaam City Council fell 
from an average of 1489.2 between 1979-1 983, to 570.2 between 1984 and 1988.29  The fact 
that most of the builders in Dar es Salaam hold no permits means that the Council loses valuable 
revenue on permit fees and also denies itself the chance to be aware of what building activity is 
going on within its jurisdiction and be able to make a follow up and give directions and regulations. 
For, even in unplanned areas, some regulation e.g. building alignment and orientation or distance 
from one structure to another, is desirable. 3° That the Council hardly knows what kind of building 
activity goes on within its jurisdiction, is reflected from the fact that with the exception of "old" 
Kijitonyama, the Council's building inspectors never visited the sites of builders even in such 
planned and "new" areas like Mbezi. Asked about why this was so, City Council authorities readily 
cited lack of resources (eg. vehicles or motor cycles to be used by the inspectors), but there is also 
a structural problem whereby land regulation powers are concentrated both geographically and 
within officials. There is also the question of poor infrastructure, e.g. lack of passable roads, poor 
records, and information on land parcels, poor incentives (which sometimes encourage corruptive 
behaviour) etc. All these make the enforcement of land regulation very difficult. 
9.4.8. Infrastructure 
With the exception of Kariakoo, most of our respondents reported lack of the usual 
infrastructure in urban neighourhood i.e. roads, piped water, electricity, health centres, schools, 
and markets in their areas when they first got their plots (Table 9.12). The majority felt that the 
residents of the respective areas were willing of come together to institute or maintain the 
infrastructure. By far the m'ijority reported that they were willing to contribute to the institution 
or the maintenance of roads, piped water and electricity networks, police stations, health centre5 
and primary schools. In Mabi, Kijitonyama, and Mbezi, most of our respondents had beer 
involved in the institution and maintenance of roads, piped water and electricity networks, anc 
(overwhelmingI) the areas' cleanliness. 
29 	
L.S. Sylvester, Building Permits: An impediment to property development in urban Tanzania?, Diploma 
Project, Department of Land Management and Valuation, Ardhi Institute, Dar as Salaam, 1990.   
30 	
Here we are not arguing for the enforcement of the unrealistic, inherited building rules. 
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Table 9.11: Aspects of Land Use Regulations 
Questions/Answer Options Karialçoo Mabibo Kfnyama Manzese Mbezi 
N. 	100 ........5. 
Do you know the intended use of this area? 
Yes 66 37 53 25 84 
No 34 63 47 75 16 
Would you say that it is easy to consult the 
official land use scheme for your area? 
It is easy 30 38 80 15 54 
It is not easy 70 62 20 85 46 
Have you ever been consulted by the authorities 
with regard to preparing land use schemes for this 
area? 
Yes I have been consulted 16 4 3 3 2 
No I have never been consulted 84 96 97 97 98 
How do you find the City Council's building 
conditions? 
Very difficult 38 20 8 36 18 
Difficult 42 40 56 45 55 
Easy 20 16 34 - 28 
Notgiven - 24 2 8 - 
Was it easy to get a building permit from the City 
Council? 
It was easy 42 18 76 7 27 
It was difficult 26 10 10 3 9 
Have tried, but have been unsuccessful so far 3 3 3 5 16 
Have not sought to get one 30 69 11 85 48 
Did the City Council's building inspectors visit 
your site and guide you during construction? 
Yes, they came and helped 42 3 69 4 25 
Yes, they came but I was fined - - 1 - - 
No they never visited th%site 58 94 30 96 75 
Not given - 3 - - 
As infrastructure was instituted in most of Kariakoo during the colonial .days, residents therein had 
participated only to a limited degree in the instituting and maintaining of roads, piped water 
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Table 9.1 2: Infrastructure 
Questions/Type of lnftrastructure Karako Mabibo Klnyama Manzese Mbz 
76 N, 	89 .N 	100 .N = 97 N : = 56 
Was the following Infrastruc3ure 
available in your neighbourhood when Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
you first got the plot?  
Roads 89 11 55 45 56 44 44 56 43 57 
• Piped Water 76 24 39 61 62 38 62 37 41 59 
Electricity 75 25 20 80 34 66 30 70 38 62 
• Health Centre 87 13 1 99 15 85 18 82 2 98 
Primary School 93 7 67 33 44 56 37 63 9 91 
Market 92 8 2 92 26 74 54 46 7 93 
Is it easy for your area's residents to 
come together to institute/maintain Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
services? - - 
86 14 97 3 88 12 93 7 71 29 
Have your ever been involved in 
instituting/maintaining the following? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Roads 18 82 58 42 82 18 36 64 68 32 
Piped Water 18 82 83 17 68 32 28 72 64 36 
Electricity 13 87 55 45 34 66 14 86 21 79 
Area Cleanliness 70 30 94 6 100 - 97 3 70 30 
Are you willing to contribute to the 
Institution or maintenance of the 
following? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Roads 89 11 97 3 100 - 96 4 98 2 
Piped water 91 9 94 6 100 - 97 3 100 
Electricity 86 14 94 6 92 8 90 10 98 2 
Police Station 92 8 97 3 97 3 97 3 96 4 
Health Centre 9 97 3 100 - 98 2 98 2 
Primary School 91 9 1 	97 1 	3 100 - 98 2 98 2 
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and electricity. The level of participation (with the exception of cleanliness) is also low in Manzese. 
This is a reflection of the non-participatory nature of the squatter area upgrading undertaking of the 
1970s   which instituted roads, piped water and electricity without involving the local population. 
The figures in Table 9.12 suggest a great potential for popular public participation in one way or 
another, in the whole question of instituting or maintaining infrastructure. Government policy has 
however, not made use of this potential, and we have offered an explanation that this is a result of 
the inherited colonial norms which saw popular participation as eroding the powers of the authorities 
vis a vis their control of the urban population in general, and land administration in particular; and 
which always aimed at getting planned (serviced) land on the cheap. 
Most of the respondents rated the condition of the infrastructure or services, i.e. roads, 
waste water removal, storm water drainage, or open spaces; and to some extent, health 
services, to be poor or very poor. (Table 9.13). Only 11 %, 1 3%, 14%, 9%, and 26% of our 
respondents in the respective areas, considered roads, waste water removal, storm water 
drainage, open spaces, and health services to be "good". The rating for piped water, 
electricity and telephone services was relatively good. A substantial proportion of the 
respondents did not give their opinion (with the exception of the Karikaoo area) on open 
spaces and telephone, services, but nevertheless, the majority of our respondents in Kariakoo, 
Kijitonyama, Manzese and Mbezi showed great concern for the lack of open spaces. Area 
security scored highly on the "good" rating and this is most probably a. reflection of the 
current 0 992) Minister for Internal Affairs' efforts to organise Dar es Salaam residents into 
popular vigilante groups known as Sungusungu. 
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Table 9.13: Respondents' rating of infrastructure services 
Questions/Answer/Type of Kariakoo Mabfbo K/nyama Maneso Mbezi Thtal 
Infrastructure N 	76 N 	89 N 	100 1. N 	97 M 	56 N418 
How do you rate the condition of the 
following infrastructure/ services in 
your area?  
(a) 	atJng 	Vor Poot  
Roads 81 25 28 40 43 39 
Piped water 	 . 20 9 1 19 16 13 
Electricity 14 - 1 11 5 6 
Telephones 22 10 - 24 7 13 
Security 24 12 - 10 16 12 
Health Services 25 49 15 46 39 35 
Waste water Removal 58 43 53 57 29 48 
Storm water drainage 62 51 62 57 55 57 
Open Spaces 54 33 50 52 39 46 
(b) Ratirg 	Poor  
Roads 36 40 66 47 54 49 
Piped water 30 40 32 44 36 36 
Electricity 45 43 24 56 16 37 
Telephones 46 27 19 31 13 27 
Security 24 20 11 25 32 22 
Health Services 30 26 36 28 14 27 
Waste water Removal 21 40 28 35 9 27 
Storm water drainage 26 29 25 32 21 27 
Open Spaces 30 3 8 5 11. 11 
continued 
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Roads 4 31 4 12 4 11 
Piped water 50 47 66 36 48 49 
Electricity 41 42 66 23 68 48 
Telephones 32 18 31 14 36 26 
Security 53 65 89 65 52 65 
Health Services 45 9 22 22 7 21 
Waste water Removal 21 9 19 6 11 13 
Storm water drainage 12 17 12 9 18 14 
Open Spaces 16 4 4 10 11 1 	9 
Roads - 3 2 
Piped water - 3 1 1 - 1 
Electricity - 16 9 10 11 9 
Telephones - 45 50 31 45 34 
Security - 2 - - . - - 
Health Services - 16 7 4 39 13 
Waste water Removal - 8 - 2 52 12 
Storm water drainage - 3 1 2 4 2 
Open Spaces - 60 38 33 39 34 
9.4.9. Policy Priorities of the respondents 
The respondents were asked to rate their three top policy priorities from a given list of 
given options. The results are presented in Table 9.14. The first absolute priority in all areas 
was Certificates of Title given as top priority by around a third of all the respondents. The 
certificate of title option appears to command a special position in that it is relegated to 
relative 
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Table 9.14: Respondents' Priorities. 
Questions/Answers/Policy Options Manzese Mbezi Tot& 
N76 N89 NiOO N97 N=56 N418 
Please select, from the given list of 
services, your three topmost 
prioritiee ___ _______  
ta) 	trst P:o4ty  
Certificates of Title 32 43 32 31 39 35 
Roads 21 9 12 9 27 14 
Piped water 12 20 23 18 5 17 
Electricity 7 1 1 2 2 
Telephone 1 1 1 2 - 1 
Storm water drains - - 1 2 - 1 
Area Security 8 4 5 9 4 6 
Health services 7 13 14 15 18 13 
School 3 6 8 5 4 5 
Market 7 1 - 2 - 2 
Waste water removal 4 - 4 1 2 2 
Notgiven - 1 4 - 1 
Certificates of Title 7 4 - 5 4 3 
Roads 14 15 15 20 25 17 
Piped water 21 26 22 14 36 23 
Electricity 8 9 9 7 5 8 
Telephone 1 1 - 4 - 1 
Storm water drainage 1 - 2 1 - 1 
Area Security 16 	- 11 11 9 9 11 
Health Services 21 21 32 27 14 24 
School 7 6 7 5 2 6 
Market 6 6 - 1 4 3 
Waste water removal 3 - 2 1 2 1 
Notgiven 1 5 1 
continued 
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Cc) Third  
Certificates of Title 4 1 3 8 - 4 
Roads 7 7 17 11 11 11 
Piped water 11 17 20 9 21 15 
Electricity 12 8 2 5 16 8 
Telephones 1 6 2 7 2 4 
Storm water drains 1 1 3 2 2 2 
Security 14 16 16 13 14 15 
Health Services 25 25 21 20 20 22 
School 9 13 9 13 9 11 
Market 7 6 3 2 2 4 
Waste Water 9 2 3 3 4 5 
Notgiven - 1 1 5 - 1 
insignificance in the second and third priorities. Other preferred services were piped water, 
roads and health services and these show significantly within all the three priority ratings. This 
is translated to mean that there is a widespread concern and need for these services as a 
matter of priority. Least priority options included telephone services, storm water drains, 
waste water removal and the market. Other low rated options e.g. area security, schools and 
electricity do gain ground as third priorities. It is rather surprising that storm water drainage 
and waste water removal described as being poor or very poor, do not feature as priorities in 
all the three rating categories. This is perhaps an example of how individual priorities may 
differ with social priorities. Go08 roads cannot remain good roads without proper drainage but 
this may not be realised unless the roads are there. With better land administration, the 
satisfaction for the need of Certificates of Title cannot be too difficult. With popular/public 
participation and proper land taxation policies, it should be possible to make some inroads into 
satisfying the Darves Salaam residents' needs for better roads, piped water and health 
services. 
Table 9.1 5: What the respondents liked most about their areas 
Questions/Answer Options i Kariakoo fvlabibo Kfnyama Manzese Mbezi Total 
N=76 N89 N=100 N7 N56 N418 
What of the following do you like most 
about your area? 
(a 	trst Lices 
Area near places of employment 
61 21 26 19 20 29 
Efficient transport 
21 31 53 41 11 31 
Friendly neighbours 
14 26 18 33 29 24 
Large plot 
- 17 2 6 30 11 
Area well serviced 
4 3 1 1 2 2 
Not given 
- 1 - - 9 2 
(b Second Likes 
Area near places of employment 
17 7 - 12 2 8 
Efficient transport 
47 33 33 36 16 33 
Friendly neighbours 
26 35 52 35 23 34 
Large Plot 
7 20 9 15 11 12 
Area well serviced 
3 2 - 1 - 1 
Not given 
- 3 6 - 48 11 
Area near places of employment 
9 	 17 	 3 	 22 	 5 
Efficient transport 
14 	 21 	 5 	 20 	 21 
Friendly neighbours 
43 	 20 	 26 	 19 	 5 
Large plot 
18 	 20 	 36 	 28 	 14 
Area well serviced 
Not given 
- 	 18 	1 24 	 1 	8 	1 54 
9.4.10. What the respondents liked or disliked about their areas 
Finally, respondents were asked to select their first three likes and their first three dislikes 
in their areas, in order of magnitude, from a number of options listed (Table 9.15 and 9.16). 
Efficient transport tops the list overall in the first "likes" category. In Kariakoo however, it 
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is nearness to places of employment that scores highly, while in Mbezi, which, because of 
distance, from the city centre and bad roads, could not score highly on the efficient transport 
option, it is the size of the plots, and the friendly attitude of the neighbours which was rated 
high. Together with efficient transport, friendly neighbourhood is a major "like". Given the 
poor level of service infrastructure described in this work, it is not surprising that "area well 
serviced" hardly features as a "like" in any of the study areas. Rather surprisingly, nearness 
to work does not feature highly as a "like" except in Karikaoo. This is possibly a result of the 
efficient transport, which is, in turn, perhaps a result of the proliferation of the private 
"da/adala" buses, legalised since 1983,   which have generally taken over the role of providing 
public transport from the ailing Dar es Salaam Public Transport Company, Usafiri Dar es 
Salaam (UDA). It could also be a result of the proliferation of work places and the importance 
of the informal sector in the provision of income earning opportunities. 
The results of the "likes" are collaborated by the results of the "dislikes", with "lack of 
services" and "poor roads" topping the list, and long distance from work and unfriendly 
neighbours not featuring significantly. 
9.5 Conclusions 
The implementation of various aspects of land policy in the five study areas has 
demonstrated that the policy has generally been conceived in the interest of the government 
and has hardly addressed the needs of the residents, whom it has sought not to involve in any 
policy undertakings. In Karikaoo, the policy has sought to replace the indigeneous population 
from the area but has failed to harness the potential of the incoming population to service the 
area. In Mabibo, government dempts to impose a land 
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Table 9.1 6: What the respondents disliked must about their areas 
Questions/Answer Options Kariakoo Mabibo K/nyma Mnzese Mbei Total 
N=76 t4.$9 N=100 N=97 N6 h418 
From the options given below please inaicate 
three that you dislike most in the area, in 
descending order of degree of disliking  
(al F4rs 	Dishice  
Long distance from work - 15 15 3 9 8 
Lack of services 26 33 45 26 43 35 
Haphazard building arrangement 9 16 5 32 9 14 
Poor roads 41 28 34 25 38 33 
Lack of water 1 6 1 4 4 3 
Poor environment 13 2 - 7 - 4 
Noise 9 - - 1 - 2 
Unfriendly Neighbours 6 - - - - 1 
Notgiven - 3 - 2 - 1 
(b Second dsIikos 
Long distance from work - 3 1 2 2 2 
Lack of services 7 27 18 22 36 22 
Haphazard building arrangement 1 12 2 20 11 9 
Poor roads 41 28 55 31 38 39 
Lack of water 7 9 2 5 11 7 
Poor environment 30 10 14 19 - 15 
Noise ,13 - 1 - - 3 
Unfriendly Neighbours 1 1 - - - - 
Notgiven - 9 7 2 4 4 
continued 
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Long distance from work 1 1 1 1 18 4 
Lack of services 28 20 15 22 16 20 
Haphazard building arrangement 9 13 - 11 5 8 
Poor roads 4 15 8 23 23 15 
Lack of water 5 3 4 9 18 8 
Poor environment 38 18 44 29 2 26 
Noise 14 2 5 2 2 5 
Unfriendly Neighbours 1 - 2 - - 1 
LN.t - 27 1 	21 3 18 14 
use scheme in the area failed but by institing rigidly on the implementation of its own planning scheme, 
the government is not supporting the area's residents' efforts to obtain certificates of title which would 
perhaps help in the area's improvement. In Kijitonyama roads, drains, etc are in a poor condition. In 
Manzese, the upgrading scheme was aimed at allowing the government easy policing of the area, but did 
not address the question of sustainable future development. In Mbezi, a government scheme replaced the 
residents but government policy has failed to institute efficient land administration, or infrastructure and 





10.1 MAJOR FINDINGS 
This study sought to find out how the land use structure of Dar es Salaam (Figure 10. 1) 
evolved. It was at the outset considered that this Land  use structure was a result of 
spontaneous action, i.e. of market forces, with little government control or direction. Instead, 
the study has found that, despite the indicators that the interest for Dar es Salaam, of the 
consecutive governments since 1 890 has all along ben detracted, the land use structure of 
Dar es Salaam is not a result of spontaneous growth. On the contrary it is the result of 
various government policies aimed at tuning Dar es Salaam's land use structure to serving 
external, and local power interests. These interests haft been examined over consequent 
epochs spanning 100 years and covering the German and British Colonial eras, as well as the 
post-colonial period. As the country's seat of government and chief port, Dar es Saaam had 
the largest concentration of the powerful social groups in the country, and was also such a 
critical focal point of political, economic, and social activity, that it attracted to itself, 
sufficient government interest to significantly affect its land use structure. This interest 
however, was rarely aimed at efficiency or equity, and for the most part it was more of a 
response to prevailing circumstances rather than a forward looking, longterm land regulation 
policy aimed at creating a Dar es Salaam with a predermined land use regime. 
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In shaping Dar es Salaam's land use structure, certain interests were dominant at various 
periods and these reflected themselves in the policy tools that were adopted or perpetrated 
to shape the form which the city took. Up to 1914,   it was the overall colonial interests, and 
the interests of government officials which were dominant. The interwars phase was really 
a continuation of the German era, and, again, it was colonial interests, (including the status 
accorded to the Indian community) and the interests of the local colonial officials that 
determined government action on Dar es Salaam's land use scene. The post war era 
witnessed a period of preparation for decolonization. Government land policy continued to 
favour officials and Indians, and aimed at placating the Africans and at moulding a stratum 
that could take over the running of the would-be ex-colony. The early years of independence 
were years of national political consolidation, and this particular interest, spearheaded by the 
politicians, determined government land policy for Dar A Salaam. With the allocation of 
choice plots to influential Africans, with the creation of the National Housing Corporation with 
its crusade of replacing slums and providing good low cost hsing, and with the toleration 
of squatting, the elite was consolidating itself. Increasingly, however, urban development was 
being internationalised in terms of ideologies, expertise, and financial resources, and these 
affected the 1 970s, in the form of sites and services schemes which were used to consolidate 
the interests of the "elite" in land acquisition in Dar es Salasm. As national consolidation was 
no longer an issue during the 1 970s, the importance of the National Housing Corporation as 
a tool of land policy declined. 
The 1 980s were years of crises: economic, political and administrative. Land policy was 
a tool used by the various sections of the bureaucracy to advance their interests, for example, 
in the form of hoarding or clamouring for powers of land allocation, in the form of new 
planning schemes and in the form of grabbing land wherever possible. Struggles too surfaced 
over land administration. 
While, during the 1980s,   the local situation as well as international ideology advocated 
the wholesale revision of stipulations of the various tools of land policy, including land tenure, 
zoning, building regulations, land administration and so on, to suit the prevailing 
circumstances, this advocacy has so far gone unheeded because the status quo serves (albeit 
inefficiently) the interests of the bureaucracy who are the ones who can initiate change. 
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Since land policy has therefore been monolithically addressed to the interests of a minority, 
the majority, including many households well placed in society, have opted to operate outside 
it. This has created a situation where the official land delivery process is inefficient because 
of its adherence to inherited unrealistic and sometimes irrelevant laws, rules and procedures, 
and because of the administrative confusion surrounding land policy. At the same time, the 
unofficial land delivery system is also inefficient for want of the necessary government 
intervention. 
In pursuing the interests of the minority, land policy has been consistent over the study 
period covers a century: it has been hostile to the existing land users whom it has, 
throughout, not consulted when contemplating or implementing aspects of land policy; it has 
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aimed at displacing existing African land users whenever conceiving land use schemes, and, 
it has bent on obtaining land cheaply. Displacement has, in most cases, been inequitable 
since, either compensation is not paid, or where it is paid, thprinciple of "equivalence" has 
rarely been upheld. Compensation, has always been underassessed, as it has been based on 
the colonial concept of "unexhausted improvements", and has never been paid on time, while 
the allocating of alternative land has usually gone unfulfilled, or, when fullfilled the, alternative 
land offered has, in most cases been unsuitable. In the past days, governments were 
powerful enough to get away with such inequitable policies. In recent years, as more of the 
elites have found themselves in unplanned areas, there has been political opposition towards 
land appropriation. This has led the government to avoid substantially built up areas in its 
new planning schemes. This in turn, has encouraged further squatting as well as urban 
sprawl, making Dar es Salaam's land use structure inefficient. Other manifestations of 
protests against inappropriate land policy have been the opposition or the disregarding, of the 
various planning schemes, and the reluctance to pay land rent and property taxes. 
By aiming at getting (planned and serviced) land cheaply, land policy has usually hurt the 
interests of the poor, who have either been replaced without adequate compensation, or shut 
out of planned land. On the other hand, such policy has usually bestowed substantial, socially 
generated benefits to those few who are allocated planned land by the government. The 
defence of this cheap access to valuable land under the justification of protecting the interests 
of low income households, has discouraged proposals to increase the cost of land. The need 
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to service land has been seen as of secondary importance compared to getting access to land 
cheaply. The power struggles to control land within the various authorities that there are, has 
resulted in the confusion in land administration which is prevalent at the moment, yet, 
streamlining land policy, making it transparent, and insisting on accountabi!ity, is difficult since 
this is likely to impinge on the benefits currently being derived by those who wield powers 
over land. 
The prevalence of unplanned development in Dares Salaam, the non-sanctioned changes 
in land uses in planned areas, and the lack of land servicing, have all been found to be the 
outcomes of inappropriate land policy particularly, that of non-coperation with land 
developers, and that of aiming at giving planned land cheaply to the few. 
'eø 
The main emphasis of this study has been to highlight how officials conceptualised land 
policy, and how these concepts were translated into the location and development of various 
land uses. Overall, government officials and politicians have been identified as having had a 
major impact on the land policy for Dar es Salaam and on the resultant City's land use 
structure. The conceptualisation and implementation of land policy has been found to have 
been tuned to suit these officials' needs and interests, but not to attain equity and efficiency. 
Over the years, government land policy has been shown to have trampled on the rights 
of the majority of Dar es Salaam's urbanites under various guises which have included the 
ideologies that: Africans knew no individual rights in land prior to colonialism; Africans were 
best suited to rural life; Africans were not used to high standards of living; land was public 
property with no realiseable value to its private African owners; Africans were occupying 
government land or land zoned for particular uses; and that many land users were 
"squatters". Where policy did not oppress existing land users (e.g. by formulating planning 
schemes to replace them), it ignored dealing with their needs. 
In terms of the objectives of this study (Chapter One), it has been found that land policy 
has been a major determinant of the land use structure of Dar es Salaam. This is despite the 
fact that Dar es Salaam changed both national and local rulers, whose interests in the city 
varied. Given the periodisation in the evolution of urban land policy in Africa outlined in 
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Chapter One, it is likely that Dar es Salaam followed more or less the same trajectory in its 
evolution, as that followed by other urban areas in the region, although the German factor, 
and the later coming of the British Administration, meant that Dar es Salaam was always 
"behind schedule" from the 1920s.   Unlike what has been written on some cities within the 
region (e.g. Nairobi), there has not been, in Dar es Salaam's history, a powerful local caucus 
aimed at creating the "Dar es Salaam that we want". This has meant that the development 
of Dar es Salaam has been generally considered in terms of short term planning schemes and 
other aspects of land policy, aimed at meeting the interests of some social groups, as well as 
political expediency. Equity and efficiency have never been the aims of land policy in Dar es 
Salaam. Unlike some conclusions arrived at in the case of Nairobi 1 , land policy n Dar es 
Salaam has not aimed at leading to the highest returns from laid. The socialist ideology 
adopted in Tanzania in the 1 960s appears only to have had an indirect impact on Dat es 
Salaam's land use structure, by tolerating and abating squatting, and by reinforcing the 
"cheap land policy" in the formal land sector. Up to the mid-i 980s, the policy of socialism 
discouraged investment in expensive urban property 
10.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.2.1 General Recommendations 
At the level of the conceptualisation of land policy, it is necessary to have an approach 
which is geared towards the interests of the majority of urbanites rather than a policy geared 
towards the narrow interests of officials and of the "elite". The idea of a temporary urban 
African population is grossly outdated but is possibly still upheld in conceiving land policy. 
Most of those who are currently sojourning in Dat es Salaam (and other urban areas), and 
many more to come, are there to stay. Dar es Salaam is their home. Many have, or are 
aspiring to have, considerable economic and social investments in the City. They must 
therefore be fully incorporated in the formulation and implementation of land policy. An 
efficient and equitable land policy is the one geared towards meeting the aspirations and the 
needs of the majority, and to support their actions in solving their problems. The principles 
of a land policy geared towards the needs of the majority are that it must: 
C.M. Kamba, The Role of the State in the control of Urban Development: Urban Land Policy for Nairobi, Phd 
Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1988. 
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o 	be supportive of popular action, not against it in solving urban problems; 
o 	aim at extensive consultation with the City's residents; 
o 	be transparent and accountable to the public; 
o 	be simple, expeditious in its operations, flexible, and responsive to popular needs; 
o 	aim at unclogging and smoothening transactions in land in both the planned and the 
unplanned areas; 
o 	aim at preservation rather than dispIacemet of the existing populations. In this 
respect it should aim at working with the land occupiers to regularize or service their 
areas; 
o 	aim at adequate and prompt compensation, where land must be compulsorily acquired 
(i.e. adhere to the principle of equivalence); 
o 	be sufficiently decentralised, to local neighbourhood levels; 
o 	avoid unnecessary technical and procedural bureaucracy in land administration; 
o 	aim at recognising land transactions in the informal land markets (where the majority 
get their land), and at helping this system to overcome its inefficiencies; 
o 	aim at minimising the differences between the formal and the informal land use 
schemes; 
o 	aim at getting out of the cheap planned land policy; 
o 	ensure that society benefits from the land values that it creates by instituting proper 
land taxation measures, the income from which should service land for all income 
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groups. 
10.2.2. Specific Recommendations 
Policy on Land Tenure, Transfer and Registration 
The principal legislation on land tenure i.e the Land Ordinance of 1923 was conceived 
with colonial interests in mind. It needs to be retuned and focused to the needs of the 
majority. In particular it needs to address, in unvague terms, the question of customary 
tenure and other tenures to be found in urban areas like Dar es Salaam, for this is where the 
majority of the urban dwellers get their land from. There are various tenures besides the two 
recogniced by the Land Ordinance, i.e. granted rights and customary tenure. The latter, in 
A 
particular, has undergone considerable metamorphosis and is no longer adequately addressed 
by the law. There is thus the need to probe intqhe existing types of tenures and come up 
with appropriate, comprehensive, but dynamic legislation. 
The theoretical equivalence between customary"enure and public land granted by way 
of Rights of Occupancy is, in practice, illusory. Customary or quasi customary tenurial rights 
are easily trampled upon or ignored, in the implementation of planning schemes and other 
aspects of land policy. Yet the majority of Dar es Salaam urbanites obtain their land through, 
and consider themselves to be holders of, customary or other non-government tenure. 
The process of granting tenurial rights needs to be streamlined and decentralised, so that 
it can work fast. The situation whereby the majority of Dar es Salaam's land owners have 
no title over their land (a carry over from the colonial days during which Africans were 
considered to be temporary urban residents), is inequitable and adversely affects both urban 
and general national development. 
There is no reason why the government should believe that the duty of allocating urban 
land is solely its own. We have seen that only a minority get land directly from the 
government. There is therefore the need to support the parallel system of land allocation, 
which in any case serves the majority. Ways of realising this support include advice on land 
use layouts and subdivisions by private landowners who may be desirous of bringing their land 
to the market, or of having this land developed; recognition of parallel land transactions by 
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government, and the expeditious extension to such land transactions, of certificates of title. 
Overall, the system of granting certificates of title to land is snail slow. One reason for this 
situation is the unrealistic land surveying standards adhered to. These need to be simplified, 
and made to work faster. At the same time, the bureaucratic procedures in, and the 
centralisation of powers of, giving titles must be revised. 
The process of land transfer, be it of planned or of unplanned land needs to supported 
so that it comes out in the open. Currently, since land transfer is regarded with suspicion by 
the government, many such transfers are not done in the open, thus leading to problems in 
land administration. 
A 
We have argued that the system of allocating planned land has consistently sought to 
allocate land cheaply. There is need to review this policy, so that land is allocated as close 
to its market value as possible, and the cost that the government might have undertaken to 
prepare such land, recovered. Such an approach, it can beargued, may have adverse political 
effects (and may be inequitable), if it will be construed that planned land can only be acquired 
by with money, to the exclusion of the poorer urbanites. Currently, since planned land is 
highly restricted in supply, it all the same ends up in the hands of the rich and the socially 
powerful, and at a highly subsidised cost at that. This means the poor are subsidising the 
rich, and in order to get access to land these poor must resort to the informal land market 
where the price of land is higher than that of planned land allocated directly by the 
government. in order for land policy to cater for the interest of the poor, the solution would 
be, first, to increase and sustain the supply and variety of planned plots (which requires 
resources which are best obtained from the land itself); and, two, to minimise the differentials 
between planned land and unplanned land by e.g. servicing or extending tenurial rights to, 
both. Thus, there should be differently priced planned plots which can suit the various 
pockets, with, if necessary, the most valuable land subsidising land earmarked for low income 
households. This way, both the poor and the rich can be catered for. Unless the government 
can muster substantial resources, the current policy of allocating land cheaply only serves the 
interest of the rich and the socially powerful members of society, and excludes the poor and 
the weak. 
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There are, at the moment, stalled government plans announced in the 1992 budget, to set 
up a Plot Development Revolving Fund to be used to acquire, survey and service plots which 
would then be disposed of through the market. 2 The government's concern however, is 
mainly related to reducing government expenditure or boosting its coffers, rather than creating 
a dynamic system of land administration. This should be remedied. 
The proposal to allocate land by way open monetary means has connotations for land 
administration. It calls for the decentralisation of the various land administration powers from 
the central government to local institutions and neighbourhoods, including land development 
bodies that may be set up to oversee the development of certain areas of Dar es Salaam. In 
the spirit of increasing transparency and responsibility in land admiistration, there is need to 
have open land allocation systems, including the advertising of the available land, and of the 
successful allotees, and this should apply to both planned and unplanned land. There should 
be a general drive to improve the flow and reliability of land information concerning land and 
land uses in both the formal and the informal sectors 
All the above proposals, it is hoped, can ease the general process of land registration 
which, as we saw in Chapter One, is important for almost all aspects of efficient land 
administration, general urban management, and even the economic advancement of the urban 
population. Basic undertakings to enhance land information, like street naming and house/plot 
numbering need to be undertaken without delay. 
Land Taxation 
We have argued that land taxation in urban Tanzania is generally low and not related to 
the needs of land management and development. Specific taxation e.g. in relation to land 
development projects is hardly imposed, although powers exist under the Urban Authorities 
(Rating) Act of 1983.   Existing land taxation practice is seen in terms of keeping the cost of 
land down, and in relation to its contribution to the general government budget, as opposed 
to easing land development and administration. In this approach, the government has been 
losing revenue and thus has had always to seek new resources to provide and service land 
2 	Daily News (Tanzania), 21/7/1 992. 
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for development. This has restricted the availability planned land which has then become a 
scene of contention, and from which the poor and the not so poor, have been edged. 
It is recommended that realistic land taxation is necessary for efficient urban land 
management and administration, and that the feared political unpopularity of such taxation 
can be surmounted if the government delivered the good e.g. by servicing land, maintaining 
infrastructure and ensuring adequate considerable supply of planned plots. Proper taxation 
increases accountability, enhances democracy, and allows land servicing. A redistributive 
element whereby those who are allocated the more valuable land pay proportionally more than 
those who are allocated less valuable land, can be an inbuilt condition of land taxation. At 
A 
the moment, those who are apparently able, get their land almost free, but even where they 
buy it, what they normally pay to the government i,speanuts. 
The system of land taxation needs to be simplified to ease payment and follow up. The 
relation between central government and the Dar es Saam City Council over the issue of 
land and property taxes in confused and is not conducive to efficient land administration. 
Likewise, if land is to be serviced, then the authority to do this servicing must be clearly 
defined. At the moment this is not the case, and both the central government and the Dar 
es Salaam City Council seem to be responsible, or can easily trade accusations against each 
other as to who is at fault. It is nevertheless the case that the central government feels that 
it has to control Dar es Salaam and has as such, been unwilling to decentralise taxation 
powers. 
Land Use Regulation 
A degree of government land use regulation is necessary for efficient urban land 
administration, but the current land use regulation regime is still as was inherited from the 
colonial era and badly needs revising in view of: the unsuitability of many of land use 
regulation provisions to the local scenes, as well as the demonstrated impossibility of 
enforcing or operationalising the system as inherited. 
There is still a feeling with the Ministry of Lands that masterplanning is an essential 
ingredient of urban land management, that a masterplan provides a framework within which 
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the urban area can grow and a reference point to which future urban land uses can be related. 
Yet, except for some generalisations that certain parts of Dar es Salaam have developed 
according to the uses stipulated in the masterplan, a phenomenon which is usually fortuitous, 
it is difficult to argue that the 1979 Dares Sa/aam masterplan is being adhered to. The level 
of public investment envisaged, for example, has never been attained. There are many 
neighbourhoods in Dar es Salaam that are growing chaotically, without any government 
direction, where this direction is clearly desirable and possible, if a more flexible approach to 
urban planning, e.g. action planning, or land pooling and adjustment was to be adopted. 
The Town and Country Planning Ordinance, 1956, needs reviewing. It gives too much 
powers to the planning authorities (particularly to the Ministry for LanIs) but does not provide 
remedies when the authorities (including the municipalities) are inefficient or incompetent. 
It should also give powers to the area residents be able to declare their areas to be a 
planning areas for example, and for they themselves to be able to prepare planning schemes 
which would be legally binding. In this endevour, the rdents should be entitled to advice 
from the planning authorities. Legal provisions should be skewed in the favour of such 
popular planning schemes being approved by the planning authorities. 
While the Town and Country Planning Ordinance is ill suited to the situation of rapid 
urban growth whereby most households can easily gravitate to unplanned areas, it 
nevertheless has provisions for land pooling and redistribution, which need a wider application 
than has hitherto been the case. Admittedly the colonial administration of the 1 950s passed 
s.27 of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance (which provides for land pooling and 
redistribution) with the Indian earmarked area of Upanga in mind, and not its general 
application to African dominated squatter areas. A feeble and unsuccessful attempt at land 
pooling and redistribution was mooted with respect to the Keko African squatter area in Dar 
es Salaam in the 1960s,   but the area ended up being removed. Otherwise, muáh as 
expatriate officials lamented the growth of squatter areas in the 1 960s, they never attempted 
the land pooling and redistribution approach, and we have suggested that this was the result 
of an antagonistic and non-collaborative approach to urban planning. The same attitude has 
been carried over by the Independence government. It is hereby advocated that land pooling 
and redistribution, or any of its variations, like land sharing, is the most plausible approach to 
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the regularisation of unplanned areas in Dar es Salaam, particularly those that are still lightly 
densified. Land pooling, however, requires the genuine decentralisation of planning powers, 
as well as a willingness to have a dymanic and collaborative land policy and the shedding of 
some bureaucratic powers over land administration by the authorities. 
Our data has shown how secretive planning schemes are. This works in favour of officials 
who can therefore vary these schemes at their whims, or use the planning schemes for their 
own benefit. There is need to bestow some legal permanence to those schemes as they are 
being prepared, and once they are approved; and to deposit them where they could easily be 
consulted within the relevant negihbourhoods. This goes hand in hand with the proposal for 
the decentralisation of planning powers to give the local residents, enablement to see to it that 
their neighbourhood is developed as envisaged, and in particular, that public lands, open 
space, etc are provided and are not unscrupulously etrnverted to private use. This is in the 
spirit of more transparency in land administration, which is desirable and imperative for an 
efficient and equitable land policy. 
1104 
It can be argued that zoning as implemented during colonial days has lost some of its 
lustre (particularly since it was conceived in terms of racial segregation), although the 
inherited income and racial distiction is still pervasive. Dar es Salaam depicts a picture of 
mixed uses in many residential neighbourhoods. This was endorsed by both the 1968 and 
1979 Dar es Sa/aam masterplans, which recommended, for example, the dispersion of 
industry within the various residential localities. All the same, some enforcement of zoning 
regulations is desirable in the growth of Dar es Salaam, but the success of any zoning 
proposals hinges strongly on factors like decentralisation of planning powers, provision of 
infrastructure, public participation, etc. 
Land subdivision in the planned areas of Dar es Salaam is guided by standards which 
allocate rather generous pieces of land, i.e. 288-400m 2 for high density plots; 400 - 800m 2 
for medium density plots, and 800m 2 and above for low density plots. These standards need 
to be revised downwards to increase densities (and therefore efficiency), but this would be 
desirable, and is indeed cost effective, if land is provided with infrastructure. No subdivision 
regulations exist for unplanned areas, so that subdivisions to choking levels are usually 
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attained especially in (parts of) unplanned areas occupied by low income households. This 
is a result of the fact that these areas have largely been ignored by the authorities. Our 
proposals for the decentralisation of land administration powers include the collaboration 
between the planning authorities and the people residing in unplanned areas, in which case 
some realistic standard of minimum plot size subdivision can be enforced. 
We have also seen how most buildings put up both in the planned and unplanned areas 
of Dar es Salaam, carry no building permits. Part of the explanation for this situation is the 
impractical bureaucracy and the technical standards required before one gets a permit. These 
should be simplified. In the case of simple residential buildings, simple drawing and/or building 
descriptions could suffice. Authorities too should set themselves the maxknum time (which 
must be as short as practicable), in which they must give a decision. As for the unplanned 
areas, again our proposals for collaboration with the are residents can go a long way to 
ensure that the proposed buildings carry building permits. Stipulations in building permits 
must be those reflecting local conditions, and which can beneçialIy and easily be enforced. 
Direct Government Intervention 
Infrastructure Provision 
The continued keeping of Dar es Salaam poorly endowed with, or totally denied of, 
infrastructure whose provision is on the shoulders of the government, is certainly undesirable 
and leads to inefficiency. Our main recommendation is that the government must adopt a 
more dynamic land policy which can ensure that the land itself is the major source of revenue 
for its own servicing. 
Land Acquisition 
Powers of eminent domain are important and must from time to time be used. However, 
acquisition should go hand in hand with the timely payment of compensation and the 
adherence to the principle of equivalence. This spells that compensation be assessed at 
market value and must include the value of disturbance and other intangible costs. The 
oppressive concept of "unexhausted improvements" should be discarded. It is however 




Direct development of land by government or quasi-public bodies does not serve a 
substantial proportion of Dar es Salaam urbanites. The ideology that government constructed 
housing (including that of the National Housing Corporation) is meant for low income 
households is a farce. It is however not recommended that bodies like the National Housing 
Corporation (NHC) be disbanded but that they be committed and allowed to operate as 
commercial enterprises. The NHC could in fact work hand in hand with the government to 
service and sell plots rather than remain tied to the politically volatile role of estate managing 
a property portfolio whose returns are low. 
Financing 
There is a dearth of land development financingThstitutions in Tanzania. These are 
mainly limited to the Tanzania Housing Bank (THB), which in 1993 was near-bankrupt. But 
even in its restricted role, the THB could be more efficient by being less bureaucratic in giving 
out loans and by following up on its debtors. Lack of institutional finance makes land 
development slow, and this is a misuse of resources which leads to land hoarding. There is 
the need to institute land development finance which is "friendly' to low income households. 
Cooperation with the Private Sector 
A major recommendation that has been made in this study is that the government 
should co-operate with the urbanites, both rich and poor, to ensure an efficient land use 
structure for Dar es Salaam. Large landowners could be advised and assisted in subdividing 
and servicing their land. Able developers could be committed to servicing land parcels as 
condition of land allocation. Poorer land owners could be assisted in regularising their land. 
Our advocacy for land pooling and redistribution is in the spirit of boosting government 
cooperation with the private sector. The government should also play a facilititating role 
where people are desirous of coming together to ameliorate conditions in their areas. The 
current preference by the government, of the policy of confrontation with existing land 
occupiers in its approach of replacement, rellocation, and allocation, is aimed at preserving 
bureaucratic power over land, and leads to the proliferation of unplanned areas and the failure 
to service land. 
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Surgical Action 
Squatter area upgrading is advocated at policy level in Tanzania as being desirable since 
it does not substantially replace existing residents, but upgrading within Dar es Salaam, has 
been highly restricted and tied to externally assisted projects. It has not been an internally 
generated process. There is need for the government to work more closely with the residents 
of squatter areas to upgrade/regularise these areas. The current land use schemes being 
prepared unilaterally for these squatter areas are, in our opinion, retrograde and possibly 
illegal. In any case they are impracticable and are likely to work in favour of the rich against 
the poor. What is required is a set of schemes prepared in collaboration with the people 
themselves. 04 
In contemplating upgrading action, it is motf important to relocate those to be replaced 
not very far from their current locations so that land around squatter areas could be planned 
to receive those who are to be replaced. 
10.3. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study has added another case to the understanding of the effects of land policy 
on the urban landscape in East Africa. An evaluation of an extensive range of land policy 
tools has been done, and a feedback sought from households in five areas of Dar es Salaam, 
representing the rest of the City. Throughout, it has been shown that the Dar es Salaam land 
use structure is a result of land policy which has been motivated by narrow goals particularly 
racial segregation and land grabbing. Policy has mainly been a response to a crisis situation. 
Nevertheless, there are many areas that it is felt, need further study so as to enhance our 
knowledge on the historical evolution of Dar es Salaam, and also to understand better, what 
the trends in society are, or are likely to be, as far as land development is concerned are, and 
thus get better prepared to cope with the future. Some of these areas of further study are 
outlined below: 
o 	Mainly as a result of the language barrier, the German period is still poorly studied. 
There are hundreds of German files and other documents on land in general, or as 
related to Dares Salaam in particular, that remain untapped. The few German scholars 
who have studied Dar es Salaam have usually, read only a couple of files. Moreover, 
most studies have been related to Tanga, Tabora and to a lesser extent, lringa. Thus 
the system and extent of German land acquisition in, and about Dar es Salaam, plus 
records of land registration, transfers and land taxation during the German era, remain 
poorly known. Anthony Ill gives some clues on how the definition of unowned land 
during the German era (which included the absence of trees) deprived many Africans 
of their land 3 . Nevertheless, alot still needs to be done in this area. 
o 	The extent of government land acquisition, while better known as related to the British 
era, is still very much wanting. In particular, the extent of government owned land at 
Independence, and what the Independence government did with this land remains 
undocumented. 
o 	The question of government land, public lartO, and customary land tenure as conceived 
under the Land Ordinance, needs further investigation, both at a theoretical and at a 
practical level. 
o 	The impact of early immigration to Dar es Salaam is an area worthy further 
investigation. It has been observed, for example, that many landowners in Kariakoo 
have their ancestry in areas within or without Tanzania and far from Dar es Salaam. 
Presumably these would by the progeny of the Caravan peoples of the 1 9th century. 
It is also worthy noting that many "owners"/occupiers of land at Dar es Salaam's 
periphery, have diverse origins and include not only the Wazaramo (the local people), 
but also the Wanyamwezi, Wagogo and the Wamakonde, from diverse parts of the 
country. How did these people get the land? Should such land holdings be recognised 
as customary tenure? 
o 	It is moreover obvious that several (including high ranking) people are taking up big 
chunks of land at Dar es Salaam's periphery and are engaged in agricultural activities. 
This has meaning in terms of permanent population immigration patterns, as it appears 
that these people are preparing their retirement abodes and no longer subscribe to the 
notion of "going back home" to their rural areas of origin. This can affect Dar es 
David Henry Anthony Ill, Culture and Society in a Town in Transition: A People's History of Dar es Salaam, 
1 865-1 939, Phd Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1983, pp.  71-74. 
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Salaam's growth, and must mean something to the local population who are being 
displaced. At the moment, a lot of big people own land to the North of Dar es Salaam 
by the Ocean in areas like Bunju and Boko. Although these areas have been declared 
"areas ripe for development" and although a maximum of 3 acres per land holding has 
been imposed by the Ministry of Lands, 4 it is unlikely that the planning authorities in 
the Ministry of Lands will get their way and effect planning schemes for these areas, 
since, essentially, dimunition of current land holdings, and introduction of new people, 
sponsored by the authorities, would be the outcome. Several of the powerful 
landowners in Dar es Salaam are known to be opposed to the subdivision of their land, 
and are prepared to use all means, including violence, to prevent their land lots from 
A 
being taken over through planning schemes. There are signs that with the northward 
growth of Dar es Salaam facing obstacles in thorm of these agricultural landsteads 
(but also of long distances), Dar es Salaam has identified "the line of least resistance" 
to its expansion, to be to the South and Southwest, in the lands mainly owned by the 
local people. 5 Already industrial plots are being earmarked for the village of Kitunda 
south of the airport where surveying is going on over the land belonging to the local 
population as if these people did not exist. The city seems to have discovered its "lost 
south", and beach plots in areas like Mjimwema, to the South of the Harbour are now 
hotly sought after. Increasingly, the local population of Southern Dar es Salaam will 
soon see themselves being displaced. This is a process worthy studying, as is the 
whole phenomenon of urban agriculture within Dar es Salaam. 
o 	While it has been argued that planning schemes have served to replace existing 
population with new people, it has also been pointed out that even influential/rich 
people find themselves in the unplanned areas of Dar es Salaam. The effects of this 
would appear to equally be the replacement, though slowly, of the existing 
populations. Observations suggest that the poor are not quickly displaced in the 
unplanned areas as they are in planned areas. In many unplanned areas, rich and poor 
influential and ordinary, live side by side. What does this mean in the context of the 
Town and Country Planning (Urban Farming) Regulations, 1992. 
I am indebted to Mr. F. Lerise of Ardhi institute for this observation. 
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received concept of categorising residential area into low, medium and high income 
areas? 
o 	The impact of foreign aid on Dar es Salaam's growth needs further investigation. 
While the World Bank removed itself from the sites and services schemes in Dar es 
Salaam in 1984,   it is now back in full swing supporting urban infrastructure. There are 
many other externally supported projects going on in Dar es Salaam, related to the 
expansion of water and electricity supply, sewer network maintenance and expansion, 
road rehabilitation and solid waste removal. In whose interests are these projects 
carried out? Who executes the projects and how is th money "repaid"? How 
efficiently are the funds utilised? Both Halfani and Mgullu 6 raise very interesting 
issues related to the purposes of these'chemes as being to placate the restive 
population in Third World urban areas and to repatriate the money through, for 
example, the purchase of inputs from abroad, as well as expatriate manned 
consultancies. How is this aid related to the external control of Tanzania's economy? 
o 	This study has emphasized that land policy should operate to support and ease the 
workings of the urban land markets. Although we have shown that most urbanites get 
their land by way of purchase, research is required to identify the types of people who 
actually become landowners. Is there a section of the community which cannot get 
access to land through the market and which could therefore need government 
subsidy? This brings into question the whole issue of urban poverty which needs to 
be studied further. In areas that are considered as traditionally belonging to the poor, 
e.g. the unplanned areas, and areas on marginal land, are to be found all kinds of 
households, and this is manifested in the type of properties that are put up, which are 
very diverse in quality. Besides there is need to find out the effects of structural 
adjustment programmes on the operation of the land markets, especially as far as the 
poor are concerned. There are signs of the rich penetrating areas considered to belong 
to the poor, be they planned (e.g. Kariakoo) or unplanned (e.g. Manzese). Could this 
6 	M.S. Halfani, Urban Management and the Implementation of an Externally financed Project in Oar es Salaam, 
Ph.D Thesis, University of Toronto, 1 986; F.P. Mgullu, Housing, A study of Tanzania's National Sites and 
Services Schemes, LLM dissertation, university of Dar es Salaam, 1978.   
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be described as a gentrification process? If so, how is it taking place and where do 
those who are replaced go? Is it a desirable process? 
o 	The question of urban land values in Tanzania is an area requiring investigation. 
Without an open land market system, assessing land values has in the past been more 
conjectural than scientific. Land administration and valuation practice has taken it 
that, given Tanzania's socialist policies, and the stipulations of the Land Ordinance that 
all land in the country was public, bare land in Tanzania had no value. Most property 
valuations are, as a result, based on the depreciated replacement concept, and even 
then, the cost of land is usually ignored. The determination of land rent is based on 
A 
unit values usually determined by the Treasury or the Ministry of Lands, without clear 
formulae related to land values. Valuation foj,crop compensation is based on 
unrealistic schedules prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture, which are rarely revised 
over the years. Thus there is little reference related to land values in land 
administration practice in Tanzania. 
o 	This study has only broached the question of location of employment and income 
generating activities. There is need to study further, the location of industry, services 
and public sector employment opportunities, as well as the proliferation of informal 
sector activities. Just like residential neighbourhoods are developed slowly, designated 
industrial areas are developed even more slowly. The location, development, and use 
of industrial land is an area which has hardly been studied in Tanzania. 
o 	Finally, this study has not addressed the questions of ethnicity, religion and gender in 
urban land administation and development. There is evidence for example that the 
majority of those who are allocated land by the government are men, but it is not 
known to what extent women benefit, as a result, say of marriage or other 
associations with men, or how they suffer as a result of traditional biases against 
women inheritance of property. In inner areas like Kariakoo, there is, surprisingly, a 
sizeable proportion of female land owners. If land policy has been inefficient and 
inequitable in general, it is likely that the weak in society, usually poor women and 
children have suffered more than their male counterparts. 
532 
CONCLUDING REMARK 
This study has investigated the evOlution of Dar es Salaam's land use structure over 
the past century. Land policy has been identified as the main determinant of land uses. This 
policy, however, has been shown not to have been aimed at efficiency and equity as 
hypothesised in the theory of land markets. It has been suggested that future land policy 
should aim at stopping being a tool for serving the interests of a minority, and be tuned to 
serving the interests of the majority. It should at the same time. aim at unclogging all market 
inefficiencies, in both the formal and informal sectors in land. Only this way, it is believed, 
are we likely to see an efficient and equitable land use structure for Dar es Salaam. 
A 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * ** * * * * ** * ** * * 
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A IPEN I) IC ES 
Appendix 3.1 Some documents related to the forceful 
Acquisition of Land from natives then 
residing in the Government Area, 1890s 
F roiii: 
)Suo bin Majidi, 
t c/o Pozt Ofrice, 	 DAR ES SALAAM 
Dar es Salaam. 
22nd January, 1951. 
The Jionourahie the Chief Secretary, 
tlwouli The llon'b'Lc the ProvtnLal Comin'iaatoncr, 
DAR ES SALAM. 
PwanD, 
Nakuoinba mimi rtziya wako nillo chini yu iniguu yako, 
nalikuwa na buba yangu, jina lake Jialidi bin 1suo, kbila yake 15.gunyo. 
'.ainin ha.ba yancu o.11kuwa na shainha hnpa Per es Salnein, nn shainba 
lit it 11kc, iniahrili pii. I pc'lciiw 	' jccinnnri -i ' y 	Mnprriiinn -t hapo zemun i , na 
Iihigut,uuutl wLdUuku kulupa fedila lit hrnnba itwo inikononi ftt'vt 
Serkali, lakini huwakuwuhi kwnpa fedha mara Vita kuu ikuinia, 
halafu Magermani wakamwmbia baha yang.0 ya kuwa sasa viko Vita 
hatuwezi kununua shasnha lako, lakini utapata fedha kidogo-kidogo, 
iii zikufac kwa chakula, .kwa kila mwezi mpaka Vita kwisha, sababu 
wewe mzee sana; lakini miml si.jui fedha ngapi waLizornpa. 
liatimac baba yangu akashikwa na ugonjwa sana asiweze 
kwertda kuchukuwa fedha, bali alimtumnia mkwewe 'jina lake winyihija 
bin iwambri kwenda mnchukulia fedha yake, na hata sasn. huyu Mwinyih'ija 
yuko hapa Dar es Salaain. Randayc baba yanRu akafa katika inwaka 
1915, na mi,n.t nalikuwahuko Tanga, na habayangu olizaa.mtoto rnmoja 
inwu.rinmuk, jina lake Chausiku binti flalidi, nac pin aniekufo., sasa 
't-yuko ntoto waha huyo Chausiku, jina lake Tute binti hebwana yupo 
hapa Dar s Salaarn, basi l3wana rnkuhwa naomba Serkali ifanye haki 
na kuwasaidia mnasikini juuyo 1)aki zao, maana mimi rialikuwa huko 
Tanga siwezi kufahamnu vyemna mas1iauii haya manna huyo hi mjomnha 
wangu; na intoto wa dada n';nwanamke haweal kuanalia thshnuri haya, 
lakini wako iiiashahidi wauweza kujua shambd hili na namnnu ake; 
kwunza Mminyihlja bin i,iwamha, Wa pili Mwinyihija bin winyisnkuu 
Lshlndo, rmuo wote wa.ko hupa Par es Salnoin, hns.t awana sino 
ya inumneno, na nisamnehe sanni juu ye maneno hayn. 
Muimii mntumnishi wnko, 
SdJsuo bin Majid c/o Posts,Dsm. 
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ER UI' GflI'AIJ R;coioG 0i'i'1Ci 
LiU( .5 'JALAAM,24t1i Scpteiitbci' fJO. 
'IDe IIon.The Land Officer 
Dar es Salaam. 
Reference: Claim by 3haha Jagna (Native) to ownership of Plots 
19 and 17,Flur 1,Oares Salaain Township. 
Referring to your No.0.6808/11001 dated 14.8.1030, the 
correct name of the claimant, and the correct numbers of the plots 
claimed are as statcd above. The mistake in the plot nuiiibcrs appears 
to have arisen thi'ough the pex'son Who trnecd liurvey ))epartnicnt plan 
Po.D 9-47 mistaking the German figure "1' for the figure "7". This 
is clearly seen on Survey Department plan No.0 D 	12. 
2. 	in order to set Lie the matter of Shaha Jagna' s claim it has 
been necessary to find out how the German Government acquired the 
plots in question. 
A Ltaulicd htcrcto arc trLunla Lions of' what appear to bc the Li Lies 
for the land of which the plots in question form part. 
Document No.1 appears to be the title for Part of plot 18 (on the 
harboi.u'), plots 19 20, 22 and 24 (possibly also 23). This can 
be ehceked by the Jurvey Department from the following particulars 
The urca stated in Document No.1 viz: G lie appeai's to agrcc 
closely with the .) lOt as shown on thc )l:tfl (hated 1891 at page 11 
or' K.G.R.File Vii C 32 Vol.1 attached iereto, and the German 
stories marking the bounduries of this Diot arc shown on Ui"JCy 
h)np:irl.iiinnl; 1Win IJci.(: 1) •J 	j. 	'. °i. Lhi.fl I,hii: 	l.LIflit5, hIII. hOt 	LU Dc 
counted in the area, is plot No.21 which was accuired Ia Lei' being 
registered in G.b.Dar-es-Salawn Folio 83 in the name of the 
i'iskus on the ground of a Contract of Exchange dated 24.5.1005 (riled at uu'cs 1 and 3 of G.L'. Dar-cs-Oaluain FoLio 82), 
whcrcundcr the Fthkus transferred parcels 70/70 and 72/73 Flur 2 
Dai'-es-Salaam to SuleiHian bi.n hasr, and recc;i.vcd in exchange 
thterefor plot No.21 11cr 1. 
Document No.3 a)peaI's to be Uie title for Plot Nos.14, 15, 10, 17 
1 	 - anu part or 18 (on the harbour1. 
There arc no plans attached to these two documents, but 
everything points to the fact that the Contracts relate txt± 
to the areas in question, and, assuming that this is so, it will 
be seen that Jagna is not one of' the oartiez concerncd, and has 
no title to the areas cluiiud. 
41. 
3. 	Document L'o.2. Jagna, the father of the claimeit,is one 
V 
of the parties to this contract ,bcing No.10 of the Vendors, 
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(2) 
but the area concerned is stated to be in the so-called Governineht 
Park,' which appears to be bounded here by Liebert Street(now 
Burton Street) and by Magogoni Street, and has therefore nothing 
to do with either i'lot 17 or Plot 19.  Shaha Jagna may be under 
the impression that his mother had pinnted some palms on these 
two latter plots, but nothing can be traced in support thereof, ..or 
that his father Jagnu had palms elsewhere than in the Government 
Park area, and for these Jagna received compensation wider Doowneni. 
No.2, so that Shaha Jagna's claim to compensation appears to fall 
to the ground. 
4. ICG.R.File VII C 32 Vol.XI. As Shaha Jagna---eope-
satien-appeaps-te-1all-to-the-geam4 states, the matter was raised. 
in the German time viz: in 1911( see Document No.4 attached hereto), 
but it will be noticed that Shaha .Jagna's claim is repud.ited. by 
Halidi bin Msuo who was one of the Vendors under Document No.1, who 
nevertheless himself puts in a claim for compensation. These people 
appear to have hoped that 20 years after the expropriation happened 
the relative docwnents might have gone astray. As a matter of fact 
nobody in the Government appeared to know about these documents in 
1911 (see page 92 reverse). Herr Leue, however, stated that there 
ought to be records in the earlier Government files, but that in 
any case he was Officer Uommanding the District from December 1890 
and had been instructed by, Governor S o d e n to purchase the 
shámbas situatd east of the lace(Ort - Village Itisi)-go?), and 
that in case of refusal to sell the parties had been expropriated 
and had received compensation Cr disturbance(page 114). 
The Governor decided. against L. 	it: round that; 
• time inquestion(1890) Nai.v;";, t:: •:!stiact from Arabs"had 
it of private ownersuip in land(see minute by the German Legal 
• page 116 reverse) and that as, according to Hei±. Leue, the 
had received. compensation for disturbance they.haci no rurthr 
claims in the matter(page 126, J.No.2911/uIB  dated 20/12/1911). 
6. Later, as Halidi bin Msuo had fallen on evIl days, the tjovcrnor 





Allowance of Rs.6/- per month should be paid to hlm(K.G.R.Flle 
VII C 2 Vol.XII page 07 reverse, J.No.3OOO/1 3 11B  dated 
18/12/191). 
No fwther reference to these claims can be traced.. 
It may be noted that there is a crave still standing on 
the land at the back of the house of the Deputy Traffic ianacr 
(Mr.Smart). This would appear to he the grave of Msuo, Halidis 
rather, as referred to in Docwrient No.4. 
May I suggest that the duplicate hereof be riled scprately 
among your German Records as a reference to the title. of these 
Government plots ? 
Sd/- H. Niinmo. 
KEEPER OF GER1AN RECORDS. 
562 
Document N.l. 
Translation from German of Contract of Purchase dated 16th" 
October1890 between Chef A. leue, Officer Commanding the Stdtion 
of Dar-es-Salaam, a6 representative of the imperial 1(eichs - 
ioimaissariat for East Africa, Purchaser, and (1) riigunya halid 
bin Llsur (2) Jiasgalla, brother of (1) and (3) Luid bin Abdalia 
(Arab), Tcndors r:lating to the sa:lc of a shamba situated on tue 
road between the (Military) Station of Dar-es-Saicain (now Police 
and Prisons huildings) and the Evangeiial Mission. 
(K.G.R.File VuIIKVol I page 2). 
	
Original 	 (rubber stamp) (Military) Station 
Dar-es-Salaain. 
Station 	 Gundbuch J.No.6. 
Dar-es:Salaam 
Transacted at Dar-cs-Salaam 16 October 1890. 
• 1' 	 J.No.I A lOOd. 
Contract of Purchase (1(aufvertrag). 
The following Contract of Purchase (Kaufvertrag) has been 
completed this day between A. Leue, Officer Cormuanding the 
(Military) Station at Dar-es-Sulaam, as re)reser1tative of the 
Imperial XeichskoiluRissariat for East Africa, and ]dgunya Khalid 
bin Msur (Msuo) and his brother Rangalla as also Kadi Mohamed 
'sin Seliman, as representative of Said bin Abdalla, Arab, absent 
in Zanzibar. 
The said craons viz L1gunya hhalid bin Maur and his 
brother Rasgaila and Kadi. Ilohamed bin Sellinan representative 
of Said bin Abdaila, Arab, cell their shamba, owned by them as 
tenants in common about 6' hectares in area, for the purchase 
price of 
-- Its 200/- in words: Two hundred Rupees 
The shamba is situated on the road 'between the (Military) 
Station at Dar-s-Salaam and the Evangelical Mission and is 
bounded: - 
by the harbour, by a shainba of liashil bin Suëii, by a shamba 
of Fundi liaburi and by another shaniba of ulaslu]:' bin Such, 
by a shaniba of ilamis bin Diwani Kiteiribe (the stammerer). 
The witnesses whose lanes are hcrnto subscribed testify that 
bL(g)unya Khaiid bin hsur, his bLoLhcr 1hLnhla and Said Iiin 
563 	 AbdalLa. 
-2-. 
Abdalia, Arab, the latter represented by Kadi Mohamed bin 
Bellman are the iole 1eg.tiinate holders of the shainba sold. 
Kadi Mohwacd bin Bellman one for a].l, has this day been 
paid Rs p001- in cash in the prescncc of the uaine witnessds 
being the purchase price stipalated, and thercunpon the 
shamba indicated passes into the undisputed possession of 
the Imperial Reiehs-Korrunissariat for East Africa, 
	
Signature of Vendors: 	Signature of the Purchaser: 
Mark of Khalid bin Msur Msuo)t 	(3d) A. Leue 
Officer Commanding the (signed in Arabic characters) RacaBah. (Lhllitary) Station at 
Kadhi 	
Dar-es-Salaam. 
 Representing the Imperial Reichs 
Mohained bin Sileman, representative Kominissariat for East Africa. 
of (wakil) Sayid bin Abdalloh. 
Vlitnesses: 




Mark of Kombo bin 1aziri -h 	rubber stamp 	
alaain 
The Administrative Official 
(signed) Greff. 
The foregoing Contract of Purchase (Kaufvertrag) is 
horewith approved. 
7 	\ 	Zanzibar 11 Novcnther 1890 / Acting Reichskonunisar for East Africa 
L.S. (signed) D.r. 1 i. 3chmidt. 
\\••• 	 /1 
To the Kanzier for information: 
thereafter to be filed. 
23.91 (signed) Soden (Governor) 
Noted. 
(signed) Eschke. 25.5.91. 
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Document No.2. 
Translation from German of Contract of Purchase dated 16.5.1891 between Binti iuinikishimba 11ajumbe and 15 other natives (including Gaa No.16) and an Arab Ho.17 Vendors, and the imperial &overnqr of German East Africa, purchaser, shainbas included in the arca known as the Government Park, Dar es Salaam. 
(K.G.R.File VIIIKSVo1 I page 4) 
J.No.II .935. 
Contract of Purchase (Kaufvertrag). 
The following Contract has been concluded this day 
betwáen Freiherr von Soden, Imperial Governor of German East 
Africa, represented by Herr Leuc, Officer Conuaanding thr, District 
of Dar-es-Salaam and the following landholders (Landbesitzer): 
l3intl huinikislumba Majumbe (pencil correction: Mwcnyi Kushiinb Binti Muinikishimba Shausiku ]duinjkjshiinba 
I inti ieche Liunikondo %!eche Muinikondo Ohojitwilali Muinlgogo Lluini. shaiide kuinisuakali iluinihagi nuinikambi Muinikwubi jungruwe 
Vlazirj. )uru Daraja Jumbe Kitembe Qagna 	 Tobe fLlcd • 2/5/C1 'ia1i Mohamed ben Selimani 	si,ned) N. 'egoner. 
Clause 1. 
The said landholders cell their plots of land si buated 
in the cocalled Oovcrnmcnt Park to the lmperial Governor for the 
to Lul price of 
1502 Nc. One Thound live liunthed Sixty Two Rupees, 
in amounts received as stated below: 
i3inti Nuinikishimba Majusthe 	and 	together 200/ Rps. Shausi binti x.iuinikishintha ituinikishimba 100/-- inti Vieche and 	toge1icr .uinikondo huinikondo Shomviilali 400/- nuinigogo 200/- 1uinishande 50/- Lunisuaka1i 75/- iuinihagi 200/- iuiniknmbi 50/- 
J.ujuiaLLmUj jwgruvIe 10/- Wairi Suru 17/- l)araja 25/- 
Gama 100/- bali. Mohained. ben Sclinicn 00/- 
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CLause 2. 
The payment al the purchase price has been duly 
made in cash and thereupon the oenership has passed to the 
Purchaser, 	- 
Clause 3. 
Upon appiJ.Ca lion i: the )CI'S011S living w:i.thin the 
art:a sold. the Iiuj i'i.al (0vLfit: is und.r 01.) l..LgltLLOfl to 
assign to them elsewhere free of costs ecuivuient sites for 
dwellings. 
Clause 4. 
The vacation ci' the )!ark by these persons shall 
I.uku plouc at tl; .1 a .cis t wi. th.i.n 	lx nonths. 	'iThoy ubit].1 he 
allowed to pull down their houses and utilize the building 
material thereof for their own use. Should they settle 
elsewhere within the township area the Purchaser guarantees 
to them a monetary subsidy not exceeding 50 Rupees. 
Dar es Salaum 16 May 1591 
(sd) Leue 	(signed in Arabic) Diwan Kitembe for District Chief, 	(characters himself, for the parties mentioned under 1 and 2 and for Gagna. 
(signed in Arabic characters) hohamed bin Slicifian 
(reinark in German under the above signature) : L[ohwaed ben 
Seliniun for hiictsolf, for Li.)jnikishilflba and for 'ii'aziri huru. 
(signed in Arabic chai'acters) iuinikondo Shdmwilali. 
(signed in Arabic characters) huinihaji.(in German tuinihagi) 
X iark of L'uir.ikoncLoechie for himself and for i3inti 'eche. 
X }ark of huinisuakali 
(signed in Arabic characters) huinigogo for himself and for 
iiUifl i shande 
(signed in Arabic chmracx's) iiuinikambi jungruvie 
X i.iark l' iuinikaiabi for himself and for Daraj. 
Certified that the foregoing is a true record of the proceedings (gcschehen wie obcn) (sd) Dsehke. ianzler to the Imperial Government. tanc Lioned. Imperial Governor (signed) Soden. 
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DocLunont No. 3. 	 . hi 
Translation from German of Contract of Purchase dated 25. G. 1901 
between (1) Wali Mohaned bin Seliinan (2) Jurabe Kitembe (Vendors) 
and the imperial Governor (Purchaser) i'iot bounded by the harbour, 
the 11isjon, the &overnment Park and the Governjjient .Lanu in hizingo. 
(K.U.It.1'ile 'VIIIK3 Vol page 19 
Contract of Purchase (Kaufvertrag). 
The following contract was concluded this day between 
yreiherr von Soden, Inperial Governor, represented by Herr Leuc, 
Imperial Chief District Officer (l3ezirkshauptniann) of 
I)ar-es-Ualaaia and the following bandliolders 
\iali krohamed ben Sc].iman 
Juinbe id Leinbe 
Clause 1. 
Mohamod bin Selintan and Juinbe Kitembe ucil to the 
Iniperial Governor t1iei uhwnbas uhich arc bOUTRJCCL by the :orehore 
of the harL.iouz' (ilufesa tratidu) , by the h.Lu:;luii ground, by the 
Goveiment Park, and by the ground in Kizingo belonging to the 
Government, the t,tal purchase price together being: 
400 Rps -- Four Uundred Sixty Rupees - 
whereof Mohaiocd ben Selinoan receives GO Rps, Juinbe Kiteinbe 600 ups. 
Clause S. 
The purchase price ha been duly Paid in cash and 
thereupon the ownership of the plots of land indicoited has 
passed to the Purchaser. 
Dar-es-Salaain 25 hay 1891. 
(signed) Leue. 	(signed in Arabic charcters) Divan 
Kitembe. 
Chief District Officer. (signed in Arabc characters) loobamed 
bin Silconan al 'ladharmi. 
As witnesses: 
(signed) Freiherr von i.oltke 	' 
(signed) Scheid 4 
Sanctioned 25/5/91. 
( 	







Document No.4. 	Ji L.' 
franslation from German of Afihlavit dated 23. 10. 1911 by Halidi Suo and others relating to the ownership 01 the land wheron are the Cusino and other Sovernment buildings. (K.G.R.File VI). C 32 Vol Xi page 113). 
Copy. 	Transacted, Dar-es-Salaam 93 October 
There appeared 
N Ilaildi bin Suo 	(4 winyi Sawakali Saich Shaban (5 Hwlnyigogo Nahoza 1i1a1i (C Llwinyikom.lo 
The parties having been cautioned to speak the truth declared: 
"At the time of Governor von iissmann (then lieiehs Koimunissar) 
all the people (Natives) lived in the quarter where now stand the 
1Lauptkasse, Koirunando and the remaining Government buildings. The 
present Native quarter was bush. An official order was issued Lhat(no 
one v'ouid be allowed to continue living there (i.e. where the 
Government buildings now are). The people were compensated and 
received about 1 Rupee for each large palm and 20 to 30 Rupees for 
a house. 
Haljdj was notwilljng to sell at that time, because there were 
standing on the plot the grave of his father and a small mosque.' 
flalidi declares that tl'.ere were standing on the plot at that 
time 2 stone houses .)f the value of a few hundred Rupees, and 05 
palms, a part whereof were bearing. 
The other witnesses confirm these statements. All of them 
abandoned their plots without regurd to compensation out of fear of 
the Europeans. 
hibu (Shaha) clerk at the District 0111cc declares: 
• 	"ly mother had pklms standing in that neighbourhood whIch she did not 
sel:L, ) beg fo eocitponsa tim ti' alidi ahou.id recoivc anything " . 
• 	Somw 	. 	cnfirmn these statements,but Halidi 
disputes these LAuLcwents, he maintains that these palms were p1anLL:.,  
by his 'Jlalid's) father. Concluded (signature of) ggebrecht. 
Certified true copy. 	Dar-es-Salaamn 25 October 1911 (Signed) Karstedt. Sekretdr. 
Notc by_K.G.ht. 	On the plan at page 92a of K.G.R.Fil VII C 32 Vol Xi dated 1911 the building which is now the Land Department de is 
marked "Romnnando der Schutztruppe" Jleadquartcrs of the Defence 'orce' 




Appendix 3.2 Some documents related to the deceitful 
acquisition of land from natives in Mioni, 1900 
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Purchased, 	Mtoni, 	21st-22nd February 1900 
1 
The undermentioned persons sell their plots of land 1 as shown 
in the sketch, to the imperial Government of German East 
Africa. 
The plants which are in the plots: palm trees, etc, will be 
paid for; the huts remain under the ownership of the 
indigenous people who are to be advised that they may keep 
staying on the plots until such a time when the Government may 
need them, 
3 
The seller must guarantee that the plot in question plots 
shall not have the right or demand to burden a third party. 
Should such a situation arise, them it will be upon the seller 
to resolve the problem unassisted. 
4 
People with other (crop) claims besides coconut palms and 
mango trees (which are on the purchased plot) have to look for 
customers themselve. Crops such as muhogo, maize, kunde, etc 
will not be included in the purchase of the plot. 
V 
5 
Usiali has kept part of his shamba on which are his house and 
an orchard of coconut palms. This area is marked with red; it 
is about 10 ha. 
6 




The seller must guarantee that the plot. in question plots 
shall not have the right, or demand to burden a third party. 
Shoul.d such a situation arise, them it will be upon the seller 
to resolve the problem unass ist:.ed, 
4 
People with other (crop) claims besides coconut palms and 
mango trees (which are on the purchased plot.) have to look for 
customers themselves. Crops such as muhogo, iiiaizc, kunde, etc 
will not be included in the purclias€ of 1 plot 
5 
Us i all has kept part of his shamba on which are his house and 
an orchard of cbconut palms. This area is marked with red; it 
is about 10 ha. 
S 
The prices are provisional and shall he fixed by the 
Government. 
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Sign of Price nemarhs 
Plot.  
1. Chanzi bin Kibinda ABC DE 350 Palm F-A I shamba 
2. 	I Msarra bin Muniuguma E,F,G 1. 350 HI,E i shamba 
I •1 shamba 
3. Mwinyi mkuii bin Mohammed G N U 2 800 L K II G Fallow 
shamba 
4. Jumbe Kirumbi N 0 P 3 600  
5. Mwinyi Mkuu bi.n Moh'd M 	N 4 200 
Mwiny: 	M1.uu X 	N  
6. Jumbe Uishande Mkup., V 	W 5 900 
Usiali 	Pazi. Y - V  _____ 
7. Miny i 	Abdal I ah bin X C P 6200 
8. Mwinyi gogo bin Pazi Q B S 7 
Mwinyi Mkuu bin Pazi S B S 
Mwinyimbegu bin Kwamha I 
9. Jumbe Madenge Mtoni Q B S 	I 8 500  
10. Simba Mdume. bin Bibawa P 	U 9 400 
and Mwinyimbegu bin Mshee - P 
11. Mwinyi goa bin Sangwa P U B 10 300 
C,D, 
Mm P  
1.2. Jumbe Giragira 1 	Id bin U Z Al 11 200 
Chaurembo, 	Misheo bin B - U (200) 
Simba, 	Mwi.nyi 	Kambbin 
Mbarana  
13. Girra 	ira Jumbe 	in Mwale A.J. 	H. 12 150 
C. 	J. 
The costs of contracts are borne by the Government.. This was read 
in Kiswahi ii .ifl which all the present. (concerned) are conversant, 
translated and signed. 
Ea 
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bciu b. A pperid ix 3.3 The 1891  Iiaiwithiui, 	or 1)ar cs Sa1aaii riifiifeii 
L;nt 
a tviut cc fetuc 	nbuu 	mit biefent Uot 	henie1Ueii çilteit : Jcoleitjdpin uiib loban 
d)eiu tiiicj eiueiit ber otcu Celtaunici 7 •aupt8o1( itee, - wo lie 	ad)vcuibirt nub 
9 n(nnb erteitt tukb. 	nmU atcc bI4 not.0 bie C-v((mb.iii5 uv Wi0fitfy in bn 
.3otht'wI11tu3 bie 	ic1)er1)eit r)nt, ha 	fotc[)e G2poLe t htid) ciucut •nup 3otfniut uooeimOct 
uevbei mtb nict On bireft Uun bent 9ctet3oflcnnI I iit 2tii(oub 0et)en, -Tnut bnfelOft 	'ie. -, 
teffw; 	iner 	iiv1a1t ober 	iiterteuit 	cuter 	i erTetL, ertont tueebcit 	• 
3cr 	navcn nad) cinern ber- ënaitntett eiie i iUic twit. bern  
1at uniicI) t biclel(cn •ciuent .auptBot1ctrnt 'ur 9thrertui un 	ortifutjreit; and) eri1cter.euiliou :. 
1cittct)cu, unfr tiiiit fic : tit :bctcit nub 	ffuu er1)itt er ür leinc 	anren citfen Q3e 
uad) it.ei 	3eftiiinu6ort,  too fic uod)iui beta be mIen bor61ifutn fmb, inn lie nut betit ' 
'o tvtrbbtc 	aarc bern 	i6cntf)jiIllcr cd)eiue 	t ber(eLd)eii; Jinbct fici) fetuc Uuvidtigret 	
• 	 ''.L auce1ielett. 	 . 	
e tac eutci nberut 	bent 	i.clue 	"i Bev 	narcu 	oit eiitein ber enaujtt 	11 	
. • 
iit)cvIiil:)reit tuift, 	at mt 9(uoa obnfcn 	ou bent 3otj 
	
eW9i3ctcltic1)eilt iitcr Icitte 	nnren 
1ifçhL d)eiiic flub fie au Tcitevcut 	vtc ititter 2(ifate bc 	cftii  itttiiorte 	tt Utfen . uiU ' 
eI.itbttt, utib tucint lid) (clue Uiirid)titeit - beiu 	ot(cuittcit t.iov6aIii 1 rctt; fie tucbeit burt uac1,i 
finbet, wieber In belt freica 	ertc1r 6elc( 	•tc 	iI tcrTc0wt 	liicr 	id)cr(t uber 	tc[(int 
	
- ; 	- 	4 	•, 	• : ,: - 	; etnu 	1r3ft toun 1eat 	Uer1ant tucben • 	Cf[p 	nib 	uiporte nab atic 
	
lltnicu 	oii, eutetit bcut[ctcit 	nfcn 
euteni aibetçn inu ett 	tuctut ftc bent .3o ((niut 
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Regulations for construction in Dar es Salaarn 
For the future development of Dar es Salaam, a plan was made, 	- 
which everybody will have to adhere to. 
§2 
This plan is in the Imperial district office in Dar es Salaam, 
and has to be shown to everybody, who wants to see it. 
§3 
By this plan the land is for the time being divided into 46 lots. 
§4 
Of these 46 lots no,1,3 up to 10 and the parts facing the port of 
lot no.2, the lots no. 44,45,46 and the sides faciiig the port of 
lot no, 26,27,28,29, 30 and 31 are exclusively for European settle-
ment, which means, thaT in. thfj ~jd lots only solid builings in 
European style may be constructed. 
§5 
On the backside of lot 26 up to 31 , on lot 11 and 12 in the 
Barra Rasta and in Inian Street, also other buildings are 
allowed, as long as these are out of solid tnat:rial and as long 
as they can not be categorizized as Iegro huts. 
The decision what is a(house in iuropean style according to 
4 and which type of buildings are meant by g 5 lies initially 
wth the Imperial district office, but there can bean appeal to 
the Imperial gouvernement. 
§7 
Therefore, when somebody wants to build on the lots concerned, he 




In the application it has to be proved, that the applicant is en-
titled to build in the area. He has also to submit a plan of the 
intended building in its surrounding and a detailed description of 
the planned construction. 
§9 
The applicATion is to be scrutinized by the district office with 
the help of a cons truction technician. If the construction 
satisfies the present building regulations and the necessary 
hygienic standards, a permission can not be denied. It is not 
allowed to start building before the permission is issued. 
§ 10 
Normally in a lot, only the two opposite sides should have 
buildings, and the buildings should be placed in a way, that 
space is reserved for gardens or yards. The question, which side 
of the lot is used for construction and which space has to be left 
open, is decided seperately iu in every single case by the 
Imperial district office. It has especially to be considered, that 
the direction of the street and of the house fronts, is main-
tamed. 
More necessary regulations in the interest of health and order 
can be issued in the course of the town development. 
§ 11 
Within a year after the declaration of these regulations, each 
lot has to be surrounded by a fence or by a living hedge, and 
it has at least to be cleared of all rubbish. The. owner or 
- 	 - I 
owners of the lot are responsible for it. In case , where this 
does not happen in the given time, the fencing and cleaning will 
be done by the administration on the expense of the proprietors. 
liar es Salaam, May 14, 1391 
The Imperial governor 
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Appendix 4. 1 Dar es Salaam's building Areas under the 
Township Rules 1923 
eoptornber 26th, 1924 	T A N 	I K A G A Z J T T Ii 	 897 
Oov,insiinr 1404-10I1. No. 150. (5.?I.'. 80810)i 
.QTICE. 
TheT hipRules, 1923. 
BUII1MNG AREA DAB R91 8ArAAM TOWNSHIP .  
In exoroie of the pô Eerrea upon the c4overnor by Itulo 04 
of the Township Bnies1 id of ii.lI powers thereto enabling 
I, ALAN EDWARD STACK; of the Most Excellent Order of the 
British Empire,GoveriOr uty, do hereby prescribe the folIoing 
reas for the purposes spe 0 
Firstly, in (ha area so n'the First Schedule hereto, residontitid 
buildings of Etuopeim ty ly may he erected. 	Such arcit. shall ho 
called YonnT. 
Secondly, in the area iflc'i in 	the Second 	Seliednie horet, 
residential and trading b 	i1gs only may be erected. 	Such arda 
shtt.l 1 ho called Zollo II, 
Thirdly, in the urea s i ec1 in thu Third Sehiodulo hereto, native 
quatte.ts IUILY be erected. h area shall be louwn as ioiie III. 
• A. E. Si',cic, 
i)nr c's Sahii.ntti, 1:1 lii 	Sept ber, 	1 93i . 	 Governor's Depu Iii. 
• S1' SO1JJWUl1. 
Zn,ui I. 	Cc 'in nionci I ig at tb. ut elton of Voisaillos FIwoot and A no i a .I"ion 	Li iO 
bin I inn i,ln.)v 	i 	ti I Fellow LI cci caste 
west. Ut)ti)Ot 	I ii:Lenri of I lot 	5541 
i if Vtusai I lea SLiest, iii t Li I it road tea the north-
]fI III 	3 	hOtICO it 	shitli 	liii low a 	sh-Itight line in a 
wesloily tii tei.i to 	for it ii istad 	i aI it itib (iliO yctids Uiit.i I it. LOitOl 104 the puint wi tore 
jitigicinoyn l'cinl Culvert e,osso tons Street; thence it shall follow it sttaight linci in 
a 	outlt.weiitotly diroLion tOA ixtost southerly beacon of L'IOL 13 Fhtc 3; thence it 
,clticli 	fellow 	(tin Itoitticlitry 0f3..15 in westerly and 	itwt)t-wosLorly titroettons: for 
an icperitsiinato dil.iitieo Of 	13 crcls; tiiiuni ii, shall follow sucenssivoiy in woslerly 
Will ,iortb.wcistnrly (lituetionB,(1 )oitnilaiiiig,,f Plots 1.1 	i:t, 	14, 57/I 	and ''M it ll ic , 
tit ml 'a until ii IoaeIittH high )J.c . mILic  of hTsinihimi Crcinh 	Liioncn it alt cii follow the 
high wator mark uutil it 	aôi 	tlte sea ci inst.; 	LI tot tOO it sit all 	f 	h ttv (he 	sea (:OILSt 
along high \Vator mark net 	itQ has a point 10 aligninetit with thu ettatoin sido of 
Versailles Stiocil; tI tenett iti"N * 9 lit. Ii tie to tIm point of COtIIfl)OflCOiliOIl I.. 
E]JOND sCil1iiDuri 
Zone II. 	Commencing junction of V.tsailIes Street and Azaitia Front the 
boundary shall follow the en side of Versailles Street until it reaches the north- 
woflt cornçr beacon of Plot 	•.'tuv 3; thence it shall Follow a straight lino in a 
w uid,ot ly direction 	for a dist of ttliout 090 yards until it. teaches the point where 
]3ccgainoyo Pool Culvort oros is elous Slrni'l.; lhot tee it. 81 110 1 	folio tv it sh-itighti inn i ll 
It soiitb.weattirly 	clirocLion 0 , it roaches the most southerly beacon (If l'lot 15 
Flur 3;, thoneci it 	shall folio lino parailol to 	Wadigo Street for an iticproxincato 
distance of 	335 yacds;be lialI 	follow a straight 	line 	in 	it 	iconth-oasterly 
direction for an approximat itee Of 730 yards until it reaches the 	south-cast 
corner of the junction of .St 0 	 Sticot and SulL'an' Street; thenco it shall follow the 
eastern side of Sultan St±os U .  it reaches a point in alignment with the northern 
sido of ICisovitwo Street; thefl • 	~iRhivll follow the alignment of the northern side of 
Kiserawn Strcicct until it rea êi 	lice 	wost.iirtt side of Sikciku Street;. thence it shall 
follow tho 	western side 	f: I uku 	Street until it 	reccetcos 	thu 	southern 	aido 	of 
Mh)ciroku Street; thonco it ii follow the southern sido of Mharttku Street until it 
rnaohoa thto wutttorn sidO ofc Ozccn i Street; thence it altithl follow the western side. 
of (oruzauti f4Ltoot in ci soutbWl .ditoeLioit until it roasiios the Railway boundary of 
t.lco l,arl'nur hitancit lane; tlieb i 	slntli follow the Railway boundary until it roctehcui. 
the eastern sido of the o 1 	ewtcy road; thence it F.t IlllII follow tho said road utitil 
It roaches thn junction of Oo Stroot; thence it shall follow a striighb line in 
northt-oicstorly direction untI voit illios high water ,ciark; thence it shall follow high 
water mark until it. ioaobe Qint in alignment with the eastern side of Vornailloa 
Stt'neb: ticencn it Bliftil folloW' traght Him to the poitit of coininencoinonb. 
583 • 
r* '.'. '' - • t!. 
.898If'. ....T.ANG'A'NYIKGAZ 
I 	 4k 
• THRD scIInlD.'UL: ..•- 
Zone III Commencing at the )untlon ofMçi 
. boundat'y bf;"Miillors" Sharitha the. boundary -shall Co 
äf"Mulors.' Shainba Plots 11711214, 1.8, 14, until it 
t... 1.4 on the o.etorn,aidoof Plot 18; thence it shall foil 
djrootkjn tothe south-easteris uorne.oC the junctou of, 
ithenoo it shall follow the eastorn side of New Streetuu 
-. Amani Sbret; thence it thall follw a straight tine it 
a distaice of 100 feet; thencu it shall follow a traighb 
It roaolos tho northern sido of Stanley Stroci tf.thou 
sub Stanley Stiout until It rollohea Now. Rtroe 
oastoii 'bide of Now 8troot uittillt roaclius the 1111 
• Kiuugu.iI Street; thoncu It shalt follow the iiorthorn' 
raaoLis'tho .wosturn side, of Sikuku Street; thence it 
Silcuku iStreet until -itroachus Wiv eouthorn side of lv 
follow hosouUiorn side of Mbaruku Sti-not tmtil 
• OurwaiU Street: thence i shalt follow thu wesLevn i 
• southerly direction until it i'caches the Railway botk t 
• un0; thonee it 5111111 folhv the Railway boundary on 4 of the old causeway i-uad; tho'içoit shall fullqw tbq4 
juliutioli ofMag,w.iuu Street ond the Oatisow,y,'tligno 
in it oith•easuily ,lii-uution ,u,Lil it roçduis high wat 
liil, wturrnaik in it outlwrIy direction until I io V. 
west ofj the South Harbour; thenco it shall Follbw the 
• wostorly direction thun eontinuing.-.'along thu Townshi 
point dto est.of th point of cdrnrnoeiuo,ibtheuop 
S. to the pbinof connnoiiciotuout. 
ptomhor 26th, 192 
• 0 
r,eek with the Boqthorfl 
000ssivoly the boundaries 
the second beacon of plot 
righit line in a southorly 
'o Street and Now Stroot; 
hes the northern side of 
oglus to Now Street for 
re-hub to Now Street until 
he-U follow the northern 
floe It uhihi follow tin, 
'of the noitluoun sido at 
f Kiungani Street until it 
ollow the wostoi-n skbo of 
ü Street; thence it shalt 
Abs the wuust,n-ii siulo of 
oL : (evuziuui i$Lroot in it 
of the Harbour branch 
roachins (ho eastovil sidu 
'cad until it rouchoti the 
all follow it uuh.iaiid it line 
nc ; l.liuiico it shall lolluw 
tio 'J'owusl,i1i J3ouudary 
nehi ' 13011 ud ny Ii 'st in It 
uu'de-i-y until it ruaehos w 
hal] follow It straight line 
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Appendix 4.2 Gerezani Native Settlement Removal: List of those compensated 
N.B: Only those who had built before the corning into force of the 
Township Rules of 1923 were compensated. These are listed 
below, the rest (97) were not compensated. 
Name 	 Year when built 	Amount of Compensa- 
tion (Tshs) 
1905 
 Nassor Kamano 1920 
 Mama Omari 1918 
 Mama Omari 1918 
 Saishe Mwinyihamisi 1905 
 Binti Yusufu 1905 
 Mwinyigoha Mwinyimkuu 
 Mshindo Bakari 1905 
 Mzee bi Mwinshehe 1919 
 Fatima binti Rajabu 1919 
 Abdallah bin Rajabu 1905 
 Salehe bin Salehe 1905 
 Salim bin Sultani 1910 
 Salim Simnba 1918 
 Gungu Mayegaye 1918 
 Gungu Mayegaye 1918 
 Asha binti Jura 1920 
 Asha binti Jura 1920 
 Abdallha Mwana 1907 
 Selemnani Wakili 1919 
 Selemani Wakili 1919 
 Binti Mwinyigogo 1919 
 Saidi Hassani 1919 
23.' Selemani Mwinyirnkuu 1905 
 Mzee Marungo ? 
 Mzee Manungo 
 Abdallah bin Chanzi ? 
 Self Ebrahim 1923 
 Ali Kirena 1922 
 Mgeni Mohamed 1919 
 Athmani 1921 
 Masudi Hemedi ? 
 Jamasha binti Selemani 
 Ibrahim Saldi 1921 
 Ibrahim Saidi 1921 
 Seif bin Salim 1921 
 Self bin Salim 1921 







































Source: 	Tanzania National Archives File No. 12589 Dan es 
Salaam Township Layout. 
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Appendix 4.3 Petition by Natives of Upanga against removal, 1931 
Dar-.es-Saiaarn 
16th I;tay, 191. 
941 
U E.' 
Tutakuarifu uaruwa iii lloxudi la shida yetu tunayo-
shitakia kwàko, kviani wewe ndio iiiaiabo matatu. 
Kwanza wevie ndio bala we reiya 
1)111 	I 	U  mzee we mji 
tatu 	" 	" Lifalme via inchi hii yote ya 
fangany.ika tangu mwanzo hate mwisho. 
Iasi tunakuomba utusamehe k'..a thaneno ye makosa yaliomo 
ndani ya haruwa hit yasio na adabu mbele yako, lakini hatuna 
hudi kuileta baruwa hit mhele yako kwani hatuna mahala pengine 
Pa kushitakia shida zetu tie kwako wewe mfalme, ingawahazina 
haja; na maneno yetu ni mabaya juiiyako, no wewe ni mzee uwezae 
kuchukua kiln wema no ubaya via watoto viako. 
hida zetu nj hizo:- 
'nna inkubwa serkali inatuainuru tuondoke ndañiya 
meshamba, na majuniba yetu yalio TJpangashamba, 
basi kwa amri hit, twaioniba. serkali iue msaada, 
we kutusamehe, kwamba sisi inakuwa ni. vigumu sane 
kuhama !Jpanpa no kuwacha malt zetu no kuvunja majumba 
yotu. 
1wani 1ata wewe bwann mkubwa. ya1uelea yote kuwa kuchujna 
ft 1•miuriu, tena kazi kuhwa sane mtu kii1idiha halt kama al.okua 
uayo zsuiani, no mal:i. hizi zilizo hapa Upanga, ni mashamba na 
nw juialia wubayo tul 1n1.)ot a zariani, tul ipokuria n a was aa., 	Ha vingine 
ni mall, ye asli,"Writkwill arnbao tulipa kwa'wazee wetu. Jee'óv,,na 
•jqkubwa tukiondolew8 hepa ilpanga wapi utatuvieka? Na mali zetu wapi 
utazipe' leka? ao nani ataziani,aiia. Na sisi ienyewe hatuwezi kuzi-
acha mali zetu, kwe .hali iviayo 1 peke yake wale kuwa nazo rn'baJi. 
)o heya bwnna mkithwa ni mezito juu. yetu hatuyawezi kuyachukua, 
• twaoina serkali itupe amri ingine bedalaya hit ilio na wemana 
upole, na lililo na huruina mx jux ye sisi raiya zake. 'Na sisi 
t1inao1cuoiba ndani ya haruwa hii ndio wazee no we1yji wa mji huu 
W8 Dar es Salaan, tuli.obaki. 	 S 
4 	obda serkali itasome iru  'e haikutuona tanu zaraani, ni 
Iwel i neal ttttaljil)u ye kane hetku'Laka' zaniani 1'abIaiya 
ao mambo haya so menine ynayo andemana na wazeewa 1R31 
586 	'• 	 •' 
9asi. kvtn hurrimn no iasnadu wa serkali itusarnehe kwa 
snakosa yetu na utovu via adbu xx tunaofanya mbeie yako, 
r1.t3i ni WCt14 tno eIimv nzuri ya cuinasihi serkali. 
rnwatu]1aj kuwa bitap iqtA malibu upesi kwa banna hii 
ututoe wasiwasi jiiu ya naomba;ji tulloyahitaji mbeie yako. 
I; 
'isi raiya zako wajinga. 
2 
4 f' 	.. 	. . • 2 . pc:.I4_ll.lIe_$4::__ .. 







Au. thor s 1T o t.e: 
'!hi s is tter was addreSsed to the 
Chief 	aore tary and. copied to the 
_t 
Provincial Coznmi83iO!. 
This is the POe cOpy 	587 
Appendix 4.4 Petition by Indian factory owners against removal from the 
commercial area, 1930s 	 / y, 
- c •;- :;3 ).ui iii, 
26th , 	, i': 
The Ilon'hle The Chief qeciletary to the Govt., 
Tanganyika Territory, 	/ ........ 
Dar-es-alaatn. 
Sir, 	 .. . 
Most hviP'ly :nd respectfully we the undersigned hill 
oners at Pugu Road Godovms jointly bog to lay the fol).owing 
few lines for your favourhble consideration. 
We were compelled by the Township ttuthority to shift to 
our present business premises at Pugu Road Godowns stating that 
no one is allowed to work any machinery part iculary for corn 
grinding in the coi:cuerci1 and :i&ttive areas us this naLw'e of 
business breeds rats and is n Ifl'21ThC0 to the public health. 
We had to build onr own goJowus at, conidr:jble ox;'on3es 
through mere nec '38 Sn ty and compls ion. 
Our grinding huiness is at a stand-still as our mills 
are outside the town and in view of the fact that the Tornship 
Authority is granting permission to the new applicants for 
grin1ng corns through whatsoever cause which is a plain ±ntt 
injustice and against which we have our strong protest,)ts one 
likes to bring his corn for grinding to our mills. 
We beg to give herehelow the names of persons at present 
carrying on business in corn grinding in the town in commercial 
and native areas prohibited for us. 
Kalyanji Ranji - 	Kitchwele St. 
Lakshmnan flanj 	- 	Ring 	St. 
NurmohamJ Jessa- 	agamoyo St. 
One Khojuw 	New Market 
We have full confidence in your honour's sense of justice 
that you will kindly giv(iA.YA favourtble considerution to this 
humble petitton and redress our grievances by applying the XXM 
same la1w tto the pxms:"xX above named corn grinders which has 
already been applied to us, otherwise it is just possible that 
the 2±x matter may go from bad to worse. 
Hoping to mneot with just..te 
	
C/) . 	
.Yc have the honoi.u' to ioi 
. 	o2V/.24Lj( l.) 	. 	
Yo'.r obodi er. servant, 
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yare roads and drains 
oantof tb town-
ere inorisqön is a miiaqe 
o a88er8by but t,o 
eri 	Terbave . 
i'ofsom:e' ohilclen iipg .'. 
swè,b way 	 f 'by 
l  hvy 	fio o 
J dra 	or. Some repair work/ 
haves been.' Btatted th a! 
opuple"of main streeta but nothi 
eing done fpr Inee. Thr 
durwg rairda,ys'. 
any ligt traf (to to as ,, ovr j 
tbem.'bi3't prde 1nthstauc to' th 4 qocu'pans.. 	
. 	 J 
j' Lil e  areas aro''never:vzsj... I I 
g officials. Not even by 
t. h.. p.reapçnibIo public spirited per . 
 . 





' to, waibtj11 the Afridan 
pains Ar this' unboaltby cq,ndi-it:
1.Wn..and;oomes out ,vibh a'lit'óf 1 -P 	,, I. 	. 	' 	• 	 ' 	 ,-.. 	 I Cr1evancs 	for an' immtjat f I edreS8 AiviFt btheie, area-
resp6n6b1e .offióiaIa;iucluding f! 
cl-\ I !: l"i 	1
J~r,t)ipJ, Governor, .ou1d,itbe1ie_ 
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Appendix 4.5 Conditions of roads and drains in African areas 
in Dar es Salaam,1939,1948 
May, 1939. 
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DAR ES SALAAM ROADS 
The Editor, TanganyiiZStdard. 
• 'Sir,—May :1, claim a little space 
in your columns to yoico c. few 
complaints which I.  am afraid vil, 
•fall'on deaf'.eais. 
We rn. this 'town •c,ontribute to 
• the Ivunicipal taxes:aud wo are 
supposed to keep vehicles in such. 
a' 8tutu of reah- that their wheels 
are not likely to damage the 'sur-
face of the rod.' So far, so good. 
Will somebody sponsor ai4 amend-
mont in the Highways Ordinance 
waking it an otence on the part 
of the local authority, concerned to 
permit roads to 'remain in suclf a 
condition as to durnug.the .wheel 
and t1w vehicles. For my putt :t 
hzvu laid IJIV ur.'sufIieieiitly clLuii• 
aed by LIu Township roads. 
The irony of th6 situation is that 
if I owned a hinnuli curt with loose 
or out of shuJ)e wheels and it tra-
versed these pot-holed, surfaceless 
apologies for ro!.lds I should be 
lined under the truthe rules be-. 
cause our Township boasts a few' 
so called burred roads and iioiicc 
there is a possibility of my hainali 
curt being taken oit those roads 
and daxrmgi.ng tliei'n. ' 
I am tired of complaining about 
this road repair tuid lilUiUbeI)UI1CC 
problem of tilit I'owusliip, purti-
culutiv iii view of the fact that 
tile old' Oyster Bay Road, mainly 
used by lorries, has. a section re-
cently added to itand 'it is tarred 
even when certain localities in tile 
Township ha ve no roads, Is there 
no Way to remedy this,  state. of 
aairs? 	, 	 •• . (• 
'rho other point. I should like to 
bring to the notice of the nutl;ri-
ties is the duiith of oIliieus UI 
the junction of. Muii ' Avenuo und 
Iiigies SLret. The ftwwie 141fk-
I big of ears outside the New. Africa, I Hotel greatly impedea 'a clear view 
of Mr,th Avenue ud ,henee the 
'datigor . ...The j.:isIund (at t.tbis. juno-, 
ti0is" ; a1so d' dangers,....:'.ba6 in 
no we chked the,..spee&.of the' 
I truthc.....It wo&ild b',.wiser I' feel, 
'to have an Asktiri at this.. ponit. 
Yours,' eta., 
"ULTRA-SIRES." 
Dar . us Sulitui it, 
May 10, 1030.. - 
It. I ~ I., 
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Appendix 4.6 Petition by Ilala natives for better services, 1932 
1)ar-es-Sa1aarn 
The Honouxab1e 
The Provincial Coirrn1ss1oner, 	. 
Dar-es-Balaain. 
Tunakuoinba sana kwa ntaoinbeo yetü karna 
haya tusernayo hapa chini katiku uiji via "Ellala" 
Wllayu Dx'-es-Sa).aw:i. Maonibe yetu 1cwa 'haya 
tuuu1iidu tutu, t1tidu yu kwuuzu kuiu juiibo. 1a 
Asikari lapili Naji Dontha ni inoja inakuwa tabu, 
sana na latatu jantholaTaa basi katik maribo 
haya a1tgtu yari1ciri sana Bwanu sababu ,wewe,Baba ,• 
we watoiv,te 1)asi kutiurahisha sisi wtizee. 
tuiiyoti'sLthihi hupa chini. ua  
6.1 , , ( j £ 1 	ii 	/" / 
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Appendix 4.8 Petition by Natives of Ilala for better services, 1939 
, 
I 	
DR E3 AIA ....... 
4th July, 199. 
The ionoura ble the Prov inc tel Comm iss toner, 
Enstern Irovtnce, 
Dar es Salearn. 
Salem sane tunalculetea barue sist Ylezee we 
hale kwa wetna vieko 13v/ane Mkubwe, sisi Rni.ya zeko 
tuna zikt stna kwa nuinbo tunnyouarifu knme huya tuseinayi.  
"liapa hlahi z po uyuinbii k tibu ya e100 je I'viana }kubwi 
rnahlt hepa kukosa Baraze ye Yzee, wale hupene huts 
Barabare ii iyo pigil tvin mevie kwa aj Ui. ye hateii ye 
moto, wale hepana Ktsend.uku cha Post 
Kvia htvi Bwno. Mkubwa pakumbuke sane bviann wetu 
mtukufu, kaina ukitüfikta kwa jambo ketna hilt .tutafuraht 
sane Rtya,zako. 
H. 
Wozee vie Ilala. 
NN 
• ./fr.t: 	.. 	 . 
• . .:'. 	• 	...'... . 	/ !'. 
• 
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592 
; 1 -1 11 I fsI 11% Hp..ttr 
st,n:si. 	..,,.t 
ae.. 4.tu1u A uptasi I - 
ox. o.dcrst Ow police 
a 1)1, , S_.l.,n. 
• 
	
......•l. •°t 	''...v 'l,.t,ct 
tt5,n - to 
vho,n or c4.J phsi plots. 
.. - ih :1w threc p3rtieu 
ri..c Utsgu 
........it •WepU 	v. 
with the Cbys land Survey 
lkpirtment, should settle the 
Jehlc within one week (Seven 
days) effective yesterday other-
wiuc he should be Sent to Court. 
He also cfrcctedWjti1T's head 
of section. Ndugu W.P. 
Tetnende. to male sure he 
ittOney nas returned to the own. 
ers even through Sale 01 Wejuli't 
t,Qtise or plots if any. 
Appendix 7.1 Land official admits taking a large sum of money 
to allocate land, 1993 
4 
Daily News 27.10:1993 
IfflMllE t1EW 
The Minister was cold In his 'Ndugu Saumu Moldenhauer for and Isack Abdallah Majura. . cases but the problem w.i that ve)and and not to otter plots. Uild retrc and go back to his 
office 	that 	Wejuli 	received viol 	no. 	134 	and 	another Wejuli agreed to have received most of the 	nents betwects Wejuli who said he had sold home viflage with his family be- 
I .(tm/-. from three people for 400.002/. 	from 	ugu- Isack 
Sheltiondo for plot no. 1157 	. 
the money from all the people but 
pleaded for money from the Wejuli and the bu)crs were talc- several other plots to lndtviduak 
he 	adr 	sttss in 
the city and 	such problems for gd Jangwani 	in lout plots at 	 beach 
the city. These plots however, had 	i. minister as he was being used by 
ing place 	secretly Outside the 
office, and that the cases were 
who had conatructed housas. 
he was ready to surrender the benefit of others. 
it 	was 	alleged 	before 	the le. lyoeenaflocated 	Ohe 
other offtdals from the City 
Council who were preparing reported co them only when house which he built under a •'Mot of the said money had 
minister 	that 	Wcjuli 	received PeOPle sitSCC 1990. 
Ndugu- Mrema was also told • tfers for lease. 
Wciullhadfailcdcoaflocatesome 
of them the nrosL'c 
THBloaninorderioraisensoney 
s 	-lie tcggts. 
gonccooff.cers'pockets. I have 
ended up fadng such problems. 800.000/- 	from Ndugu Sikitu that .Wejuli received 350.000/- Ndugu Temende e -vntain"4 
rno for plots number Peter Kisu t 1rom J.J.ii  Bu,'Scsha aM fl Sm.' •  ' 	 :,_.. c cautioned the people that After the case was over, Wejuli I thInk the litne has come for me 
258 	and 	239; 400000/- 	Iron - 	. 	 ..uisgttra responsible for to many such the role of 	 qsur- who is over 40 usrs, said he fO quit the ckY'. he lamented. - 




Table 2.3 The Wards of Dur es Salaam, with their Population in 1988 
ILALA DISTRICT 	KINONDONI DISTRICT TEMEKE DISTRICT 
(210km2) 	 (527km2) 	 (650km2) 
Urban Wards Popula- Urban Wards Popula- Urban Ward Popula 
tiOn tiOfl ti()fl 
Kariakoo 12,569 Mzimuni 23,985 *s1bagala 	40,866 
Mchafukoge 8,547 Magomeni 16,944 	Miburani 	72,892 
Kisutu 8,358 	Ndugunibi 32,736 Mtoni 	39,417 
Gerezani 7,487 Makurumla 53,991 Temeke 	91,144 
Kivukoni 5,372 Manzese 54,499 Kurasini 	26,776 
Jangwani 15,320 Kigogo 21,222 Keko 	42,868 
E.Upanga 9,807 Maljiho 45,963 Kigamboni 26,078 
W . Upanga 11,020 Uhungo 46,980 Charambe 	18,624 
Ilala 	35,048 	Kinondoni 42,387 
Mchikichini 15,040 Mwananyamala 72,508 H r 
Buguruni 48,247 Msasani 51,293 N 	d 	er 	i Vingunguti 33,690 Tandale 58,413 
Kipawa 36,910 Kawe 44,085 P 	': 
Tabata 18,465 ('ot 
Ukomza 45,203 
Total population,u rhan wards 
311,083 	565,006 	358,665 
Rural Wards Popula- Rural Wards Popula- Rural Wards Popula-
tion 	 tion 	 tiOn 
Kinyerezi* 3,048 	K und u chi* 22,743 Yombo Vituka*13,408 
Pugu 	6,226 	Kibarn ha* 16,751 
Msongora 	13,351 	Goba 	4,753 Kimbiji 	6,465 
Bunju 	9,977 Somangila 6,730 
Mb wen i* 2,159 Vijihweni 2,557 




Total population rural Wards 
22,625 	 56,383 oN 	47,088 
Total IV Population 333,708 	621,389 	405,753 
Source: Bureau of Statistics, Population Gensus, 1988. Regional 
Profile, Dar es Salaain, Dar es Salaam, n.d. 
* Rural wards with Town Planning layouts already. 
MA 
